[Cites 13, Cited by 0]
Chattisgarh High Court
Kamal Baghel vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 10 March, 2026
1
2026:CGHC:11428
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRA No. 81 of 2026
Kamal Baghel S/o Pusau Baghel Aged About 38 Years R/o Karhi, Police
Station - Sargaon, District - Mungeli, Chhattisgarh
... Appellant
versus
State Of Chhattisgarh through Police Station Sargaon, District Mungeli,
Chhattisgarh
... Respondent
For Appellant : Ms. Shriya Jaiswal, Advocate
For Respondent/State : Mr. Shubham Bajpayi, Panel Lawyer
RAJSHEKHAR
SONI Hon'ble Mr. Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Judgment on Board
10.03.2026
1. In compliance of the Court's order dated 20.02.2026, a fresh
notice was issued to the complainant/father of the victim (PW-2)
informing him about the pendency of the present appeal, and he
has appeared in video conferencing through Distract Legal
Services Authority (DLSA) and objected the prayer made by the
appellant in the present appeal. Considering the fact that the
appellant is in jail since 30.10.2024, with the consent of the
parties, this Court proceeds to hear the matter finally on merits.
2. The appellant has preferred this appeal under Section 374(2) of
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, 'CrPC') questioning
the impugned judgment dated 07.11.2025 passed by the learned
Additional Session Judge (F.T.C.) Mungeli, District - Mungeli
(C.G.) in Special Criminal Case No. 51/2024, whereby the trial
Court has convicted and sentenced the appellant with a direction
to run all the sentences concurrently in the following manner :
CONVICTION SENTENCE
U/s 75(1)(i) of Rigorous imprisonment for 3 years with fine of
Bharatiya Nyaya Rs.500/-, in default of payment of fine
Sanhita, 2023 (In additional R.I. for 6 months.
short, 'BNS')
U/s 76 of BNS, Rigorous imprisonment for 3 years with fine of
and Sections 8 Rs.500/-, in default of payment of fine
and 12 of additional R.I. for 6 months.
POCSO Act.
3. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that the father of the victim
(PW-02) lodged a written complaint at Police Station Sargaon on
29.10.2024, stating that on 29.10.2024 at about 4:30 PM, his
daughter/victim was going to the pump (water source) to fetch
water. At that time, the accused Kamal Baghel, a resident of the
same village, pushed the victim near the government pond
(dabri) located close to his house, causing her to fall down. The
accused tore the upper kurti worn by the victim and asked her for
sexual intercourse in a filthy language. Upon the victim raising
alarm and shouting, her brother-in-law and his wife reached
there, and thereafter the complainant himself went towards the
pond asking what had happened and helped his daughter get up.
4. Although no incident of rape/sexual intercourse occurred with the
victim. Thereafter, the complainant took his daughter to the
concerned Police Station to lode the report. On the basis of the
said written complaint of the complainant/victim's father (Ex.P-
23), the First Information Report (FIR) (Ex.P-24) was registered
at Police Station Sargaon against the accused in Crime No.
170/2024 under Section 75(1)(ii), 76 of the BNS and Sections 12
of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012,
and investigation was commenced.
5. During the course of investigation, the Spot Map of the place of
occurrence (Ex.P-11) and Patwari Map-cum-panchnama (Ex.P-
02) were prepared. With regard to the date of birth of the victim,
the original admission and Dakhila Kharij Register of the victim's
school (Ex.P-07), in which the date of birth of the victim is
recorded, and its certified copy (Ex.P-07C) were seized vide
seizure memo (Ex.P-08). The victim was subjected to medical
examination. On production by the victim's mother, a long-
sleeved white and blue striped shirt (log suit) worn by the victim,
which was torn on both sleeves, was seized vide seizure memo
(Ex.P-05). The statement of the victim (Ex.P-01) was recorded
before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Mungeli under Section
183 of the BNSS. The accused was arrested and arrest memo
(Ex.P-17) was prepared.
