Mayank Chhabra vs Lovely Singh
2026 Latest Caselaw 1845 Chatt

Chattisgarh High Court

Mayank Chhabra vs Lovely Singh on 20 April, 2026

                                                        1




                                                                      2026:CGHC:17767


                                                                                    NAFR

                               HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

                                              MA No. 186 of 2025

                    1. Mayank Chhabra S/o Dilip Singh Chhabra, Aged About 45 Years R/o
       Digitally
                    Village - Munrethi, Tehsil - Arang, District - Raipur (C.G.)
       signed by
       JYOTI
JYOTI  SHARMA
SHARMA Date:

                    2. Gurjeet Kaur Chhabra, W/o Mayank Chhabra, Aged About 33 Years
       2026.04.21
       11:24:54
       +0530



                    C/o Nishant Sharma, R/o House No. E-52, Sumit City Of Dreams,
                    Kachna, Raipur (C.G.)
                                                                     ... Appellant(s)
                                                 versus

                    1. Lovely Singh S/o Dilip Singh Chhabra Aged About 39 Years R/o Flat
                    No. E-104, Ashoka Ratan, Khamardih, Raipur, District - Raipur (C.G.)

                    2. State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Collector Raipur, Office Of
                    Collector, Ge Road, Raipur, Tehsil And District - Raipur (C.G.)

                    3. Sub-Divisional Officer (R), Arang, Tehsil - Arang, District - Raipur
                    (C.G.)

                    4. Additional Tehsildar, Mandir Hasaud, Tehsil - Arang, District - Raipur
                    (C.G.)
                                                                         ... Respondent(s)

(Cause title is taken from CIS) For Appellant(s) : Mr. N. Naha Roy, Advocate For Respondent : Mr. Anand Gupta, Dy. G.A.

Hon'ble Shri Justice Bibhu Datta Guru Judgment on Board 20/04/2026

1. The appellants/defendants have preferred the present appeal

under Order 43 Rule 1(r) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908,

being aggrieved by the order dated 04.09.2025 passed by the

learned 9th District Judge, Raipur (C.G.) in Civil Suit No.

14-A/2023 (Lovely Singh Vs. Mayank Chhabra & Ors. ), whereby

the learned trial Court allowed the application filed by the

respondent No. 1/plaintiff under Order 39 Rules 1 & 2 r/w Section

151 of CPC.

2. The plaintiff/respondent No.3 instituted a civil suit seeking partition

of suit land pleading, inter alia, that the plaintiff and defendant

No.1 are real brothers and defendant No.2 is the wife of

defendant No.1. It is averred that the plaintiff and defendant No.1

jointly purchased the agricultural land situated at Village Munrethi,

Patwari Halka No.11/12, R.N.M. Mandir Hasaud, Tahsil Arang,

District Raipur, bearing Khasra No.151/1, area 0.690 hectare, by

registered sale deed dated 27.05.2008 for a consideration of

Rs.5,25,000/-, and thereby acquired title and possession over the

same (hereinafter referred to as 'the suit land'). Since the suit land

was jointly purchased, the plaintiff claims half share therein.

Thereafter, the names of the plaintiff and defendant No.1 were

duly mutated in the revenue records. It is further pleaded that for

proper management of the suit land and payment of land revenue,

defendant No.1 obtained from the plaintiff a relinquishment

deed/consent letter on a non-judicial stamp paper of Rs.50/-,

representing that the same was merely a formal document and,

being unregistered, would have no legal effect. Thereafter, both

parties signed the mutation register of Village Munrethi on

25.09.2012, which was certified by the Tahsildar on 14.12.2012.

The original relinquishment deed/consent letter is stated to be in

possession of defendant No.1. It is also pleaded that when

defendant No.1 started showing the suit land to prospective

purchasers, the plaintiff obtained a certified copy of the mutation

order dated 14.12.2012 and challenged the same before the

Tahsil Court, but the said application was dismissed by the

Additional Tahsildar by order dated 15.01.2021 and the appeal

preferred thereagainst was also dismissed by the Sub-Divisional

Officer. Thereafter, defendant No.1 executed a registered gift

deed in favour of defendant No.2 in respect of the entire suit land,

thereby making her ostensible owner thereof. It is further pleaded

that during pendency of the suit, defendant No.2 published an

advertisement in the daily newspaper Dainik Bhaskar dated

25.01.2023 for sale of the suit land, whereupon the plaintiff issued

a rebuttal publication on 27.01.2023. Along with the suit, the

plaintiff also filed an application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of

the CPC contending that he has a strong prima facie case and is

likely to succeed in the suit; however, if during pendency of the

suit the land is alienated to a third party, it would result in

multiplicity of proceedings and cause irreparable loss to him. On

these grounds, prayer has been made for grant of temporary

injunction.

3. Per contra, the defendant filed the written statement along with

the reply to the application under Section 39 Rule 1 & 2 stating

therein that the suit land was purchased by defendant No.1 from

his own income and, out of goodwill, the name of his younger

brother, i.e., the plaintiff, was also included therein. It is further

pleaded that a few days after purchase of the suit land, the

plaintiff expressed his desire to start a business and demanded

money, whereafter he voluntarily relinquished his rights in the land

through a consent deed, without any fear, pressure or coercion.

