Jamia Hamdard And Others vs K.S. Durrany
1991 Latest Caselaw 699 Del

JUDGMENT

B.N. Kripal, J.

1. The Challenge in this writ petition is to be award of the Labour Court dated April 17, 1990, whereby the petitioner was directed to reinstate Dr. K. S. Durrany, respondent No. 3, with full back wages.

2. Briefly stated the facts are that respondent No. 3 was a highly qualified person holding the degrees of M.A. and ph.D. It appears that he applied to the petitioner and was, vide letter dated September 25, 1980, appointed as a Research Fellow. The petitioner is a deemed university and according to the terms of the said letter, respondents No. 3 was to get Rs. 1,300/- per month consolidated for a period of two years. He was also to get accommodation at 10 percent of the consolidated salary plus Rs. 5/- for water charges. The work which was to be done by the petitioner was also set out in the said letter and it was as follows :-

"You will be responsible for doing your own research during the tenure of the Fellowship and will also be guiding research, and helping in the administration of the Department and publication of the Department's quarterly under the direction of the Head of the Department."

According to this letter the appointment of the respondent No. 3 was for a period of two years. The letter further stated that no completion of term of fellowship, respondent, No. 3 could be considered for permanent appointment in a graded salary. It seems that an extension was granted to respondent No. 3 but subsequently, vide letter dated March 15, 1983, respondent No. 3 was informed that his services were no longer required by the petitioner. There after the Delhi Administration referred dispute between the petitioner and respondent No. 3 to the Labour Court. The term of reference was as follows :-

"Whether the terminations of Shri K. S. Durrany is illegal and/or unjustified and if so, to what relief is he entitled and what directions are necessary in this respect ?"

After the pleading had been completed a number of issues were framed. These were as follows :-

"1. Whether respondent management IHMMR and IIIS are not industry ? O.P.M.

2. Whether the petitioner is workman ? O.P.W.

3. Whether the relief against the management of IHMMR is maintainable ? O.P.W.

4. As per terms of reference.

5. Relief."

As is evident from the issues as framed, two main contentions which were raised by the petitioner, whether it was an industry and, secondly, respondent no. 3 was not a workman. The Labour court further seeing all the facts on the record, came to the conclusion that the petitioner was a industry and that respondent No. 3 was a workman. The other issues were also decided against the petitioner and the petitioner was directed to reinstate respondent No. 3 with full back wages.

3. The main argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that looking at the duties of respondent No. 3, he cannot be regarded as a workman. According to the learned counsel the function and duties of respondent No. 3 are akin to that of a teacher and even if we assume that the petitioner is an industry, nevertheless respondent No. 3 cannot be regarded as a workman. The learned counsel for the respondent however contends that the function which was being performed by respondent no. 3 clearly showed that he was a workman. In this connection reliance is placed no the testimony of MW-2 who was a Director of Management of the petitioner, who had stated that respondent No. 3 was made to engage in the following jobs :-

"i) Reading proofs of publications.

ii) Editing Indexes of DCR.

iii) Maintaining Press clippings.

iv) Organising academic activities.

v) Drafting research proposals.

vi) Maintaining correspondence.

vii) Doing translation from one language to another.

viii) Several unskilled jobs, and

ix) all that was directed by the Supervisor".

4. The learned counsel for the respondent also relied on two decisions of the Supreme Court is S. K. Verma v. Mahesh Chandra (1983-II-LLJ-4229) and Ved Prakash Gupta v. Delton Cable Pvt. Ltd. India Ltd. (1984-I-LLJ-546) and has contended that on a correct interpretation of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947, respondent No. 3 has to be regarded as a workman. The submission of the learned counsel is that respondent No. 3 was discharging functions which were not supervisory in nature and he was a skilled workman and as held by the Supreme Court that Section 2(s) has to be given a very wide interpretation, keeping in view the scope of the intention of the legislation. Reliance was also placed on Arun Mills Ltd. v. Dr. Chandraprasad, 1976 Gujarat Law Reports 291 wherein it was held that a doctor employed by a organisation could also be regarded as a workman.

