[Cites 8, Cited by 0]
Chattisgarh High Court
Parameshwar Vishwakarma vs Nirmala Sharma on 13 March, 2026
1
2026:CGHC:12014
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
SA No. 581 of 2025
Parameshwar Vishwakarma S/o Late Mundhar Vishwakarma Aged
About 40 Years R/o Village Karli (Thothapara), Tehsil- Geedam,
Digitally
signed by
JYOTI
District Dantewada C.G.
... Appellant(s)
JYOTI SHARMA
SHARMA Date:
2026.03.13
17:28:30
+0530
versus
1. Nirmala Sharma D/o Late Mundhar Vishwakarma, W/o Mr. Lalan
Sharma Aged About 38 Years R/o Village Karli (Thothapara),
Tehsil- Geedam, District Dantewada C.G.
2. State Government, Through Collector, District Dantewada C.G.
3. Gaya Prashad S/o Late Mundhar Vishwsakarma Aged About 60
Years R/o Village Chitalanka Tehsil And District- Dantewada C.G.
4. Smt. Durgadevi W/o Shri Mulchand Vishwakarma Aged About 56
Years R/o Village- Jagannathpur, District Jaunpur (U.P.)
5. Smt. Saroj Sharma W/o Mr. Sitaram Sharma Aged About 52
Years R/o Garividi, District Vijaynagram (A.P.)
6. Smt. Laxmi W/o Mr. Omprakash Sharma Aged About 37 Years
R/o Frejarpur Behind Bus Stand, Jagdalpur, District Bastar C.G.
7. Smt. Priya Vishwakarma W/o Parmeshwar Vishwakarma Aged
About 40 Years R/o Karli, District- Dantewada C.G.
... Respondent(s)
For Appellant(s) : Mr. T.K. Jha along with Mr. Tapan
Kumar Chandra, Advocate
For State : Mr. Malay Jain, P.L.
For Private : Mr. Aditya Dhar Diwan along with Ms.
Respondent Shivangi Agrawal, Advocate
Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge
Judgment on Board
13.03.2026
1. The defendant/ appellant has preferred this second appeal
under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for
brevity CPC) against the judgment & decree dated
25.07.2025 passed by the Learned 2nd Additional District
Judge, Dantewada, Dist South Bastar in Civil Appeal No. 07-
A/2023 (Parameshwar Vishwakarma Vs. Nirmala Sharma &
Ors.) affirming the judgment and decree dated 08.11.2024
passed by the Trial Court in Civil Suit No. 02-A/16 ( Nirmala
Vs. Patameshwar & Ors.) whereby the learned trial Judge has
partly allowed the suit of the plaintiff/ respondent. For the
sake of convenience, the parties would be referred as per
their status before the learned trial Court.
2. The plaintiff preferred the suit for declaration, permanent
injunction and partition pleading inter alia that the suit
property originally belonged to Late Munghar Vishwakarma
(father of the plaintiff) and the same was his self-acquired
property. It is pleaded that after the death of Munghar
Vishwakarma and his wife Smt. Shanti Devi Vishwakarma,
the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 remained in possession of
the suit property and were using and enjoying the same in
equal shares since the lifetime of Munghar Vishwakarma. It is
further pleaded that Munghar Vishwakarma was residing with
the plaintiff during his lifetime and had handed over the
original patta of the suit land to her. The plaintiff claims to be
in possession of the northern portion of the suit property
where she has constructed a double-shutter shop and a
residential house consisting of three rooms with a tube-well
installed therein and is carrying on a grocery business,
whereas defendant No. 1 is in possession of the southern
portion where he has constructed a single-shutter shop and
four rooms and is also carrying on a grocery business. It is
further averred in the plaint that disputes and business rivalry
exist between the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 and
proceedings in respect of the suit land were also initiated
before the Sub-Divisional Officer, Dantewada under Section
145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. According to the
plaintiff, defendant No. 1, on the false pretext that the original
patta had been lost, moved an application before the Sub-
Divisional Officer for issuance of a duplicate patta and by
misrepresenting himself as the sole legal heir of Late
Munghar Vishwakarma and in collusion with the revenue
authorities, managed to obtain a duplicate patta in his name
and in the name of his wife (defendant No. 7), which
according to the plaintiff is illegal and liable to be cancelled.
On the aforesaid pleadings, the plaintiff instituted the suit. The
cause of action is stated to have arisen after the death of
Munghar Vishwakarma on 28.08.2014 and also on account of
the subsequent proceedings before the Sub-Divisional
Officer and the continuing dispute between the parties
regarding the suit property.
