State Of Chhattisgarh vs Jagan @ Satish Pizyani
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Chattisgarh High Court

State Of Chhattisgarh vs Jagan @ Satish Pizyani on 13 March, 2026

Author: Ramesh Sinha

Bench: Ramesh Sinha

                                                            1




                                                                             2026:CGHC:12084-DB
                                                                                          NAFR

                                 HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR


                                                  CRMP No. 1037 of 2022

                       State of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station Jamul, District : Durg,
                       Chhattisgarh
                                                                                   ... Applicant(s)
                                                         versus
                       Jagan @ Satish Pizyani S/o Nihal Chandra Aged About 22 Years R/o
                       Qutr. No. C 78 Block, Near Chhota Nalanda School, Housing Board,
                       Police Station Jamul, District : Durg, Chhattisgarh
                                                                                 ...Respondent(s)

(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)

For State/Applicant : Mr. S.S. Baghel, Government Advocate.

Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Order on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 13.03.2026

1. Heard Mr. S.S. Baghel, learned Government Advocate for the

applicant/State.

2. The State has sought leave to appeal against the impugned

judgment of acquittal dated 01.12.2021 passed in Special Sessions

Digitally signed by Case (POCSO Act) No. 238 of 2019 by the learned Additional Sessions BRIJMOHAN BRIJMOHAN MORLE MORLE Date:

2026.03.13 18:59:43 +0530

Judge, Third Fast Track Special Court (POCSO Act) Durg, District Durg

(C.G.) (hereinafter referred to as the "learned trial Court"), whereby the

learned trial Court acquitted the respondent trial Court acquitted the

respondents of the offences punishable under Section 509, 354 (?k) of

the IPC & under Section 12 of the Prevention of Childresh from Sexual

Offences Act, 2012 (for short, 'POCSO Act') and under Section 354 of

the IPC & U/s 8 of POCSO Act and under Section 376 (2)(>) of the IPC

& under Section 4 of the POCSO Act, holding that the prosecution failed

to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt.

3. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that:

(i) On 17.03.2016, the complainant / mother (PW-4) of the

victim lodged a complaint in the Police Station Jamul, Distt.

Durg alleging that she lives at Ghasidasnagar, Qutr. No. 32.

She alleged that on 17.03.2016 her daughter informed her that

the accused/respondent, with ill intention, always touched her

breast, chick and body and saying her I love you, caught her

anywhere. The victim (PW-3) also informed that on 01 st

February the accused/respondent, in the newly constructed

house, was doing obscene acts with her. When the

complainant told that why she has not informed earlier, the

victim said that the accused/respondent has said to not inform

the incident anyone. The Police registered the case and took

the matter under investigation. The Police recorded the

statement of the witnesses and seized the caste certificate of

the victim. The victim was sent for medical examination, after

getting consent.

(ii) After due and necessary investigation, the charge-sheet

was filed against the respondent/accused and the

respondent/accused was put to face charge before the learned

trial Court. The respondent/accused abjured the guilt. In order

to prove its case, the prosecution examined as many as 05

witnesses in its favour.

(iii) After appreciating the evidences on record, the learned trial

Court did not believe the evidence proving guilt of the

respondent/accused, and therefore, acquitted the

respondent/accused from the offence charged vide impugned

judgment and order dated 01.12.2021, hence, the present

Criminal Miscellaneous Petition has been filed seeking leave to

appeal.

4. Learned State counsel submits that the learned trial Court

committed a grave error in acquitting the respondent/accused by

unjustifiably discarding the evidence of the complainant without

assigning any cogent, convincing, or substantial reasons. It is

contended that the learned trial Court failed to consider that, for proving

the age of the victim, the admission register (Ex.P/3), wherein the date

of birth of the victim is recorded as 25.03.2004, has not been rebutted

by the defence. He further submitted that the learned trial Court failed to

properly appreciate the statement of the victim (PW-3), wherein she

stated that on the date of the incident one Kasturi called her to her

house for playing Carrom. When she reached the house, Kasturi called

the accused/respondent by mobile phone. In the room, Kasturi opened

her clothes, thereafter the accused/respondent caught hold of the victim

and, after opening his clothes, established physical relations with her.