6. During the course of investigation, statements of witnesses were
recorded under Section 180 of the BNSS. After completion of
investigation and other necessary formalities, the charge-sheet
against the accused was filed before the trial Court under
Sections 75(1)(i) and 76 of the BNS and Section 12 of the
POCSO Act.
7. So as to prove the complicity of the accused/appellant in the
crime in question, the prosecution has examined as many as 11
witnesses and exhibited 25 documents in support of its case.
Statement of the accused/appellant under Section 351 of BNSS
was also recorded in which he pleaded his innocence and false
implication in the case. The accused did not give any defense
evidence in his defence.
8. The trial Court after completion of trial and after appreciating oral
and documentary evidences available on record, by the
impugned judgment dated 07.11.2025 convicted and sentenced
the appellant in the manner mentioned in the opening paragraph
of this judgment, against which this appeal under Section 415(2)
of the BNSS has been preferred by them calling in question the
impugned judgment.
9. Learned counsel for the appellant vehemently argued that the
learned trial Court has failed to properly appreciate the evidence
led by the prosecution and has wrongly convicted the appellant.
The prosecution failed to prove the case against the appellant
beyond reasonable doubt. The statement of the victim is full of
conjectures and surmises and is highly unreliable. The age of the
victim has not been properly proved and no ossification test for
determining the age has been done which makes the whole case
of the prosecution doubtful. Hence, the conviction is liable to be
set aside.
10. On the other hand, learned State counsel submitted that the
appellant has committed a heinous crime of trying to outrage the
modesty of the minor victim who was aged about 15 years and 8
months on the date of incident by tearing the clothes worn by the
victim and asked her for sexual intercourse in a filthy language,
and the same has been duly proved by the prosecution beyond
reasonable doubt. As such, the judgment of conviction and
sentence awarded by the learned trial Court is just and proper
warranting no interference.
11. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their
rival submissions made herein-above and went through the
records with utmost circumspection.
12. The first question for consideration before this Court would
be, whether the trial Court has rightly held that on the date
of incident, the victims were minor?
13. When a person is charged for the offence punishable under the
POCSO Act, or for rape punishable in the Indian Penal Code, the
age of the victim is significant and essential ingredient to prove
such charge and the gravity of the offence gets changed when
the child is below 18 years, 12 years and more than 18 years.
Section 2(d) of the POCSO Act defines the "child" which means
any person below the age of eighteen years.
14. In Jarnail Singh Vs. State of Haryana, reported in (2013) 7
SCC 263, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down the guiding
principles for determining the age of a child, which read as
follows :
"22. On the issue of determination of age of a minor, one only
needs to make a reference to Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice
(Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 (hereinafter
referred to as the 2007 Rules). The aforestated 2007 Rules
have been framed under Section 68(1) of the Juvenile Justice
(Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. Rule 12 referred
to hereinabove reads as under :
"12. Procedure to be followed in
determination of Age.? (1) In every case
concerning a child or a juvenile in conflict with
law, the court or the Board or as the case may
be the Committee referred to in rule 19 of these
rules shall determine the age of such juvenile or
child or a juvenile in conflict with law within a
period of thirty days from the date of making of
the application for that purpose.
(2) The court or the Board or as the case may
be the Committee shall decide the juvenility or
otherwise of the juvenile or the child or as the
case may be the juvenile in conflict with law,
prima facie on the basis of physical appearance
or documents, if available, and send him to the
observation home or in jail.
(3) In every case concerning a child or juvenile
in conflict with law, the age determination
inquiry shall be conducted by the court or the
Board or, as the case may be, the Committee
by seeking evidence by obtaining -
(a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent
certificates, if available; and in the absence
whereof;
(ii) the date of birth certificate from the school
(other than a play school) first attended; and in
the absence whereof;
(iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or
a municipal authority or a panchayat;
(b) and only in the absence of either (i), (ii) or
(iii) of clause (a) above, the medical opinion will
be sought from a duly constituted Medical
Board, which will declare the age of the juvenile
or child. In case exact assessment of the age
cannot be done, the Court or the Board or, as
the case may be, the Committee, for the
reasons to be recorded by them, may, if
considered necessary, give benefit to the child
or juvenile by considering his/her age on lower
side within the margin of one year.
and, while passing orders in such case shall,
after taking into consideration such evidence as
may be available, or the medical opinion, as the
case may be, record a finding in respect of his
age and either of the evidence specified in any
of the clauses (a)(i), (ii), (iii) or in the absence
whereof, clause (b) shall be the conclusive
proof of the age as regards such child or the
juvenile in conflict with law.
