[Cites 13, Cited by 0]
Chattisgarh High Court
Miss. Akanksha Bhardwaj vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 22 April, 2026
1
2026:CGHC:18247-DB
AFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
Reserved for Judgment On : 19.03.2026
Judgment Delivered On : 22/04/2026
Judgment Uploaded On : 22/04/2026
WA No. 34 of 2026
1 - Miss. Akanksha Bhardwaj D/o Shri Ashok Kumar Bhardwaj Aged About 35 Years
R/o Jr. M I G- 05, Near Post Office, Rajkishore Nagar, Bilaspur (C.G.).
--- Appellant
versus
1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through : Principal Secretary, Law and Legislative Affairs,
Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya, Naya Raipur (C.G.)
2 - High Court Of Chhattisgarh, Through : The Registrar General, High Court
Building, Bodri, Bilaspur (C.G.)
---- Respondents
(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)
For Appellant : Ms. Akanksha Bhardwaj, appellant-in-person.
For State No.1 : Mr. Gairy Mukhopadhyay, Additional A.G.
For Respondent No.2 : Mr. Amrito Das, Advocate
DIVISION BENCH : Hon'ble Shri Parth Prateem Sahu, Judge
BALRAM Hon'ble Shri Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal, Judge
PRASAD
DEWANGAN
PRASAD C A V Order
Per Parth Prateem Sahu, Judge
1. Appellant by this appeal has questioned the legality and sustainability
of the impugned order dated 03.12.2025, passed in WPS No. 2942 of
2025, whereby learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition filed
by appellant against the order of termination dated 14.01.2025.
2. Facts relevant for disposal of this appeal are that appellant was initially
appointed on the post of Civil Judge (Entry Level) vide her letter of
appointment dated 12.12.2013. Period of probation according to order
of appointment was two years. Period of probation of appellant along
with other judicial officers was extended on 18.03.2016. On
09.02.2017 appellant was terminated from service. Order of
termination was challenged by appellant by way of filing writ petition
bearing WPS No.2206 of 2017, which came to be allowed in part vide
order dated 01.05.2024. Order passed by learned Single Judge in
WPS No.2206 of 2017 was put to challenge in writ appeal by
respondent No.2/High Court of C.G. bearing WA No.363 of 2024 and
appellant herein also questioned the order passed in earlier writ
petition bearing WPS No.2206 of 2017 in WA No.362 of 2024 claiming
back wages. Both the writ appeals came to be dismissed vide order
dated 20.09.2024 and Division Bench of this Court affirmed the order
passed in WPS No.2206 of 2017. Appellant was reinstated in service
vide order dated 28.11.2024 and she was posted as Fourth Civil Judge
Class-II at Mahasamund to which she joined on 04.12.2024. Vide
order dated 14.01.2025, petitioner was terminated and order of
termination was communicated to her on 15.01.2025. Order of
termination was put to challenge in WPS No.2942 of 2025, which
came to be dismissed by impugned order.
3. Appellant-in-person submits that writ petition filed by her bearing WPS
No.2206 of 2017 was allowed in part and learned Single Judge while
passing the order of reinstatement has further observed that
reinstatement of appellant with continuity of service but without back-
wages. As there is order of continuity of service and appellant was
initially appointed on the post of Civil Judge vide appointment letter
dated 12.12.2013 with a conditions mentioned therein that period of
probation is of two years and even considering the extension of
probation period of one year, appellant has been confirmed in service
by virtue of Rule 11 of the Chhattisgarh Lower Judicial Service
(Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2006 (In short 'the
Rules, 2006'). It is contention of appellant that under Rule 11 of the
Rules, 2006, maximum period of probation has been clearly stipulated
of four years, therefore, language used in Rule 11 (3) of the Rules,
2006 after four years of maximum period of probation, appellant got
automatically confirmed in service, therefore, appellant is having
protection under Article 311 of the Constitution of India. She submits
that her services could not have been terminated without holding due
departmental enquiry against her. She contended that there is no
mention of issuing of an order of confirmation under Rule 11 of the
Rules, 2006. Amendment incorporated under Rule 11 (1) and Rule 11
(3) came into force w.e.f. 08.06.2021 and 19.12.2024 respectively.