The victim (PW-3) was crying due to pain; thereafter Kasturi covered

her mouth and held her hands. After some time, the

accused/respondent left the victim. Despite the prosecution having led

consistent, reliable, and corroborative evidence through its witnesses,

the learned trial Court failed to properly evaluate and appreciate their

testimonies in their correct legal perspective and erroneously acquitted

the accused. The findings recorded by the learned trial Court are

therefore perverse, contrary to the evidence available on record, and

unsustainable in law. Accordingly, it is most respectfully prayed that

leave to appeal against the impugned judgment of acquittal be granted.

5. We have heard learned State counsel and perused the record of

the case including the impugned judgment of acquittal.

6. Learned trial Court while acquitting the accused/respondent has

observed in paragraphs 39 to 48 as follows:

"39. According to the prosecution story, since February 2016 the accused had been touching the victim's body, breasts and cheeks with bad intention, saying "I love you," and catching hold of her anywhere and committing obscene acts with her. About one and a half months later, when the victim informed her mother (PW-4) about the incident, her mother

submitted a written complaint against the accused at Police Station Jamul, District Durg, on the basis of which the First Information Report was registered. However, during the trial the victim (PW-3), while improving her earlier statements, described the incident in an entirely different manner and alleged that the accused had committed rape upon her.

40. The victim's mother (PW-4), without giving any detailed account of the alleged incident of molestation, merely stated that the accused had teased/molested the victim. Her testimony is silent regarding any allegation that the accused had committed rape upon the victim. Thus, the statements of the victim (PW-3) are not supported by the testimony of her mother (PW-4); rather, the statements of the victim (PW-3) and her mother (PW-4) are contradictory to each other, thereby creating doubt regarding their testimonies.

41. The Investigating Officer, Inspector Navi Monika Pandey (PW-5), deposed that she visited the place of occurrence and prepared the spot map (Ex.P/10) as pointed out by the complainant/victim's mother (PW-

4), which bears her signature at portions 'A to A' and 'B to B'. Revenue Inspector G.S.N. Kaushik (PW-1) also stated that he prepared the site map (Ex.P/01) of the place of occurrence as pointed out by the complainant/victim's mother (PW-4), which bears his signatures at portion 'A to A'. This fact is corroborated by the testimony of the victim's mother (PW-4), who stated that the police prepared the spot map (Ex.P/10) and that the Patwari prepared the site map (Ex.P/01) on the basis of her indication. No material contradiction to this evidence has been brought on

record by the defence.

42. According to the site map (Ex.P/01) and the spot map (Ex.P/10), the place of occurrence is an under-

construction house situated at a distance of about 150 feet from the residence of the complainant/victim's mother (PW-4). However, the victim (PW-3), in her testimony, made a contradictory statement by stating that the place of occurrence was Kasturi's house, and in cross-examination she clarified that Kasturi's house and her own house are situated one above the other. Thus, from the statements of the victim herself, the place of occurrence in the present case becomes doubtful.

43. It is noteworthy that the victim (PW-3) herself could not remain consistent during her cross- examination and admitted that the accused had not committed any wrongful act, molestation or rape with her. She further stated that the accused never came to her house, never met her on the way, never went to her school, and that she had never informed her mother or any other person about such an incident.

44. Even the victim's mother (PW-4), during her cross- examination, denied the written complaint (Ex.P/8) and the First Information Report (Ex.P/9) registered on the basis of that complaint. As a result, the very first information regarding the incident comes under doubt, thereby rendering the entire investigation based on it doubtful.

