For Appellants : Mr.P.K.Bhaduri, Deputy Advocate General
For Respondents : Mr.Sanjeev Verma, Advocate
1. Heard Mr.P.K.Bhaduri, learned Deputy Advocate General for the
(Rajendra Prasad Patel ane others vs. State of Chhattisgarh
3. The case of the writ petitioners before the learned Single Judge is
Conditions of Service) Rules, 1997. Their appointments were
4. Upon rendering long and uninterrupted service, the services of the
resolutions, and executive instructions in force from time to time.
5. After absorption, the writ petitioners continued to serve in regular,
entitlements. Despite such absorption and continued service in
6. The dispute giving rise to the batch of writ petitions originates from
representations pertaining to pensionary status were rejected.
compliance of earlier directions of this Court. The writ petitioners
regularisation and absorption occurred thereafter.
7. During the pendency of the writ petitions, the State Government
Scheme. However, according to the writ petitioners, despite
absorption. It is this continuing uncertainty and lack of a definitive
8. By the impugned order, the learned Single Judge has disposed of
"45. In the considered view of this Court, the ends of
justice would be best served not by issuing a
mandamus either granting or denying pensionary
benefits, but by requiring the respondent-State to
undertake a comprehensive and reasoned
reconsideration of the determinative date of
appointment for pensionary purposes in respect of
employees whose service commenced as
Shikshakarmis and later culminated in absorption
into regular government service. Such
reconsideration must necessarily take into account
the continuity of service, nature of duties performed,
source of salary, administrative control, and the
constitutional mandate of equality under Articles 14
and 16 of the Constitution.
46. It is, therefore, clarified in unequivocal terms that
this Court does not strike down or modify the
existing policy, nor does it direct extension of any
specific pensionary benefit. The formulation or
amendment of policy remains within the exclusive
prerogative of the State Government. However, any
policy decision so taken must be clear,
unambiguous, uniformly applicable and
constitutionally compliant, so as to obviate further
litigation and ensure predictability in service
administration.
47. The State Government is accordingly expected
to take a conscious, reasoned and categorical
decision on the issue, including the question as to
whether and to what extent the service rendered by
the petitioners as Shikshakarmis prior to absorption
in the School Education Department merits
consideration for pensionary purposes, including the
requirement of completion of ten years of qualifying
service from 01.07.2018. Such decision shall be
finalized and communicated via a speaking order
within a strict period of 120 days from the date of
receipt of this order. It is expected that authorities
would consider the observations made herein
above.
48. Needless to observe that any such decision
shall be informed by relevant considerations, shall
eschew arbitrariness, and shall conform to the
constitutional guarantees of fairness, non-
discrimination, and proportionality.
49. With the aforesaid observations/directions, all
these writ petitions are disposed of. There shall be
no order as to costs."
Being aggrieved by the same, the appellants/State have filed this
writ appeal.
9. Learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellants/State
submits that the impugned order passed by the learned Single
Judge is legally unsustainable. It is contended that an issue which
had already attained finality was impermissibly sought to be
reopened by issuance of a direction founded merely on
sympathetic considerations, directing reconsideration of the
respondents' case. It is further submitted that the vital aspect of
unexplained delay and laches, which goes to the root of the
matter and which stood specifically pleaded and elucidated in the
affidavit of the Secretary, Department of Finance, has neither
been adverted to nor adjudicated upon by the learned Single
Judge, thereby resulting in a grave error of law.
10. Elaborating the aforesaid submission, it is urged that the law is
well settled that stale and time-barred claims ought not to be
revived under the guise of directing "consideration" of
representations. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the
judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India vs.
