Ankur Vahi vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Ors.
2003 Latest Caselaw 1367 Del

JUDGMENT

Vikramajit Sen, J.

1. In this Writ Petition a challenge has been laid to the decision of the Indian Institute of Foreign Technology sic Trade (hereinafter called the IIFT) removing the Petitioner from the Masters in Business Administration, 2002-2004 conducted by it. The Petitioner had applied to the IIFT while he was in the Final Year of Engineering and had scored 650 marks out of 800 in the Graduate Management Aptitude Test (GMAT). All students were required to submit their eligibility qualification, in the present case the Engineering Degree, as well as the Mark Sheet, on or before 3rd October, 2002. In paragraph 6 of the Petition it has been specifically pleaded that '' the Respondents had stated at the time of selection that in case the Petitioner does not get 50% in the Bachelor Degree Engineering Examination and fails to submit the result by 3rd October, 2002, his admission will stand cancelled. ...... Thus admission of the Petitioner was on provisional basis subject to the filing of the Mark sheet.'' This is indeed a significant admission. The result of the Engineering Degree was declared in August/September, 2002 and the Petitioner was shown as `Failed', having obtained 850 out of 1500 marks. He thereupon applied for Revaluation on 2nd September, 2002. The petitioner has averred that he immediately informed the Respondents in the 1st week of September, 2002 that he had applied for Revaluation of his result and that he would submit his Mark Sheet as and when he would be conveyed the result of the Revaluation This statement has been categorically denied by the IIFT, and in the absence of any documentary proof on such an important issue, I would accept the stand of the IIFT. It is not in dispute that the First Semester examinations were held on 15.9.2002, that is before the deadline of submissions of results i.e. 3.10.2002 and hence the Petitioner was allowed to appear in these examinations. It has next been pleaded in the Petition that in the third week of September, 2002 the Petitioner went to Pune where he was informed that the University would announce the Revaluation result in November, 2002. It is stated that the Petitioner orally informed the IIFT that the results would be declared in the third week of November, 2002, but he was not permitted to at end classes. The Petitioner's Representation dated 17.10.2002 was considered by the Rules Committee of IIFT in its meeting held on 31.10.002 but was rejected. On 25/29 November, 2002, the University of Pune, after the revaluation exercise, declared the Petitioner as having passed in the B.E. Degree Course and that he had been placed in high Second Class. The Certificate and Mark Sheet dated 29th November, 2002 was submitted by the Petitioner to the IIFT on 3rd December, 2002.

2. Although no challenge has been laid to the fixation of the cut-off date of 3rd October, this matter has received the attention of the Apex Courts on several occasions, the pronouncements are to the effect that cut-off dates should not be elasticised by judicial verdicts. The first opinion is to be found in Union of India and Another Versus Sudhir Kumar Jaiswal which reads thus:

''3. That there can be no arbitrariness in fixation of even a cut-off date is not disputed before us by the learned Additional Solicitor General who has appeared for the appellant. This stand has been correctly taken, because after Article 14 has spread its wings in the field of administrative law following what was principally held in Maneka Gandhi case no stand can be taken by any administrative authority that it can act arbitrarily. Indeed, even before the decision in Maneka Gandhi law was that no administrative authority has absolute discretion to decide a matter within its competence the way it chooses. This has been the accepted position and this Court had cited with approval what had been stated in this regard in United States v. Martin Wunderlih the relevant part of which reads as below:

''Law has reached its finest moments when it has freed men from unlimited discretion of some rules, some civil or military official, some bureaucrat. ...Absolute discretion is a ruthless master. It is more destructive of freedom than any of man's other inventions.''

4. Insofar as fixation of cut-off date is concerned, the same can be regarded as arbitrary by a court if the same be one about which it can be said that it has been ''picked out from a hat'', as was found to be by this Court in D.R. Nim v. Union of India because of which fixation of 19-5-1991 as the date for the purpose concerned was held to be invalid.

5. As to when choice of a cut-off date can be interfered was opined by Holmes, J. in Louisville Gas and Electric Co. v. Clell Coleman by stating that if the fixation be ''very wide of any reasonable mark'', the same can be regarded arbitrary. What was observed by Holmes, J. was cited with approval by a Bench of this Court in Union of India v. Parameswaran Match Works (in paragraph 10) by also stating that choice of a date cannot always be dubbed as arbitrary even if no particular reason is forthcoming for he choice unless it is shown to be capricious or whimsical in the circumstances. It was further pointed out where a point or line has to be, there is no mathematical or logical way of fixing it precisely, and so, the decision of the legislature or its delegate must be accepted unless it can be said that it is very wide of any reasonable mark.