Appointment of appellant was prior to that, therefore, rules applicable
to the services of appellant in facts of the case in particular the
provision of Rule 11 of the Rules, 2006 governing the period of
probation will apply as it exists prior to 08.06.2021. She further
contended that period of probation under Rule 11(1), as provided
under the pre-amended provision, is two years, therefore, without
there being any further order after completion of two years, she got the
status of confirmed employee under the principles of 'deemed
confirmation'. In support of her contention, she placed reliance upon
the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of State of Punjab Vs.
Dharam Singh, reported in 1968 SCC OnLine SC 66, in case of High
Court of Madhya Pradesh, through Registrar & Ors. Vs. Satya
Narayan Jhavar, reported in (2001) 7 SCC 161, in case of Abhay
Jain Vs. High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan & Another,
reported in (2022) 13 SCC 1, in case of Anantdeep Singh Vs. High
Court of Punjab And Haryana at Chandigarh & Another, reported in
(2024) 18 SCC 616.
4. Referring to Rule 11 (3), 11 (4) and 11 (5) of the Rules, 2006 she
argued that sub-rule-5 of Rule 11 of the Rules, 2006, no where
provides for separate order to be issued for confirmation of service of
Judicial Officers (entry level), therefore, order of termination passed
without affording proper opportunity to appellant is per-se illegal and
arbitrary in light of the protection granted under 311 (2) of the
Constitution of India. She next contended that Standing Committee is
having no jurisdiction under the rules applicable to services of
appellant to recommend for termination of her service. It is contention
of appellant that High Court means High Court of Chhattisgarh as
envisaged under Rule 2 (g) of the Rules, 2006 and Rule 2 (f) of the
High Court of Chhattisgarh Rules, 2007 (In short 'the Rules, 2007').
Appellant further contended that under Rule 4-O of the Rules, 2007, it
is envisaged that all the recommendations for dismissal from office of
the Judicial Officer shall be taken by the Judges at a meeting of Full
Court and in her case, recommendation is made by the Standing
Committee. The recommendation of the Standing Committee for
termination of her services is in contravention of the provisions under
the Rules, 2007. It is also argued that learned Single Judge has not
discussed as to the "recommendation for dismissal" as envisaged
under Rule 4-O (i) (b) is different from "recommendation for
termination".
5. She next contended that she was not served with ACR for the year
2015-16 and 2016-17, whereas, ACRs of both the years have been
considered by the Committee in the proceedings. The very ground
raised by appellant in the writ petition was not considered and
appreciated by the learned Single Judge in appropriate manner.
Learned Single Judge relied upon the finding recorded in the order
dated 01.05.2024 passed in WPS No.2206 of 2017, which is subject
matter of challenge before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Special
Leave Petition and is pending consideration before the Hon'ble
Supreme Court. Learned Single Judge erroneously considered and
took note that SLP filed by appellant before Hon'ble Supreme Court
has been withdrawn. She also contended that in view of the extract
from the ACR for period from 01.04.2015 to 31.03.2016, it is apparent
that it was stigmatic, therefore, in support of her above contention, she
placed reliance upon the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of
Dev Dutt Vs. Union of India, reported in (2008) 8 SCC 725, in case
of Sukhdev Singh Vs. Union of India & Ors., reported in (2013) 9
SCC 566, Sarita Choudhary Vs. High Court of Madhya Pradesh &
Anr, reported in 2005 INSC 289.