M.K. Sarkar, (2010) 2 SCC 59, wherein it has been categorically
held that belated representations pertaining to "dead" or "stale"
issues ought not to be entertained and that compliance with a
court's direction to consider such representation does not furnish
a fresh cause of action. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in
paragraphs 15 and 16, has clearly laid down that limitation, delay
and laches are to be examined with reference to the original
cause of action and not from the date of decision rendered
pursuant to a judicial direction. It is further submitted that the
Hon'ble Supreme Court has cautioned that courts and tribunals,
before issuing directions for "consideration" of a claim, must first
satisfy themselves whether the issue is a live one or stands
concluded. In cases involving stale or dead claims, the matter
ought to be given a quietus rather than being reopened.
11. Learned Deputy Advocate General submits that the direction
contained in paragraph 47 of the impugned order is directly in the
teeth of the law laid down in M.K. Sarkar (supra), which has
recently been followed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Chief
Executive Officer v. S. Lalita, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 916. It is
further contended that the Hon'ble Supreme Court, in Mahendra
Prasad Agrawal v. Arvind Kumar Singh [SLP (C)
No.17141/2025 decided on 10.02.2026], has deprecated the
practice of so-called "consideration jurisprudence". In paragraphs
14 and 15 of the said judgment, it has been observed that
routinely directing consideration of claims, without adjudicating
their merits, is counterproductive and legally unsound. It has been
emphasized that where a claim deserves to be allowed,
appropriate relief ought to be granted forthwith, and where it does
not, the same ought to be rejected. Applying the aforesaid
principles, it is submitted that despite recording that the
respondents' claims had already been conclusively rejected by
the order dated 16.02.2021, and further explained in detail in the
affidavit of the Secretary, Department of Finance, the learned
Single Judge nevertheless proceeded to direct reconsideration of
a closed issue, thereby committing a manifest error of law.
12. Learned Deputy Advocate General further submits that the
judgment rendered by the Division Bench of this Court in Har
Narayan Yadav v. Chhattisgarh Public Service Commission
and another (WA No.215 of 2017), decided on 07.01.2019
continues to hold the field and remains binding. It was neither the
case of the respondents before the learned Single Judge that the
said judgment has been set aside by the Hon'ble Supreme Court,
nor that it has been overruled by a larger Bench. In such
circumstances, it is contended that the principles of judicial
discipline, as expounded by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community v. State of
Maharashtra, (2005) 2 SCC 673, were clearly attracted. It has
been authoritatively held therein that a Bench of lesser strength
cannot take a view contrary to that of a Bench of greater strength,
and in case of disagreement, the only permissible course is to
refer the matter to a larger Bench. It is, therefore, submitted that
the learned Single Judge could not have taken a view contrary to
the binding Division Bench judgment of this Court in Har Narayan
Yadav (supra) and the directions issued in paragraph 47 of the
impugned order are thus ex facie erroneous and contrary to
settled principles of law.
13. Learned Deputy Advocate General also submits that, in light of the
law laid down in Har Narayan Yadav (supra), members of
Panchayat and local bodies were not treated as Government
servants. Accordingly, the absorption notification dated
30.06.2018 clearly stipulated that no arrears for the prior period
would be admissible and that all service benefits would accrue
only with effect from 01.07.2018. The respondents, having
accepted the terms and conditions of such absorption, are bound
thereby. It is further submitted that the doctrine of precedent and
judicial discipline has been consistently reiterated by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court, inter alia, in Sandeep Kumar Bafna v. State of
Maharashtra and another, (2014) 16 SCC 623, relying upon the
Constitution Bench judgment in Union of India vs. Raghubir
Singh, (1989) 2 SCC 754, as well as in Chandra Prakash v.
State of U.P., (2002) 4 SCC 234, wherein it has been emphasized
that consistency and certainty in law require adherence to
precedents rendered by Benches of equal or larger strength. It is
thus contended that, in view of the binding precedents and settled
legal position, the directions issued by the learned Single Judge in
paragraph 47 are patently illegal and unsustainable, and the
impugned order dated 17.02.2026 passed by the learned Single
Judge deserves to be set aside.
14. Learned Deputy Advocate General also submitted that the
respondents, having consciously accepted the terms and
conditions of their absorption and having exercised options under
the notifications relating to the Old Pension Scheme dated
11.05.2022 and 20.01.2023, are estopped from challenging the
same. Such conduct is hit by the doctrine of approbate and
reprobate, as recognized in law, including in State of Punjab v.