(4) If the age of a juvenile or child or the
juvenile in conflict with law is found to be below
18 years on the date of offence, on the basis of
any of the conclusive proof specified in sub-rule
(3), the court or the Board or as the case may
be the Committee shall in writing pass an order
stating the age and declaring the status of
juvenility or otherwise, for the purpose of the
Act and these rules and a copy of the order
shall be given to such juvenile or the person
concerned.
(5) Save and except where, further inquiry or
otherwise is required, inter alia, in terms of
section 7A, section 64 of the Act and these
rules, no further inquiry shall be conducted by
the court or the Board after examining and
obtaining the certificate or any other
documentary proof referred to in sub-rule (3) of
this rule.
(6) The provisions contained in this rule shall
also apply to those disposed off cases, where
the status of juvenility has not been determined
in accordance with the provisions contained in
sub- rule(3) and the Act, requiring dispensation
of the sentence under the Act for passing
appropriate order in the interest of the juvenile
in conflict with law."
23. Even though Rule 12 is strictly applicable only to
determine the age of a child in conflict with law, we are of the
view that the aforesaid statutory provision should be the basis
for determining age, even for a child who is a victim of crime.
For, in our view, there is hardly any difference in so far as the
issue of minority is concerned, between a child in conflict with
law, and a child who is a victim of crime. Therefore, in our
considered opinion, it would be just and appropriate to apply
Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules, to determine the age of the
prosecutrix VW-PW6. The manner of determining age
conclusively, has been expressed in sub-rule (3) of Rule 12
extracted above. Under the aforesaid provision, the age of a
child is ascertained, by adopting the first available basis, out
of a number of options postulated in Rule 12(3). If, in the
scheme of options under Rule 12(3), an option is expressed
in a preceding clause, it has overriding effect over an option
expressed in a subsequent clause. The highest rated option
available, would conclusively determine the age of a minor. In
the scheme of Rule 12(3), matriculation (or equivalent)
certificate of the concerned child, is the highest rated option.
In case, the said certificate is available, no other evidence
can be relied upon. Only in the absence of the said
certificate, Rule 12(3), envisages consideration of the date of
birth entered, in the school first attended by the child. In case
such an entry of date of birth is available, the date of birth
depicted therein is liable to be treated as final and conclusive,
and no other material is to be relied upon. Only in the
absence of such entry, Rule 12(3) postulates reliance on a
birth certificate issued by a corporation or a municipal
authority or a panchayat. Yet again, if such a certificate is
available, then no other material whatsoever is to be taken
into consideration, for determining the age of the child
concerned, as the said certificate would conclusively
determine the age of the child. It is only in the absence of any
of the aforesaid, that Rule 12(3) postulates the determination
of age of the concerned child, on the basis of medical
opinion."
15. In the present case, the victim (P.W.-01) has stated that she does
not know her exact date of birth and deposed that, on the date of
her testimony, her present age was 15 years. The father of the
victim (P.W.-02) and the mother of the victim (P.W.-03) also
stated that they are not aware of the exact date of birth of the
victim, but deposed that on the date of their testimony the victim
was 15 years of age, thereby corroborating the version of the
victim. The statements made by the victim and her parents
regarding the age of the victim remain unchallenged and
unrebutted, as no material could be elicited by the defence
during cross-examination to contradict their testimony.
Consequently, the contention of the victim and her parents that
the victim was a minor at the time of the incident cannot be
refuted or said to be incorrect.
