[Cites 6, Cited by 0]
Chattisgarh High Court
Chhedi Lal Shahjit vs Rajesh Gupta on 27 March, 2026
1
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
ACQA No. 83 of 2016
Chhedi Lal Shahjit S/o Shri S.R. Shahjit Aged About 50 Years R/o House No. 1017,
Kripal Nagar, Kohka, Bhilai, Near Sevendays School, Tahsil And District Durg,
Chhattisgarh. Complainant. ... Appellant
versus
Digitally
1 - Rajesh Gupta S/o R.L. Gupta Aged About 46 Years R/o Sundar Nagar, Tata Line,
signed by
ALLENA
ANJANI
KUMAR
Date:
2026.03.27
15:57:24
Kohka, Bhilai, Tahsil And District Durg, Chhattisgarh. (Accused)
+0530
2 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through District Magistrate Durg, Chhattisgarh.,
... Respondents
For Appellant : Shri A.D.Kuldeep, Advocate.
For Respondent 1 : Shri Pushpendra Kumar Patel, Advocate.
For Respondent 2/State : Shri Atanu Ghosh, Deputy Government Advocate.
(HON'BLE SHRI JUSTICE RADHAKISHAN AGRAWAL)
Judgment on Board
27/03/2026
1. This Acquittal Appeal filed by the appellant / complainant under Section
378 of the Cr.P.C. arises out of the judgment dated 01.02.2016 passed
by the Additional Sessions Judge, Durg in Criminal Appeal No.
137/2015, whereby the learned trial trial Court acquitted the
respondent No.1 herein of the charge under Section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short, the NI Act).
2. Brief facts as projected by the appellant/complainant are that the
complainant had provided to respondent No.1, a sum of Rs.20,000/-,
Rs.15,000/- and Rs.15,000/- respectively as loan and as against the
said amounts, the respondent No.1 also given three cheques of the
same amount to the complainant on 06.11.2011, 21.11.2011 and
02.12.2011 respectively. The complainant submitted those cheques in
the State Bank of India, Sector-1, Bhilai on 24.02.2012, but the same
were dishonoured as informed by the Bank on 27.02.2012 whereupon
the complainant issued a legal notice to the respondent No.1 on
03.03.2012, despite that, the respondent No.1 did not repay the same.
Thereafter, the complainant is constrained to file a complaint under
Section 138 of the NI Act before the J.M.F.C. Durg.
3. Learned J.M.F.C., after appreciating the evidence on record, vide its
judgment 28.09.2015 passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class,
Durg in Complaint Case No. 345/12, held respondent No.1 guilty under
Section 138 of the NI Act and accordingly he was convicted and
sentenced to RI for 6 months with compensation amount of
Rs.55,000/- and in default thereof, to further undergo SI for one month.
Against the said judgment, both the complainant and respondent No.1
preferred separate appeals before the Additional Sessions Judge,
Durg, and the appellate Court vide its judgment dated 01.02.2016,
allowed the appeal of respondent No.1 while acquitting him of the
charge whereas dismissed the appeal of the complainant. Hence, this
appeal by the complainant.
4. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the trial Court was
justified in convicting the respondent No.1 under Section 138 of the NI
Act whereas the finding of acquittal recorded by the appellate Court is
perverse and contrary to law. He further submits that despite there
being sufficient evidence and material on record pointing out the
offence towards respondent No.1, the learned appellate Court has
committed an error in acquitting the respondent No.1. Thus, the
impugned judgment of acquittal suffers from perversity and illegality,
therefore, the same is liable to be set aside.
5. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent No.1 submit
that the appellate Court, after properly appreciating the evidence on
record, has rightly acquitted the respondent/accused of the said
charges by reversing the finding of J.M.F.C. convicting the respondent
No.1. He further submits that in the facts and circumstances of the
case, the finding of acquittal recorded by the appellate Court is based
on evidence and material available on record, which is neither perverse
nor contrary to law.
6. Learned counsel for respondent No.2/State supports the submissions
made by the learned counsel for the appellant/complainant.
7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record
with utmost circumspection.
8. The Supreme Court in the matter of Jafarudheen and others vs. State
of Kerala reported in (2022) 8 SCC 440 has considered the scope of
interference in Appeal against acquittal in judgment at para 25, which
reads as under:-
25. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal by
invoking Section 378 CrPC, the appellate court has to
consider whether the trial court's view can be terms as a
possible one, particularly when evidence on record has
been analysed. The reason is that an order of acquittal
adds up to the presumption of innocence in favour of the
accused. Thus, the appellate court has to be relatively
slow in reversing the order of the trial court rendering
acquittal. Therefore, the presumption in favour of the
accused does not get weakened but only strengthened.
