Dhanpothowar Co-Operative Group ... vs Dda & Ors.
2000 Latest Caselaw 945 Del

ORDER

Vijender Jain, J.

1. Aggrieved by the decision of competent authority, i.e., Lt. Governor, who is the Chairman of D.D.A. to grant more time to deposit the amount by the respondent-Societies, the petitioners have presented the present writ petition. Pursuant to the offer of respondent-DDA to allot land to the cooperative societies in the year 1982 in Delhi. Cooperative societies were formed and in all approximately about 1600 societies were registered. Out of these 1600 societies, broadly speaking, the petitioners have contended that the case which presently pertains to the societies which are from serial Nos. 1200 to 1400 except one society which is respondent No. 4, whose serial number is 1168.

2. Mr. Sumit Bansal, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, has vehemently, contended that once the offer of allotment was made by the respondent no.1-DDA pursuant to their letter dated 18.12.1995 in which it was specifically mentioned that the amount to be deposited in terms of the said offer was within 45 days,. the subsequent extension granted by the competent authority i.e., Lt. Governor to deposit the amount was without any authority of law. Mr. Bansal has based his arguments on, broadly, speaking, four premiss, firstly, the Lt. Governor exercising his powers as Chairman of Delhi Development Authority (For short 'DDA') could not have granted extension because said grant of extension was not provided either in the Nazul Rules or the Delhi Development Act or the Rules framed thereunder: secondly, in the absence of any specific power of review after having taken a decision that those respondents, who have not paid the amount as demanded by the D.D.A pursuant to its letter dated 18.12.1995 and respondent-DDA having cancelled their allotment could not have granted extension so as to enable the respondents to deposit the amount after expiry of the date; and thirdly, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that in terms of Rule 24 of DDA and Nazul Land Rules, 1981, the Lt. Governor or the competent authority did not have any power to extent the period so as to enable the respondents to deposit the amount. The next arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioners was that in view of declared policy on the subject by the DDA which appeared in a newspaper on 4.2.1982, there was a legitimate expectation in favour of the petitioners that on default of payment by the espondent-societies in a time frame fixed by the respondent-DDA itself, the petitioners will automatically get offer of allotment as next in seniority after respondents. What has been contended before me by Mr. Bansal is that in view of extension allotted to the respondent-societies in making payment after expiry of stipulated time, the petitioners have to be in queue for more time and have to pay extra amount which will be decided as and when the respondent-DDA decides to offer allotment at their revised terms. In support of his con-

tentions, learned counsel for the petitioners has relied upon Sriniketan Cooperative Group Housing Society Ltd. etc. etc., Vs. Vikas Vihar Cooperative Group Housing Society Ltd. & Ors. , Patel Narshi Thakershi & Ors. Vs. Shri Pradyumansinghji Arjun singh ji , Dr. (Smt.) Kuntesh Gupta Vs. Management of Hindu Kanya Mahavidyalaya, Sitapur (U.P.) & Ors. and M.I. Builders Pvt. Ltd., Vs. Radhey Shyam Sahu & Ors., Jt 1999 (5) SC 42. Lastly, Mr. Bansal, has also contended that DDA adopted a policy consistent of and cancelled the allotment in case of non-deposit of amount within the stipulated period and the same yardstick has been maintained by DDA in relation to other 439 societies.

3. Repelling the contentions raised by Mr. Bansal, Mr. Ashwani Kumar, learned counsel appearing for respondent no.-1-DDA, has contended that offer of 45 days to deposit the amount from the date of issue of letter was not in pursuance of any statutory rules, it was primarily a provisional letter of allotment de hors of any statutory requirement. Learned counsel for respondent-DDA has contended that in the matter of administrative decision untill and unless this Court comes to a conclusion that decision is vitiated on the ground of perversity, mala fide or irrationality, this Court while exercising the powers of judicial review will not interfere in the decision making process. He has further contended that no legitimate expectation has arisen in view of the advertisement in the 'Indian Express' dated 4.2.1982 and even if there is some expectation, the said expectation is not which would confer an enforceable right in favour of the petitioners. What has been contended before me is that it is not the case of the petitioners that decision to extend time to make the deposit was taken on either extraneous consideration or for mala fide reasons. It is also not the case of the petitioners that in the grant of extension, the petitioners were not treated in the similar fashion under the said policy of the respondent-DDA, therefore, it has been contended before me by Mr. Kumar that for good and valid reasons when the payment, the same cannot be interfered in the writ jurisdition of this Court. In support of his contentions, Mr. Kumar has cited of Union of India & Ors., Vs. Hindustan Development Corporation & Ors. (1993) SCC 499, National Buildings Construction Corporation Vs. S. Raghunathan & Ors. , U.P. Financial Corporation Vs. Gem Cap (India) Ltd. & Ors. , and M.P. Oil Extraction & Anr. Vs. State of M.P. & Ors. .

