[Cites 18, Cited by 0]
Chattisgarh High Court
State Of Chhattisgarh vs Devidas Manikpuri on 21 April, 2026
Author: Ramesh Sinha
Bench: Ramesh Sinha
1
2026:CGHC:18062-DB
BABLU
NAFR
RAJENDRA
BHANARKAR
Digitally signed by
BABLU RAJENDRA
BHANARKAR
Date: 2026.04.24
10:09:51 +0530
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
ACQA No. 336 of 2024
State Of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station Kasdol, District
Balodabazar-Bhatapara (C.G.)
...Appellant
versus
Devidas Manikpuri S/o Shambhudas Manikpuri Aged About 20 Years
R/o Village Dharashiv, Police Chowki Lawan, Police Station Kasdol,
District Balodabazar-Bhatapara (C.G.)
... Respondent
For Appellant : Mr.Nitansh Jaiswal, Deputy Government
Advocate
For Respondent : Mr.Aishwarya Kumar Dubey, Advocate
Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice and
Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
Judgment on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, C.J.
21/04/2026
1. Learned counsel appearing for the accused/respondent submits
that, in pursuance of the order passed by this Court on
16.03.2026, the accused/respondent has furnished a bail bond,
which has been approved by the concerned CJM and endorsed
by the Principal and Sessions Judge, Balodabazar, and that an
affidavit has also been filed by the respondent, which is taken on
record.
2. In view of the above, this Court proceeds to hear the appeal
finally.
3. The appellant-State has filed this acquittal appeal under Section
14(A)(1) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for short 'Atrocities Act')
against the impugned judgment dated 30.09.2023 passed by the
Special Judge (Atrocities), Balodabazar, District Balodabazar-
Bhatapara in Special Sessions Case No.15/2021, whereby the
Special Judge while convicting the accused / respondent for
offence under Section 454 of the IPC has acquitted him of the
charges under Sections 376(1) & 323 of the IPC and Section
3(2)v) of the Atrocities Act.
4. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that the victim (PW-1)
resides in village Dharashiv and does domestic work. The victim
was sleeping home at night on 22.02.2021 and her husband had
gone to the wedding ceremony in an Auto. At about 11.00 P.M., a
man with intention to rape breaking the door of her house and
forcefully entered her house and enter the hand inside her vagina.
When she raised her voice, the accused/respondent attacked her
fatally by putting a cloth in her mouth and biting her lips with his
teeth. The victim raised a voice, at that time her husband came
and tried to catch him after hearing the sound, the
accused/respondent also made a fatal attack on her husband,
then hearing the sound, her father-in-law woke up and caught the
accused/respondent. At that time, the accused / respondent was
naked.
5. On the basis of complaint made by the victim, FIR in Crime
No.0/2021 was registered against the accused / respondent at
Police Station Lavan under Sections 450, 376 and 323 of the IPC.
A memo was sent to the District Hospital, Balodabazar, for
examination of the victim's genitals and the victim's genitals were
examined vide Ex.P-3 and the doctor has opined that all signs of
forceful penetration are present at the time of examination.
6. During the investigation, a blue petticoat was seized upon the
victim's production as per Ex.P-4. A map of the scene of the
incident was prepared as per Ex.P-5. After examination, a
preserved slide of the victim's vaginal swab was jammed in a
sealed packet by constable Memin Brahme. Injured Rohit
Ghritalhar was examined at the District Hospital, Baloda Bazar. A
complaint under Ex.P.-9 was sent to the District Hospital, Baloda
Bazar for examination of the petticoat worn by the victim at the
time of the incident and a report was submitted. An application
under Ex.P-17 was sent to the Judicial Magistrate First Class,
Baloda Bazar, to have the victim's statement recorded in court.
The accused was arrested as per the arrest memo Ex.P-18. The
underwear worn by accused Devidas at the time of the incident
was seized as per seizure memo Ex.P-10 and a written complaint
Ex.P.-7 was sent to the Community Health Centre, Lavan, for
testing the seized underwear and submitting a report. A written
complaint Ex.P.-20 was written to the Tehsildar, Lavan, for
preparing a site map of the incident. On production of the victim's
caste certificate by injured Rohit Ghritalhare, same was seized
vide Ex.P-21. The statements of the witnesses were recorded.