Such a double presumption that enures in favour of the
accused has to be disturbed only by thorough scrutiny on
the accepted legal parameters."
9. The Hon'ble Apex Court in its judgment dated 12.02.2024 (Criminal
Appeal No 1162 of 2011) passed in Mallappa and Ors. Versus State of
Karnataka, has held in para 36 as under:-
"36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the
promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All
the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal
law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. The
principles which come into play while deciding an appeal
from acquittal could be summarized as:-
"(i) Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a
criminal trial and such appreciation must be
comprehensive--inclusive of all evidence, oral and
documentary;
(ii) Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may
result in a miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground
of challenge;
(iii) If the Court, after appreciation of evidence, finds
that two views are possible, the one in favour of the
accused shall ordinarily be followed;
(iv) If the view of the Trial Court is a legally plausible
view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify
the reversal of acquittal;
(v) If the appellate Court is inclined to reverse the
acquittal in appeal on a re-appreciation of evidence, it
must specifically address all the reasons given by the
Trial Court for acquittal and must cover all the facts;
(vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction,
the appellate Court must demonstrate an illegality,
perversity or error of law or fact in the decision of the
Trial Court."
10. In the present case, the question that arises for consideration is
whether the appellate Court was justified in acquitting the respondent
No.1 of the charge under Section 138 of NI Act?
11. The complainant (C.W.1) Chhedilal Shahjit in his examination-in-chief
has stated that he provided a sum of Rs.20,000/-, Rs.15,000/- &
Rs.15,000/- to the accused/respondent in three installments for
domestic purpose and in lieu of it, the respondent No.1 has also given
three cheques. However, in cross-examination, he admitted that firstly
he advanced to the accused Rajesh Gupta, a sum of Rs.15,000/-,
secondly he gave a sum of Rs.20,000/- and then Rs.15,000/-, but he
did not remember on which dates, he gave the said amounts to the
accused/respondent No.1. He further admitted that he has stated
before the competent court that, apart from payment of Rs.10,000/- on
06.06.2008, no other amount had been paid to Rajesh Gupta,
respondent No.1 herein, and he had also made the same statement
during his cross-examination. He further admitted that the aforesaid
three cheques had been filled by himself.
12. Thus, from perusal of the above, it appears that the complainant's
version is doubtful, as although he specifically remembered advancing
Rs.10,000/- on 06.06.2008, but he failed to recall the dates on which
the subsequent alleged loans of Rs.20,000/-, Rs.15,000/- and
Rs.15,000/- were advanced, and his admissions further created doubt
that, apart from Rs.10,000/-, no other amount had been paid to the
accused and that other blank cheques had also been obtained from
him and no explanation was offered as to why the complainant himself
filled in the cheque amount, his name and other particulars. The visible
difference in ink between the accused's signatures and the remaining
writings on Exhibits P-1, P-2 and P-3 further rendered the case
suspicious. Though the accused admitted his signatures, thereby
attracting the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, but he successfully rebutted the
same by raising a probable defence through cross-examination on the
standard of preponderance of probabilities, creating doubt regarding
the existence of a legally enforceable debt of Rs.50,000/-. In such
circumstances, the complainant was required to adduce cogent
evidence proving the dates and circumstances of the alleged three
installments, but failed to do so.
13. The learned appellate Court has elaborately discussed the evidence
led by the complainant and after analyzing the entire evidence, has
come to the conclusion that the complainant's version, regarding the
alleged advancement of amounts in three installments to the
accused/respondent No. 1, is doubtful and lacks credibility, and as
such, acquitted the accused/respondent No.1 of the said charge
levelled against him.
14. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the law laid
down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jafaruddeen & Mallappa
(supra) and the view which has been taken by the learned trial Court
appears to be plausible and possible view and in the absence of any
patent illegality or perversity this Court is not inclined to interfere with
the impugned judgment.
15. For the foregoing discussion, the impugned judgment dated
01.02.2016 acquitting the respondent No.1/accused person is affirmed
and the appeal filed by the appellant/complainant is liable to be and is
hereby dismissed.
Sd/-
(Radhakishan Agrawal)
JUDGE
Anjani
