(3) वह अपने को समस्त नियमों को आशयों के अनुरूप
स्खेगा, जो कि सेवा की उचित व्यवस्था के विनियम के लिए
समय-समय पर बनाए जावें और पद की प्रतिष्ठा और मर्यादा
में ध्यान देने की आदत डालेगा।
***
(11) वह सरकार के सभी अधिकारियों के साथ आदर और
सम्मान से और सभी श्रेणियों के निजी व्यक्तियों के साथ
सहनशीलता, दयालुता तथा शिष्टता से कार्य करेगा। निजी
जीवन में वह शान्तिपूर्ण व्यवहार का आदर्श प्रस्तुत करेगा तथा
सभी प्रकार के पक्षपात से दूर रहेगा।"
28. In the present case, the findings of guilt are primarily founded upon
statements of the complainant and her relatives, without the
petitioner being granted a fair and reasonable chance to effectively
test their credibility through cross-examination. The enquiry, thus,
assumes the character of a one-sided proceeding, wherein
adverse material was relied upon without affording the petitioner
an adequate opportunity of defence. Such a procedure strikes at
the very root of fairness embedded in service jurisprudence and
renders the enquiry proceedings arbitrary and legally untenable.
29. In Saroj Kumar Sinha (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has
lucidly reiterated the foundational requirement of fairness in
departmental proceedings and emphatically held that non-supply
of relevant documents and statements relied upon by the
disciplinary authority amounts to denial of reasonable opportunity
and is violative of principles of natural justice and observed as
follows :-
"34. This Court in Kashinath Dikshita v. Union
of India, (1986) 3 SCC 229, had clearly stated
the rationale for the rule requiring supply of
copies of the documents, sought to be relied
upon by the authorities to prove the charges
levelled against a government servant. In that
case the enquiry proceedings had been
challenged on the ground that non-supply of
the statements of the witnesses and copies of
the documents had resulted in the breach of
rules of natural justice. The appellant therein
had requested for supply of the copies of the
documents as well as the statements of the
witnesses at the preliminary enquiry. The
request made by the appellant was in terms
turned down by the disciplinary authority.
35. In considering the importance of access to
documents in statements of witnesses to meet
the charges in an effective manner this Court
observed as follows: (Kashinath Dikshita case ,
SCC pp. 234-35, para 10)
"10. ... When a government servant is facing
a disciplinary proceeding, he is entitled to be
afforded a reasonable opportunity to meet
the charges against him in an effective
manner. And no one facing a departmental
enquiry can effectively meet the charges
unless the copies of the relevant statements
and documents to be used against him are
made available to him. In the absence of
such copies, how can the employee
concerned prepare his defence, cross-
examine the witnesses, and point out the
inconsistencies with a view to show that the
allegations are incredible? It is difficult to
comprehend why the disciplinary authority
assumed an intransigent posture and refused
to furnish the copies notwithstanding the
specific request made by the appellant in this
behalf. Perhaps the disciplinary authority
made it a prestige issue. If only the
disciplinary authority had asked itself the
question: 'What is the harm in making
available the material?' and weighed the pros
and cons, the disciplinary authority could not
reasonably have adopted such a rigid and
adamant attitude. On the one hand there was
the risk of the time and effort invested in the
departmental enquiry being wasted if the
courts came to the conclusion that failure to
supply these materials would be tantamount
to denial of reasonable opportunity to the
appellant to defend himself. On the other
hand by making available the copies of the
documents and statements the disciplinary
authority was not running any risk. There
was nothing confidential or privileged in it."
36. On an examination of the facts in that case,
the submission on behalf of the authority that
no prejudice had been caused to the appellant,
was rejected, with the following observations:
(Kashinath Dikshita case, SCC p. 236, para 12)
"12. Be that as it may, even without going
into minute details it is evident that the
appellant was entitled to have an access to
the documents and statements throughout
the course of the inquiry. He would have
needed these documents and statements in
order to cross-examine the 38 witnesses who
were produced at the inquiry to establish the
charges against him. So also at the time of
arguments, he would have needed the
copies of the documents. So also he would
have needed the copies of the documents to
enable him to effectively cross-examine the
witnesses with reference to the contents of
the documents. It is obvious that he could not
have done so if copies had not been made
available to him. Taking an overall view of the
matter we have no doubt in our mind that the
appellant has been denied a reasonable
opportunity of exonerating himself."