The examination of the victim and the accused was done at the
State Forensic Science Laboratory, Raipur as per Ex.P-12 and the
report was obtained as per Ex.P-14 in which semen and human
sperm were found in the underwear and it was mentioned that
semen stains and human sperm were not found in the petticoat
slide.
7. After completing the investigation and getting sufficient evidence
against the accused / respondent, a charge-sheet was presented
in the court of Special Judge, Balodabazar on 03.05.2021 under
Sections 450, 376, 323 of the IPC and section 3(2)(V-a) of the
Atrocities Act, which was registered as Special Sessions Case No.
15/2021 and the trial was started.
8. After the charge sheet was prepared by the trial Court against the
accused / respondent under Sections 450, 376(1), 323 of the IPC
and Section 3(2)(v) of the Atrocities Act and its contents were read
out and explained to him, the accused / respondent denied the
charge and claimed trial. Under Section 313 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, the accused / respondent stated that he was
innocent and had been falsely implicated in the case.
9. In order to bring home the offence, the prosecution examined as
many as 12 witnesses and exhibited 21 documents. The accused-
respondent examined none in his defence nor any document has
been exhibited in support of his case.
10. The trial Court upon appreciation of oral and documentary
evidence available on record, by its judgment dated 30.09.2023,
while acquitting the accused / respondent of the charges
punishable under Sections 376(1) & 323 of the IPC and Section
3(2)(v) of the Atrocities Act convicted him under Section 454 of the
IPC and sentenced to undergo RI for one year and fine of
Rs.1000/-, in default of payment of fine to further undergo
additional imprisonment for three months. Hence, this acquittal
appeal.
11. Learned Deputy Government Advocate for the appellant / State
submits that the impugned judgment passed by the learned trial
Court is contrary to the settled principles of law as well as the
evidence available on record. Learned trial Court has failed to
appreciate the prosecution evidence in its correct perspective and
has thereby arrived at an erroneous conclusion. The evidence
brought on record clearly establishes the involvement of the
respondent/accused in the commission of the offence. He further
submits that the victim (PW-1) has categorically affirmed the
commission of the offence by the respondent/accused and has
given a detailed account of the manner in which the incident
occurred. Learned trial Court failed to consider that the victim
remained consistent in her statements, including the FIR, her case
diary statement, her statement recorded under Section 164 of the
Cr.P.C., and her deposition before the trial Court. The version of
the victim stands duly corroborated by the statements of her
husband (PW-3), her sister-in-law (PW-4) and Banshilal Chelak
(PW-5), all of whom have supported the prosecution case. There
is nothing on record to discredit or cast any reasonable doubt
upon the testimony of the victim. He also submits that the police
witnesses who participated in the investigation have also
supported the case of the prosecution. Learned trial Court has
based its findings on irrelevant considerations, ignoring material
evidence on record. Learned trial Court has failed to properly
appreciate the direct and cogent allegations made in the
statements of the prosecution witnesses. He contended that the
finding of the trial Court that the victim was a consenting party is
wholly contrary to and inconsistent with the evidence on record. It
is a settled principle of law that the sole testimony of the victim, if
found credible and trustworthy, is sufficient to base a conviction
and does not require further corroboration. The evidence on
record is clear, cogent, and unambiguous, and proves the guilt of
the respondent beyond reasonable doubt. Learned trial Court has
failed to appreciate that the evidence available on record was
sufficient to warrant the conviction of the respondent/accused. In
view of the foregoing, acquittal of the respondent for offence
under Sections 376(1) & 323 of the IPC and Section 3(2)v) of the
Atrocities Act is erroneous, perverse, and contrary to the evidence
on record, and therefore deserves to be set aside by this Court.
12. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the
respondent/accused submits that the impugned judgment of
acquittal passed by learned trial Court is well-reasoned, legally
sound, and based on a proper appreciation of the evidence on
record, and therefore does not warrant any interference by this
Court. It is contended that learned Deputy Government Advocate
has sought to reappreciate the entire evidence as if this were a
trial, which is impermissible in an appeal against acquittal unless
the findings of the trial Court are shown to be perverse or wholly
unreasonable. In the present case, the trial Court has taken a
plausible view based on the material available on record, and
such a view ought not to be disturbed. Learned counsel further
submits that the prosecution has failed to establish its case
beyond reasonable doubt. The testimony of the victim (PW-1),
which forms the foundation of the prosecution case, is not of
sterling quality. It suffers from material omissions, improvements,
and contradictions at various stages, including the FIR, her
statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C., her statement under Section
164 Cr.P.C., and her deposition before the Court. These
inconsistencies go to the root of the prosecution case and render
her testimony unreliable. It is further submitted that while it is a
settled principle that conviction can be based on the sole
testimony of the victim, such testimony must be of unimpeachable
and sterling quality. In the present case, the victim's evidence
does not inspire confidence and is not free from doubt. The
learned trial Court has rightly scrutinized her testimony with
caution and has found it unsafe to base a conviction solely on
such evidence. Learned counsel also submits that the alleged
corroboration by other prosecution witnesses, namely her
husband (PW-3), her sister-in-law (PW-4) and Banshilal Chelak
(PW-5), is not substantive in nature and does not independently
establish the prosecution case. Their testimonies are either
hearsay or based on what was allegedly narrated to them by the
victim, and therefore cannot cure the inherent defects in the
prosecution's case. It is further argued that the investigation in the
present case suffers from serious lapses, and the police
witnesses have merely given formal statements without
addressing the core inconsistencies in the prosecution version.
The benefit of such lapses must necessarily go to the accused /
respondent. Learned counsel also supports the finding of the trial
Court that the circumstances on record indicate the possibility of
consent, or at the very least, create a reasonable doubt regarding
the absence of consent. The prosecution has failed to
conclusively establish the essential ingredients of the offence
alleged. It is a cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that if
two views are possible on the evidence on record, the one
favourable to the accused must be adopted. The presumption of
innocence is further strengthened by an judgment of acquittal, and
unless the conclusions drawn by the trial Court are wholly
unreasonable or perverse, interference is unwarranted. He also
submits that the accused / respondent has also received injuries
during the scuffle, but he has not examined by the prosecution
and no evidence has been produced by the prosecution. In view
of the aforesaid submissions, it is prayed that the appeal filed by
the State being devoid of merit deserves to be dismissed, and the
judgment passed by the learned trial Court be affirmed.
13. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties,
perused the impugned judgment of acquittal and record of the trial
Court.
14. The question for consideration is whether learned trial Court has
rightly acquitted the respondent of the charges under Sections
376(1) & 323 of the IPC and Section 3(2)v) of the Atrocities Act
despite the presence of the testimony of the victim (PW-1) along
with other material evidence available on record.
15. This is the appeal against the judgment of acquittal filed by the
State. The appellate Courts are required to keep in mind that the
trial Court had the advantage of looking at the demeanour of
witnesses and observing their conduct in the Court especially in
the witness-box and also required to keep in mind that even at
that stage, the accused was entitled to benefit of doubt. The doubt
should be such as a reasonably person would honestly and
conscientiously entertain as to the guilt of the accused.
16. The Supreme Court in C.Antony v. Raghavan Nair, AIR 2003 SC
182 has held that unless the High Court arrives at definite
conclusion that the findings recorded by trial Court are perverse, it
would not substitute its own view on a totally different perspective.
17. The Supreme Court in Ramanand Yadav v. Prabhunath Jha,
AIR 2004 SC 1053 has held that the appellate Court in
considering the appeal against judgment of acquittal is to interfere
only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing
so. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable and relevant
and convincing materials have been unjustifiably eliminated in the
process, it is a compelling reason for interference.