6. The aforesaid decision was cited with approval in D.G. Gouse and Co. v. State of Kerela; so also in State of Bihar v. Ramjee Prasad to which decision we shall have occasion to refer later also.

7. In this context, it would also be useful to state that when a court is called upon to decide such a matter, mere errors are not subject to correction in exercise of power of judicial review; it is only its palpable arbitrary exercise which can be declared to be void, as stated in Metropolis Theater Co. v. City of Chicago in which Justice McKenna observed as follows:

''It may seem unjust and oppressive, yet be free from judicial interference. The problem of government are practical ones and may be, and unscientific. But even such criticism should not be hastily expressed. What is best is not always discernible; the wisdom of any choice may be disputed or condemned. Mere errors of government are not subject to our judicial review. It is only its palpably arbitrary exercises which can be declared void....''

The aforesaid was noted by this Court in Sushma Sharma v. State of Rajasthan in which case also reasonability of fixation of a date for a particular purpose had come up for examination.''

Similar views have been expressed in University Grants Commission Versus Sadhana Chaudhary and Others which read thus:

''It is settled law that the choice of a date as a basis for classification cannot always be dubbed as arbitrary even if no particular reason is forthcoming for the choice unless it is shown to be capricious or whimsical in the circumstances. When it is seen that a line or a point there must be and there is no mathematical or logical way of fixing it precisely, the decision of the legislature or its delegate must be accepted unless it can be said that it is very wide off the reasonable mark. (See: Union of India v. Parameswaran Match Works at p. 579 and Sushma Sharma (Dr) v. State of Rajasthan at p. 269.) In the present case, the date, 31-12-1993, as fixed by notification dated 21-6-1995, in the matter of grant of exemption from the eligibility test for appointment on the post of lecture has a reasonable basis keeping in view the time taken in submitting the Ph.D. Thesis or obtaining M.Phil. Degree prior to the issuance of the 1991 Regulations and the date, 31-12-1993, cannot be held to be capricious whimsical or wide off the reasonable mark. The High Court of Punjab and Haryana has proceeded on the basis that the cut-off date for the purpose of granting exemption from eligibility test should have nexus with the date of the advertisement inviting applications for appointment on the post of Lectures. The High Court was in error in taking this view. The exemption from eligibility test that has been granted under para 5 of the advertisement dated 23-1-1995 is relatable to the introduction of the requirement of eligibility test in the 1991 Regulations. The object underlying the grant of exemption is to mitigate the resultant hardship to candidates who had registered for Ph.D. Degree or had joined the course for M. Phil. Degree on the basis of the minimum qualification prescribed under the 1982 Regulations. The validity of the fixation of cut-off date for the purpose of grant of exemption from the eligibility test has to be considered with reference to the date of issuance of the 1991 Regulations and not with reference to the date of advertisement inviting applications for appointment on the post of Lectures. We are, therefore, unable to uphold the direction of the High Court that it would not be necessary to appear in the eligibility test for candidates who have applied or/are applying for the Lecturers' posts pursuant to the advertisement dated 23-1-1995 if they have obtained M. Phil degrees or submitted Ph.D. Thesis before 31-12-1994, i.e., prior to the date of the publication of advertisement dated 23-1-1995 and the further direction to the Haryana Public Service Commission and State of Haryana to ensure that as and when any such advertisement is issued they would bear in mind that the eligibility dates be not far off from the date of advertisment. The exemption from the requirement regarding clearing the eligibility test has to be confined within the limits indicated in the amendment introduced in the 1991 Regulations by notification dated 21-6-1995. Respondents 1 and 2 who had moved the High Court by filing the writ petition obtained their M. Phil degrees prior to 31-12-1993. They would be entitled to exemption from clearing the eligibility test under the terms of the notification dated 15-6-1995. The decision of the High Court, insofar as it relates to the said respondents, is not required to be disturbed and is, therefore, maintained.''

3. Ms. Pinki Anand has contended that even if the sanctity of 3rd October, 2002 is kept intact, the Petition should still be allowed because on the results being declared in November/December, 2002, this event would relate back to the initial declaration of the results. To make good her arguments she has relied on the following paragraphs of Prashant Srivastava Vs C.B.S.E. and Ors. 8 (2000) DELHI LAW TIMES 538 (DB) which reads thus:

