Bhagat Singh vs Sanyukta Uppal
1971 Latest Caselaw 339 Del

JUDGMENT

V.S. Deshpande, J.

(1) The sole question for decision in. this second appeal by the tenant is whether the notice dated 1-1-1965 given to him by the landlord was sufficient to determine his contractual tenancy of the premises. The tenancy began prior to 1-12-1962 when section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act became applicable to Delhi. The notice to terminate the tenancy was, therefore, required to be only a reasonable notice and not a notice in accordance with the terms of section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, Such a reasonable notice has to be for about 15 days but need not terminate the tenancy with the expiry of the month of tenancy.

(2) Bearing this in mind, the last paragraph of the notice may be perused which is as below :- "Thereby give you another notice to remove the unauthorised construction as mentioned above, and to stop the misuse of the godowns as residence, within one month of the receipt of this notice, failing which an application for your eviction will be filed against you at your risk and costs".

(3) The Controller dismissed the petition of the landlord for the eviction of the tenant on the preliminary ground that the abovementioned notice was not a valid one. This decision was reversed by the Tribunal who held that the notice was valid to terminate the contractual tenancy of the tenant.

(4) It appears to me that the only requirements of a reasonable notice to terminate the contractual tenancy are that the landlord should express his intention to evict the tenant clearly and the notice should give a reasonable time to the tenant to vacate the premises. Both these requirements are satisfied by the notice reproduced above. In Mangilal v. Sugan Chand Rathi, Aid 1965 Sc 101 the notice to quit, the validity of which was in question, was referred to in paragraph (2) of the decision. It falls into two parts, namely, (1) the tenant being in arrears of rent, he was required to pay the rent within one month from the date of the service of the notice and on his failure to do so. he was told that a suit for resentment would be filed against him; (2) in addition to this the notice also called upon the tenant to vacate the premises by the end of the month on the grounds that the premises were required by the landlord for his own business and the tenant had also sublet a portion of the premises without the permission of the landlord. The question before their Lordships was whether the first part of the notice was valid for both the purposes, namely; (1) section 4(a) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (corresponding to section 14(1)(a) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958) and (2) as a notice to quit terminating the tenancy of the tenant. At page 104, column 1, their Lordships held that the first part of the notice was valid for both these purposes.

(5) Learned counsel for the appellant Shri Makhija argues that the notice in the Supreme Court case would have been valid in any case because in the second part of the notice, the tenant was required to vacate the premises by the end of the month of tenancy. Learned counsel, therefore, argues that the notice could not be said to be valid because of its first part. What is binding on us here is the ratio of the decision which is at page 104, column 1. and not the mere statement of facts which is in paragraph (2) of the decision. Their Lordships were not called upon to decide the validity of the notice by looking to the second part of it but only by looking to the first part of it. It is not, therefore, possible to distinguish the decision on the ground that the second part of the notice made it valid when their Lordships have expressly held that only the first part of the notice made it valid without any reference to the second part of it.

(6) Learned counsel then referred to the recent decision of B.C. Misra, J. in M/s. Hindustan Trust Private Limited v. G. S.. Gupta, 1971 R.C.R. 879, for the proposition that a notice in the following terms was held to be invalid in that case :- "IT is therefore, to serve you with this notice of demand asking you to pay the said sum of Rs. 5,700.00 and future rent within the statutory period failing which you will render yourself liable to ejectment and legal proceedings will be initiated against you at your risk as to costs and consequences."

(7) Again the ratio of the decision by B. C. Misra, J. is contained in paragraphs 13 and 14 of the decision. His Lordship was of the view that the notice was vague and did not indicate which of the too legal proceedings, namely, one for the recovery of rent and the other for eviction was intended to be filed by the landlord and that the notice was not intended to and did not determine the contractual tenancy but was only a demand for the arrears of rent. The decision of B. C. Misra, J. was based on this interpretation of the facts of that particular case. The Supreme Court decision in Mangilal's case was sought to be distinguished on the ground that in Mangilal's case, the notice clearly shows the intention of the landlord to terminate the tenancy of the tenant under the provisions of both the Acts. It is clear to me that the notice in the present case before me clearly shows the intention of the landlord to evict the tenant if the tenant does not comply with the landlord's demand within one month. It is, therefore, clearly governed by the ratio of the Supreme Court decision in Mangilal's case followed by this Court in Megh Raj Mannulal v. L.I.C., (Civil Revision 16 of 1971 decided on 11-3-1971). It is governed by the ratio of the decision by Misra J., as the facts were interpreted to be different in that decision.

(8) In view of the above decision on the merits of the case, it is not necessary to consider the preliminary objection by the respondent that the appeal was also time-barred.

(9) The appeal is, therefore, dismissed but without any order as to costs.