16. In this regard, the Investigating Officer Santosh Kumar Sharma,
Inspector (P.W.-09) has deposed that, with respect to the date of
birth of the victim, the original Dakhila Kharij register of the
victim's school (Ex.P-07) and its certified copy (Ex.P-07C) were
seized vide seizure memo (Ex.P-08). The aforesaid facts have
not been contradicted or discredited in the cross-examination of
this witness. Furthermore, the Headmaster of the victim's school
(P.W.-05) has supported the fact that the said Dakhila Kharij
Register (Ex.P-07C) was seized by the police from him. As per
the said Register, the date of birth of the victim is recorded as
31.01.2009. The testimony of this witness has also not been
shaken or rendered unreliable in cross-examination.
17. As per the said entry in Dakhila Kharij Register (Ex.P-07), the
victim was admitted to Class-I on 19.06.2015, which indicates
that at the time of admission she was approximately 06 years
and 04 months old. If the age of the victim is calculated on the
basis of the said date of birth, then on the date of the incident i.e.
on 29.10.2024, the victim would be 15 years and 08 months old.
The defence has not presented any oral or documentary
evidence to refuse the said date of birth, therefore, there is no
reason to disbelieve the date of birth of the victim, as
31.01.2009, hence, we are of the considered opinion that the trial
Court has rightly held that the date of birth of the victim is
31.01.2009 and his age on the date of incident i.e. 29.10.2024
was 15 years and 08 months.
18. The next question for consideration is whether the appellant
has committed rape on minor victim ?
19. In this regard, the statement of the victim (PW-1) is of much
importance. The victim (PW-1) in his statement recorded by the
Magistrate under Section 183 of the BNSS has stated that the
occurrence took place during Diwali of the year preceding her
testimony. On the date of the incident, at approximately 05:00
PM, while she was going to the tap/pump to fetch water, the
accused pushed her to the ground. The accused solicited her by
asking that how much amount she would take from him and
offering her the amount of Rs.500 and Rs.1000. He then climbed
on top of her, tore her clothes, and began touching her body.
Subsequently, her brother-in-law and elder sister arrived and
rescued her, followed by the arrival of her parents.
20. Upon perusal of the victim's statement under Section 183 of the
BNSS (Ex.P-01), it is found to be corroborated by her Court
testimony. A comparison of her Section 183 BNSS statement and
her Court deposition reveals no such contradictions or
inconsistencies that would render her testimony suspicious or
unreliable.
21. The Father of the victim (P.W.-02), in his examination-in-chief,
deposed that the incident occurred during the last Diwali. Around
05:00 PM, while he was at home, his daughter went to fetch
water. After 5-7 minutes, his elder daughter, who was on the
terrace, heard a commotion and rushed toward the dabri
(pond/ditch). She was followed by his son-in-law and then his
wife. Shortly after, his grandson informed him that a fight was
occurring involving his mother, father, and grandmother. Upon
reaching the spot, he observed the accused grappling with his
family members and intervened to free them. This witness further
stated that his daughter informed him that while she was going
for take water, the accused/appellant abused her; when she
resisted, the appellant started quarrelling with her, grabbed her
arms, and pinned her down in a ditch. Thereafter, he, along with
his wife and daughter, went to Sargaon Police Station and
submitted a written complaint, based on which the First
Information Report (FIR) was registered.
22. While the father's testimony contained certain omissions
regarding material facts, upon being asked leading questions by
the prosecution, he admitted the suggestion that his
daughter/victim had informed him that the accused had torn her
clothes.
23. The mother of the victim (P.W.-03) deposed that the incident took
place last Diwali at 05:00 PM. While the family was at home and
the victim went to fetch water, the accused molested her. At that
time, her son-in-law was seated on the platform (chabutara)
outside, and the elder daughter was drying clothes on the
terrace. Upon seeing the incident, the son-in-law raised an
alarm, and the family rushed to the spot. The accused had
pushed the daughter into a nearby ditch, tore her clothes,
climbed on top of her, and throttled her. They subsequently
reported the matter at the concerned Police Station.