''Our attention has been drawn to the judgment dated 7th September, 1999 passed by Division Bench of this Court in LPA No.385 of 1999 entitled Neha Kattyar v. Central Board of Secondary Education and Ors. The fact of that case are almost identical as that of the present case. That was also a case where the appellant had to appear in complementary examination. She had also appeared in the PMT and was placed in merit list at S. No. 794. By the time result of this supplementary examination was declared, first round of allotment was over which she missed and she had also filed writ petition seeking direction against the respondents to allot her the seat in the second round of allotment. Although her writ petition was dismissed by the Single Bench, the Division Bench by the aforesaid judgment allowed her appeal and directed the respondents to consider her at the time of second round by personal appearance as a candidate having successfully passed the qualifying examination. It was held that once the appellant passed the supplementary examination of Class XII, result of that would relate back to the first appearance in the said examination. The effect is that it would be treated as if the candidate has passed the Class XII examination on the date when the result was declared initially. On the basis of this analogy in the present case, it would be deemed that the petitioner passed the Class XII examination on 30th May, 2000. The present writ petition, therefore, warrants to be allowed following the aforesaid judgment dated 7th September, 1999 in LPA No.385/1999.

This view has however to be reconciled with that of another Division Bench of this Court which appears to have missed the attention of Ms. Anand in Bhupinder Singh Versus DSSSB in LPA No. 621/2002 which reads thus:

''In the judgment reported as 1993 Suppl. (3) SCC 168, Rekha Chaturvedi vs. University of Rajasthan, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the date of eligibility for appointment has to be the last date for submitting the applications. The court held that the selection based on treating the eligibility criteria as the date of interview was patently illegal. This view was re-affirmed in the judgment , U.P.P.S.C. V. Alpana. The respondent who had appeared for her L.B degree examination but had yet to clear the same had applied for selection to the post of Munsif. The Public Service Commission allowed her to appear in the examination conducted by it, but did not declare her result on the ground that she was ineligible. Respondent had in the meanwhile cleared her LL.B examination. She approached the High Court which allowed her writ petition holding that since she had qualified in her LL.B examination, her result was liable to be declared. The Hon'ble Supreme Court set aside the Judgment of the Allahabad High Court holding that eligibility had to be fulfillled by the last date when the application had to be submitted. This view was reiterated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in its Judgment reported as 1995 Supp (IV) SCC 706. Harpal Kaur Chahal vs. Director, Punjab Instructions, and in the latest judgment , Bhupinder Singh vs. State of Punjab.

9. It is, thus, apparent that a candidate must be eligible for appointment as on the last date of submitting the application, which in the present case happened to be 4.6.2002. In our view, as per the settled law, the impugned direction could not have been passed by the learned single Judge.

4. In Prashant's case (supra) the attention of the Division Bench had not been drawn to previous judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, and it will suffice to make reference to the opinion expressed in Ashok Kumar Sharma and Others versus Chander Shekhar and Another, which reads thus:

''6. ...... The proposition that where applications are called for prescribing a particular date as the last date for filing the applications, the eligibility of the candidates shall have to be judged with reference to that date and that date alone, is a well-established one. A person who acquires the prescribed qualification subsequent to such prescribed date cannot be considered at all. An advertisement or notification issued/published calling for applications constitutes a representation to the public and the authority issuing it is bound by such representation. It cannot act contrary to it. One reason behind this proposition is that if it wee known that persons who obtained the qualifications after the prescribed date but before the date of interview would be allowed to appear for the interview, other similarly placed persons could also have applied. Just because some of the persons had applied notwithstanding that they had not acquired the prescribed qualifications by the prescribed date, they could not have been treated on a preferential basis. Their applications ought to have been rejected at the inception itself. This proposition is indisputable and in fact was not doubted or disputed in the majority judgment. This is also the opposition affirmed in Rekha Chaturvedi v. University of Rajasthan. The reasoning in the majority opinion that by allowing the 33 respondents to appear for the interview, the recruiting authority was able to get the best talent available and that such course was in furtherance of public interest is, with respect, an impermissible justification. It is, in our considered opinion, a clear error of law and an error apparent on the face of the record. In our opinion, R.M. Sahai, J. (and the Division Bench of the High Court) was right in holding that the 33 respondents could not have been allowed to appear for the interview''.

5. In Krishna Priya Ganguly and Others vs. University of Lucknow and Others, , the Apex Court depricated the practice where ''courts start directing the authorities to grant provisional admissions to students even if they did not deserve the same in some cases. Experience has shown that in view of the huge accumulation of arrears in courts, it takes a long time for the petitions to be disposed of, hence we have evolved the practice of forcing the authorities to grant provisional admissions which has resulted in a piquant and pungent situation because by the time the case comes up for haring, the rejected candidates having completed their course and having appeared at the examination with every hope of success become eligible for admission to the higher course in case of success though the court may ultimately find that their initial rejection was justified. Such a situation becomes a sort of a fait accompli for those in charge of the institutions as a result of which the candidates are admitted in due deference to the desire of the court by increasing or creating vacancies even in the absence of suitable and proper facilities to train the extra candidates. This results in an anathema and a dilemma for which there is hardly any remedy.

