[Cites 23, Cited by 0]
Chattisgarh High Court
Manish Netam vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 22 April, 2026
Author: Ramesh Sinha
Bench: Ramesh Sinha
1
2026:CGHC:18361-DB
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRA No. 260 of 2024
Manish Netam S/o Shri Ghasiram Netam Aged About 20 Years R/o
Village Piparpara Chherkabandha Ps Kota, District - Bilaspur,
Chhattisgarh.
... Appellant(s)
versus
State of Chhattisgarh Through District Magistrate, Bilaspur, Distt. -
Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh.
...Respondent(s)
(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)
For Appellant : Mr. Vijay Shankar Mishra, Advocate.
For Respondent/State : Mr. Nitansh Jaiswal, Deputy Government
Advocate.
For Objector : Mr. Sumit Singh Rathore, Advocate.
Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
Judgment on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
22.04.2026
Digitally
signed by
BRIJMOHAN
BRIJMOHAN MORLE
1. Heard Mr. Vijay Shankar Mishra, learned counsel for the
MORLE Date:
2026.04.30
18:19:31
+0530
appellant. Also heard Mr. Nitansh Jaiswal, learned Deputy Government
Advocate, appearing for the State/respondent and Mr. Sumit Singh
Rathore, learned counsel, appearing for the objector.
2. Though the matter is listed today for hearing on I.A. No. 1 of 2024
(application for suspension of sentence and grant of bail), however,
considering that the appellant has been in custody since 07.03.2023,
and with the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the appeal is
taken up for final hearing.
3. This criminal appeal filed by the appellant/accused under Section
374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, 'CrPC') is
directed against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of
sentence dated 29.12.2023, passed by the learned Special Judge
(FTSC) POCSO Act, Bilaspur, District Bilaspur (C.G.) (for short, 'learned
trial Court') in Special Criminal Case No. 66 of 2023, whereby the
appellant has been convicted and sentenced as under:
Conviction under Section Sentence
Section 305 of the Indian Rigorous imprisonment (for short,
Penal Code (for short, 'IPC') 'R.I.') for 10 years and fine of
Rs.1,000/-, in default of payment of
fine, 06 months R.I. more.
Section 3/4 of the Protection R.I. for life (for the remainder of the
of Children from Sexual natural life) and fine of Rs.2,000/-,
Offences Act, 2012 (for in default of payment of fine, 01
short, 'POCSO Act') year R.I. more.
All the sentence shall run concurrently
4. The brief case of the prosecution is that the complainant, i.e., the
victim's father (PW-2), appeared at Police Station Kota on 05.03.2023 at
about 4:00 p.m. and lodged an oral report stating that his daughter (the
victim), aged about 14 years and studying in Class VIII, was at home.
On the same day, at around 10:00 a.m., he had asked his daughter to
water the vegetable plants in the backyard and instructed his son to sit
at the grocery shop, after which he left for Ratanpur. He returned at
about 2:00 p.m. and called out to his daughter, but she did not respond.
When he did not find her in the backyard or the veranda, he removed
the curtain of the room and saw that his daughter was hanging by a
rope inside the house and was found dead. He then called his son from
the shop and brought his wife, who was working at a factory, back
home. Thereafter, he went to the police station and reported the
incident.
5. On the basis of the information given by the victim's father, a merg
(inquest) No. 37/2023 was registered at Police Station Kota under
Section 174 of the CrPC. Panchnama proceedings of the dead body
were conducted, and the body of the deceased was sent for medical
examination. Statements of witnesses were recorded.
6. After completion of the merg inquiry, and based on the facts that
emerged, an FIR bearing Crime No. 209/2023 (Ex.P/23) was registered
on 07.03.2023 at Police Station Kota against the appellant under
Sections 376, 511, and 305 of the IPC and Sections 8 and 12 of the
POCSO Act. After completing seizure and other formalities, the
appellant was arrested.
7. Upon completion of the entire investigation, and finding sufficient
evidence against the appellant, a charge-sheet was filed before the
learned trial Court on 02.06.2023 under Sections 376 and 305 of the
IPC and Section 4 of the POCSO Act for trial.
8. The learned trial Court framed charges against the appellant
under Sections 376, 376(3), and 305 of the IPC and Sections 3/4 of the
POCSO Act. The charges were read over and explained to the
appellant, who denied the same and claimed trial.
9. In order to prove its case, the prosecution examined 15 witnesses
and exhibited 29 documents. The statement of the accused/appellant
was recorded under Section 313 of the CrPC, wherein he denied all
incriminating circumstances put to him and pleaded false implication.
