Raj Kumar vs Union Of India And Ors.
1997 Latest Caselaw 794 Del

JUDGMENT

Arun Kumar, J.

(1) The petitioner has filed this petition challenging the acquisition proceedings with respect to his land measuring 5 Bighas and 17 Biswas comprised in Khasra Nos. 3987/186 to 191 (C-4), 2988/186 to 191 (C-4), 3989/186 to 191 (C-3), 3990/186 to 191 (C-4), 3991 /186 to 191 (C-1) and 3992/186 to 191 (5- 1) situated in Village Karkardooma, Delhi. The petitioner has challenged the notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) dated 13.11.1959 and the declaration under Section 6 dated 7.11.1968 and the award bearing No. 21/70-71 dated 28.7.1970.

(2) The main ground urged on behalf of the petitioner is that on account of long lapse of time since the date of the award the acquisition proceedings have lapsed and, therefore, they are liable to be quashed in toto. The challenge to the acquisition proceedings being on the sole ground of delay in taking possession, the petitioner has placed reliance on a decision of this Court in Satyendra Kumar & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., 1994 (1) Apex Decisions (Delhi) 242=54 (1994) Dlt 181 (DB). In the said decision an individual house property bearing No. Ix /3335, Kucha Bajrang Bali, Bazaar Sita Ram, Delhi, constructed on a plot of 853 sq.yds. was involved. The acquisition proceedings started with the notification under Section 4 of the Act dated 1.7.1965 and culminated in the award dated 30.3.1974. The judgment of this Court is dated 6.1.1994 and it is noted that the possession of the property had still not been taken by the respondents as required under Section 16 of the Act. The case of the petitioners in the said case was that the purpose of acquisition stood frustrated in view of the long lapse of time and the acquisition proceedings were thus rendered mala fide. The Government did not file any counter affidavit in response to the writ petition. Thus there was no effort on the part of the Government to explain the delay in taking possession of the acquired property. The Court noted that it was unfortunate that the authorities remained complacent all these years and the petitioner had to approach the Court ultimately. It was also observed that under Section 16 of the Act the possession has to be taken within a reasonable time depending on the facts and circumstances of each case. There was no explanation forthcoming as to why possession had not been taken during all the intervening years. Under these circumstances the Court set aside the award, the notification and the declaration.

(3) In reply the learned Counsel for the respondent-DDA brought out the following undisputed facts:

(I)The same acquisition had been challenged in C.W. No. 394/1970 by the predecessor in interest of the petitioner i.e., one Deoki Nandan. Stay of dispossession was initially granted by the Court in favour of the petitioner. The writ petition was, however, dismissed as with- drawn on 22nd December, 1971 in view of the offer of the Government to the petitioner of allotment of an alternative plot in lieu of acquisition of his land.

(II)The petitioner claims to have purchased the land in the year 1972, i.e. long after even the award had been made with respect to the land in question. For showing purchase the petitioner relied only on a Jamabandi. The petitioner had no right to be heard: He is not entitled to seek any relief.

(III)The very notification under Section 4 and the declaration under Section 6 involved in the present case were subject matter of litigation in several other writ petitions which were pending in this Court. The matter finally was disposed of by the Supreme Court vide judgment in Aflatoon v. Union of India, (1975) 4 Scc 284. The acquisition was upheld. Thus it is explained that till 1975 the same Notifications which are subject matter of the present case, were under challenge and there were stay orders qua possession of land in the various cases which were pending in this Court and, therefore, steps for taking possession could not be taken.

(IV)A second round of litigation started in this High Court in 1980-81 etc. challenging the same acquisition proceedings and the same notifications on the ground of delay in completion of the acquisition proceedings etc. There were stays qua dispossession in favour of the petitioners in the various cases and, therefore, steps of taking possession could not be taken by the respondents. This second round of litigation also went upto the Supreme Court and culminated the decision of the Supreme Court in Ram Chand v. Union of india, . The acquisitions were upheld and in cases of delay the persons concerned were ordered to be compensated through payment of additional interest. After the decision of the Supreme Court in Ram Chand several writ petitions pending in this Court on similar points were heard by a Full Bench of this Court and decision was rendered in Roshanara Begum v. Union of India, .