6. Appellant next contended that she being the confirmed employee is
entitled for protection under 311 (2) of the Constitution of India. She
also contended that if recommendation of termination of appellant is
based on extracts made in ACR of the appellant mentioning that "she
would not be able to discharge any other job" confirming basis for
issuance of order of termination, then passing of an order of
termination without conducting enquiry against appellant is against
well settled principles of law. She also contended that the manner in
which the order of termination of appellant was served upon her after
office hours in the night at about 11 PM is inhuman. Serving upon the
order of termination and asking her to handover the charge of Judicial
Officer at 11 PM is unbecoming of constitutionally protected service
like 'Judicial Function', appellant is entitled for back wages in the facts
of the case and placed reliance upon the decision of Hon'ble Supreme
Court in case of Deepali Gundu Surwase Vs. Kranti Junior
Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) & Ors., reported in (2013) 10 SCC
324 and in case of Pradeep Vs. Manganese & Ors. (India) Limited &
Others, reported in (2022) 3 SCC 683.
7. Learned counsel for respondent No.2 vehemently opposes the
submission of learned counsel for appellant and would submit that
there is no concept of deemed confirmation under the Rules, 2006. He
contended that even though under Rule 11 (3) of the Rules, 2006
there is mention of maximum period of probation of four years now
and earlier 3 years then also under Rule 11 (5), it is provided that
probationer shall be confirmed on successful completion of probation,
which means that authority will issue the order of confirmation only
after assessment of working and performance of Judicial Officer,
therefore, it cannot be said that confirmation of Judicial Officer to be
automatic after completion of period as provided under Rule 11 of the
Rules, 2006. He also referred to the sub-rule 6 of Rule 11 of Rules,
2006, which envisages that Judicial Officer shall continue as
probationer until he or she is terminated or confirmed under sub-rule 4
or sub-rule-5 of Rule 11 of the Rules, 2006, therefore, from the reading
of the provision under Rule 11 of the Rules, 2006, it is apparent that
before the Judicial Officer is said to be confirmed in service, it requires
an order of the authority that particular Judicial Officer has been
confirmed in service. Sub-rule 3 of Rule 11 of the Rules, 2006 has to
be read along with sub-rule -5 and sub-rule 6 in conjunction and not in
isolation. He further contended that for conformation of Judicial officer
there has to be a conscious decision on assessment by authority,
which has not been done in case of appellant. Consideration of
confirmation of Judicial Officer and that of other government servant is
different.
8. Referring to the dates and events it is submission of learned counsel
for respondent No.2 that order of appointment of appellant is dated
12.12.2013. Her joining is of 27.12.2013. The order of extension of
period of probation is on 18.03.2016 and the order of termination is on
09.02.2017. He contended that decision relied upon by appellant in
case of Dharam Singh (supra) is on different set of facts and not
applicable to the present case. In that case, probationer was allowed
to continue in post after completion of maximum period of probation
and further respondent therein was allowed to draw annual increments
of salary including the increments which fell due on October, 1962. He
contended that even after reinstatement, appellant worked only for one
month and five days beyond three years. He placed reliance upon the
decision of Division Bench of this Court in case of Ganesh Ram
Burman Vs. High Court of Chhattisgarh, in W.A. No.727 of 2024,
decided on 07.11.2024. He also contended that aforementioned
decision in case of Ganesh Ram Burman (supra) is under challenge
before the Hon'ble Supureme Court in SLP (C) No. 809 of 2025 and is
pending consideration before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. He next
contended that consequence of order of reinstatement passed in first
writ petition filed by appellant herein bearing WPS No.2206 of 2017 is
that appellant has been reinstated on her formal post i.e. Civil Judge
Class-II as probationer.