Upon appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence on record, the
learned trial Court convicted the appellant and sentenced him as
mentioned in paragraph 3 of the impugned judgment. Aggrieved
thereby, the present appeal has been preferred.
10. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the impugned
judgment of conviction and order of sentence are illegal, perverse, and
contrary to the facts and evidence on record. It is contended that the
learned trial Court has erred in holding the appellant guilty without there
being any cogent or conclusive evidence establishing his involvement in
the alleged offences. According to learned counsel, the findings
recorded by the learned trial Court are based on conjectures and
surmises, as it has mechanically accepted the prosecution case without
properly appreciating the material contradictions and omissions in the
evidence of prosecution witnesses. It is further submitted that the
prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and,
therefore, the conviction of the appellant is unsustainable.
11. It is further contended by learned counsel for the appellant that
there is no evidence on record to establish that the appellant had any
direct contact with the deceased or that he was present at or near the
place of occurrence on the date of the incident. It is also submitted that
during the inquest proceedings, no allegation was made against the
appellant by any family member of the deceased, which creates serious
doubt about the prosecution case. Learned counsel further submits that
the learned trial Court has failed to properly appreciate the delay in the
case and the inconsistencies in the statements of prosecution
witnesses, which are fatal to the prosecution case. It is specifically
argued that the prosecution has failed to prove the age of the victim by
reliable and admissible evidence; therefore, the applicability of the
POCSO Act becomes doubtful, and consequently, the conviction and
sentence awarded under the said Act are unsustainable. It is also
contended that the essential ingredients of abetment, as defined under
Section 107 of the IPC, are not made out in the present case. In support
of his submissions, reliance has been placed on the judgments of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gangula Mohan Reddy v. State of Andhra
Pradesh (AIR 2010 SC 327), Mahendra Singh & Another v. State of
M.P. (1995 Supp (3) SCC 731), and State of West Bengal v. Orilal
Jaiswal ((1994) 1 SCC 73), to contend that mere allegations, in the
absence of any positive act of instigation or aiding, are insufficient to
sustain a conviction for abetment of suicide. On these grounds, it is
prayed that the appellant be acquitted of all the charges.
12. Per contra, learned counsel for the State opposes the
submissions advanced on behalf of the appellant and contends that the
impugned judgment is well-reasoned and based on proper appreciation
of the evidence available on record. It is submitted that the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses are reliable, consistent, and inspire
confidence, and are duly corroborated by other evidence on record. It is
further submitted that the alleged discrepancies pointed out by the
appellant are minor in nature and do not affect the core of the
prosecution case.
13. Learned counsel appearing for the objector has also supported
the impugned judgment and submits that the learned trial Court has
rightly appreciated the evidence on record in its proper perspective. It is
contended that the prosecution has successfully established the guilt of
the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. It is further submitted that the
evidence on record clearly proves the age of the victim and the
applicability of the POCSO Act has been rightly invoked. According to
the learned counsel, appearing for the objector, the conduct of the
appellant and the surrounding circumstances clearly establish his
involvement in the crime, and no interference is warranted by this Court.
14. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, considered their
rival submissions made hereinabove, and have also perused the entire
record of the learned trial Court with due care and circumspection.
15. The first question that arises for consideration before this Court is
whether the learned trial Court has rightly held that, on the date of the
incident, the victim was a minor.
16. When a person is charged for the offence punishable under the
POCSO Act, or for rape punishable in the Indian Penal Code, the age of
the victim is significant and essential ingredient to prove such charge
and the gravity of the offence gets changed when the child is below 18
years, 12 years and more than 18 years. Section 2(d) of the POCSO
Act defines the "child" which means any person below the age of
eighteen years.
17. In Jarnail Singh Vs. State of Haryana, reported in (2013) 7
SCC 263, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down the guiding principles
for determining the age of a child, which read as follows:
"22. On the issue of determination of age of a minor,
one only needs to make a reference to Rule 12 of the
Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children)
Rules, 2007 (hereinafter referred to as the 2007
Rules). The aforestated 2007 Rules have been framed
under Section 68(1) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and
Protection of Children) Act, 2000. Rule 12 referred to
hereinabove reads as under :
"12. Procedure to be followed in
determination of Age.? (1) In every case
concerning a child or a juvenile in conflict with
law, the court or the Board or as the case may be
the Committee referred to in rule 19 of these rules
shall determine the age of such juvenile or child
or a juvenile in conflict with law within a period of
thirty days from the date of making of the
application for that purpose.