(V)The petitioner filed a C.W. 4648 of 1993 in this Court challenging this very acquisition. In the said writ petition an ex-parte stay against dispossession was granted in favour of the petitioner on 7th January, 1994. The said writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn on 14th July, 1995. It is noteworthy that the withdrawal of the writ petition was unconditional and without reserving any right to file any fresh writ petition on the same subject.

(VI)Inspite of the withdrawal of the previous writ petition, the present writ petition was filed in January, 1996. This Court granted stay in favour of the petitioner on 2nd February, 1996 restraining the respondents from taking possession of the land.

(4) On the basis of the above facts the learned Counsel for the respondents has explained that the facts of the present case are entirely different as compared to the facts in Satyendra Kumar's case (supra). It is further pointed out that in the present case the taking over of possession of the acquired land was thwarted by the actions of the respondents throughout. First their predecessor Deoki Nandan got a stay against dispossession from the Court. Thereafter, there were stays against dispossession granted by this Court in various other writ petitions pertaining to the land covered under the same notifications. When in the year 1993 the respondents started the action for taking possession after the stay orders from various Courts stood vacated, the action of respondents was again thwarted by the petitioner by filing Writ Petition No. 4648 of 1993 in which stay of dispossession was granted on 7th January, 1994. Again the stay of dispossession was granted by this Court in the present writ petition on 2nd February, 1996.

(5) From the aforesaid facts it is clear that ratio in Satyendra Kumar is not at all attracted in the present case. In Satyendra Kumar's case there was complete inaction on the part of the respondents regarding taking possession of the property involved in the acquisition for more than twenty years. In the present case the respondents have not been able to take possession on account of one stay order or the other granted by Courts regarding possession of the land. The facts about the aforesaid litigation have not been disputed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. Even Satyendra Kumar's case leaves the matter about delay or inaction regarding taking possession of the acquired property/land depending upon the facts of each case.

(6) In the facts of this case I do not find any reason to blame the respondents from inaction in the matter of taking possession of the land in question so far.

(7) The learned Counsel for the respondent has further urged that at least in the year 1997 when the petitioner filed Cw 4648/93 in this Court, the ground of delay in taking possession was available to the petitioner but the same was not taken. In 1993 at least twenty years had gone-by since the date of the award. Still the petitioner did not take the ground that the acquisition had lapsed on account of delay in taking possession. It is contended that for this reason also the petitioner is estopped from raising the point now in the present petition especially in view of the fact that C.W. 4648/93 had been unconditionally withdrawn by the petitioner. I agree with the learned Counsel for the respondents that for this reason also the petitioner is estopped from raising the points of delay in taking possession of land vitiating the acquisition.

(8) There is yet another ground on which this petition is liable to be dismissed. Deoki Nandan, the predecessor in interest of the petitioner had filed a writ petition challenging the acquisition in the year 1970. He withdrew the writ petition on 22.12.1971 in view of the offer of the Government for an alternative plot to him in lieu of acquisition of his land. This means that Government offered an alternative plot to the owner of the land for the reason that his land was being acquired by the Government. The owner accepted the offer which further means that the owner accepted the acquisition by taking a plot of land in lieu thereof. The petitioner has stepped into the shoes of the erstwhile owner and cannot be permitted to reagitate the question of acquisition of the same land.

(9) The learned Counsel for the petitioner also relied on Spl. Land Acquisition Officer v. M/s. Godrej & Boyce, to urge that till possession of the acquired land is taken under Section 16 of the Act, the owners are not. divested of their interest in the land. Since the petitioner continues to be in land. Since the petitioner continues to be in possession he is entitled to urge that the acquisition has lapsed for the reason of inaction on the part of respondents in taking possession of the land. The question which is foremost in the present case is the locus standi of the petitioner to raise any such pleas in view of the fact that the petitioner claims to be a purchaser of the land in the year 1972 when the Award with respect to the land had already been made. The Supreme Court has in a catena of decisions held that such a person has no right to be heard. The latest decision being Star Wire (India) Ltd. v. State of Haryana etc. (1996) 1 SCC698=IV (1996) Clt 269 (SC). Following the law laid down by the Supreme Court in this behalf I cannot permit the petitioner to raise any pleas.

For all these reasons this writ petition is dismissed with costs. Counsel fee Rs. 5,000.00 .