The defendants further contend that the documents filed by the

plaintiff himself clearly show that in the year 2010 a partition in

respect of the purchased property had taken place, which was

approved by the Tahsildar. Thereafter, on 12.11.2012, the plaintiff

personally appeared before the Tahsil Court along with defendant

No.1 and submitted a relinquishment deed in respect of the suit

property, on the basis whereof mutation proceedings were carried

out and the plaintiff's name was deleted, while the name of

defendant No.1 was recorded as exclusive bhoomiswami of the

entire suit land. It is also pleaded that the plaintiff personally

signed the mutation register. According to the defendants, the

plaintiff has no right, title or possession over the suit property and,

in fact, he was never in possession thereof. It is further pleaded

that the application and appeal preferred by the plaintiff before the

Tahsil Court have already been dismissed and, no further appeal

or revision having been preferred thereagainst, the order passed

by the Sub-Divisional Officer has attained finality. It is contended

that the present suit has been instituted deliberately and without

any cause of action only with an intention to create dispute over

the property. It is also pleaded that after execution of the gift deed

dated 03.06.2022 in favour of defendant No.2, she has acquired

title and possession over the suit land. The defendants further

state that the publication made by the plaintiff in the newspaper

dated 02.05.2025 was duly rebutted by them through a public

notice published on 03.05.2025. According to the defendants, the

balance of convenience lies in their favour and, therefore, the

application filed by the plaintiff deserves to be rejected.

4. After hearing the parties and considering the material available on

record, the trial Court held that the sale deed dated 27.05.2008

prima facie showed the plaintiff and defendant No.1 as joint

purchasers of the suit land. Though both parties relied upon a

relinquishment deed/consent letter, the same was not produced

before the Court and its validity could be decided only after trial.

Accordingly, the plaintiff was held to have established a prima

facie case. The Court further found that defendant No.1 had got

his name mutated in the revenue records and had thereafter

executed a gift deed in favour of defendant No.2, who was alleged

to be intending to sell the suit property. It was held that any

transfer during pendency of the suit may lead to multiplicity of

proceedings and cause irreparable loss to the plaintiff, whereas

no prejudice would be caused to the defendants if restrained from

alienating the land. Accordingly, holding that prima facie case,

balance of convenience and irreparable injury were in favour of

the plaintiff, the application under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC

was allowed and defendant Nos.1 and 2 were restrained from

selling the suit property during pendency of the suit. Thus, this

appeal.

5. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the impugned

order granting temporary injunction is arbitrary, perverse and has

virtually prejudged the merits of the suit by erroneously recording

a prima facie case in favour of the plaintiff. It is contended that the

mutation register for the year 2012-13, filed by the plaintiff himself,

clearly reflects the plaintiff's relinquishment of his rights in the suit

property before the competent revenue authority and, therefore,

no prima facie case survived in his favour after lapse of several

years. It is further submitted that merely because the original

relinquishment deed/consent letter was not produced, the

transaction of relinquishment could not have been ignored at the

interim stage, particularly when the mutation entries supported the

same. Learned counsel argues that the plaintiff was never in

possession of the suit land and, therefore, neither balance of

convenience nor irreparable loss lay in his favour. It is also

contended that the trial Court wrongly relied upon newspaper

publications alleging proposed sale of the property while ignoring

the rebuttal publications issued by the appellants. According to

learned counsel, irrelevant allegations beyond the pleadings were

also considered by the trial Court, resulting in a wholly

misconceived exercise of discretion warranting interference in

appeal.

6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the

record with due circumspection, this Court is of the considered

opinion that no ground is made out for interference with the

discretionary order passed by the learned trial Court. It is well

settled that while considering an appeal against an order granting

temporary injunction, the Court would not substitute its own

discretion unless the order impugned is shown to be arbitrary,

capricious or contrary to settled principles governing grant of

interim relief.

7. In the present case, the registered sale deed dated 27.05.2008

prima facie demonstrates that the plaintiff and defendant No.1

were shown as joint purchasers of the suit property. Thus, at this

stage, the claim of the plaintiff cannot be said to be wholly devoid

of substance. The principal defence raised by the appellants is

founded upon an alleged relinquishment deed/consent letter said

to have been executed by the plaintiff, on the basis whereof

mutation entries were subsequently made in the name of

defendant No.1. However, the said relinquishment deed itself has

not been produced before the Court. In absence of the primary

document, its true nature, due execution, voluntariness, validity in

law and legal effect cannot be conclusively examined at the

interlocutory stage. Whether the plaintiff had in fact relinquished

his rights voluntarily, whether the document was legally

enforceable, and what effect the mutation entries based thereon

would carry, are all matters requiring evidence and detailed

adjudication during trial.

8. The mutation entries or revenue proceedings relied upon by the

appellants do not by themselves conclusively determine title,

particularly when the very basis of such entries is under challenge

in the civil suit. The learned trial Court, therefore, committed no

error in holding that the defence founded upon the alleged

relinquishment deed is a matter to be tested after parties lead

evidence.

9. So far as balance of convenience and irreparable injury are

concerned, the learned trial Court has rightly noticed that if the

suit property is transferred during pendency of the suit, third party

rights may be created, resulting in multiplicity of proceedings and

further complications in final adjudication. On the contrary, the

injunction granted merely restrains alienation of the property and

does not dispossess the appellants or finally determine rights of

either party. Thus, greater hardship would ensue in permitting

transfer than in maintaining the property intact till disposal of the

suit.

10. In view of the aforesaid, the findings recorded by the learned trial

Court regarding existence of a prima facie case, balance of

convenience and likelihood of irreparable injury cannot be said to

be arbitrary or perverse. The order impugned is only protective in

nature and subject to final outcome of the suit. Accordingly, no

interference is warranted in exercise of appellate jurisdiction

under Order 43 Rule 1(r) of the Code of Civil Procedure.

11. Accordingly, the instant appeal being devoid of merit is hereby

dismissed at the motion stage itself.

Sd/-

(Bibhu Datta Guru) Judge Jyoti