Super Engineers And Others vs New Delhi Municipal Committee
1994 Latest Caselaw 77 Del

JUDGMENT

Anil Dev Singh, J.

1. By this writ petition the petitioners challenge the order of the respondent-New Delhi Municipal Committee dated July 14, 1992 whereby the respondent has imposed a ban on transacting any business with the second petitioner and the action of the respondent in not furnishing the tender documents to the first petitioner in respect of tenders floated on July 15, 1992 for the purchase of Low Tension Air Circuit Breaker panels.

2. The first petitioner M/s. Super Engineering is a partnership firm and an authorised stockist of Low Tension Air Circuit Breaker (for short 'LT-ACB') and other equipment manufactured by M/s. Larsen & Toubro Ltd. The second petitioner, a proprietary concern of the third petitioner, undertakes fabrication of electrical panel Boards and is claimed to be an associate of the first petitioner. The second petitioner had been dealing with the respondent in the past but a ban order dated July 14, 1992 was slapped by the respondent on the former, stopping all business with it. By a notice dated July 15, 1992 the respondent invited tenders for purchase of LT-ACB panels. The notice also laid down the eligibility criteria for participating in the tender. The eligibility criteria reads as under :

"Only manufacturers of LT-ACB/their authorised stockist having adequate fabricating and testing arrangement of their own or with their associates with the recommendation letter from the manufacturers of ACB for which they are quoting in this tender are eligible to participate in the tender. Further they should have complete set of test certificate on the breaker and their panel from CPRI/Govt./Recognised test house as per relevant ISS. The request for issue of tender documents shall be entertained on furnishing the documentary proof from the manufacturers, otherwise tender document shall not be issued."

3. According to the above, a party will be entitled to participate in the tender only if the following conditions are fulfillled :

(1) The party should be a manufacturer of LT-ACB; or

(2) The party should be an authorised stockist of the manufacturer for latter's product, namely, LT-ACB, provided :

(a) it has adequate fabricating and testing arrangements of its own or with its associates;

(b) it has a letter of recommendation from the concerned manufacturer; and

(c) it has the test certificate for the breaker and panel from Central Power Research Institute (for short CPRI)/undertaking/recognised test house as per relevant ISS.

4. It appears that the second petitioner, the proprietary concern of the third petitioner, did not apply for the tender because of the ban order also because it was not otherwise qualified to participate in the tender being only a fabricator. The first petitioner, however, considering itself to be fully eligible to participate in the tender applied to the respondent by its letter dated July 20, 1992 for issue of the tender documents. The first petitioner not getting any favorable response from the respondent followed up his application by reminders dated July 24, 1992, August 4, 1992 and August 5, 1992. But this was also of no avail. Failing to secure the tender documents and because of the aforesaid ban order the petitioners filed the present writ petition on August 20, 1992. In response the respondent in the counter-affidavit has taken the plea that the first petitioner does not fulfilll the eligibility criteria and therefore the tender documents were not furnished to it. The precise stand in the counter-affidavit is that the first petitioner does not have test certificate of the equipment in its own name. It is, however, not denied that the associate of the first petitioner namely, Jain Motor Garage has the test certificate for the equipment in question from CPRI.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that according to the eligibility criteria it is not necessary for the first petitioner to have the test certificate of the equipment from CPRI in its own name when its associate has such a certificate and the manufacturer also has the CPRI certificate for LT-ACB. On the other hand learned counsel for the respondent submits that the first petitioner in order to be eligible must have a test certificate for the panels in its own name from "CPRI/Government Test house". I am afraid the construction placed by the learned counsel for the respondent on the notice inviting tenders is not correct. The object of the requirement of a test certificate from CPRI or Government Recognised test house is to ensure the quality of the goods which are to be supplied to the respondent. It is apparent from the pleadings of the parties, that LT-ACB manufactured by Larsen & Toubro Ltd. and the panels which are fabricated by the associate of the first petitioner have the requisite test certification. Even the LT-ACBs when fitted in the panels by the said associate of the first petitioner have the necessary certificates from the CPRI. Copies of the requisite certificates are on record and the learned counsel for the respondent, on instructions of Mr. K. K. Singhal, Executive Engineer of the respondent states that these certificates indeed certify the equipment in question in the name of Jain Motor Garage. Therefore, the reason stated in the counter-affidavit for not furnishing the tender documents to the first petitioner shows a complete misapprehension about the eligibility criteria for participating in the bid. In my opinion the first petitioner is fully qualified for receiving the tender documents from the respondent.

6. Moreover learned counsel for the petitioners submit that the respondent is only concerned with the quality of the product and the first petitioner gives an undertaking that it will be responsible for the quality of the product and would also be liable for any damage in the event of the product turning out to be of inferior quality.

7. In so far as the grievance of the second petitioner that the ban order was passed without providing an opportunity to it is concerned, I am of the opinion, that the grievance is not unfounded. It is not disputed by the respondent that no opportunity was provided to the first petitioner before passing the impugned order. The ban order has the effect of preventing the second petitioner from entering into contract with the respondent. This disability has been created by the impugned order without providing any opportunity to the second petitioner to represent his case. This order is clearly violative of the principles of natural justice and cannot be sustained.

8. In view of the above discussion, the writ petition succeeds. The ban order dated July 14, 1992 is hereby quashed and the respected to issue the tender documents to the first petitioner.