Mr. Chaman Lal vs State Bank Of India Through ...
2003 Latest Caselaw 897 Del

JUDGMENT

Vijender Jain, J.

1. Petitioner has filed writ petition being aggrieved by the findings of inquiry committee and imposition of major penalty of dismissal from service vide letter No. VIG/1323 dated 17th September, 1986. Petitioner joined as Clerk in the erstwhile Imperial Bank of India and after establishment of the State Bank of India services of the petitioner were transferred to the respondent/SBI w.e.f. 1.7.1955. Petitioner was promoted as Grade II officer w.e.f. December, 1971. He was further promoted as Officer Grade- I w.e.f. December, 1973. In the year 1979, petitioner was promoted as Branch Manager.

2. It is the case of the petitioner that the prior to the order of dismissal from service he had put more than 32 years of unblemished service. A charge sheet dated 17th September 1985 which contains four charges was issued to the petitioner. The petitioner has challenged the finding of the Inquiry Officer, order of the Disciplinary Authority dismissing petitioner and order of the Appellate Authority rejecting its appeal. It was contended before me by the counsel for the petitioner that Appointing Authority has not been defined under the Rules approved by the Board of Directors on 25th July 1975. The petitioner's appointment as Grade-II Officer was made by the Executive Committee of the Central Board of Directors and the dismissal order was passed by the Deputy Managing Director who is a lower authority than the Executive Committee of the Central Board of Directors and therefore, order of termination could not have been passed by Deputy Managing Director. It was contended that the charges 1(i) (ii) and (v) were deleted on 20th March, 1986 and charges (iii) and (iv) were not proved. In relation to charge II it was contended that no pecuniary loss has been caused to the bank on account of Current Account of Ram Lal having been opened at Punjabi Bagh by the petitioner. The petitioner omitted to put initials in the introductory reference on the A/c opening form but no loss has been caused to the bank in this regard. In relation to charge No. IV it was argued that entire amount of loss in the name of Raje Singh was recovered together with interest and no loss has been caused on this count. It was contended by the counsel for the petitioner that penalty of dismissal was an extreme penalty and ends of justice would have been met if a penalty of recovery of the loss of exchange of about Rs. 25,000/- if any, was deducted from the terminal dues of the petitioner as per Rule 49 (d) of the Rules. The attention of this Court was invited to the finding of the Appellate Authority which is to the following effects:

"While no doubt the Bank has not suffered any loss other than the loss of exchange, being the difference between the normal exchange and the concessionary rate granted by the Appellant, in my view, the quantum of punishment is not dependant on the loss suffered by the Bank alone."

3. On the basis of the aforesaid finding of the Appellate Authority it was contended that in spite of the fact that no loss was caused to the bank still the extreme penalty of dismissal was imposed upon the petitioner and on that account petitioner has not been given any terminal benefits even after rendering 32 years of service. It was further contended that no opportunity of personal hearing was given to the petitioner before passing the order of dismissal from the service. Appellate Authority has also arbitrarily rejected the appeal of the petitioner without affording him personal hearing and without recording a specific order on the efficacy of imposing extreme penalty of dismissal.

4. On the other hand Mr. Jagat Arora counsel for the respondent has contended that punishment of dismissal has been imposed upon the petitioner on the basis of the proved charges of misconduct. It was contended by counsel for the respondent that petitioner was given full opportunity in the inquiry to conduct his defense and the petitioner had admitted most of the irregularities before the Inquiring Authority. Controverting the argument of counsel for the petitioner that Disciplinary Authority ought to have been the Executive Board, Mr. Jagat Arora contended that the Chief General Manager was the Disciplinary Authority in the case of the petitioner and Chief General Manager was a lower authority than the Deputy Managing Director and the order of dismissal was passed by Deputy Managing Director. It was contended that in view of the Rules of the Respondent, Deputy Managing Director was fully competent to pass the impugned order being appointing authority of the petitioner. It was contended by Mr. Arora that punishment was not at all in excess or disproportionate to the nature of the charges and in any case this Court would not substitute its own opinion for that of Disciplinary Authority to decide the quantum of punishment.