18. The scope of interference in appeal against the judgment of
acquittal is well settled. In Tota Singh and another v. State of
Punjab, AIR 1987 SC 1083 the Supreme Court has held in para 6
as under:-
"6...........the mere fact that the Appellate Court is
inclined on a reappreciation of the evidence to reach
a conclusion which is at variance with the one
recorded in the order of acquittal passed by the
Court below will not constitute a valid and sufficient
ground for setting aside the acquittal. The
jurisdiction of the appellate Court in dealing with an
appeal against an order of acquittal is circumscribed
by the limitation that no interference is to be made
with the order of acquittal unless the approach made
by the lower Court to the consideration of the
evidence in the case is vitiated by some manifest
illegality or the conclusion recorded by the Court
below is such which could not have been possibly
arrived at by any Court acting reasonably and
judiciously and is, therefore, liable to be
characterised as perverse. Where two views are
possible on an appraisal of the evidence adduced in
the case and the Court below has taken a view
which is a plausible one, the Appellate Court cannot
legally interfere within an order of acquittal even if it
is of the opinion that the view taken by the Court
below on its consideration of the evidence is
erroneous."
19. While exercising the appellate jurisdiction against judgment of
acquittal the High Courts or the appellate Courts are fully
empowered to appreciate and reappreciate the evidence adduced
on behalf of the parties while reversing the judgment of the trial
Court. The appellate Court is required to discuss the grounds
given by the trial Court to acquit the accused and then to dispel
those reasons.
20. The question for consideration before us is whether the
respondent committed rape on the victim, knowing fully well that
she belongs to the Scheduled Caste category ?
21. Rape has been defined in Section 375 of the IPC as follows :
"375. Rape.-- A man is said to commit "rape" if he--
(a) penetrates his penis, to any extent, into the vagina,
mouth, urethra or anus of a woman or makes her to do
so with him or any other person; or
(b) inserts, to any extent, any object or a part of the
body, not being the penis, into the vagina, the urethra
or anus of a woman or makes her to do so with him or
any other person; or
(c) manipulates any part of the body of a woman so
as to cause penetration into the vagina, urethra, anus
or any part of body of such woman or makes her to do
so with him or any other person; or
(d) applies his mouth to the vagina, anus, urethra of a
woman or makes her to do so with him or any other
person,
under the circumstances falling under any of the
following seven descriptions:
First. Against her will.
Secondly. Without her consent.
Thirdly. With her consent, when her consent has been
obtained by putting her or any person in whom she is
interested, in fear of death or of hurt.
Fourthly. With her consent, when the man knows that
he is not her husband and that her consent is given
because she believes that he is another man to whom
she is or believes herself to be lawfully married.
Fifthly. With her consent when, at the time of giving
such consent, by reason of unsoundness of mind or
intoxication or the administration by him personally or
through another of any stupefying or unwholesome
substance, she is unable to understand the nature and
consequences of that to which she gives consent.
Sixthly. With or without her consent, when she is
under eighteen years of age.
Seventhly. When she is unable to communicate
consent.
Explanation 1. For the purposes of this section,
"vagina" shall also include labia majora.
Explanation 2. Consent means an unequivocal
voluntary agreement when the woman by words,
gestures or any form of verbal or non-verbal
communication, communicates willingness to
participate in the specific sexual act:
Provided that a woman who does not physically
resist to the act of penetration shall not by the reason
only of that fact, be regarded as consenting to the
sexual activity.
Exception 1. A medical procedure or intervention shall
not constitute rape.
Exception 2. Sexual intercourse or sexual acts by a
man with his own wife, the wife not being under fifteen
years of age, is not rape."
22. In the light of aforesaid dictum and proposition of law, we have
examined the evidence adduced on behalf of the prosecution.
23. The victim has been examined as PW-1. In para 1 of her
deposition, the victim stated that the incident occurred on a
Monday, five to six months ago. On that date, her husband had
gone to install a generator at a wedding in the village. After
returning home, he ate dinner and went back to the wedding
venue. That same date, she was watching television at home
around 11:00 P.M., she turned it off and went to sleep. At around
11:30 P.M., the accused pushed open the door and came to her
bed. When she asked him his name, he refused to give her his
name and pushed her off the bed, pressing her mouth shut. He
began kissing me on the mouth. He said, "Your husband does not
love you; I have come to love you." When she offered him water,
he refused to give it to her and even slapped her. After that, she
pushed the accused and went to drink water, then the accused
again caught hold of her, pulled her and threw her on the ground
and started beating her again due to which her nose ring fell
somewhere there. In para 2 of her evidence, she has stated that
the accused had inserted his hand deep into her genitals. After
that, he also inserted his penis into her genitals. At that very
moment, she heard the sound of her husband arriving in an auto-
rickshaw and she screamed loudly. Hearing her voice, her
husband came into her room. At that time, the accused was
raping her by inserting his penis into her genitals. Her husband
and she caught the accused immediately. They woke her father-
in-law, who was sleeping in the house. Upon waking him, her
father-in-law came into her room. Her father-in-law caught the
accused and threw him to the ground. While trying to catch him,
he tried to escape. While trying to catch him, her husband
suffered scratches on his hands and legs and his clothes were
torn. After catching the accused, he was tied with a rope and kept
in the house. In para 3 of her evidence, she has stated that after
the incident, she went to call her sister-in-law Parvati that very
night. Parvati and her son Jageshwar had come to their house.
