[Cites 10, Cited by 0]
Chattisgarh High Court
State Of Chhattisgarh vs Anup Singh on 25 February, 2026
Author: Ramesh Sinha
Bench: Ramesh Sinha
1
Digitally 2026:CGHC:9781-DB
signed by
ANURADHA
ANURADHA TIWARI
TIWARI Date:
NAFR
2026.02.26
10:40:38
+0530
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRMP No. 584 of 2026
State of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station Pulgaon, District Durg
C.G.
... Petitioner
versus
1 - Anup Singh S/o Brugunnarayan Singh Aged About 37 Years R/o
L.I.G. 4/c, Sector Shahpura, Police Station Shahpura, Bhopal (M.P.)
2 - Amit Singh S/o Omprakash Singh Aged About 35 Years R/o H.No.
107, Kolar Road, Gehukheda, Police Station Kolar Road, Bhopal (M.P.)
3 - Rakesh Kushwaha S/o Late Shri Vinod Kushwaha Aged About 35
Years R/o H. No. 10 Near Canal, Chunabhatti Kolar Road, Police
Station Chunabhatti, Bhopal (M.P.)
... Respondents
(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)
For Petitioner : Mr. Nitansh Jaiswal, Deputy Government Advocate
Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
Order on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
25.02.2026
1. Though the matter has been listed in default, however,
considering the fact that there is an inordinate delay of 116 days in
preferring the present petition, this Court deems it appropriate to
proceed to hear learned counsel for the petitioner on the application
seeking condonation of delay in filing the present petition.
2. Heard Mr. Nitansh Jaiswal, learned Deputy Government Advocate
for the appellant/State on I.A. No.01, which is an application for
condonation of delay of 116 days in preferring the present criminal
miscellaneous petition.
3. Learned Deputy Government Advocate appearing for the
State/petitioner submits that the present petition has been preferred
challenging the judgment dated 16.07.2025 passed by the Court of the
learned First Additional Sessions Judge, Durg, District Durg (C.G.) in
Sessions Case No. 152/2024, whereby the respondents have been
acquitted of the charges under the relevant provisions of the Indian
Penal Code in connection with Crime No. 200/2024 registered at Police
Station Pulgaon, District Durg. It is submitted that though there is a
delay of 116 days in filing the instant petition, the same has neither been
intentional nor deliberate, but has occurred due to procedural formalities
inherent in governmental functioning.
4. Learned counsel further submits that after passing of the
impugned judgment, the matter was processed by the Law & Legislative
Affairs Department, Government of Chhattisgarh, Mantralaya, Naya
Raipur, which thereafter forwarded the proposal to the Office of the
Advocate General for filing the appropriate criminal petition. Upon
receipt of the proposal, the case was examined at various levels, the
certified copy of the impugned judgment and relevant documents were
obtained from the concerned department, and only thereafter was the
present petition drafted and filed. It is contended that the delay has
occurred on account of administrative procedures, file movement, and
necessary departmental approvals, which are unavoidable in the
functioning of the State machinery.
5. Reliance has been placed upon the judgment rendered by
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of Haryana v. Chandra
Mani and others, (1996) 3 SCC 132, to buttress his submissions. As
such, the learned State counsel prays that the delay of 116 days in
preferring the petition may be condoned.
6. The question for determination before this Court is whether the
provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (i.e. Act 9 of 1908 i.e.
the old Limitation Act) would apply to an application for leave to appeal
from an order of acquittal.
7. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Postmaster General
and others v. Living Media India Limited and another, (2012) 3 SCC
563, has dealt with the limitation issue and held as under:-
"27. It is not in dispute that the person(s)
concerned were well aware or conversant with
the issues involved including the prescribed
period of limitation for taking up the matter by
way of filing a special leave petition in this
Court. They cannot claim that they have a
separate period of limitation when the
Department was possessed with competent
persons familiar with court proceedings. In the
absence of plausible and acceptable
explanation, we are posing a question why
the delay is to be condoned mechanically
merely because the Government or a wing
of the Government is a party before us.
28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in
a matter of condonation of delay when there
was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction
or lack of bonafide, a liberal concession has to
be adopted to advance substantial justice, we
are of the view that in the facts and
circumstances, the Department cannot take
advantage of various earlier decisions. The
claim on account of impersonal machinery
and inherited bureaucratic methodology of
making several notes cannot be accepted in
view of the modern technologies being used
and available. The law of limitation
undoubtedly binds everybody including the
Government.
29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all
the government bodies, their agencies and
instrumentalities that unless they have
reasonable and acceptable explanation for the
delay and there was bonafide effort, there is no
need to accept the usual explanation that the
file was kept pending for several months/years
due to considerable degree of procedural red-
tape in the process. The government
departments are under a special obligation to
ensure that they perform their duties with
diligence and commitment. Condonation of
delay is an exception and should not be used
as an anticipated benefit for government
departments. The law shelters everyone under
the same light and should not be swirled for the
benefit of a few.
