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Delhi Transport Corprn. And Anr. vs Nirmala And Ors.
2002 Latest Caselaw 1277 Del

Citation : 2002 Latest Caselaw 1277 Del
Judgement Date : 7 August, 2002

Delhi High Court
Delhi Transport Corprn. And Anr. vs Nirmala And Ors. on 7 August, 2002
Equivalent citations: I (2003) ACC 389, 2003 ACJ 1300, 103 (2003) DLT 121
Author: S Mahajan
Bench: S Mahajan

JUDGMENT

S.K. Mahajan, J.

1. Admit.

With the consent of the parties matter has been heard and disposed of finally.

2. The only point argued by learned Counsel for the appellant in this case is that since the claim petition was filed under Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act (in short referred to as 'the Act'), the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (in short referred to as 'the Tribunal') could not have given benefit of Section 163A of the Act to the respondents as the same was clearly prohibited by the provisions of Section 163B before I deal with the arguments advanced by learned Counsel for the appellant, a few facts relevant for deciding the present appeal are:

One Mr. Kishan Lal while going on a cycle on 7th November, 1996 near Aurobindo Marg, was hit by a D.T.C bus bearing No. DEP 9826 driven by appellant No. 2. As a result of the accident, the deceased received fatal injuries and died in the hospital the same day. The legal heirs of the deceased, who are respondents in the present case, filed a petition, claiming compensation under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act. In the typed proforma in which normally the claim petition is filed by the parties claiming compensation, it is printed that the application was under Sections 166 and 140 of the Act. It was alleged in the petition that the bus at the time of the accident was being driven rashly and negligently at a very fast speed by the driver of the bus and the accident was caused because of such rash and negligent driving by the driver of the bus. It was, therefore, submitted that the appellants were liable to make payment of compensation to the legal heirs of the deceased.

3. The appellant in the written statement did not deny the faction of accident. It was, however, submitted that on 7th November, 1996 the appellant No. 2 was performing his duty on Route No. 502 and was driving the bus very carefully, cautiously and on the correct side of the road in normal speed. It was further alleged in the written statement that at about 9.30 a.m. the bus reached near Adhchini Corner and the driver was taking a left turn at a slow speed, when the deceased came at a very high speed riding his cycle in a very rash and negligent manner and hit against the, left corner of the bus as a result of which he fell down and received accidental injuries and subsequently succumbed to such injuries received by him in that accident.

4. The statement of respondent No. 1 was recorded by the Tribunal on 27th July, 1998. She was also cross-examined by Counsel for the appellant and during her statement, it was established that the deceased at the relevant time was earning about Rs. 4,000/- per month, though in the petition, the claimants had alleged that the income of the deceased was Rs. 3,000/- per month. After the statement of respondent No. 1 was recorded, the learned Tribunal was of the view that the matter can be disposed of taking recourse to the provisions of Section 163A of the Act, The Tribunal, accordingly, assessing the income of the deceased at Rs. 3,000/- per month, as was stated in the claim petition, awarded a sum of Rs. 3,19,000/- as compensation to the respondent. This award has now been challenged by the appellants by way of the present appeal.

5. As already mentioned above, the only point argued by learned Counsel for the appellants is that since the respondents had claimed compensation under Sections 166 and 140 of the Act, they by virtue of the provisions of Section 163B were precluded from being granted compensation under Section 163A of the Act. To appreciate the arguments of learned Counsel for the appellants, it will be useful to look to the provisions of Sections 140, 163A and 163B of the Act, which read as under:

Section 140.

Liability to pay compensation in certain cases on the principle of no fault--

(1) Where death or permanent disablement of any person has resulted from an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle or motor vehicles, the owner of the vehicle shall, or, as the case may be, the owners of the vehicles shall, jointly and severally, be liable to pay compensation in respect of such death or disablement in accordance with the provisions of this section.

(2) The amount of compensation which shall be payable under Sub-section (1) in respect of the death of any person shall be a fixed sum of (fifty thousand rupees) and the amount of compensation payable under that sub-section in respect of the permanent disablement of any person shall be a fixed sum of (twenty five thousand rupees).

(3) In any claim for compensation under Sub-section (1), the claimant shall not be required to plead and establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act, neglect or default of the owner or owners of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other person.

(4) A claim for compensation under Sub-section (1) shall not be defeated by reason of any wrongful act, neglect or default of the person in respect of whose death or permanent disablement the claim has been made nor shall the quantum of compensation recoverable in respect of such death or permanent disablement be reduced on the basis of the share of such person in the responsibility for such death or permanent disablement.

(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in Sub-section (2) regarding death or bodily injury to any person, for which the owner of the vehicle is liable to give compensation for relief, he is also liable to pay compensation under any other law for the time being in force:

Provided that the amount of such compensation to be given under any other law shall be reduced from the amount of compensation payable under this section or under Section 163A.

Section 163A.

Special provisions as to payment of compensation on structured formula basis--

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force or instrument having the force of law, the owner of the motor vehicle or the authorised insurer shall be liable to pay in the case of death or permanent disablement due to accident arising out of the use of motor vehicle compensation, as indicated in the Second Schedule, to the legal heirs or the victim, as the case may be.