37. We are of the considered opinion that the
aforesaid observations are fully applicable in
the facts and circumstances of this case. Non-
disclosure of documents having a potential to
cause prejudice to a government servant in the
enquiry proceedings would clearly be denial of
a reasonable opportunity to submit a plausible
and effective rebuttal to the charges being
enquired into against the government servant.
38. The aforesaid proposition of law has been
reiterated in Tirlok Nath v. Union of India [1967
SLR 759 (SC)] wherein it was held that non-
supply of the documents amounted to denial of
reasonable opportunity. It was held as follows:
(SLR pp. 764-65)
"... Had he decided to do so, the documents
would have been useful to the appellant for
cross-examining the witnesses who deposed
against him. Again had the copies of the
documents been furnished to the appellant
he might, after perusing them, would have
exercised his right under the rule and asked
for an oral inquiry to be held. Therefore, in
our view the failure of the inquiry officer to
furnish the appellant with copies of the
documents such as the first information
report and the statements recorded at the
Shidipura house and during the investigation
must be held to have caused prejudice to the
appellant in making his defence at the
inquiry."
39. The proposition of law that a government
employee facing a departmental enquiry is
entitled to all the relevant statements,
documents and other materials to enable him
to have a reasonable opportunity to defend
himself in the departmental enquiry against the
charges is too well established to need any
further reiteration. Nevertheless given the facts
of this case we may re-emphasise the law as
stated by this Court in State of Punjab v.
Bhagat Ram [(1975) 1 SCC 155 (SCC p. 156,
paras 6-8)
"6. The State contended that the respondent
was not entitled to get copies of statements.
The reasoning of the State was that the
respondent was given the opportunity to
cross-examine the witnesses and during the
cross-examination the respondent would
have the opportunity of confronting the
witnesses with the statements. It is
contended that the synopsis was adequate to
acquaint the respondent with the gist of the
evidence.
7. The meaning of a reasonable opportunity
of showing cause against the action
proposed to be taken is that the government
servant is afforded a reasonable opportunity
to defend himself against charges on which
inquiry is held. The government servant
should be given an opportunity to deny his
guilt and establish his innocence. He can do
so when he is told what the charges against
him are. He can do so by cross-examining
the witnesses produced against him. The
object of supplying statements is that the
government servant will be able to refer to
the previous statements of the witnesses
proposed to be examined against the
government servant. Unless the statements
are given to the government servant he will
not be able to have an effective and useful
cross-examination.
8. It is unjust and unfair to deny the
government servant copies of statements of
witnesses examined during investigation and
produced at the inquiry in support of the
charges levelled against the government
servant. A synopsis does not satisfy the
requirements of giving the government
servant a reasonable opportunity of showing
cause against the action proposed to be
taken."
30. In Satyendra Singh (supra), while dealing with the similar issue,
has observed as under :-
"13. This Court in a catena of judgments has
held that the recording of evidence in a
disciplinary proceeding proposing charges of a
major punishment is mandatory. Reference in
this regard may be held to Roop Singh Negi v.
Punjab National Bank and Others, (2009) 2
SCC 570 and Nirmala J. Jhala v. State of
Gujarat and Another, (2013) 4 SCC 301.
14. In the case of Roop Singh Negi, this Court
held that mere production of documents is not
enough, contents of documentary evidence
have to be proved by examining witnesses.
Relevant extract thereof reads as under: -
"14. Indisputably, a departmental proceeding
is a quasi-judicial proceeding. The enquiry
officer performs a quasi-judicial function. The
charges levelled against the delinquent
officer must be found to have been proved.
The enquiry officer has a duty to arrive at a
finding upon taking into consideration the
materials brought on record by the parties.