30. Considering the fact that there was no
proper explanation offered by the Department
for the delay except mentioning of various
dates, according to us, the Department has
miserably failed to give any acceptable and
cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a
huge delay. Accordingly, the appeals are liable
to be dismissed on the ground of delay."
8. Recently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of
Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary, 2024 INSC 932, while
considering the delay, issued some directions and observed as follows:-
"5. The legal position is that where a case has
been presented in the Court beyond limitation,
the petitioner has to explain the Court as to
what was the "sufficient cause" which means
an adequate and enough reason which
prevented him to approach the Court within
limitation. In Majji Sannemma v. Reddy Sridevi,
2021 SCC Online SC 1260, it was held by this
Court that even though limitation may harshly
affect the rights of a party, it has to be applied
with all its rigour when prescribed by statute. A
reference was also made to the decision of this
Court in Ajay Dabra v. Pyare Ram, 2023 SCC
Online 92 wherein, it was held as follows:
"13. This Court in the case of Basawaraj v.
Special Land Acquisition Officer [(2013) 14
SCC 81] while rejecting an application for
condonation of delay for lack of sufficient
cause has concluded in Paragraph 15 as
follows:
"15. The law on the issue can be
summarised to the effect that where a case
has been presented in the court beyond
limitation, the applicant has to explain the
court as to what was the "sufficient cause"
which means an adequate and enough
reason which prevented him to approach
the court within limitation. In case a party is
found to be negligent, or for want of bona
fide on his part in the facts and
circumstances of the case, or found to have
not acted diligently or remained inactive,
there cannot be a justified ground to
condone the delay. No court could be
justified in condoning such an inordinate
delay by imposing any condition
whatsoever. The application is to be decided
only within the parameters laid down by this
Court in regard to the condonation of delay.
In case there was no sufficient cause to
prevent a litigant to approach the court on
time condoning the delay without any
justification, putting any condition
whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in
violation of the statutory provisions and it
tantamounts to showing utter disregard to
the legislature."
14. Therefore, we are of the considered
opinion that the High Court did not commit
any mistake in dismissing the delay
condonation application of the present
appellant."
Thus, it is crystal clear that the discretion to
condone the delay has to be exercised
judiciously based on facts and circumstances
of each case and that, the expression
'sufficient cause' cannot be liberally
interpreted, if negligence, inaction or lack of
bona fides is attributed to the party.
5.1. In Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji
Jeejeebhoy (D) through his legal heir, 2024
INSC 262, wherein, one of us (J.B.Pardiwala,
J) was a member, after referring to various
decisions on the issue, it was in unequivocal
terms observed by this Court that delay
should not be excused as a matter of
generosity and rendering substantial justice is
not to cause prejudice to the opposite party.
The relevant passage of the same is
profitably extracted below:
"24. In the aforesaid circumstances, we made
it very clear that we are not going to look into
the merits of the matter as long as we are not
convinced that sufficient cause has been
made out for condonation of such a long and
inordinate delay.
25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a
private party or a State or Union of India
when it comes to condoning the gross delay
of more than 12 years. If the litigant chooses
to approach the court long after the lapse of
the time prescribed under the relevant
provisions of the law, then he cannot turn
around and say that no prejudice would be
caused to either side by the delay being
condoned. This litigation between the parties
started sometime in 1981. We are in 2024.
Almost 43 years have elapsed. However, till
date the respondent has not been able to
reap the fruits of his decree. It would be a
mockery of justice if we condone the delay of
12 years and 158 days and once again ask
the respondent to undergo the rigmarole of
the legal proceedings.
26. The length of the delay is a relevant
matter which the court must take into
consideration while considering whether the
delay should be condoned or not. From the
tenor of the approach of the appellants, it
appears that they want to fix their own period
of limitation for instituting the proceedings for
which law has prescribed a period of
limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost
his right to have the matter considered on
merits because of his own inaction for a long,
it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate
delay and in such circumstances of the case,
he cannot be heard to plead that the
substantial justice deserves to be preferred
as against the technical considerations. While
considering the plea for condonation of delay,
the court must not start with the merits of the
main matter. The court owes a duty to first
ascertain the bona fides of the explanation
offered by the party seeking condonation. It is
only if the sufficient cause assigned by the
litigant and the opposition of the other side is
equally balanced that the court may bring into
aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of
condoning the delay.