(2) The court or the Board or as the case may be
the Committee shall decide the juvenility or
otherwise of the juvenile or the child or as the
case may be the juvenile in conflict with law,
prima facie on the basis of physical appearance
or documents, if available, and send him to the
observation home or in jail.
(3) In every case concerning a child or juvenile in
conflict with law, the age determination inquiry
shall be conducted by the court or the Board or,
as the case may be, the Committee by seeking
evidence by obtaining -
(a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent
certificates, if available; and in the absence
whereof;
(ii) the date of birth certificate from the school
(other than a play school) first attended; and
in the absence whereof;
(iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation
or a municipal authority or a panchayat;
(b) and only in the absence of either (i), (ii) or
(iii) of clause (a) above, the medical opinion
will be sought from a duly constituted
Medical Board, which will declare the age of
the juvenile or child. In case exact
assessment of the age cannot be done, the
Court or the Board or, as the case may be,
the Committee, for the reasons to be
recorded by them, may, if considered
necessary, give benefit to the child or juvenile
by considering his/her age on lower side
within the margin of one year.
and, while passing orders in such case shall, after
taking into consideration such evidence as may
be available, or the medical opinion, as the case
may be, record a finding in respect of his age and
either of the evidence specified in any of the
clauses (a)(i), (ii), (iii) or in the absence whereof,
clause (b) shall be the conclusive proof of the age
as regards such child or the juvenile in conflict
with law.
(4) If the age of a juvenile or child or the juvenile
in conflict with law is found to be below 18 years
on the date of offence, on the basis of any of the
conclusive proof specified in sub-rule (3), the
court or the Board or as the case may be the
Committee shall in writing pass an order stating
the age and declaring the status of juvenility or
otherwise, for the purpose of the Act and these
rules and a copy of the order shall be given to
such juvenile or the person concerned.
(5) Save and except where, further inquiry or
otherwise is required, inter alia, in terms of
section 7A, section 64 of the Act and these rules,
no further inquiry shall be conducted by the court
or the Board after examining and obtaining the
certificate or any other documentary proof
referred to in sub-rule (3) of this rule.
(6) The provisions contained in this rule shall also
apply to those disposed off cases, where the
status of juvenility has not been determined in
accordance with the provisions contained in sub-
rule(3) and the Act, requiring dispensation of the
sentence under the Act for passing appropriate
order in the interest of the juvenile in conflict with
law."
23. Even though Rule 12 is strictly applicable only to
determine the age of a child in conflict with law, we are
of the view that the aforesaid statutory provision
should be the basis for determining age, even for a
child who is a victim of crime. For, in our view, there is
hardly any difference in so far as the issue of minority
is concerned, between a child in conflict with law, and
a child who is a victim of crime. Therefore, in our
considered opinion, it would be just and appropriate to
apply Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules, to determine the age
of the prosecutrix VW-PW6. The manner of
determining age conclusively, has been expressed in
sub-rule (3) of Rule 12 extracted above. Under the
aforesaid provision, the age of a child is ascertained,
by adopting the first available basis, out of a number
of options postulated in Rule 12(3). If, in the scheme
of options under Rule 12(3), an option is expressed in
a preceding clause, it has overriding effect over an
option expressed in a subsequent clause. The highest
rated option available, would conclusively determine
the age of a minor. In the scheme of Rule 12(3),
matriculation (or equivalent) certificate of the
concerned child, is the highest rated option. In case,
the said certificate is available, no other evidence can
be relied upon. Only in the absence of the said
certificate, Rule 12(3), envisages consideration of the
date of birth entered, in the school first attended by
the child. In case such an entry of date of birth is
available, the date of birth depicted therein is liable to
be treated as final and conclusive, and no other
material is to be relied upon. Only in the absence of
such entry, Rule 12(3) postulates reliance on a birth
certificate issued by a corporation or a municipal
authority or a panchayat. Yet again, if such a
certificate is available, then no other material
whatsoever is to be taken into consideration, for
determining the age of the child concerned, as the
said certificate would conclusively determine the age
of the child. It is only in the absence of any of the
aforesaid, that Rule 12(3) postulates the determination
of age of the concerned child, on the basis of medical
opinion."