The purported evidence collected during
investigation by the investigating officer
against all the accused by itself could not be
treated to be evidence in the disciplinary
proceeding. No witness was examined to
prove the said documents. The management
witnesses merely tendered the documents
and did not prove the contents thereof.
Reliance, inter alia, was placed by the
enquiry officer on the FIR which could not
have been treated as evidence.
15. We have noticed hereinbefore that the
only basic evidence whereupon reliance has
been placed by the enquiry officer was the
purported confession made by the appellant
before the police. According to the appellant,
he was forced to sign on the said confession,
as he was tortured in the police station. The
appellant being an employee of the Bank, the
said confession should have been proved.
Some evidence should have been brought
on record to show that he had indulged in
stealing the bank draft book. Admittedly,
there was no direct evidence. Even there
was no indirect evidence. The tenor of the
report demonstrates that the enquiry officer
had made up his mind to find him guilty as
otherwise he would not have proceeded on
the basis that the offence was committed in
such a manner that no evidence was left.
...
19. The judgment and decree passed against
the respondent in Narinder Mohan Arya case
[(2006) 4 SCC 713 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 840]
had attained finality. In the said suit, the
enquiry report in the disciplinary proceeding
was considered, the same was held to have
been based on no evidence. The appellant
therein in the aforementioned situation filed a
writ petition questioning the validity of the
disciplinary proceeding, the same was
dismissed. This Court held that when a
crucial finding like forgery was arrived at on
evidence which is non est in the eye of the
law, the civil court would have jurisdiction to
interfere in the matter. This Court
emphasised that a finding can be arrived at
by the enquiry officer if there is some
evidence on record. ..."
(emphasis supplied)
15. Same view was reiterated in State of Uttar
Pradesh v. Saroj Kumar Sinha, (2010) 2 SCC
772 wherein, this Court held that even in an ex-
parte inquiry, it is the duty of the Inquiry Officer
to examine the evidence presented by the
Department to find out whether the unrebutted
evidence is sufficient to hold that the charges
are proved. The relevant observations made in
Saroj Kumar Sinha are as follows: -
"28. An inquiry officer acting in a quasi-
judicial authority is in the position of an
independent adjudicator. He is not supposed
to be a representative of the department
/disciplinary authority/ Government. His
function is to examine the evidence
presented by the Department, even in the
absence of the delinquent official to see as to
whether the unrebutted evidence is sufficient
to hold that the charges are proved. In the
present case the aforesaid procedure has
not been observed. Since no oral evidence
has been examined the documents have not
been proved, and could not have been taken
into consideration to conclude that the
charges have been proved against the
respondents.
....
33. As noticed earlier in the present case not
only the respondent has been denied access
to documents sought to be relied upon
against him, but he has been condemned
unheard as the inquiry officer failed to fix any
date for conduct of the enquiry. In other
words, not a single witness has been
examined in support of the charges levelled
against the respondent. The High Court,
therefore, has rightly observed that the entire
proceedings are vitiated having been
conducted in complete violation of the
principles of natural justice and total
disregard of fair play. The respondent never
had any opportunity at any stage of the
proceedings to offer an explanation against
the allegations made in the charge-sheet."
(emphasis supplied)
16. In the case of Nirmala J. Jhala, this Court
held that evidence recorded in a preliminary
inquiry cannot be used for a regular inquiry as
the delinquent is not associated with it and the
opportunity to cross-examine persons
examined in preliminary inquiry is not given.
Relevant extract thereof reads as under: -
"42. A Constitution Bench of this Court in
Amalendu Ghosh v. North Eastern Railway
[AIR 1960 SC 992] , held that the purpose of
holding a preliminary inquiry in respect of a
particular alleged misconduct is only for the
purpose of finding a particular fact and prima
facie, to know as to whether the alleged
misconduct has been committed and on the
basis of the findings recorded in preliminary
inquiry, no order of punishment can be
passed. It may be used only to take a view
as to whether a regular disciplinary
proceeding against the delinquent is required
to be held.
43. Similarly in Champaklal Chimanlal Shah
v. Union of India [AIR 1964 SC 1854] a
Constitution Bench of this Court while taking
a similar view held that preliminary inquiry
should not be confused with regular inquiry.