5. The nature and duties of respondent No. 3 have, to our mind, initially to be seen from the letter dated September 25, 1980. An analysis of the functions which were to be performed as per the said letter, the relevant portions of which have been quoted hereinabove, clearly shows that the work of respondent no. 3 was academic in nature. Apart from showing that respondent No. 3 had a tenure of two years with the petitioner, it is clearly stated that during this tenure of Fellowship, respondent No. 3 will be doing his own research.

6. Research of course is usually for the benefit of mankind, but when it is successfully carried out it primarily and essentially brings credit to the researcher. Various Nobel Laureates have achieved distinction in sciences through research which was carried out by them. In the very nature of things research means bringing out a creative work. It is difficult for us to comprehend as to how a highly qualified post-graduate Research Fellow can possibly be regarded as a workman within the meanings of Section 2(s) of the Act. The research which is carried out is not a function of the institute which is being discharged by respondent No. 3. The letter of September 25, 1980 further states that during the fellowship, respondent No. 3 will also be guiding researcher. It is clear that like a highly qualified academician this letter postulated respondent No. 3 giving guiding to research scholars. It is not in dispute that prior to September 25, 1980 respondent No. 3 had been a Reader in Gujarat Vidyapeeth. Counsel for the petitioner has placed before us a publication by respondent No. 3 called "Religion & Society". This was a publication under the auspices of the Indian Institute of Islamic Studies and the Publication is a result of the research which was carried out by respondent No. 3 during his tenure with the petitioner. In the brief bio-data of respondent No. 3 it was indicated that he was a Lecturer in Gujarat University in the year 1963-64 and in Udaipur from 1967-1972. Thereafter he became a Reader in Gujarat Vidyapeeth from January 1973 to June 4, 1975. It is thus clear that respondent No. 3 was, previously, taking regular classes and teaching the students and, therefore, vide letter dated September 25, 1980, he was also given the task of 'guiding research'. Further duties which were assigned to respondent No. 3 by the said letter was that of helping the administration of the department and the publication of the department's quarterly under the direction of the Head of the Department.

7. Seeing the aforesaid terms contained in the letter dated September 25, 1980 and also the jobs which were assigned to him as per the testimony of MW-2, we have no manner of doubt that the academic work which was being carried out by respondent No. 3 was similar to a work which could be carried out by a teacher and the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in A. Sundarambal v. Govt. of Goa, Damman & Diu (1989-I-LLJ-601), would be clearly applicable to the present case. The decision relied upon by Shri Anand can have no application in the present case in view of the nature of duties being performed by respondent No. 3. In the latest judgment of the Supreme Court in Sundarambal (supra) it has been categorically stated that it is to possible to accept the suggestion that having regard to the object of the Act, all employees in a industry except those falling under the four exception, should be treated as workmen. In Sundarambal's case (supra) the Supreme Court followed its earlier decision in the case of May & Baker (India) Ltd. v. Their Workmen (1961-II-LLJ-94) and in our opinion these two decision are clearly applicable to the present case. The functions of respondent no. 3 were purely academic in nature and he should not be regarded as a workman within the meaning of the definition in section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Labour Court was, therefore, in our opinion, wrong in coming to the conclusion that respondent No. 3 was a workman. In view of this conclusion of ours it is to necessary for us to decide the other contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner or the other issues decided by the Labour court. It is also not necessary for us to deal with other prayers in the writ petition, namely, that the amended definition approved by the Parliament of the word 'industry' should be brought into force.

8. For the aforesaid reasons this writ petition is allowed. The award dated April 17, 1990 of the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court is quashed and the reference made by the Delhi Administration is, therefore, answer in favor of the petitioner before us. The effect of this is that the interim order stand vacated and if any money has been paid or deposited by the petitioner during the pendency of this writ petition pursuant to the award then the petitioner is entitled to the restitution thereof. There will be no orders as to costs.