18. In the present case, the prosecution has asserted that the date of
birth of the victim is 30.08.2009. To establish the same, the prosecution
has produced the Admission and Discharge Register (Ex.P/12C)
pertaining to Class 1 of Government Primary School, Peepar Para
(Cherkabandha), Police Station Kota, District Bilaspur (C.G.). The said
document has been duly proved by PW-7, the Headmaster of the said
school, who has categorically deposed that the victim was admitted to
Class 1 on 23.06.2015 and that her date of birth was recorded in the
school register as 30.08.2009. The said register pertains to the first
school attended by the victim and, therefore, squarely falls within the
category contemplated under Rule 12(3)(a)(ii) of the 2007 Rules.
19. The testimony of PW-2, the father of the victim, also supports the
prosecution case and affirms that the date of birth of the victim is
30.08.2009. His oral testimony stands duly corroborated by the
documentary evidence in the form of the Admission and Discharge
Register (Ex.P/12C). In view of the law laid down in Jarnail Singh
(supra), once the date of birth recorded in the school first attended is
available and duly proved, the same constitutes conclusive proof of age,
and no further evidence, including medical opinion, is required to be
considered.
20. The defence has neither adduced any oral nor documentary
evidence to rebut or discredit the aforesaid document. There is no
material on record to suggest that the entry regarding the date of birth in
the school register is incorrect or fabricated. In absence of any such
challenge, the said document deserves to be accepted as reliable and
conclusive proof of age. Accordingly, the date of birth of the victim being
30.08.2009, she was aged about 13 years 06 months and 06 days on
the date of the incident, and thus, was clearly a minor at the relevant
time. The finding recorded by the learned trial Court in this regard calls
for no interference.
21. The next question that arises for consideration is whether the
appellant has committed penetrative sexual assault upon the victim, a
minor girl, as alleged by the prosecution.
22. In this regard, PW-1, the younger brother of the victim/deceased,
aged about 09 years, has deposed that he knew and identified the
appellant, who was previously residing in their village and used to drive
a tractor. He stated that on the date of the incident, while he was
present at their grocery shop, the victim had come there to purchase
shampoo. At that time, the appellant arrived at the shop and demanded
cigarettes on credit, which PW-1 refused. Thereafter, the appellant
asked the victim to provide him cigarettes, but she declined and
proceeded towards her house, whereupon the appellant followed her.
PW-1 further stated that when the victim closed the door from the lane
side, the appellant entered the house from the backyard. Upon hearing
a sound as if the door was being broken, he went towards the house
and saw the appellant holding a stick and attempting to assault the
victim. On being noticed, the victim asked him to run away, failing which
the appellant would kill him as well, whereupon he returned to the shop.
His testimony further establishes that thereafter, his father came and
found the victim hanging in the house. Despite lengthy cross-
examination, this witness remained firm and denied all material
suggestions put by the defence. His testimony inspires confidence and
establishes the presence of the appellant at the place of occurrence and
his overt acts.
23. The testimony of PW-1 finds due corroboration from PW-3,
neighbour of the victim and PW-6, friend of the victim, both of whom are
neighbours of the victim's family. PW-3 has categorically stated that on
the date of the incident, she saw the appellant chasing the victim, who
ran towards her house, and the appellant followed her inside. Similarly,
PW-6 has also deposed that she saw the appellant running after the
victim on the same day. These independent witnesses lend assurance
to the version of PW-1 and firmly establish that the appellant had
followed the victim from the shop to her house immediately prior to the
incident.
24. PW-9, the elder sister of the victim, has also supported the
prosecution case. Though she was not present at the time of the
incident, she reached the spot upon receiving information from her
father and found the victim hanging inside the house. She further
deposed that she was informed by her father and brother about the
sequence of events, including the appellant following the victim to the
house and attempting to assault her with a stick. Significantly, she also
stated that 2-3 days prior to the incident, the victim had informed her
that the appellant was harassing her and threatening her for refusing to
talk to him. This part of the testimony establishes prior conduct and
motive on the part of the appellant. Her testimony remained unshaken
in cross-examination, and she denied the suggestion of any love affair
between the victim and the appellant.
25. Dr. N.K. Gupta (PW-10) and Dr. Richa Tiwari (PW-11), who
conducted the postmortem examination, have categorically opined that
the cause of death was asphyxia due to hanging. However, the
postmortem findings also reveal significant ante-mortem injuries,
including scratch marks on the right side of the chest and chin, along
with a ruptured hymen. The Doctors have specifically opined that the
scratch marks could have been caused by forceful physical contact or
fingernail scratches, thereby indicating resistance on the part of the
victim and use of force prior to her death. The presence of a fractured
thyroid cartilage further reinforces the nature of the hanging.