24. Witness Ashok Kaushik, Head Constable (P.W.-11), has deposed
that on 29.10.2024, based on the written complaint (Ex.P-23)
lodged by the victim's father, an FIR (Ex.P-24) was registered at
Sargaon Police Station. No facts adverse to this testimony
emerged during cross-examination. This corroborates the
father's (P.W.-02) version of filing the complaint and affixing his
thumb impression on the FIR.
25. Witness Karunalata Patle, Patwari (P.W.-08), deposed that under
the directions of the Executive Magistrate, Sargaon, she visited
the spot and prepared the site map (Nazri Naksha) and
Panchnama (Ex.P-02) in the presence of witnesses. Similarly,
Witness Santosh Kumar Sharma, Sub-Inspector (P.W.-09),
testified to preparing the Spot Map (Ex.P-11) in the presence of
witnesses.
26. The Victim (P.W.-01) and her mother (P.W.-03) supported the
preparation of (Ex.P-02), while the victim's elder sister (P.W.-06)
supported the Spot Map (Ex. P-11). In the Spot Map, the spot
marked in "red ink" corresponds to the location described by the
victim where the accused pushed and molested her. The maps
are consistent with each other and the victim's testimony, leaving
no room for doubt regarding the place of occurrence.
27. Thus, the statement of the victim is also confirmed by the
statement of the victim's father (PW-02), victim's mother (P.W.-
03), and the statement of both the witnesses also corroborates
with the statements of elder sister and brother-in-law of the victim
(PW-06 and PW-07). The FIR (Ex.P-24) also confirms the above
statements of the victim, victim's father, victim's mother, as well
as the brother-in-law and elder sister of the victim.
28. Investigating Officer, Santosh Kumar Sharma (P.W.-09) stated
that on the date of incident i.e. on 29.10.2024, he issued a
requisition (Ex.P-13) for the victim's medical examination. This
was confirmed by Dr. Mohnish Kurre (P.W.-04), who examined
the victim and prepared the medical report (Ex.P-06). The doctor
noted that the victim complained of pain in the neck and her
clothes were torn near the neck area. Although the doctor
admitted that clothes could be torn for various reasons and no
external bruises or nail marks were found, the torn state of the
clothes at the time of examination supports the prosecution's
case. The victim herself did not claim to have sustained specific
physical injuries when pushed, which explains the lack of visible
wounds. On 30.10.2024, the Investigating Officer seized the
victim's clothing -- a white and blue striped long suit with full
sleeves, torn at both sleeves and the front button belt, with dried
mud on the back; via seizure memo (Ex.P-05). This seizure was
supported by the testimony of the victim's mother (P.W.-03) and
brother-in-law (P.W.-07).
29. On a holistic consideration of the testimonies of the victim, her
father, mother, sister, and brother-in-law, the victim's account of
being pushed into a ditch and having her clothes torn is duly
corroborated. Although the relatives did not explicitly mention the
sexual solicitation in their examination-in-chief, the victim's court
testimony remains consistent with her written complaint (Ex. P-
23), her statement recorded under Section 183 BNSS (Ex.P-01),
and her Police Statement (Ex.P-03). Her testimony remained
unshaken during cross-examination. The seizure of the torn and
muddied clothes further substantiates the struggle.
30. The victim clearly stated that the accused pushed her, made
monetary sexual propositions, tore her clothes, and touched her
body. Since this testimony was not discredited, the legal
presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act is invoked
against the accused. Furthermore, under Section 30 of the
POCSO Act, the Court finds sufficient legal grounds to presume
a culpable mental state on the part of the accused. Despite being
given adequate opportunity, the accused failed to lead any
defense evidence to rebut this presumption or prove the absence
of such mental intent.
31. The Investigating Officer detailed the procedural steps, including
recording statements under Sections 180 and 183 of the BNSS,
recording statements before the Children Welfare Committee,
verifying school records (showing the victim's age as 15 years
and 8 months), and collecting electronic evidence (Ex.P-20 to P-
22). The defense failed to provide any basis to suggest that
these investigation proceedings were fabricated.