9. It is next contended by learned counsel for respondent No.2 that
submission of appellant herein that the Standing Committee is not
having jurisdiction to recommend the appellant- Judicial Officer for
termination under the Rules, 2007 is not correct. Rule 4-O (i) (b) of the
Rules, 2007 provides for dismissal whereas appellant is recommended
for termination. It is submitted that termination is not penalty under
Rule 10 of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control &
Appeal) Rules, 1966 (In short 'the Rules, 1966') and in support of his
contention he referred to the explanation appended to Rule 10 of the
Rules, 1966. Decision which was taken by the Standing Committee in
its meeting dated 06.01.2025 is with regard to confirm the appellant in
service or not. Learned Single Judge has extracted the decision of
Standing Committee in para-38. Referring to Rule 11 (6) of the Rules,
2006, it is argued that termination of judicial officer on his/her non-
confirmation will not come within the purview of Rule 4-O of the Rules,
2007, but will fall under Rule 4-C (xvii). In the aforementioned facts of
the case provision under Rule 11 of the Rules, 2006 and the provision
under the Rules, 2007, the Standing Committee is having jurisdiction
to recommend for termination of a non-confirmed Judicial Officer on
the ground of his/her non-confirmation.
10. He next contended that grievance of appellant that she was served
with order of termination in the night at about 11 PM, which was not
proper is only because the Principle District Judge received an
envelop in the name of appellant mentioning over envelop the word
'Confidential', therefore, Principle District Judge might have thought
appropriate to serve the envelop upon appellant immediately after its
receipt. Service of order of termination after office hours is for not other
purpose. He next contended that argument raised by appellant with
regard to non-serving of her ACR within time prescribed, to be not
sustainable because, ACR is not sole consideration for non-
confirmation of appellant but the Standing Committee in its resolution
has considered over all performance entire services record ACRs and
assessment chart of appellant and thereafter concluded that she is not
fit for confirmation in service and recommended for termination of her
services. The procedure adopted for recommendation is in accordance
with provisions/rules applicable to the facts of the case. Decision relied
upon by appellant in case of Dev Dutt (supra), in case of Sukhdev
Singh (supra), in case of Sarita Choudhary (supra) and in Abhay
Jain (supra) are on different facts and are not applicable to the case
at hand.
11. Learned counsel for State would support the contention of learned
counsel for respondent No.2. It is submitted that based on the
recommendation made by respondent No.2, order of termination has
been issued by the respondent No.1, which is in accordance with
provisions under the Rules, 2006.
12. Appellant in reply to the arguments raised by learned counsel for
respondents would submit that unless and until ACRs are served upon
her within time, she was not having an opportunity to improve her
work. She also contended that the decision in case of Ganesh Ram
Burman (supra) is on different facts. She submits that in the facts of
the case, after reinstatement after completion of maximum period of
probation, the status of appellant would be of confirmed employee and
in support of her contention, she placed reliance upon the decision of
Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Anantdeep Singh (supra). She
also pointed out that during appellant was in service prior to her first
order of termination, she was conferred summary powers and powers
of Judicial Magistrate First Class. Appellant has earlier filed writ
petition before Hon'ble Supreme Court against the order of
termination, however, the said writ petition was withdrawn to challenge
the second order of termination before the High Court.
13. We have heard learned counsel for parties and perused the
documents placed on record.
14. Appellant has pressed upon the grounds that she was confirmed on
her post i.e. Civil Judge (Entry Level) automatically after completion of
period of probation as provided under the Rules, 2006 i.e. of three
years by application of principles of 'deemed confirmation'. Appellant
as well as respondent No.2 have pressed upon their arguments relying
upon Rule 11 of the Rules, 2006, therefore, before proceeding further,
to appreciate the submission of learned counsel for respective parties,
we find it appropriate to extract Rule-11 of the Rules, 2006 for ready
reference, which is as under :-
"11. Probation. -
(1) A person appointed to category (a) of sub-
rule (1) of Rule 3 shall be posted on probation
for a period of three years.
(2) A person appointed to a post in category (a)
of sub-rule (1) of Rule 3 shall undergo a judicial
training for a period of one year in accordance
with the scheme prepared by the High Court and
shall also include training in the Chhattisgarh
State Judicial Academy.
(3) The High Court may, at any time, before the
completion of probation period extend the period
of probation, but the total period of probation
shall not exceed four years.
(4) The High Court, may at any time, before the
completion of period of probation, recommend
termination of the services of Civil Judge (Junior
Division) (Entry Level) appointed to the category
(a) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 3.