The preliminary inquiry is not governed by
the provisions of Article 311(2) of the
Constitution of India. Preliminary inquiry may
be held ex parte, for it is merely for the
satisfaction of the Government though
usually for the sake of fairness, an
explanation may be sought from the
government servant even at such an inquiry.
But at that stage, he has no right to be heard
as the inquiry is merely for the satisfaction of
the Government as to whether a regular
inquiry must be held. The Court further held
as under : (AIR p. 1862, para 12)
"12. ... There must therefore be no confusion
between the two enquiries and it is only
when the government proceeds to hold a
departmental enquiry for the purpose of
inflicting on the government servant one of
the three major punishments indicated in
Article 311 that the government servant is
entitled to the protection of that article [, nor
prior to that]."
44. In Narayan Dattatraya Ramteerthakhar v.
State of Maharashtra [(1997) 1 SCC 299 :
1997 SCC (L&S) 152 : AIR 1997 SC 2148]
this Court dealt with the issue and held as
under:
"... a preliminary inquiry has nothing to do
with the enquiry conducted after issue of
charge-sheet. The preliminary enquiry is only
to find out whether disciplinary enquiry
should be initiated against the delinquent.
Once regular enquiry is held under the
Rules, the preliminary enquiry loses its
importance and, whether preliminary enquiry
was held strictly in accordance with law or by
observing principles of natural justice of (sic)
nor, remains of no consequence."
45. In view of the above, it is evident that the
evidence recorded in preliminary inquiry
cannot be used in regular inquiry as the
delinquent is not associated with it, and
opportunity to cross-examine the persons
examined in such inquiry is not given. Using
such evidence would be violative of the
principles of natural justice."
(emphasis supplied)"
31. Further, the very same view has been reiterated by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in V. M. Saudagar (supra), wherein the Civil
Appeal was allowed and the judgment of the High Court was set
aside, restoring the order of the Central Administrative Tribunal.
The Supreme Court held that where the findings in a departmental
enquiry are based on non-examination of material witnesses,
reliance on untested statements, absence of relevant
documentary evidence, and perverse appreciation of record,
interference by the Tribunal is justified. The Hon'ble Apex Court
further directed release of all consequential monetary and
pensionary benefits to the legal heirs of the deceased employee,
thereby reaffirming that disciplinary findings unsupported by legally
admissible evidence cannot be sustained.
32. Very recently, in Monty Goyal (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court
while dealing with the scope of judicial review in disciplinary
proceedings and the requirement of adherence to principles of
natural justice, has observed as under :-
"9. ..... It appears that the appellant-advocate
has been held guilty of professional misconduct
merely on the basis of bald allegations
contained in the complaint, without the
complainant being examined on oath and
without affording the appellant-advocate the
indefeasible right of cross-examination, thereby
rendering the finding of professional
misconduct legally unsustainable.
10. Thus, considering the totality of the facts
and circumstances, particularly that the genesis
of the dispute was a mere misunderstanding
regarding the deposit of costs which stood
resolved during the pendency of the
proceedings, the impugned judgment cannot
be sustained. Once the respondent-
complainant himself expressed complete
satisfaction with the professional services
rendered by the appellant-advocate and
categorically sought to withdraw the complaint,
the very substratum of the disciplinary
proceedings ceased to exist. In these
circumstances, the order holding appellant-
advocate guilty of professional misconduct is
considered wholly unsustainable in facts as
well as in law. "
33. Having bestowed anxious consideration to the rival submissions
advanced by learned counsel for the parties and upon meticulous
examination of the original record placed before this Court, it
transpires that the entire edifice of the impugned disciplinary
action rests upon allegations emanating from matrimonial discord
between the petitioner and his wife. Admittedly, the matrimonial
dispute subsequently culminated in dissolution of marriage by
mutual consent, thereby indicating that the dispute was essentially
personal in nature. There is no material on record to demonstrate
that the petitioner, during his tenure as a Constable, was ever
found wanting in discharge of his official duties or that any act
attributable to him had adversely affected public confidence in the
police administration. In order to attract Para 64(03)(11) of the
Chhattisgarh Police Regulations, the conduct in question must be
of such gravity so as to constitute moral turpitude or bring
demonstrable disrepute to the disciplined force. A mere allegation
arising out of a private matrimonial dispute, in absence of legally
admissible evidence establishing grave misconduct affecting
public service, does not ipso facto satisfy the threshold
contemplated under the said provision. The application of the
aforesaid regulation, therefore, appears to be legally
unsustainable and disproportionate to the nature of accusations
brought on record.