The present cases are a clear illustration of this problem. Our suggestion, therefore, is that whenever a writ petition is filed provisional admission should not be given as a matter of course on the petition being admitted unless the court is fully satisfied that the petitioner has a cast-iron case which is bound to succeed or the error is so gross or apparent that no other conclusion is possible. In order, however, to test this fact even a short notice may be given to explore as to what the other side has to say and thereafter if the court is satisfied that there is strong prima facie case and the matter needs thorough examination, provisional admission may be given. We hope and trust that the High Courts would in future discontinue the practice of Rightly granting provisional admission to the candidates at the time of regular admissions, as observed above. It is needless to state that this Court on its part would also be extremely reluctant to grant provisional admission and would do so only in very special case. The fundamental reason for this is that otherwise the institutions are likely to become overcrowded by candidates, eligible or ineligible, efficient or inefficient. Unless the institutions can provide complete and full facilities for the training of each candidate who is admitted in the various disciplines, the medical education will be incomplete and the universities would be turning out doctors not fully qualified which would adversely affect the health of the people in general

6. In Union of India Versus Joginder Sharma the Apex Court was concerned with a prayer for compassionate appointment to the family of employees who had died while in harness. The prayer was rejected; and the extracted observations are apposite to the grant of interim relief because it appears that equitable considerations so dictate.

''The compassionate appointment is intended to enable the family of the deceased employee to tide over the sudden crisis resulting due to death of the sole breadwinner, who died leaving the family in penury and without sufficient means of livelihood. If under the Scheme in force any claim for compassionate appointment can be countenanced only as against a specified number of vacancies arising, in this case 5 per cent, which ceiling it is claimed came to be imposed in view of certain observations emanation from this Court in an earlier decision, the Tribunal or the High Court cannot compel the department concerned to relax the ceiling and appoint a person. Since this method of appointment is in deviation of the normal recruitment process under the rules, where people are waiting in the queue indefinitely, the policy laid down by the Government regarding such appointment should not be departed from by the courts/tribunals by issuing directions for relaxation, merely on account of sympathetic consideration or hardships of the person concerned. This Court as early as in the decision reported in LIC of India v. Asha Ramachhandra Ambekar held that the courts cannot direct appointments on compassionate grounds dehors the provisions of the Scheme in force governed by rules/regulations/instructions. If in a given case, the department of the Government concerned declines, as a matter of policy, not to deviate from the mandate of the provisions underlying the Scheme and refused to the stipulation in respect of ceiling fixed therein, the courts cannot compel the authorities to exercise its jurisdiction in a particular way and that too by relaxing the essential conditions, when no grievance of violation of substantial rights of parties could be held to have been proved, otherwise.''

7. The analysis and distillation of these precedents lead us to the following propositions (a) Courts should abjure interfering in academic matters where no arbitrariness is complained of and is manifest; (b) Courts should eschew from reviewing decisions where an infraction of a legal right is not visible since Article 226 does not envisage the substitution of a view taken in the ostensible exercise of powers of discretion vested in an Authority by the view preferred by the Court; (c) If a cut-off date as been fixed which is not palpably absurd, the schedule set by the concerned Institution should not be interfered with; (d) interim orders permitting admissions or participating in any course should be generally avoided.

8. When these principles are applied to the case in hand the inescapable result is that the decision of the IIFT ought not to be interfered with by traversing the avenue of judicial review. No orders can therefore be passed in the present Writ Petition.

9. Having said all this I may suggest that the IIFT, which had demonstrated its bona fides by offering to refund a sum of Rs. Six lakhs, ought to cogitate upon some method for granting accommodation to the Petitioner, such as by allowing him studying credit for the classes/semesters attended by him and the examinations in which he has appeared. The IIFT would thus demonstrate its benevolence much like the manner in which the father dealt with his prodigal son, even though this may be difficult after bring embroiled in litigation. Courts have preferred not to judicially review decisions of academic bodies but this does not preclude or impede the latter from exercising the discretion possessed by them. It should not be forgotten for fear of compounding an injustice on the Petitioner perpetrated by the negligence of the University that the Petitioner's inability to produce his results was occasioned by a mistake committed by the University concerned. After all every teacher selflessly toils for bettering the future of each of his students. Interim Orders are frequently passed by Courts not because they are interested in traversing upon the discretion reposed in a particular Authority, but because that Authority obdurately refuses to correctly exercise the discretion vested in it so that no injustice is allowed to transpire. The Petitioner has been placed in a position of disadvantage for no fault of his, and it would be in the fitness of things if the IIFT reviews/reconsiders its decisions within fifteen days.

10. The Petition is dismissed with these observations.