[Cites 10, Cited by 0]
Chattisgarh High Court
Ghashi Ram Lonia vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 16 March, 2026
Author: Rajani Dubey
Bench: Rajani Dubey
1
2026:CGHC:12372-DB
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
ACQA No.45 of 2018
1 - Ghashi Ram Lonia S/o Baishakhu Ram Lonia Aged About 44 Years
R/o Village Kaya, Police Station Chakerbhata, District Bilaspur,
Chhattisgarh
Appellant (s)
versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer, Chowki Chilfi,
Police Station Lormi, District Mungeli, Chhattisgarh
2 - Jagdeep Jaiki Lonia S/o Kanhaiya Lal Lonia Aged About 23 Years
3 - Smt. Gulaba Bai W/o Kanhaiya Lal Lonia Aged About 55 Years
4 - Kanhaiya Lal Lonia S/o Late Khhamhhan Lal Lonia Aged About 58
Years
All R/o Village Navrangpur, Chowki- Chilfi, Police Station Lormi, District
Mungeli, Chhattisgarh
Respondent(s)
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through- Police Outpost Chilfi, Police Station
Lormi, District- Mungeli, Chhattisgarh
Appellant (s)
Versus
Digitally 1 - Jagdeep Jaiki Lonia S/o Shri Kanhaiya Lal Aged About 23 Years
signed
by R 2 - Smt. Gulaba Bai W/o Shri Kanhaiya Lal Aged About 55 Years
NIRALA
3 - Kanhaiya Lal (Since Deceased) S/o Late Shri Khamhan Singh Lonia
All R/o- Village Navrangpur, Police Outpost Chilfi, Police Station Lormi,
District- Mungeli, Chhattisgarh
Respondent(s)
For Complainant (s) : Mr. Ravindra Sharma and Ms. Saumya
Vaishnav, Advocates
For State(s) : Mr. Ramnarayan Sahu, Dy. GA
For respondent-accused : Mr. Rajesh Jain, Advocate
Hon'ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey
Hon'ble Shri Justice Radhakishan Agrawal
Judgment on Board
Per Rajani Dubey. J.
16/03/2026
1. Since both these appeals arise out of common judgment of
conviction and order of sentence, as one appeal has been filed
by the complainant whereas the another appeal has been filed by
the State, therefore, the same have been clubbed together, heard
together and are being decided by a common order.
2. The present acquittal appeals have been preferred by the
appellants against the judgment of acquittal dated 21.08.2017
passed by the learned Additional Session Judge, Mungeli in ST
No.40/2014, whereby the accused respondents have been
acquitted of the charges under Sections 302/34, 304-B & 201 of
IPC.
3. Brief facts of the case are that on 02.07.2014, the complainant
Ghasiram Loniya lodged the report at Police Station concerned to
the effect that the marriage of her daughter (deceased Smt. Kunti
Bai) was duly solemnized with the Accused Respondent Jagdeep
@ Jaiki Laniya about 2 or 2 years ago, thereafter, she was
residing at her in-law's house at Village Navrangpur, District
Mungell and she was having a male child aged about 15 months.
On 23.06.2014 at about 07:00 PM, the Up Sarpanch Narayan of
Village Navrangpur had informed his son Hariram on Mobile that
her daughter (deceased Smt. Kunti Bai) had got electric current
and asked to immediately come to the Village Navrangpur.
Thereafter, he along with Lalaram, Hariram, Vishram, Mahesh
Kaushik and Anil Kaushik went to Village Navrangpur at about
09:30 PM and saw there that her daughter deceased Kunti Bai
was burnt from face, mouth, hair, hands, legs and she was
covered with bed sheet and she was already died. The death of
the deceased did not appear as due to electric current and the
respondents accused committed murder of his daughter.
Thereafter a case was registered against the accused
respondents. After completion of the investigation, the charge-
sheet was filed before the Magistrate concerned. The learned
Trial Court after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence
available on record acquitted the accused respondents of the
aforesaid charges.
4. Learned counsel for the complainant as well as State jointly
submit that the impugned judgment of acquittal passed by the
learned Trial Court is illegal. Some of the prosecution witnesses
stated against the accused/respondents, but the learned Trial
Court only on minor contradictions and omissions on the part of
the other prosecution witnesses acquitted the respondents. The
prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt
against the respondents based on the evidence available on
record but the learned Trial Court did not appreciate the oral and
documentary evidence properly, as such the impugned judgment
is liable to be set aside and the respondents are liable to be
convicted.
5. Learned counsel for the respondents supports the impugned
judgment and submits that the learned Trial Court has minutely
appreciated the oral and documentary evidence available on
record and has rightly acquitted the respondents of the aforesaid
charges. They further submit that the death of the deceased was
also not proved by the prosecution whether homicidal, suicidal or
accidental and soon before death of deceased demand of dowry
is also not proved. It is also not proved that the deceased was
subjected to any cruelty regarding demand of dowry, as such the
learned Trial Court has rightly acquitted the respondents of the
aforesaid charges. Therefore, the appeals are liable to be
dismissed.