4. Mr. V.P. Singh, learned counsel appearing for respondent nos. 15 and Mr. Harish Malhotra, learned counsel appearing for respondent nos. 19 and 26/societies, have contended that in view of the fact that the land is to be allotted to the cooperative societies and there are large number of members, who have to be contacted and, therefore, a representation was made to the Vice-Chairman, DDA as well as before the Lt. Governor of Delhi to extend the time to facilitate the members to deposit the amount and for that purpose the extension granted was in the realm of larger public interest.

5. I have given my careful consideration to the argument advanced by the earned counsel appearing for he parties. I have perused the order passed by the competent authority on the note of the Vice-Chairman, DDA, who recommended for grant of extension to the competent authority, the ViceChairman, DDA also recommended that on fulfillling the following conditions the time for making payment be extended and these were the following condi-

tions:-

i) Each society will have to deposit restoration fee at the rate of Rs. 200/- per sq. mtr.

ii) They will have to pay interest of 18% on the 1st installment for a period starting from the last date of deposit as per the original offer letter till the actual deposit of 1st installment.

iii) The 2nd and 3rd installment will be calculated on the basis of the current rate of land.

iv) DDA will send the list of cooperative societies whose offer is renewed to the Registrar of Cooperative Societies with the request to exercise necessary control for ensuring that these cooperative societies are functioning as per rule.

6. This notice was sent by the Vice-Chairman, DDA to the Lt. Governor on 27.6.1997. Lt. Governor vide his note dated 31.7.1997 agreed with the proposal of the Vice-Chairman, DDA subject to following conditions:-

i) Restoration charges will be Rs. 250/- per sq mtr.

ii) Societies shall have to pay interest at the rate of 18% on the 1st installment from the due date of payment till actual date of payment.

iii) On the remaining amount, these societies shall pay either interest of 18% from the due date of payment, had the initial deposit been made in time, till date of issue of actual demand letter, or the current PDR, whichever is higher.

iv) The societies shall pay the entire amount along with the entire interest within two months of the issue of demand letter, failing which cancellation shall be final.

7. By no stretch of imagination it can be said that extension of time by the competent authority was inconsistent with Nazul Rules or any other rules. Rule 24 of Nazul Rules on which petitioner placed reliance is as follows:-

"Manner of realisation of premium or price of plots:-

(1) Save as otherwise provided in Rules 29, 36 and 40, premium or price of plots of Nazul land chargeable in accordance with the provisions of these rules shall be realised in installments in the following manner, namely:-

(a) 25 per cent of the total premium for the plot, along with such earnest money, not exceeding 10 per cent of the premium, as may be decided by the Authority, shall be deposited at the time of submitting the application for allotment of land;

(b) 50 per cent of the premium shall be deposited within 60 days of the issue of demand-cum-allotment letter; and

(c) balance premium after adjusting the earnest money shall be deposited before taking over possession of the land or within two months of the receipt of communication from the authority offering possession, whichever is earlier.

(2) If the premium or price of land as provided in sub-rule (1) is not deposited, the earnest money deposited shall be forfeited and it shall be competent for the Authority to allot the land to any other person including a co-operative society in accordance with the prescribed procedure."

8. From the bare perusal of Nazul Rules it cannot be said that in case the time is extended for making the payment of the price of plot contemplated in Rule 24 would be hit by Rule 24. Rule 24 provides the manner of realisation of premium or the price of plots. It does not lay down as to whether the price has to be realised within 45 days or within 60 days or within six months. It cannot be the intention of the legislature. Rule-24 provides the method and manner of realisation of premium or the price of plot. Some discretion has to be left with the executive authority exercising such functions under the rules keeping in view the ground realities so as to give meaning and effect to a policy for allotment of land that too for cooperative societies. Therefore, I do not see any force in the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioners, that grant of extension by the Lt. Governor was in any way consistent with the provisions of Nazul Rules. There is no force in the arguments of the petitioners that grant of extension in the absence of any power of review would not be an exercise of proper power on the part of competent authority. The authority cited in this regardby the learned counsel for the petitioner is of no avail. It was not a case of review of a policy. It was a case of grant of extension in making payment on the basis of representations made by respondent societies. Respondent-societies are admittedly senior at their social numbers to the petitioners. Even otherwise, nowhere in the writ petition it has been alleged that extension of time by the competent authority was either mala fide or based on extraneous consideration. The extension was granted by the competent authority in order of benefit the members of the cooperative societies for whose benefit the land was allotted by the D.D.A. In the matter of judicial review, it is well settled by catena of cases by the Supreme Court as well as this Court that the court while exercising the power of judicial review is not concerned with the decision but only with the decision making process and untill and unless it is shown to the court that decision making process is vitiated on the ground of arbitrariness, irrationality, mala fides or perversity, the court will be very reluctant to exercise power of judicial review. For the reasons stated above, I do not find any merit in this writ petition and the same is, therefore, dismissed. Interim orders granted earlier stands vacated.