34. This Court further finds that the disciplinary proceedings are
vitiated on account of patent violation of principles of natural
justice. The petitioner has consistently averred that he was denied
a fair, effective and meaningful opportunity to cross-examine the
material witnesses, whose statements constituted the sole basis of
the findings of guilt. The record reveals that the statements of the
complainant and her relatives were mechanically relied upon
without subjecting them to the test of cross-examination. It is trite
law that cross-examination is not an empty ritual but a substantive
right that enables the delinquent employee to demolish or discredit
adverse evidence. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Saroj Kumar
Sinha (supra) and Kashinath Dikshita (supra) has categorically
held that denial of adequate opportunity to defend, including denial
of relevant documents and cross-examination, renders the entire
enquiry void. The failure on the part of the enquiry officer to ensure
adherence to such fundamental safeguards has caused serious
prejudice to the petitioner and strikes at the very root of procedural
fairness.
35. It is no doubt true that the scope of judicial review in disciplinary
matters is limited; however, where the findings are based on no
evidence, or where procedural safeguards are sacrificed,
constitutional courts are obliged to intervene. In B.C. Chaturvedi
(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has recognized that
interference is warranted where the punishment is
disproportionate or where the procedure adopted is contrary to
law. In the present case, the punishment of dismissal from service
being the harshest civil consequence, has been imposed without
strict compliance of procedural mandates and without establishing
grave misconduct by cogent evidence. The cumulative effect of
these infirmities renders the impugned action arbitrary,
disproportionate and violative of Article 14 and Article 311(2) of the
Constitution of India. The decision-making process, therefore,
stands vitiated.
36. Consequently, in view of the foregoing discussion and the settled
principles governing exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India, this Court is of the considered opinion
that the impugned order passed by respondent No.4 (Annexure
P/1) suffers from manifest illegality, arbitrariness and non-
application of mind. The said order having been passed in
violation of the prescribed procedure and the principles of natural
justice, the same cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. The
appellate order dated 17.10.2022 and the revisional order dated
28.03.2023, being consequential in nature and founded upon the
very same defective reasoning, also stand vitiated and are liable
to be interfered with. Once the foundation goes, the superstructure
built thereupon cannot survive.
37. Accordingly, the impugned order issued by respondent No.4
(Annexure P/1), along with the consequential appellate order
dated 17.10.2022 and revisional order dated 28.03.2023, are
hereby quashed and set aside. The respondents are directed to
reinstate the petitioner in service forthwith with continuity of
service. The petitioner shall also be entitled to all consequential
benefits flowing from such reinstatement, including notional
seniority and other service benefits, in accordance with law.
38. However, considering the interregnum period and the fact that the
petitioner has not discharged duties during that period, this Court
deems it appropriate to award 50% of back wages, which shall be
paid within a period of three months from the date of receipt of
certified copy of this order. It shall, however, remain open to the
respondents to proceed afresh in accordance with law from the
stage of enquiry, if so advised, strictly adhering to statutory
provisions and principles of natural justice.
39. The writ petition stands allowed in the aforesaid terms. No order
as to costs.
Sd/-
(Amitendra Kishore Prasad)
Judge
Yogesh
The date when the The date when the The date when the judgment is
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reserved pronounced
Operative Full
13.02.2026 24.03.2026 ------ 24.03.2026
Head note
Interference by the Court in disciplinary matters, though limited, is
warranted where the findings are based on no evidence or are
perverse, where there is violation of procedural safeguards or principles
of natural justice, or where the punishment imposed is so
disproportionate to the misconduct as to shock the conscience of the
Court.