(5) On successfully completion of probation, a
probationer shall be confirmed in the Service or
post, to which, he has been appointed and if no
permanent post is available, a certificate shall be
issued in his favour by the High Court to the
effect that the probationer would have been
confirmed, but for the non- availability of the
permanent post and as soon as a permanent
post becomes available, he shall be confirmed.
(6) A person appointed on probation shall
continue as such until terminated or confirmed
under sub-rule (4) or sub-rule (5) as the case
may be.
(7) When a probationer is confirmed, he shall be
allowed to draw annual increment for the whole
of the period of probation."
15. The above extracted Rule 11 (1) is amended vide notification dated
08.06.2021 and Rule 11 (3) came to be amended vide notification
dated 19.12.2024. Prior to it, Rule -11 (1) provides for probation of 2
years and Rule 11 (3) provides for probation shall not exceed 3 years.
Perusal of aforementioned extracted provision under Rule 11 would
show that a person is to be appointed on probation for a period of two
years with further provision that period of probation can be extended
but shall not exceed 3 years. Under the rules for considering the status
of employee to be a probationer or confirmed employee, it is not only
Rule 11 (1) or Rule 11 (3) only is to be read, but it also have sub rule-5
under Rule 11 of the Rules, 2006 which provides that on successful
completion of probation, a probationer shall be confirmed in service or
post which means that there has to be assessment of an officer by the
competent authority before an officer shall be confirmed in service.
There has to be application of mind, therefore, there has to be
conscious decision of authority on the issue of confirmation of an
employee/officer as envisaged under Rule 11 (5). Further sub-rule (6)
of Rule 11 of the Rules, 2006 also envisages that a person appointed
on probation shall continue as such until terminated or confirmed
under sub-rule 4 or sub-rule -5 meaning thereby the status of a
probationer under Rule -11 has to be treated to be a probationer till
further orders is passed, either under sub-rule 4 or sub-rule 5 of Rule
11 of the Rules, 2006. Reading of the provision under Rule 11 of the
Rules, 2006 in its entirety the only conclusion would be that authority
has to take conscious decision either to confirm an employee/officer or
to terminate, therefore, until such a decision is taken, persons
appointed under the Rules, 2006 shall continue to hold the status of
probationers only. Upon reading of the entire provision under Rule 11
of the Rules, 2006 we are unable to accept the contention of appellant
that she attained the status of confirmed employee by applying the
principles of deemed confirmation. The said submission/grounds
raised by appellant in view of the specific provision under Rule 11 of
the Rules, 2006 is not sustainable and accordingly, it is repelled. The
decision relied upon by appellant in case of Dharam Singh (supra),
there was a consideration of Rule 6 of the Punjab Educational Service
(Provincialised Cadre) Class-III Rules, 1961, which mentions only on
the completion of period of probation, whereas under the Rules, 2006,
the language used under sub-rule - 5 of Rule 11 is on successful
completion of probation. Under the Punjab Educational Service
(Provincialised Cadre) Class-III Rules, 1961, which was considered by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Dharam Singh (supra), there is
no provision like sub-rule 6 of Rule 11 of the Rules, 2006, therefore,
the decision relied upon by appellant in case of Dharam Singh
(supra) is distinguishable on facts. The conclusion of aforementioned
discussion is that appellant has not got the status of confirmed
employee at any point of time from the date of her appointment till the
date of passing of order of termination dated 14.01.2025 but she
worked only as a probationer as envisaged under sub-rule -6 of Rule
11 of the Rules, 2006. Learned Single Judge has discussed the issue
raised by appellant in this regard from para-22 to 26.