3. Defendants No. 1, 3 and 5 filed a joint written statement and,
while admitting the admitted facts, denied the averments
made in the plaint paragraph-wise. Their principal contention
is that defendant No. 1 is the exclusive owner of the suit land
and no other person has any legal right over the same. It is
further pleaded that in Revenue Case No. 291/4-121/2014-
15, by order dated 19.02.2024 passed by the Sub-Divisional
Officer, Dantewada, the original forest rights patta issued in
favour of Munghar Vishwakarma has been cancelled and a
patta has been issued in favour of defendant No. 1 and
defendant No. 7. On the said grounds, dismissal of the suit
has been prayed for. Defendant No. 7 has also filed a
separate written statement reiterating the same averments as
made by defendants No. 1, 3 and 5 and has likewise prayed
for dismissal of the suit.
4. Defendant No. 6 filed a written statement and, except for the
admitted facts, denied the averments made in the plaint
paragraph-wise. It is mainly contended that although the
plaintiff and defendant No. 1 are in possession of the suit
land, the plaintiff and the defendants, being the children of
Late Munghar Vishwakarma, are all entitled to equal rights
and shares in the suit property. It is further pleaded that Late
Munghar Vishwakarma had not made any transfer of the suit
land in favour of either the plaintiff or defendant No. 1.
According to this defendant, he is also entitled to a 1/5th
share in the suit property.
5. After framing the issues and upon due appreciation of the
oral as well as documentary evidence available on record, the
learned Trial Court partly allowed the suit filed by the plaintiff,
holding that the plaintiff is only entitled for 1/6th share over the
disputed property. Aggrieved by the said judgment and
decree dated 08.11.2024, the defendant No. 1 preferred a
First Appeal under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure
before the learned First Appellate Court. The learned First
Appellate Court, on re-appreciation of the entire evidence on
record, affirmed the findings recorded by the Trial Court and
dismissed the appeal by the impugned judgment. Hence, the
present appeal.
6. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that both the
Courts have committed grave illegality and perversity in
holding that the Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain and
decide the present suit. It is contended that the dispute in
question arises out of proceedings under the provisions of the
Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers
(Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006 (for short Act, 2006)
and the Rules framed thereunder. Referring to Chapter IV of
the Act and Rules 12 to 16 of the Rules, 2006, it is submitted
that a complete mechanism and procedure has been
provided for adjudication of claims relating to forest rights.
According to the learned counsel, against the order passed
by the Sub-Divisional Level Committee, the appropriate
remedy available to the aggrieved party is to approach the
District Level Committee under Rule 15 of the Rules, 2008. It
is further submitted that in view of the statutory scheme
providing a specific forum and procedure for redressal of
grievances, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is impliedly
barred. Therefore, both the Courts have erred in entertaining
and deciding the suit. It is thus contended that the decree
passed by the Civil Court without jurisdiction is a nullity in the
eyes of law and is liable to be set aside. He placed his
reliance in the case of Dhruv Green Field Ltd. Vs. Hukum
Singh and Ors. reported in AIR 2002 Supreme Court 2841.
7. I have heard learned counsel for the appellant on the question
of admission, and the impugned judgments and decrees
passed by the learned trial Court as also the learned First
Appellate Court have been carefully examined.
8. This Court has considered the aforesaid submission made by
learned counsel for the appellant. So far as the procedural
provisions contained in the Scheduled Tribes and Other
Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights)
Act, 2006 and the Rules framed thereunder are concerned,
the said procedure is primarily meant for a situation where a
claim over forest land is made for the first time by a forest
dweller. In the present case, however, the forest rights patta
over the suit land had already been granted in favour of Late
Munghar Vishwakarma. After his death, the devolution of
such forest rights can only take place in accordance with
Section 4(4) of the Act.
9. In the instant case, the plaintiff has instituted the suit
challenging the legality and validity of the second modified
forest rights patta issued in favour of defendant No.1 and
seeking the reliefs of declaration, partition and permanent
injunction. Under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908, the Civil Courts have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil
nature except those which are either expressly or impliedly
barred. The defendants have not been able to point out any
specific provision under the Act of 2006 or the Rules framed
thereunder which expressly or impliedly bars the jurisdiction
of the Civil Court in matters relating to succession to forest
rights or in respect of challenge to the validity of such patta.