27. We are of the view that the question of
limitation is not merely a technical
consideration. The rules of limitation are
based on the principles of sound public policy
and principles of equity. We should not keep
the 'Sword of Damocles' hanging over the
head of the respondent for indefinite period of
time to be determined at the whims and
fancies of the appellants.
xxx xxx xxx
34. In view of the aforesaid, we have reached
to the conclusion that the High Court
committed no error much less any error of
law in passing the impugned order. Even
otherwise, the High Court was exercising its
supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of
the Constitution of India.
35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it
has been said that delay should not be
excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering
substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to
the opposite party. The appellants have failed
to prove that they were reasonably diligent in
prosecuting the matter and this vital test for
condoning the delay is not satisfied in this
case.
36. For all the foregoing reasons, this appeal
fails and is hereby dismissed. There shall be
no order as to costs."
Applying the above legal proposition to the
facts of the present case, we are of the opinion
that the High Court correctly refused to
condone the delay and dismissed the appeal
by observing that such inordinate delay was not
explained satisfactorily, no sufficient cause was
shown for the same, and no plausible reason
was put forth by the State. Therefore, we are
inclined to reject this petition at the threshold.
6. At the same time, we cannot simply brush
aside the delay occurred in preferring the
second appeal, due to callous and
lackadaisical attitude on the part of the
officials functioning in the State machinery.
Though the Government adopts systematic
approach in handling the legal issues and
preferring the petitions/applications/appeals
well within the time, due to the fault on the
part of the officials in merely
communicating the information on time,
huge revenue loss will be caused to the
Government exchequer. The present case is
one such case, wherein, enormous delay of
1788 days occasioned in preferring the
second appeal due to the lapses on the part
of the officials functioning under the State,
though valuable Government lands were
involved. Therefore, we direct the State to
streamline the machinery touching the legal
issues, offering legal opinion, filing of cases
before the Tribunal / Courts, etc., fix the
responsibility on the officer(s) concerned,
and penalize the officer(s), who is/are
responsible for delay, deviation, lapses,
etc., if any, to the value of the loss caused
to the Government. Such direction will have
to be followed by all the States
scrupulously.
7. There is one another aspect of the matter
which we must not ignore or overlook. Over a
period of time, we have noticed that whenever
there is a plea for condonation of delay be it at
the instance of a private litigant or State the
delay is sought to be explained right from the
time, the limitation starts and if there is a delay
of say 2 years or 3 years or 4 years till the end
of the same. For example if the period of
limitation is 90 days then the party seeking
condonation has to explain why it was unable
to institute the proceedings within that period of
limitation. What events occurred after the 91st
day till the last is of no consequence. The court
is required to consider what came in the way of
the party that it was unable to file it between
the 1st day and the 90th day. It is true that a
party is entitled to wait until the last day of
limitation for filing an appeal. But when it allows
the limitation to expire and pleads sufficient
cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the
sufficient cause must establish that because of
some event or circumstance arising before the
limitation expired it was not possible to file the
appeal within time. No event or circumstance
arising after the expiry of limitation can
constitute such sufficient cause. There may be
events or circumstances subsequent to the
expiry of limitation which may further delay the
filing of the appeal. But that the limitation has
been allowed to expire without the appeal
being filed must be traced to a cause arising
within the period of limitation. (See: Ajit Singh
Thakur Singh and Another v. State of Gujarat,
AIR 1981 SC 733)."
9. Taking into account the facts and circumstances of the present
case, in the light of aforementioned judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the matters of Postmaster General (supra) and Ramkumar
Choudhary (supra), it is evident that Government departments are
under a special obligation to discharge their duties with due diligence
and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception, not the rule,
and cannot be claimed as a matter of right or anticipated privilege by
Government entities. The law casts its protection equally upon all
litigants and cannot be distorted to confer undue advantage upon a
select few.
10. Upon considering the matter in its entirety, we find that the State
has failed to provide any proper or satisfactory explanation for the delay
in filing the present petition. The only reason cited is that the Law &
Legislative Affairs Department, Government of Chhattisgarh,
Mantralaya, Naya Raipur, had forwarded a proposal to the Office of the
Advocate General for initiating an appeal against the impugned acquittal
order dated 16.07.2025. Thereafter, the case was processed, and the
present petition was ultimately filed. However, this sequence of events,
lacking in specificity or justifiable cause, does not amount to a cogent or
acceptable explanation. Thus, the State has miserably failed to
demonstrate sufficient cause warranting the condonation of an
inordinate delay of 116 days.
11. Consequently, we are not inclined to exercise our discretionary
power under the law to condone such extraordinary delay. The learned
counsel for the State has not been able to establish any convincing or
bona fide reason for the delay. Therefore, there is no justification for
condoning the delay of 116 days in filing the petition against acquittal.
12. In view of the above, the Criminal Miscellaneous Petition seeking
leave to appeal is hereby rejected on the ground of delay and laches.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)
Judge Chief Justice
Anu