6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material
available on record.
7. It is clear from the record of the learned Trial Court that the
learned Trial Court framed charges under Section 304-B of IPC
and in alternate under Sections 302 read with Section 34 and
201 of IPC against the respondents and after appreciation of oral
and documentary evidence the learned Trial Court acquitted the
respondents of the aforesaid charges on the ground that the
prosecution has failed to prove its case against the respondents
beyond reasonable doubt.
8. It is not disputed in the present case that the deceased Kunti Bai
was wife of respondent Jagdeep and within 3 years of marriage,
she died on 23.06.2014.
9. Dr. Jitendra Paikra (PW-11) conducted postmortem of deceased
and he opined that the death was due to excessive and extensive
thermal burn and nature of death is dependent on police
investigation and forensic report. In FSL report (Ex-P/28), no
flammable substance like petrol, diesel was found and other
substance was also not found and in viscera of deceased
(Ex-P/29), no chemical poison was found. He admitted this
suggestion in para 15 that smell was not found in intestine, lung
and kidney of the deceased. He admitted this suggestion in para
16 that the injuries sustained by the deceased may come due to
electric shock in the house. He also admitted that he did not
opine the nature of death to be homicidal, accidental or suicidal,
as no signs were present.
10. The learned Trial Court also minutely appreciated the oral and
documentary evidence including the statement of PW-11 Dr.
Jitendra Paikra and rightly found that nature of death of the
deceased whether homicidal or suicidal has not been proved by
the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
11. PW-1 Ghasiram, father of deceased, PW-2 Hariram, brother of
deceased, PW-3 Lalaram, uncle of deceased and PW-4 Vishram
also uncle of deceased all these witnesses only stated that upon
receiving information they went at the place of occurrence. Only
PW-2 Hariram stated in his examination-in-chief that the accused
Jagdeep slapped his sister for demand of dowry and except the
same nothing was stated regarding any cruelty for demand of
dowry.
12. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Charan Singh @ Charanjit Singh vs
The State of Uttarakhand, reported in 2023 Live Law SC 341
held in para 11 as under:-
"11. The interpretation of Sections 304B and 498A IPC came
up for consideration in Baijnath's case (supra). The opinion
was summed up in paras 25 to 27 thereof, which are
extracted below:-
"25. Whereas in the offence of dowry death defined by
Section 304-B of the Code, the ingredients thereof are:
( i) death of the woman concerned is by any burns or bodily
injury or by any cause other than in normal circumstances,
and
(ii) is within seven years of her marriage, and
(iii) that soon before her death, she was subjected to cruelty
or harassment by her husband or any relative of the
husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry.
The offence under Section 498-A of the Code is attracted
qua the husband or his relative if she is subjected to cruelty.
The Explanation to this Section exposits "cruelty" as:
(i) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to
drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury
or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or
physical), or
(ii) harassment of the woman, where such harassment is
with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to
meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable
security or is on account of failure by her or any person
related to her to meet such demand.
26. Patently thus, cruelty or harassment of the lady by her
husband or his relative for or in connection with any
demand for any property or valuable security as a demand
for dowry or in connection therewith is the common
constituent of both the offences.
27. The expression "dowry" is ordained to have the same
meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
The expression "cruelty", as explained, contains in its
expanse, apart from the conduct of the tormentor, the
consequences precipitated thereby qua the lady subjected
thereto. Be that as it may, cruelty or harassment by the
husband or any relative of his for or in connection with any
demand of dowry, to reiterate, is the gravamen of the two
offences."
13. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Shoor Singh and others vs State of
Uttarakhand, reported in MANU/SC/1036/2024 held in paras 12
& 13 as under:-
"12. To constitute a 'dowry death', punishable under Section
304- B7 IPC, following ingredients must be satisfied:
i. death of a woman must have been caused by any burns
or bodily injury or it must have occurred otherwise than
under normal circumstances;
ii. such death must have occurred within seven years of her
marriage;
iii. soon before such death, she must have been subjected
to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of
her husband; and
iv. such cruelty or harassment must be in connection with
any demand for dowry.
The phrase 'otherwise than under normal circumstances' is
wide enough to encompass a suicidal death.
13. When all the above ingredients of 'dowry death' are proved,
the presumption under Section 113-B8 of the Evidence Act is to
be raised against the accused that he has committed the offence
of 'dowry death'. What is important is that the presumption under
Section 113-B is not in respect of commission of an act of
cruelty, or harassment, in connection with any demand for dowry,
which is one of the essential ingredients of the offence of 'dowry
death'. The presumption, however, is in respect of commission of
the offence of 'dowry death' by the accused when all the
essential ingredients of 'dowry death' are proved beyond
reasonable doubt by ordinary rule of evidence, which means that
to prove the essential ingredients of an offence of 'dowry death'
the burden is on the prosecution."