32. Based on the analysis of evidence, the prosecution has
successfully proven that the victim was a minor (aged 15 years
and 8 months) on the date of the incident. It is established that
the accused pushed her into a ditch, tore her kurti, and engaged
in physical contact involving an unwelcome sexual overture and
proposal, thereby committing sexual assault/harassment and the
use of criminal force with the intent to outrage her
modesty/disrobe her.
33. The victim girl and the witnesses have not revealed any
circumstances related to the accused being falsely implicated
during the evidence, nor has the accused said anything in his
statement under Section 351 of BNSS, regarding being falsely
implicated. In such a situation, there is no reason to disbelieve
the said statements of the prosecution witnesses.
34. According to the above stated evidence presented by the
prosecution, the statement of the victim girl, who was 15 years
and 8 months of age at the time of the incident, was not
challenged by the defence that the accused has tried to outrage
the modesty of the victim by tearing her clothes and asking her
for sexual intercourse in such a filthy language. Therefore, there
is sufficient basis to draw a presumption against the accused in
relation to the said crime and the accused has completely failed
to refute the said presumption.
35. In the case of Ganesan v. State, reported in (2020) 10 SCC 573,
the Supreme Court observed and held that that there can be a
conviction on the sole testimony of the victim/prosecutrix when
the deposition of the prosecutrix is found to be trustworthy,
unblemished, credible and her evidence is of sterling quality.
36. In the case of State (NCT of Delhi) v. Pankaj Chaudhary,
reported in (2019) 11 SCC 575, it was observed and held that as
a general rule, if credible, conviction of accused can be based on
sole testimony, without corroboration. It was further observed
and held that sole testimony of victim should not be doubted by
court merely on basis of assumptions and surmises.
37. In the case of Sham Singh v. State of Haryana, reported in
(2018) 18 SCC 34, the Supreme Court observed that testimony
of the victim is vital and unless there are compelling reasons
which necessitate looking for corroboration of her statement, the
courts should find no difficulty to act on the testimony of the
victim of sexual assault alone to convict an accused where her
testimony inspires confidence and is found to be reliable. It was
further observed that seeking corroboration of her statement
before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts
to adding insult to injury.
38. Applying the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the cases
(supra) to the facts of the case on hand and as observed
hereinabove, I see no reason to doubt the credibility and/or
trustworthiness of the victim though no definite opinion regarding
sexual intercourse has been given by doctor, who has medically
examined the victim, but considering the statement given by the
victim (PW-1), supported by the statement of other prosecution
witnesses, wherein it has stated that the accused pushed her
into a ditch, tore her kurti, and engaged in physical contact
involving an unwelcome sexual overture and proposal, thereby
committing sexual assault/harassment and the use of criminal
force with the intent to outrage her modesty. Therefore, without
any further corroboration, the conviction of the accused relying
upon the sole testimony of the victim can be sustained.
39. The view taken by the learned trial Court that the appellant is the
author of the crime is a pure finding of fact based on evidence
available on record and as such, I am of the opinion that in the
present case, the only view possible was the one taken by the
learned trial Court.
40. From the above analysis, I am of the considered opinion that the
prosecution has been successful in proving its case beyond
reasonable doubt and the learned trial Court has not committed
any legal or factual error in arriving at the finding with regard to
the guilt of the appellant/convict.
41. Accordingly, the appeal being devoid of merit is liable to be and
is hereby dismissed.
42. The appellant/convict is stated to be in jail. He shall serve out the
sentence awarded by the trial Court by means of the impugned
judgment and order dated 07.11.2025.
43. Registry is directed to send a certified copy of this judgment
along with the original record of the case to the trial court
concerned forthwith for necessary information and compliance
and also send a copy of this judgment to the concerned
Superintendent of Jail where the appellant is undergoing his jail
sentence to serve the same on the appellant informing him that
he is at liberty to assail the present judgment passed by this
Court by preferring an appeal before the Hon'ble Supreme Court
with the assistance of High Court Legal Services Committee or
the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee.
44. All Interlocutory Applications which are pending, if any, are
hereby disposed off.
Sd/-
(Ramesh Sinha)
Chief Justice
Rajshekhar