10. The reliance placed by learned counsel for the appellant on
the decision in Dhruv Green Field Ltd. Vs. Hukum Singh
and Ors. is also of no assistance to the appellant. In the said
judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has dealt with a
situation where the statute contained a clear and specific bar
of jurisdiction of the Civil Court. In the present case, however,
no such specific statutory bar has been shown to exist under
the provisions of the Act of 2006 or the Rules framed
thereunder. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the
contention raised by the appellant regarding lack of
jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not acceptable. It is held that
the Civil Court had the jurisdiction to entertain and decide the
present suit. Consequently, the said contention stands
rejected.
11. Further, in the present case, both the learned Trial Court as
well as the learned First Appellate Court, upon due
appreciation of the pleadings and the oral and documentary
evidence available on record, have concurrently held that the
provisions of the Act, 2006, that the suit land was not the self-
acquired property of Late Munghar Vishwakarma but a forest
rights patta granted by the Government under the said Act. It
has been held that such patta confers only a right of use and
enjoyment and, in view of Section 4(4) of the Act 2006, the
same is not transferable. The Courts have further
concurrently found that the order dated 19.02.2016 passed
by the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), Dantewada, on the
basis of which a modified second copy of the forest rights
patta was issued in favour of defendant No.1 and defendant
No.7, was passed without following the procedure prescribed
under the Act and the Rules and in violation of the principles
of natural justice, and therefore the said modified patta was
illegal and void. It has also been concurrently held that after
the death of Munghar Vishwakarma, all his legal heirs are
entitled to succeed to the rights of use and enjoyment of the
patta land; however, since the land is Government/forest land
granted only for use and enjoyment, the same is not capable
of partition. At the same time, the house and shops
constructed over the suit land by the family members are
divisible properties and each of the six legal heirs is entitled to
1/6th share therein. The Courts have further held that the
jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not barred under the Act in
respect of disputes relating to succession to forest rights. On
the basis of the aforesaid findings, the Trial Court partly
decreed the suit and the First Appellate Court, upon
reappreciation of the material on record, affirmed the said
findings and dismissed the appeal filed by defendant No.1.
12. Even otherwise, the scope of interference in a Second Appeal
under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is extremely
limited. Interference is permissible only when the appeal
involves a substantial question of law. Concurrent findings of
fact recorded by both the Courts cannot be interfered with
unless such findings are shown to be perverse, based on no
evidence, or contrary to settled principles of law.
13. In the present case, both the Trial Court and the First
Appellate Court have concurrently recorded findings, on the
basis of evidence available on record, that the appellant/
defendant failed to establish their case by placing cogent and
sufficient material. The appellants have failed to demonstrate
any perversity, illegality, or misapplication of law in the
findings so recorded.
14. The questions sought to be raised in the present Second
Appeal essentially relate to re-appreciation of evidence and
challenge to concurrent findings of fact. Such questions do
not give rise to any substantial question of law within the
meaning of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
15. It is well established that when there is a concurrent finding of
fact, unless it is found to be perverse, the Court should not
ordinarily interfere with the said finding.
16. In the matter of State of Rajasthan and others Vs. Shiv
Dayal and another, reported in (2019) 8 SCC 637, reiterating
the settled proposition, it has been held that when any
concurrent finding of fact is assailed in second appeal, the
appellant is entitled to point out that it is bad in law because it
was recorded de hors the pleadings or based on misreading
of material documentary evidence or it was recorded against
any provision of law and lastly, the decision is one which no
Judge acting judicially could reasonably have reached.
17. Be that as it may, the argument advanced by learned counsel
for the appellants and the proposed question of law cannot be
regarded as satisfying the test of being 'substantial question
of law' within the meaning of Section 100 of CPC. These
questions, in my view, are essentially question of facts. The
appellants failed to raise any substantial question of law
which is required under Section 100 of the CPC. In any event,
the Second Appeal did not involve any substantial question of
law as contemplated under Section 100 of the CPC, no case
is made out by the appellants herein. The judgments
impugned passed by the learned trial Court as as well as by
the learned First Appellate Court are just and proper and
there is no illegality and infirmity at all.
18. Having heard learned counsel for the appellants and on
perusal of the record of the case and in view of the above
settled legal proposition, I find absolutely no merit in this
appeal, involving no question of law much less substantial
question of law within the meaning of Section 100 of the CPC.
In my view, the judgment and decree passed by both the
Courts appear to be just, proper and legal. The findings
recorded are based on proper appreciation of evidence
available on record and there is no illegality or perversity in
the same and they does not call for any interference.
19. Consequently, the Second Appeal fails and is hereby
dismissed in limine resulting in upholding of the judgment
and decree of the trial Court as well as the Appellate Court.
SD/-
(Bibhu Datta Guru)
Judge
Jyoti