16. The decision relied upon by the appellant in case of Satya Narayan
Jhavar (supra), particularly the portion of paragraph 11 thereof, if read
in its entirety, would not support the appellant's contention. In
concluding para-11, Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed the cases
where even if the rules provided for maximum period of probation but
the same require a specific act on the part of the employer by issuing
an order of confirmation and of passing a test for the purposes of
confirmation and it is held that even if the maximum period of
probation has expired and neither any order of confirmation has been
passed nor the person concerned has passed the requisite test, he
cannot be deemed to have been confirmed merely because the said
period has expired. The case of appellant falls in the aforementioned
category as observed by Hon'ble Supreme Court. For the
aforementioned discussions, the submission made by appellant that
status of appellant is of confirmed employee by applying the principles
of deemed confirmation is having no legs to stand, accordingly it is
repelled.
17. So far as the second ground raised by appellant with regard to
jurisdiction of Standing Committee to make recommendation to the
State Government for terminating the Judicial Officer like appellant
herein is concerned, provision under Rule 2 (s) of Rules, 2007 defines
Standing Committee, which is extracted below for ready reference.
"2(s) 'Standing Committee' means the Committee
constituted under these rules;"
18. Power of Standing Committee is envisaged under Rule 4-C of the
Rules, 2007, which is extracted below for ready reference :-
"4-C. The Standing Committee shall have power, without
reference to the Judges generally-
(i) to dispose of all correspondence within its own
Department urgent in its nature and not of general
importance;
(ii) to make recommendations for promotion of
Subordinate Judges to the rank of Additional District
& Sessions Judges and of the Additional District &
Sessions Judges to the rank of District & Sessions
Judges, and their initial posting on promotion or
appointment;
(iii) to exercise the power exercisable by the Court
under 1[the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita,
2023];
(iv) to make recommendations to the Government
for the vesting of special powers under any special
Act;
(v) to pass orders of transfer of District & Sessions
Judges and Additional District & Sessions Judges;
(vi) to pass orders of the transfer and posting of
subordinate Judges with or without the powers of an
Additional Sessions Judges and Civil Judges;
(vii) to make recommendations for the deputation of
Lower Judicial Service or Higher Judicial Service to
posts under the Government of India, Government of
Chhattisgarh or other State Government or to
Foreign Service;
(viii) to issue orders regarding the promotion of Civil
Judges;
(ix) to pass orders of suspension, initiation of
departmental proceedings against members of the
Higher Judicial Service and Subordinate Judicial
Service, and consequential orders in the said
proceedings other than that of dismissal from
service;
(x) to issue Circular Orders and General letters to
the Subordinate Courts;
(xi) to dispose of any matter which might have been
dealt with by the Judge in charge of the
Administrative Department, but which he has
referred to the Committee for their opinion;
(xii) to make recommendation to the State
Government for compulsory retirement of any
Judicial Officer of any rank:
Provided that notice of the decision of the Standing
Committee shall be circulated to the Full Court within
ten days from the date of the decision and if any
member of Full Court desires, within three weeks of
the decision, the matter to be discussed at a meeting
of the Full Court then no action will be taken till the
decision at such a meeting; and
(xiii) to dispose of any matter referred to it by the Full
Court which might have been dealt with by the Full
Court;
1[(xiv) to consider the representations of Judicial
Officers with regard to expunging the adverse
remarks/up-gradation of grades in Annual
Confidential Reports or to refer to a Committee for
the said purpose;)
2[(xv) Matters relating to the service conditions,
facilities and amenities of the Judges of the Courts;
(xvi) Rules which when published will have the force
of law;
(xvii) To dispose of any other matter(s) which are not
covered under Rule 4-C excluding matters covered
under Rule 4-O."
19. Rule 4-C of the Rules, 2007 came to be amended vide notification
dated 28.11.2023. In Rule 4 (c) following has been added by virtue of
amendment dated 28.11.2023 :-
"[(xv) Matters relating to the service conditions,
facilities and amenities of the Judges of the Courts;
(xvi) Rules which when published will have the force
of law;
(xvii) To dispose of any other matter(s) which are not
covered under Rule 4-C excluding matters covered
under Rule 4-O."."