26. As per the FSL report (Ex.P/29), human spermatozoa were
detected in the vaginal slides of the victim (Exhibit "A"). This scientific
evidence conclusively establishes that sexual intercourse had taken
place prior to the death of the victim. Thus, the medical and forensic
evidence, when read conjointly, clearly demonstrate that the victim was
subjected to force and sexual assault immediately prior to the act of
hanging.
27. Further, Dr. N.K. Gupta (PW-10) has also examined the appellant
on 08.03.2023 and has deposed that no external injuries were found on
his body, his secondary sexual characteristics were fully developed, and
the cremasteric reflex was present. He has clearly opined that there
was nothing to suggest that the appellant was incapable of performing
sexual intercourse. The report in this regard is Ex.P/15. Thus, the
medical evidence also establishes the capability of the appellant to
commit the alleged act, thereby ruling out any defence to the contrary.
28. The prosecution has also proved the memorandum statement of
the appellant (Ex.P/19) and the consequent recovery of the bamboo
stick (Ex.P/20). PW-15 (Investigating Officer) has deposed that the
appellant, in his memorandum, disclosed the place where he had
concealed the stick used during the incident, and the same was
recovered at his instance from near the door of the victim's house. This
recovery is duly corroborated by PW-13 (Madan Singh Jagat), an
independent witness, who has proved both the memorandum and
seizure. The recovery of the weapon at the instance of the appellant
lends further assurance to the prosecution case and corroborates the
testimony of PW-1, who had seen the appellant attempting to assault
the victim with a stick.
29. Upon a comprehensive and careful re-appreciation of the entire
evidence available on record, this Court finds that the prosecution has
succeeded in establishing the presence and active involvement of the
appellant in the incident beyond reasonable doubt. The testimony of
PW-1, a child witness, is wholly natural, cogent, and free from material
contradictions. His presence at the spot is unquestionable, and his
account of the appellant following the victim, entering the house, and
attempting to assault her is consistent and trustworthy. It is well settled
that the testimony of a child witness, if reliable, can form the basis of
conviction, and in the present case, the evidence of PW-1 inspires full
confidence.
30. The testimony of PW-1 stands duly corroborated by independent
witnesses PW-3 and PW-6, who have consistently deposed that they
saw the appellant chasing the victim and following her towards her
house immediately prior to the incident. Further, PW-9 (elder sister of
the victim) has deposed regarding the prior conduct of the appellant,
including harassment and threats extended to the victim shortly before
the incident, thereby establishing motive. The defence has failed to
discredit these witnesses in any material particular.
31. The medical and scientific evidence lends strong corroboration to
the prosecution case. The postmortem findings clearly establish that the
death occurred due to asphyxia by hanging; however, the presence of
ante-mortem injuries, including scratch marks on the chest and chin,
along with a ruptured hymen, clearly indicates that the victim was
subjected to force prior to her death. The FSL report (Ex.P/29)
conclusively establishes the presence of human spermatozoa in the
vaginal slides of the victim, thereby proving that sexual intercourse had
taken place prior to her death. This evidence, taken together, unerringly
points towards sexual assault preceding the incident.
32. The medical examination of the appellant further establishes that
he was capable of performing sexual intercourse. The recovery of the
bamboo stick at the instance of the appellant, pursuant to his
memorandum statement, also stands duly proved and corroborates the
testimony of PW-1. The chain of circumstances is complete and leads to
no other hypothesis except the guilt of the appellant.
33. The defence has failed to bring on record any material
contradiction or inconsistency so as to create a reasonable doubt. No
plausible explanation has been offered by the appellant. The
prosecution evidence remains intact and trustworthy.
34. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the considered
opinion that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable
doubt. The findings recorded by the learned trial Court are based on
proper appreciation of evidence and do not suffer from any perversity or
illegality warranting interference.
35. Consequently, the appeal, being devoid of merit, is hereby
dismissed. The impugned judgment of conviction and order of
sentence passed by the learned trial Court are affirmed.
36. In view of the final disposal of the appeal, I.A. No. 1 of 2024,
stands disposed of as having become infructuous.
37. It is reported that the appellant is in custody. He shall continue to
remain in custody and serve out the remaining part of the sentence as
awarded by the learned trial Court.
38. The Registry is directed to transmit the original record to the
concerned trial Court for necessary information and compliance. The
Registry shall also send a certified copy of this judgment to the
Superintendent of the Jail concerned, where the appellant is undergoing
sentence, for service upon the appellant, informing him that he is at
liberty to challenge the present judgment before the Hon'ble Supreme
Court with the assistance of the High Court Legal Services Committee
or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)
Judge Chief Justice
Brijmohan