When she asked the accused, he was telling someone else's
name instead of his father's name. After her sister-in-law Parvati
came to her house, she went to call the village Kotwar and
Sarpanch. Then the village Kotwar and Sarpanch came to her
house. Other family members were also called. Sarpanch Banshi
informed the police, on which the police came to her house in the
village. The police caught the accused and took him to the police
station. Her bangles were broken at the time of the incident. The
accused had poured vegetable juice into her eyes.
24. In para 10 of her cross-examination, the victim denied that she
did not recognize the man who entered her house at 11:30 P.M.
on the night of the incident. She also denied that she did not ask
who he was. She stated in her written report (Ex.P-1) and in her
police statement (Ex.D.-1) that she asked him who he was. In
para 11 of her cross-examination, she also denied that the
accused did not gag her or throw her under the bed. She also
denied that the accused did not kiss her on the mouth. She also
denied that the accused did not say anything affectionate to her
there.
25. Dr.Neha Gangeshri (PW-8) has stated in para 3 of his evidence
that the victim's body has signs of a struggle, including (1) a bite
mark on the victim's lower lip, accompanied by a blood clot, (2)
there were bruises on the victim's right and left arms, measuring
approximately 0.2 x 0.1 cm. There were six bruises on the victim's
right arm and five bruises on the victim's left arm and (3) a
reddened, raised bruise on the right side of the back. In para 4 of
her evidence, she stated that during the examination of the
victim's genitals, she found a dried blood clot in the vulva. The
vagina was slightly swollen and bleeding. The hymen was torn,
with swelling all around, and a cut mark approximately 0.5 cm in
size was present. In her opinion, the examination indicated signs
of forced penetration of the victim's genitals.
26. In para 8 of her cross-examination, she admitted that the injuries
mentioned in her report during the examination of the victim's
genitals are unlikely to have occurred during sexual intercourse.
She further admitted that the injuries she found on the victim's
genitals could have been caused by physical assault. She also
admitted that she did not find any sperm in the victim's genitals
during the examination. She also admitted that if the person who
caused the injuries had inserted their hands or any object into the
vagina, unless the object or hand was washed, evidence of
vaginal discharge and blood could have emerged.
27. The victim (PW-1) in her 164 CrPC statement (Ex.P-6) before the
Judicial Magistrate First Class, Balodabazar has stated that the
incident occurred on Monday, February 22, 2021. On that date,
her husband had gone to a wedding to install a generator. She
was alone at home. Around 11:00 P.M., the accused, whose name
she do not know, broke in. It was dark inside, so she could not
see him. He threw her to the floor and began forcefully kissing her
on the mouth. She tried to push him away and run away, but he
pulled her back towards him, slapped her, threw her to the floor,
and attempted to rape her. He put his hand in her vagina, causing
her to scream loudly. Her screams led to the accused biting her
lips and telling her that her husband does not love her, so he is
come to make love to her. Her husband then came home and
apprehended the accused. They tied him up with a rope. After
daybreak, they informed the Sarpanch about the incident, then the
Sarpanch and the Kotwar recognized the accused. They do not
know the accused by name, they only recognize him by face.
28. Husband of the victim (PW-2) has stated that the incident
occurred approximately 8-9 months ago. There was a wedding
ceremony taking place at Gautia home in his village, Dharashiv,
where she had taken his auto. Around 11:00 P.M., he was
returning home when he heard the victim's voice, "Babu Babu!"