45. From the above analysis of evidence, this Court reaches the conclusion that the testimony of the victim is not consistent with the prosecution story. She could not remain firm during cross-examination and

admitted that the accused had not committed any wrongful act, molestation or rape with her and that she had never informed anyone about such an incident prior to the date of her evidence. Moreover, the statements of the victim (PW-3) and her mother (PW-

4) are mutually contradictory, and the victim's mother (PW-4) has even denied the written complaint on the basis of which the FIR was registered. Therefore, the testimony of the victim suffers from inherent weaknesses and raises doubts about its credibility, and thus fails to inspire confidence. The investigation has also not been corroborated by reliable evidence. Consequently, the prosecution case appears doubtful.

46. In this regard, the Bombay High Court in Navin Dhanicam Baraiye (In Jail) vs State of Maharashtra (decided on 25 June 2018) has held that the presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act is not absolute and operates only after the prosecution first establishes foundational facts against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. It was further held that if such foundational facts are not proved, the presumption does not arise, and even if it does, the accused may rebut the same through cross-

examination or by leading defence evidence on the touchstone of preponderance of probability.

47. As the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, the presumption provided under Sections 29 and 30 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 does not apply in the present case. The Court therefore concludes that the prosecution has failed to prove the charges against the accused beyond reasonable doubt.

48. Consequently, giving the benefit of doubt to the accused, he is acquitted of the charges under Section 509 and Section 354-D of the Indian Penal Code and Section 12 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012; under Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 8 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012; and under Section 376(2)(a) of the Indian Penal Code and Section 4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012."

7. Having considered the submissions advanced by learned State

counsel and upon perusal of the entire record, including the impugned

judgment and the findings recorded by the learned trial Court, this Court

finds that the trial Court has minutely examined and appreciated the

evidence available on record. The trial Court has taken into

consideration the testimony of the victim and her mother, the evidence

of the Investigating Officer, the documentary evidence such as the site

map and spot map, as well as the contradictions emerging from the

statements of the prosecution witnesses. The trial Court has particularly

noted that the victim was not consistent in her testimony and, during

cross-examination, admitted that the accused had not committed any

wrongful act with her. The Court has also observed that the statements

of the victim (PW-3) and her mother (PW-4) are mutually contradictory,

and even the written complaint and the FIR were denied by the victim's

mother during her cross-examination. The trial Court further found that

the place of occurrence itself became doubtful due to contradictory

statements of the victim in relation to the site plan. On the basis of the

aforesaid discrepancies and lack of reliable corroboration, the trial Court

reached the conclusion that the prosecution failed to prove the charges

beyond reasonable doubt and, therefore, extended the benefit of doubt

to the accused.

8. It is well settled that in an appeal against acquittal, the scope of

interference by the appellate Court is very limited. Unless the findings

recorded by the trial Court are shown to be perverse, manifestly illegal,

or wholly unsustainable on the basis of the evidence on record, the

appellate Court would not be justified in interfering with the order of

acquittal. Recently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while considering the

scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal in State of

Rajasthan vs. Kistoora Ram, reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC 984,

has held as follows:

"8. The scope of interference in an appeal against

acquittal is very limited. Unless it is found that the view

taken by the Court is impossible or perverse, it is not

permissible to interfere with the finding of acquittal.

Equally if two views are possible, it is not permissible

to set aside an order of acquittal, merely because the

Appellate Court finds the way of conviction to be more

probable. The interference would be warranted only if

the view taken is not possible at all."

9. In the present case, the findings recorded by the learned trial

Court are based on a proper appreciation of the evidence available on

record and cannot be said to be perverse or wholly unsustainable in

law. Even otherwise, the view taken by the learned trial Court is a

possible and plausible view on the basis of the material placed before it.

Therefore, this Court does not find any sufficient ground to grant leave

to appeal against the judgment of acquittal.

10. Consequently, the Criminal Miscellaneous Petition seeking grant of

leave to appeal is dismissed in limine. In view of the dismissal of the

petition, the accompanying acquittal appeal also stands dismissed.

                             Sd/-                               Sd/-
                  (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal)                 (Ramesh Sinha)
                            Judge                           Chief Justice




Brijmohan