20. Perusal of Rule 4.C. (xvii) provides that Standing Committee to
dispose of any other matter (s) which are not covered under Rule 4-C
excluding matters covered under Rule 4-O.
21. Prior to amendment Rule 4-O reads as under :-
"4-O (i) On the following matter decision shall be
taken by the Judges at a meeting of the Full
Court:-
(a) All appointments which by law are to be
made by the High Court and which are not
otherwise expressly provided for by these
rules in this Chapter.
(b) All recommendations for the dismissal
from office of Judicial Officer.
(c) Proposals for designating Advocates as
Senior Advocates under section 16(2) of the
Advocates Act, 1961.
(d) Matters relating to the service
conditions, facilities and amenities of the
Judges of the Courts.
(e) Constitution of Rule Committee under
section 123 of the new Civil Procedure
Code nominating Judges for the Rule
Committee.
(f) Consideration of matters relating to the
Chief Justices' Conference.
(g) High Court Calendar.
(ii) The following matters on which Judges have
to be consulted, may be disposed of by
circulation of files, except in a case where a
meeting is called in accordance with Rule 4-N:-
(a) Proposed changes in the law where the
proposition emanates from the Government
or, in other cases, where a committee or
any Judge of the Court considers that action
is called for.
(b) The Administration Report yearly
submitted to Government when passed by
the Judges of the Standing Committee.
(c) Rules which when published will have
the force of law.
(d) Subjects connected with the relation
between the Supreme Court and the High
Court."
22. By virtue of amendment dated 28.11.2023 Rule 4-O (i) (d) has been
deleted. Rule 4-O (i) (b) provides for recommendation for the dismissal
from office of Judicial Officer. It is this rule which is pressed upon by
appellant to submit that recommendation for termination is made by
the Standing Committee is also covered under Rule 4-O (i) (b),
therefore, decision has to be taken by the Judges of the meeting of
Full Court. The said submission of appellant in the opinion of this Court
under amended provision of the Rule 4-C and 4-O of the Rules, 2007
is not sustainable. While bringing amendment under the Rules, 2007
with conscious decision Rule 4-O (i) (d) has been deleted and it has
been brought in under Rule 4-C (xv) of the Rules, 2007.
23. To appreciate the submission of appellant herein that dismissal and
termination are one and same for which it is only the Full Court to
recommend for termination, We find it appropriate to extract the
relevant provision under Rule 10 of the Rules, 1966, because the
Rules, 1966 is applicable to the services of appellant. Rule 10 of the
Rules, 1966 talks of penalties. Rule 10 (viii) talks of removal from
service and 10 (ix) talks of dismissal from service. Both of which has
been treated to be major penalties. Under explanation Clause (viii)
talks of termination of services not amount to penalty. Provision under
(viii) (a) under explanation appended to the Rule 10 of the Rules, 1966
mentions that termination of the services of a government servant
appointed on probation, during or at the end of period of probation, in
accordance with the terms of his appointment or the rules and orders
governing such probation shall not amount to penalty. If both the
provision one under Rule 10 of the Rules, 1966 and another under the
Rules, 2007 if read together it will be clear that under Rule 4-O (i) (b)
only talks of dismissal and not termination. Dismissal and termination,
therefore, is to be understood to be distinct connotation and cannot be
replaced one for another. In view of the provision under the Rules,
2007 read with Rule 10 of the Rules, 1966 the Standing Committee
has not exercised the jurisdiction as envisaged under Rule 4-O (i) (b)
but has exercised jurisdiction under the Rule 4-C (xvii) of the Rules,
2007. Recommendation of the probationer for termination of his/her
service on account of his/her non-confirmation is not part of provision
under Rule 4-O (i) (b) of the Rules, 2007, therefore, submission of
appellant that Standing Committee is having no jurisdiction for making
recommendation for termination of service of appellant is misplaced
and cannot be accepted in view of the specific provision under the
Rules, 1966 and the Rules, 2007 as discussed above. Accordingly, the
said grounds raised and submission made by appellant is not
sustainable and according it is also repelled.