He pushed open the main door and found it locked from the
inside. He turned around and entered the house from the
backyard. He saw accused Devidas raping his wife. At that very
moment, he grabbed accused Devidas by his hair. While he was
trying to separate him from the victim, he began assaulting him
and the victim. He yelled for his father to run, and his father got up
and ran to them. Together, they tied accused Devidas with a rope.
29. In the Indian society refusal to act on the testimony of the victim of
sexual assault in the absence of corroboration as a rule, is adding
insult to injury. A girl or a woman in the tradition bound non-
permissive society of India would be extremely reluctant even to
admit that any incident which is likely to reflect on her chastity had
ever occurred. She would be conscious of the danger of being
ostracized by the society and when in the face of these factors the
crime is brought to light, there is inbuilt assurance that the charge
is genuine rather than fabricated. Just as a witness who has
sustained an injury, which is not shown or believed to be self-
inflicted, is the best witness in the sense that he is least likely to
exculpate the real offender, the evidence of a victim of sex offence
is entitled to great weight, absence of corroboration
notwithstanding. A woman or a girl who is raped is not an
accomplice. Corroboration is not the sine qua non for conviction in
a rape case. The observations of Vivian Bose, J. in Rameshwar
v. The State of Rajasthan, AIR 1952 SC 54 were:
"The rule, which according to the cases has hardened
into one of law, is not that corroboration is essential
before there can be a conviction but that the
necessity of corroboration, as a matter of prudence,
except where the circumstances make it safe to
dispense with it, must be present to the mind of the
judge...".
30. A victim of a sex-offence cannot be put on par with an accomplice.
She is in fact a victim of the crime. The Evidence Act nowhere
says that her evidence cannot be accepted unless it is
corroborated in material particulars. She is undoubtedly a
competent witness under Section 118 and her evidence must
receive the same weight as is attached to an injured in cases of
physical violence. The same degree of care and caution must
attach in the evaluation of her evidence as in the case of an
injured complainant or witness and no more. What is necessary is
that the Court must be conscious of the fact that it is dealing with
the evidence of a person who is interested in the outcome of the
charge levelled by her. If the Court keeps this in mind and feels
satisfied that it can act on the evidence of the victim. There is no
rule of law or practice incorporated in the Indian Evidence Act,
1872 (in short 'Evidence Act') similar to illustration (b) to Section
114 which requires it to look for corroboration. If for some reason
the Court is hesitant to place implicit reliance on the testimony of
the victim it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to
her testimony short of corroboration required in the case of an
accomplice. The nature of evidence required to lend assurance to
the testimony of the victim must necessarily depend on the facts
and circumstances of each case. But if a victim is an adult and of
full understanding the Court is entitled to base a conviction on her
evidence unless the same is own to be infirm and not trustworthy.
If the totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the
case discloses that the victim does not have a strong motive to
falsely involve the person charged, the Court should ordinarily
have no hesitation in accepting her evidence.
31. The Supreme Court in the matter of Ranjit Hazarika v. State of
Assam, AIR 1998 SC 635 has held that the evidence of a victim
of sexual assault stands almost on a par with the evidence of an
injured witness and to an extent is even more reliable. It must not
be overlooked that a woman or a girl subjected to sexual assault
is not an accomplice to the crime but is a victim of another
person's lust and it is improper and undesirable to test her
evidence with a certain amount of suspicion, treating her as if she
were an accomplice.