Dhanjit Singh Sandhu, (2014) 15 SCC 144, which was
specifically relied upon before the learned Single Judge, but has
not been considered. It is also submitted that though the learned
Single Judge has referred to several judgments of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court pertaining to policy matters, including Census
Commissioner and others v. R. Krishnamurthy, (2015) 2 SCC
796, BALCO Employees' Union v. Union of India and others,
(2002) 2 SCC 333, D.S. Nakara and others v. Union of India,
(1983) 1 SCC 305, Government of Andhra Pradesh and others
v. N. Subbarayudu and others, (2008) 14 SCC 702 and Union
of India v. P.N. Menon and others, (1994) 4 SCC 68, the
ultimate direction issued is inconsistent with the principles laid
down therein.
15. It is contended that the observations regarding alleged
"conspicuous silence" in the notifications dated 11.05.2022 and
20.01.2023 are factually incorrect, inasmuch as the affidavit of the
Secretary, Department of Finance, had comprehensively clarified
the position, specifically in paragraphs 19 to 22 thereof, and
further supported by finance instructions dated 24.06.2024.
Learned Deputy Advocate General submits that the learned
Single Judge has failed to consider the said affidavit in its proper
perspective and has proceeded on assumptions, thereby vitiating
the impugned order. It is, therefore, submitted that the impugned
order has been rendered on sympathetic considerations,
overlooking binding precedents, statutory provisions, and material
on record, and proceeds on an erroneous assumption that the
controversy still subsists, whereas the same had already been
conclusively settled. In view of the aforesaid submissions, it is
prayed that this Court may be pleased to allow the present appeal
and set aside the order dated 17.02.2026 passed by the learned
Single Judge, in the interest of justice.
16. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the
respondents/writ petitioners, while supporting the impugned order,
submits that the learned Single Judge has exercised jurisdiction
with due circumspection and in accordance with settled principles
of law, and that no interference is warranted by this Court. He
further submits that a plain reading of paragraphs 45 to 47 of the
impugned order would demonstrate that the learned Single Judge
has consciously refrained from issuing any positive mandamus
either granting or denying pensionary benefits to the respondents.
Instead, the learned Single Judge has adopted a balanced and
legally sound approach by directing the State Government to
undertake a comprehensive, reasoned, and policy-based
reconsideration of the issue relating to the determinative date of
appointment for pensionary purposes. He also submits that such
a course of action is fully justified in the facts of the present case,
where the respondents initially served as Shikshakarmis and were
subsequently absorbed into regular government service. It is
urged that the issue involves examination of complex and
interrelated factors, including continuity of service, nature of duties
discharged, source of remuneration, degree of administrative
control exercised by the State, and the overarching mandate of
equality enshrined under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of
India. These are essentially matters falling within the domain of
executive policy, and therefore, the learned Single Judge rightly
left the final determination to the State. It is further submitted that
the clarification contained in paragraph 46 of the impugned order
unequivocally preserves the prerogative of the State Government
in matters of policy formulation. The learned Single Judge has
neither struck down the existing policy nor directed extension of
any particular pensionary benefit. On the contrary, it has been
expressly observed that the policy domain remains exclusively
within the competence of the State, subject only to the
requirement that such policy be clear, non-arbitrary, and
constitutionally compliant. Learned counsel contends that the
direction issued in paragraph 47 of the impugned order is in the
nature of requiring the State to take a "reasoned decision" on an
issue which directly affects a large class of employees and has
led to repeated rounds of litigation. It is submitted that the
requirement of passing a "speaking order" within a stipulated
timeframe merely ensures transparency, accountability, and
adherence to principles of natural justice, and does not, in any
manner, prejudice the rights of the appellants/State. It is thus
contended that the impugned order strikes a careful balance
between judicial restraint and the need to ensure fairness in State
action. As such, the writ appeal deserves to be dismissing
affirming the order of learned Single Judge.
17. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the
impugned order and other documents appended with writ appeal.
18. The principal contention advanced on behalf of the
appellants/State is that the learned Single Judge has erred in law
in directing reconsideration of an issue which, according to the
appellants, had already attained finality and stood concluded. It
has further been urged that the impugned order suffers from non-
consideration of delay and laches, and is contrary to the law laid
down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M.K. Sarkar (supra) and
other judgments.
19. We are unable to persuade ourselves to accept the aforesaid
submissions.
20. A careful reading of paragraphs 45 to 47 of the impugned order
would reveal that the learned Single Judge has consciously
refrained from issuing any positive mandamus either granting or
denying pensionary benefits to the respondents. The direction
issued is neither in the nature of conferring any substantive
benefit nor does it unsettle any existing policy. On the contrary,
the learned Single Judge has adopted a restrained and balanced
approach by requiring the State Government to take a conscious,
reasoned, and policy-based decision on the issue.
21. It is significant to note that the controversy in the present case
arises in a peculiar factual backdrop, where the respondents
initially served as Shikshakarmis and were subsequently
absorbed into regular government service. The question as to
whether, and to what extent, the pre-absorption service ought to
be reckoned for pensionary purposes involves consideration of
multiple factors, including continuity of service, nature of duties,
administrative control, and the constitutional mandate of equality
under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. These are
matters which squarely fall within the domain of executive policy.
22. The learned Single Judge, in our considered view, has rightly
refrained from adjudicating upon such policy matters and has
instead directed the competent authority to undertake an informed
decision-making process. The clarification contained in paragraph
46 of the impugned order explicitly preserves the prerogative of
the State in matters of policy formulation, thereby ensuring that
there is no judicial overreach.
23. The contention of the appellants/State that the impugned direction
amounts to revival of a stale or concluded issue is also misplaced.
The direction issued is not for consideration of an individual or
belated representation so as to attract the ratio of M.K. Sarkar
(supra). Rather, it is a direction to the State to address a broader,
systemic issue affecting a class of employees, which has
continuing civil consequences and has led to recurring litigation.
Such a direction, in our opinion, cannot be equated with the
"consideration jurisprudence" deprecated by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court. In fact, the requirement of passing a reasoned and
speaking order within a stipulated timeframe advances the cause
of transparency and accountability in governance, and ensures
that the issue is examined at the appropriate level on relevant
considerations. No prejudice, much less irreparable prejudice, is
caused to the appellants by such a direction.
24. As regards the submission pertaining to judicial discipline and
binding precedent, we find that the learned Single Judge has not
taken any view in derogation of the judgment rendered by the
Division Bench of this Court in Har Narayan Yadav (supra). The
learned Single Judge has neither overruled nor disregarded the
said judgment, but has merely directed reconsideration of the
issue in light of existing legal and factual parameters. Therefore,
the argument founded on alleged breach of judicial discipline is
misconceived.
25. Similarly, the plea based on delay and laches, as well as the
reliance placed upon the affidavit of the Secretary, Department of
Finance, are matters which can appropriately be considered by
the State Government while undertaking the exercise directed by
the learned Single Judge. The impugned order does not foreclose
any such contention and leaves it open to the State to take an
appropriate decision in accordance with law.
26. We also find merit in the submission advanced on behalf of the
respondents that the impugned order strikes a balance between
judicial restraint and the need to ensure fairness in State action.
The learned Single Judge has neither encroached upon the policy
domain nor abdicated judicial responsibility, but has facilitated a
lawful and structured decision-making process.
27. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we are of the considered
opinion that the impugned order passed by the learned Single
Judge does not suffer from any legal infirmity warranting
interference in exercise of appellate jurisdiction.
28. For the foregoing reasons, the writ appeal being devoid of merit is
liable to be and is hereby dismissed . No order as to costs.
Sd/- Sd/-
Sd/- Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)
Judge Chief Justice
Bablu