24. So far as the another ground raised by appellant that she was not
served the excerpts of annual confidential report for the period from
01st April, 2015 to 31st March, 2016 and for the year 2016-17 even then
the said ACRs have been considered by the Committee in the
proceedings . As discussed in the preceding paragraph and according
to the rules governing the services of appellant, in particular Rule 11 of
the Rules, 2006, appellant from the date of her joining the service till
the date of passing of an order of termination, she was a probationer,
she was not confirmed in service by an order passed by the competent
authority, she had not successfully completed the period of probation
and there was no order of confirmation. The status of probationer in
service like appellant stands on different footing than that of a
confirmed employee in service. A probationer does not have a right to
hold the post during period of probation, therefore, probationer cannot
be equated with that of an employee who has been substantively
appointed on the post and has a right to hold that post.
25. Appellant could not able to make out a case that her services had
been terminated by way of punishment but challenge of order of
termination on the ground as discussed above, on the authority of the
Standing Committee to recommend for termination of her services and
that appellant has been confirmed in service on the principles of
deemed confirmation, which was negated by this Court in preceding
paragraph.
26. Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of High Court of Judicature at Patna
Vs. Pandey Madan Mohan Prasad Sinha & Others, reported in
(1997) 10 SCC 409 has considered the issue raised by respondent
therein that they were not communicated ACRs with adverse entries
and held thus :-
"6............The question is whether the non-
communication of the said adverse remarks vitiates the
action that has been taken against Respondent 1, viz.,
termination of his services on the ground that he was not
fit for confirmation on the post of Munsif. As regards a
probationer, the law is well settled that he does not have
a right to hold the post during the period of probation.
The position of a probationer cannot be equated with
that of an employee who has been substantively
appointed on a post and has a right to hold that post. An
order terminating the services of a probationer can be
questioned only if it is shown that it has been passed
arbitrarily or has been passed by way of punishment
without complying with the requirements of Article 311(2)
of the Constitution. Since a probationer has no right to
hold the post on which he has been appointed on
probation, he cannot claim a right to be heard before an
order terminating his services is passed. The obligation
to communicate the adverse material to a person before
taking action against him on the basis of the said
material is a facet of the principles of natural justice. But
principles of natural justice have no application in the
case of termination of the services of a probationer
during the period of probation since he has no right to
hold the post. It is, therefore, not possible to hold that
there is an obligation to communicate the adverse
material to a probationer before a decision is taken on
the basis of the said material that he is not fit for being
retained in service. Such material can be relied upon to
show that such a decision does not suffer from the vice
of arbitrariness and is not capricious. ..............
* * *
8. We are, therefore, unable to hold that the failure to
communicate some of the adverse remarks to
Respondent 1 prior to 19-6-1985 vitiates the decision
taken by the High Court on 19-6-1985 that Respondent
1 was not fit for confirmation on the post of Munsif and
that his services should be terminated."
27. In the aforementioned facts of the case, decision of Hon'ble Supreme
Court as referred above we are of the considered view that the ground
raised by appellant that non-supply of ACR to her for the period from
01st April, 2015 to 31st March, 2016 and for the year 2016-17 vitiates
the entire proceedings, is not sustainable, accordingly it is repelled.
28. So far as the arguments raised by appellant about service of order of
termination upon her at about 11.00 PM is concerned, submission is
made by the counsel representing respondent No.2 that envelop which
is sent to Principal District Judge mentions "Confidential". The
concerned Judicial Officer has though it to be some urgent post, has
informed appellant and to collect the same. We are not making any
observation on the said ground raised by appellant as it will not have
any bearing on the merits of the appeal i.e. the order of termination of
appellant (probationer).
29. For the foregoing discussions, we do not find any good ground to
interfere with the decision of learned Single Judge. The appeal, being
devoid of merit, is liable to be and it is hereby dismissed.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Sanjay Kumar Jaiswal) (Parth Prateem Sahu)
Judge Judge
Balram