32. The Supreme Court in the matter of Rai Sandeep @ Deenu v.
State of NCT of Delhi, 2012 (8) SCC 21 held as under:-
"22. In our considered opinion, the 'sterling witness'
should be of a very high quality and caliber whose
version should, therefore, be unassailable. The Court
considering the version of such witness should be in a
position to accept it for its face value without any
hesitation. To test the quality of such a witness, the
status of the witness would be immaterial and what
would be relevant is the truthfulness of the statement
made by such a witness. What would be more
relevant would be the consistency of the statement
right from the starting point till the end, namely, at the
time when the witness makes the initial statement and
ultimately before the Court. It should be natural and
consistent with the case of the prosecution qua the
accused. There should not be any prevarication in the
version of such a witness. The witness should be in a
position to withstand the cross-examination of any
length and howsoever strenuous it may be and under
no circumstance should give room for any doubt as to
the factum of the occurrence, the persons involved,
as well as, the sequence of it. Such a version should
have co-relation with each and everyone of other
supporting material such as the recoveries made, the
weapons used, the manner of offence committed, the
scientific evidence and the expert opinion. The said
version should consistently match with the version of
every other witness. It can even be stated that it
should be akin to the test applied in the case of
circumstantial evidence where there should not be
any missing link in the chain of circumstances to hold
the accused guilty of the offence alleged against him.
Only if the version of such a witness qualifies the
above test as well as all other similar such tests to be
applied, it can be held that such a witness can be
called as a 'sterling witness' whose version can be
accepted by the Court without any corroboration and
based on which the guilty can be punished. To be
more precise, the version of the said witness on the
core spectrum of the crime should remain intact while
all other attendant materials, namely, oral,
documentary and material objects should match the
said version in material particulars in order to enable
the Court trying the offence to rely on the core version
to sieve the other supporting materials for holding the
offender guilty of the charge alleged."
33. Upon hearing learned counsel for the parties and perusing the
record, the central issue that arises for consideration is whether
the appreciation of evidence by the trial Court suffers from such
infirmity or perversity as would justify interference in an appeal
against acquittal.
34. It is a settled principle of law that though an appellate Court
should exercise caution in interfering with a judgment of acquittal,
such restraint does not bar interference where the findings of the
trial Court are perverse, manifestly unreasonable, or founded on a
misappreciation of material evidence.
35. The prosecution case primarily rests upon the testimony of the
victim (PW-1). A careful examination of her statement under
Section 164 Cr.P.C., and deposition before the trial Court
indicates that her version on the core aspects of the incident
remains broadly consistent, particularly regarding the occurrence,
the nature of the act, and the identity of the accused / respondent.
36. The defence has highlighted certain omissions and contradictions.
However, the legal position is that minor inconsistencies which do
not go to the root of the matter cannot be treated as fatal to the
prosecution case. The Court is required to assess whether such
discrepancies materially affect the credibility of the witness.
37. The contention that the victim is not a "sterling witness" must be
examined in light of the principles laid down by the Supreme
Court. A "sterling witness" is one whose testimony is wholly
reliable, consistent, and inspires confidence without reservation.
In the present case, while certain variations exist, the core
narrative of the victim does not appear to have been shaken in
cross-examination. The alleged discrepancies must be tested
against the overall consistency and inherent probability of her
version. The absence of material contradictions on the essential
ingredients of the offence may weigh in favour of treating her
testimony as reliable, though not necessarily flawless.
38. It is also a settled principle that conviction can be based on the
sole testimony of the victim if it is found trustworthy and of
sufficient quality. Corroboration, though desirable in some cases,
is not a rule of law.
39. The testimony of PW-2 (husband) assumes significance, as he
claims to have reached the spot during the occurrence. His
version, if found reliable, lends assurance to the prosecution case.
Similarly, the medical evidence indicating injuries suggestive of
struggle may provide corroboration, though it must be carefully
weighed in light of the doctor's cross-examination.
40. At the same time, the defence argument regarding the absence of
certain forensic indicators and the possibility of alternative
explanations for injuries cannot be brushed aside and requires
cautious evaluation.
41. The question of consent must be determined from the totality of
circumstances. Factors such as alleged resistance, surrounding
circumstances, conduct of the parties, and medical findings are all
relevant. The trial Court's conclusion on this aspect must be
tested against whether it reasonably flows from the evidence on
record.
42. In an appeal against acquittal, if two views are reasonably
possible on the evidence, the view favouring the accused
ordinarily prevails. However, if the trial Court has ignored material
evidence or its conclusions are not supported by the record, the
appellate Court would be justified in reappreciating the evidence.
Accordingly, the determination would ultimately depend on
whether the testimony of the victim, read as a whole and in
conjunction with other evidence, inspires sufficient confidence to
displace the presumption of innocence reinforced by the acquittal.