5. I have given my careful considerations to the arguments advanced by the counsel for the parties. Deputy Managing Director has been defined in Rule 3 (c) of State Bank of India (Supervising Staff)Service Rules. The same is as under:

"Managing Director" means Managing Director of the Bank and includes a Deputy managing Director."

6. The Schedule provided for disciplinary action for MMG Scale II in the Circle is as under:

 
Category of employees   Disciplinary   Appellate Reviewing
Authority    Authority   Authority

(i) For officers in 
MMG Scale II in 
the Circle 
(a) For Minor    Circle Chief   Local Reviewing
Penalties     General Board   Committee Manager
(b) For Major    Circle Chief   Managing Reviewing
Penalties     General Director   Committee
        Manager on the 
         basis of order 
        passed by the Dy.
        Managing Director

(ii) For Officers   Dy. Managing   Managing Reviewing
in MMGS-II in    Director    Director Committee
Central Office
or under establishments
of Central Office. 
 

7. From the aforesaid Schedule it is clear that in the case of the petitioner the Appointing Authority was Deputy Managing Director and the Disciplinary Authority was Chief General Manager and the Appellate Authority was Managing Director. Therefore, the order of dismissal passed by the Deputy Managing Director cannot be faulted with. The writ petition was filed in the year 1989. It seems that in the year 1999, an additional affidavit was filed by the respondent taking the plea that bank had suffered huge financial loss. To my mind the affidavit which was filed 10 years later is of no consequence as the respondent bank itself has deleted allegations with regard to pecuniary loss contained in charge I (v) and no enquiry in that regard was held by the respondent bank. Therefore, the affidavit filed in the year 1999 cannot be looked into. The charge pertaining to loss to the bank was withdrawn by the respondent bank vide its order dated 20.3.86. Coming to the last contention of the petitioner as to whether the penalty of dismissal in a case where no loss was caused to the respondent is appropriate so as to forfeit 32 years of service of the petitioner. Law in this point is well settled that this Court in normal circumstances will not substitute its own opinion or will not substitute one punishment for other. Where an administrative decision relating to punishment in disciplinary cases is questioned as arbitrary under Article 14, Supreme Court in Om Kumar and Ors. V. Union of India 2001 SSC (L&S) 1039 held as under:

"The Court will not apply proportionality as a primary reviewing court because no issue of fundamental freedoms nor of discrimination under Article 14 applies in such a context. The Court while reviewing punishment and if it is satisfied that Wednesbury principles are violated, it has normally to remit the matter to the administrator for a fresh decision as to the quantum of punishment. Only in extreme and rare cases where there has been long delay in the time taken by the disciplinary proceedings and in the time taken in the Courts, can the court substitute its own view as to the quantum of punishment."

8. In view of the law laid down in Ranjit Thakur V. Union of India , normally this Court would not substitute a punishment awarded by the Disciplinary Authority. However, in this case from the perusal of the order of Appellate Authority while coming to a conclusion that no loss has been caused to the bank still Appellate Authority has not stated that why dismissal be not substituted. 30 years of services rendered by the petitioner from 1955 to 1985 when show cause notice was issued has been washed away. Said order shows complete non application of mind whereby denying the terminal benefits to the petitioner. This writ petition is pending in this Court since last 14 years. Petitioner, I have been told is quite old. No useful purpose will be served if case is remanded back to Disciplinary Authority. Even otherwise during the course of hearing on the last date of hearing, I had directed the respondent to take instructions as to whether the respondent was prepared to take a fresh decision in view of what has been stated above. Mr. Arora has informed that he has received instructions that the decision cannot be reviewed and in this regard has placed a letter dated 21.8.2003 on record. Therefore, no useful purpose will be served to remit the case again to the respondent. The penalty of dismissal is disproportionate to the charges proved against the petitioner. The order dated 17.9.86 passed by Disciplinary Authority order dated 8.9.87 passed by Appellate Authority and order dated 4.2.89 passed by Reviewing Authority are hereby quashed.

9. The order of dismissal is hereby quashed. The petitioner shall be treated as compulsorily retired. However, he will be entitled to terminal benefits.