14. The father of the deceased Ghasiram admitted in his cross-
examination that prior to 6 months of her marriage, she tried to
commit suicide by taking poison and she was treated at CIMS
Bilaspur. He also admitted that her daughter was short tempered
due to which she administered poison and if she gets angered,
she tries to commit suicide. The brother of deceased Hariram
admitted this suggestion of defence that the deceased used to
live well in her matrimonial house, as such it is clear that the
prosecution has only proved this fact that the deceased died
within 7 years of her marriage but any cruelty related to demand
of dowry soon before her death is not proved by the prosecution.
The learned Trial Court also minutely appreciated the oral and
documentary evidence and rightly found that the prosecution has
failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt against the
respondents.
15. In para 45 of the judgment, the learned Trial Court observed as
under:-
"45. उपरोक्त साक्ष्य के विवेचन के पश्चात् निम्नलिखित परिस्थितियां एवं
तथ्य प्रमाणित होत हैं कि:-
1. मृतक अपने ससुराल (अभियुक्तगण के घर) में जल कर मरी है,
पी०एम० रिपोर्ट में मृतका के कं ठ, श्वास नली, दांहिने एवं बांये फे फड़े में
कार्बन पार्टीकल पायी गयी थी।
2. मृतका जब जली कमरा उसका अंदर से बंद था।
3. यह साक्ष्य नहीं आयी है कि अभियुक्तगण घटना के समय घर में थे।
4. बचाव साक्ष्य में यह तथ्य आया है कि अभियुक्त जगदीप अपने दोस्तों के
साथ के रम खेल रहा था, जब मृतका के कमरे से धुआं निकलने लगा तो वे
लोग सब दौड़े और मृतका पति अभियुक्त जगदीप भी दौड़कर आया।
5. जहां से धुआं निकल रहा था वह कमरा अंदर से बंद था और वे दरवाजा
को तोड़कर अंदर घुसे थे।
6. मृतका जली हुयी मृत पायी गयी थी, जिससे स्पष्ट है कि उसकी हत्या
नहीं की गयी थी, अन्यथा दरवाजा अंदर से बंद नहीं मिलता।
7. मृतका के शरीर में करेंट के निशान नहीं पाये गये थे, उसकी बिजली की
करेंट से मृत्यु नहीं हुयी थी, क्योंकि यदि उसकी बिजली की करेंट से मृत्यु
होती तो उसके फे फड़े, कं ठ एव श्वास नली में कार्बन पार्टीकल नहीं पाये
जाते तथा शरीर में बिजली के करेंट से जलने के निशान भी होते। जो कि
इस मामले में नहीं पाया गया है।
8. अभियुक्तगण के द्वारा दहेज से प्रताड़ित करने के कोई साक्ष्य नहीं है।
9. मृतका के पिता घासीराम (अ०सा०-1) के साक्ष्य से स्पष्ट है कि विवाह के
पूर्व भी मृतका एक जहर खाकर आत्महत्या करने की प्रयास कर चुकी थी,
जो यह दर्शाता है कि मृतका मानसिक रूप से मजबूत नहीं थी।
10. मृतका को आत्महत्या के लिए उकसाने संबंधी साक्ष्य नहीं आयी है।
11. बचाव पक्ष द्वारा मृतका की मृत्यु का कारण यह बताया गया है कि
मृतका गुस्सैल थी और छोटी-छोटी बातों पर तेज गुस्सा करती थी।"
16. The Hon'ble Apex Court in its judgment dated 12.02.2024
passed in Criminal Appeal No.1162 of 2011) in case of
Mallappa and Ors. Versus State of Karnataka, has held in para
36 as under:-
"36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based
on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned
as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential
values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any
failure of justice. The principles which come into play
while deciding an appeal from acquittal could be
summarized as:-
"(i) Appreciation of evidence is the core
element of a criminal trial and such
appreciation must be comprehensive
inclusive of all evidence, oral and
documentary;
(ii Partial or selective appreciation of
evidence may result in a miscarriage of
justice and is in itself a ground of
challenge;
(iii If the Court, after appreciation of
evidence, finds that two views are
possible, the one in favour of the accused
shall ordinarily be followed;
(iv) If the view of the Trial Court is a legally
plausible view, mere possibility of a
contrary view shall not justify the reversal
of acquittal;
(v) If the appellate Court is inclined to
reverse the acquittal in appeal on a re-
appreciation of evidence, it must
specifically address all the reasons given
by the Trial Court for acquittal and must
cover all the facts;
(vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to
conviction, the appellate Court must
demonstrate an illegality, perversity or error
of law or fact in the decision of the Trial
Court."
17. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the law
laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mallappa (supra) and
the view which has been taken by the learned trial Court appears
to be plausible and possible view and in the absence of any
patent illegality or perversity, as such this Court is not inclined to
interfere with the impugned judgment.
18. Accordingly, both the appeals are dismissed.
Sd/- Sd/-
Rajani Dubey Radhakishan Agrawal
Judge Judge
Nirala