Explanation--For the purposes of this sub-section, permanent disability shall have the same meaning and extent as in the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923).

(2) In any claim for compensation under Sub-section (1), the claimant shall not be required to plead or establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the vehicle or vehicle concerned or of any other person.

(3) The Central Government may, keeping in view the cost of living by notification in the Official Gazette, from time to time amend the Second Schedule.

Section 163B.

Option to file claim in certain cases--

Where a person is entitled to claim compensation under Section 140 and Section 163A, he shall file the claim under either of the said sections and not under both.

6. Section 163A of the Act was added in the Act by way of an amendment made in the Act with effect from 14th November, 1994. Compensation under Section 163A can be granted on the basis of no fault liability. Section 140 of the Act also stipulates mat compensation can be awarded on the basis of no fault liability but such compensation is restricted to Rs. 50,000/- in case of death and Rs. 25,000/- in case of permanent disability. Moreover, in a petition filed by the claimants for grant of compensation under Section 166 of the Act, the Tribunal is empowered to pass an interim award to direct the owner to pay compensation mentioned in Section 140 of the Act to the claim ant by way of interim relief as even if ultimately negligence is not proved the claimants would still be entitled to such relief under Section 140 of the Act. In any case, the claimants in the present case had claimed nor were granted compensation under Section 140 of the Act. The mention of Sections 166 and 140 in the claim application form is only by way of a routine inasmuch as such claim application is in a printed proforma and both the sections are mentioned therein. In case the claimant had insisted on their petition being tried on the basis of "fault liability" they could claim interim compensation under Section 140 of the Act. It is for this reason that while drafting a petition claiming compensation under Section 166 of the Act, Section 140 is also mentioned so as to get an interim award under that section. Merely because Section 140 was printed on the claim application form will not mean that the claimants had claimed compensation under Section 140 of the Act or that they could not take recourse to Section 163A at a, subsequent stage. It is the admitted case of the parties that the claimants had not at any time made any application for passing interim award under Section 140 of the Act. While under Section 140 of the Act the maximum compensation payable in the case of death is Rs. 50,000/-, under Section 163A of the Act, compensation is payable on the basis of structured formula as given in Schedule II of the Motor Vehicles Act. As already mentioned above, the claimant had not claimed interim relief under Section 140 of the Act nor any such relief was ever awarded to the claimants. I am, therefore, not in agreement with learned Counsel for the appellant that merely because the claimants had mentioned Section 140 of the Act in the application claiming compensation, they were barred from claiming the same under Section 163A of the Act.

7. It was observed by the Supreme Court in Oriental Insurance Company v. Hansraj Bhai v. Kodala and Ors., 1 (2001) ACC 618 (SC)=2001 SCC (Criminal) 857, that the reason for in corporating Section 163A was to give early relief to the road accident victims. As per the objects and reason, it is a new predetermined formula for payment of compensation to the road accident victims on the basis of age/income and it is more liberal and rational. It is also apparent that compensation payable under Section 163A is based on relevant criteria for determining the compensation such as actual income/age of the victim and the multiplier employed. The purpose of Section 163A and II Schedule is to avoid long-drawn litigation and delay in payment of compensation to the victim or his heirs who are in dire need of relief. If claimants opt for accepting the lump-sum compensation based on a structured formula, as contained in Schedule II of the Act, he will get relief at the earliest. It also gives vital advantage of not pleading or establishing any wrongful act or neglect or default of the owner of the offending vehicle or vehicles. This no fault liability was introduced on the basis of the suggestion of the Law Commission to the effect that the expanding notions of social security and social justice envisage that liability to pay compensation must be "no-fault liability". However, this benefit can be availed by the claimant only by restricting his claim on the basis of income at a slab of Rs. 40,000/- per annum which is the highest slab in the Second Schedule, which indicates that the Legislature wanted to give benefit of no fault liability to a certain limit. Granting of relief under Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act was an alternative to the determination of compensation on fault basis under the Act.

8. The Supreme Court has also dealt with the effect of Section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act and it has been held that law, before insertion of Section 163A, was giving limited benefit to the extent provided under Section 140 for no-fault liability and determination of compensation amount at fault liability was taking a long time what mischief is now sought to be remedied by introducing Section 163-A and the disease of delay is sought to be curbed to a large extent by affording benefit to the victims on structured formula basis.

9. A perusal of the judgment of the Supreme Court clearly shows that while benefit under Section 140 of the Act is an addition to the compensation that may be payable under Section 168 of the Act, the award under Section 163A is not in addition to Section 168 but is in alternative to Section 168 of the Act. The relief under Section 140 of the Act is normally granted by way of interim relief to the victims or to the heirs of the victims who are in dire need of such a relief. Grant of interim relief under Section 140 of the Act cannot be any stretch of imagination, preclude the petitioner from claiming relief under Section 163A of the Act. Moreover, in the present case, admittedly no relief under Section 140 of the Act was granted to the respondents, therefore, the Bar, if any, of Section 163B of the Act will not, in any case, apply in the present case.

10. For the foregoing reasons, since no other point has been argued, in my view, the appellants are not entitled to any relief in this appeal. The appeal, is accordingly, dismissed with no order as of costs.

 
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