43. Upon a cumulative consideration of the testimony of the victim
(PW-1), her statement under Section 164 Cr.P.C., and her
deposition before the trial Court, this Court finds that her evidence
on the core substratum of the prosecution case remains
consistent, cogent, and inspires confidence. The minor
inconsistencies pointed out by the defence do not go to the root of
the matter so as to discredit her version or render it unreliable.
44. The testimony of PW-2, the husband of the victim, who reached
the spot during the occurrence, lends further assurance to the
prosecution case. His presence at or near the place of occurrence
has not been successfully dislodged in cross-examination. The
medical evidence indicating injuries consistent with physical
struggle also provides corroboration to the prosecution version.
45. The reasoning adopted by the trial Court in disbelieving the
prosecution case, in the opinion of this Court, suffers from
misappreciation of material evidence and undue emphasis on
minor discrepancies, while overlooking the consistent core
narrative of the victim and the corroborative medical and oral
evidence.
46. The defence raised by learned counsel for the respondent is
bogus and absurd on the face of record. The medical report fully
corroborates the statement of the victim, and her evidence falls
within the category of a sterling witness. The contention of learned
counsel for the respondent that the victim's evidence is not of
sterling quality is absolutely fallacious.
47. It is significant that immediately after the incident, the victim and
her husband caught hold of the accused/respondent and
physically restrained him at the spot. At that time, the village
Kotwar and the Sarpanch also reached the house of the victim.
The Sarpanch thereafter informed and called the police, and upon
their arrival, the accused/respondent was handed over to them.
This sequence of events clearly establishes the presence of the
accused/respondent at the scene of occurrence and lends strong
support to the prosecution case regarding his involvement in the
alleged offence. The prompt apprehension of the accused by the
victim and her husband, followed by the arrival of the village
Kotwar and Sarpanch and immediate intimation to the police,
rules out the possibility of false implication or mistaken identity
and provides substantial corroboration to the testimony of the
victim and other prosecution witnesses. Such immediate restraint
and subsequent handover to the police, when considered along
with the consistent ocular evidence on record, forms an important
link in the chain of circumstances and reinforces the credibility of
the prosecution version.
48. In an appeal against acquittal, though interference is
circumscribed, it is equally well-settled that where the findings of
the trial Court are perverse or based on an erroneous
appreciation of evidence, the appellate Court not only has the
power but the duty to correct such findings. In the present case,
the view taken by the trial Court does not appear to be a
reasonably possible view on the evidence available on record.
49. This Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion that the
prosecution has been able to establish its case beyond
reasonable doubt. The testimony of the victim, duly corroborated
by medical and ocular evidence, unerringly points towards the
guilt of the accused/respondent and rules out the hypothesis of
innocence.
50. For the foregoing reasons, the acquittal appeal filed by the State
under Section 14A(1) of the Atrocities Act is hereby allowed. The
impugned judgment dated 30.09.2023 passed by learned Special
Judge (Atrocities), Balodabazar, District Balodabazar-Bhatapara,
in Special Sessions Case No. 15/2021 is set aside. The
respondent/accused is hereby convicted for offences punishable
under Sections 376(1) and 323 of the IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of
the Atrocities Act, and is sentenced to undergo imprisonment for
life along with a fine of Rs.1,000/- for offence under Section
376(1) of the IPC, in default of payment of fine, to further undergo
rigorous imprisonment for six months. For offence under Section
323 of the IPC, he is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment
for six months along with a fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default of
payment of fine, to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for one
month. For offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the Atrocities Act, he
is sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life along with a fine of
Rs.1,000/-, in default of payment of fine, to further undergo
rigorous imprisonment for six months. His conviction and
sentence under Section 454 of the IPC are hereby affirmed. All
the sentences shall run concurrently.
51. The accused / respondent is directed to surrender before the
concerned trial Court within a period of three weeks from today to
serve the sentence imposed upon him by this Court, failing which
the trial Court shall take him into custody for execution of the
sentence. A compliance report shall be submitted to this Court
thereafter.
52. Let a copy of this judgment and the original records be transmitted
to the trial Court concerned forthwith for necessary information
and compliance.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)
Judge Chief Justice
Bablu
