Mr. Kamal Kumar Bajaj vs Union Of India
2026 Latest Caselaw 1735 Chatt

Chattisgarh High Court

Mr. Kamal Kumar Bajaj vs Union Of India on 16 April, 2026

Author: Ramesh Sinha

Bench: Ramesh Sinha

                                                            1




                                                                       2026:CGHC:17338-DB
                                                                                            NAFR
          Digitally
          signed by
          BABLU
BABLU     RAJENDRA


                                  HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
RAJENDRA  BHANARKAR
BHANARKAR Date:
          2026.04.17
          13:56:44
          +0530




                                                 REVP No. 105 of 2026

                       Mr. Kamal Kumar Bajaj S/o Shri R.N. Bajaj Aged About 62 Years C/o
                       Dolly Dresses, In Front Of Gate No. 4, Bilaspur Railway Station,
                       Budhwari Bazar, Bilaspur (C.G.)
                                                                                 ... Petitioner
                                                         versus
                       1 - Union Of India Through Its Senior Divisional Engineer (Settlement),
                       South      East     Central     Railway,     District     Bilaspur     (C.G.)
                       2 - General Manager Secr District Bilaspur (C.G.)
                                                                                 ... Respondents

For Petitioner : Mr.Gagan Tiwari, Advocate For Respondents : Mr.Ramakant Mishra, Deputy Solicitor General

Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Order on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 16.04.2026

1. Heard Mr.Gagan Tiwari, learned counsel for the petitioner as well

as Mr.Ramakant Mishra, learned Deputy Solicitor General

appearing for the respondents.

2. The present review petition has been filed seeking review of the

judgment dated 11.02.2026 passed in Writ Appeal No.132/2026

by which the writ appeal filed by the petitioner was dismissed.

3. Learned counsel for the review petitioner submits that it is a

settled principle of law that non-consideration of a material

pleading or an undisputed fact, which goes to the root of the

matter, constitutes an error apparent on the face of the record.

Such an error justifies the exercise of review jurisdiction by this

Court under Section 114 read with Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code

of Civil Procedure, 1908. He further submits that the impugned

judgment proceeds on the premise that the petitioner is merely a

licensee of the Railways and, therefore, has no vested right to

remain in possession of the subject premises. However, this

finding is factually incorrect and contrary to the record. The land in

question was purchased by the grandfather of the petitioner in the

year 1944 through a registered sale deed, and the petitioner

claims ownership on that basis. This fundamental fact is germane

for adjudication of the dispute, and its non-consideration has

resulted in grave prejudice to the Applicant, constituting an error

apparent on the face of the record. He also submits that the

petitioner had specifically pleaded the aforesaid fact of purchase

in paragraph 8.2 of Writ Petition (C) No. 5086/2024 and again in

Writ Appeal No. 132/2026. The same was also reiterated in the

memorandum of appeal. Despite such specific and categorical

pleadings, this Court proceeded to decide the matter along with

other connected cases, wherein the petitioners were admittedly

licensees of the Railways. The failure to independently consider

the Applicant's distinct claim of ownership amounts to non-

consideration of material pleadings.

4. Learned counsel for the review petitioner contended that the

impugned judgment dismissing the writ appeal is founded on the

observation that the review petitioner has no subsisting lease and,

therefore, no enforceable right to remain in possession. Such

reasoning is applicable only to cases involving licensees or

lessees. The present petitioner, however, stands on an entirely

different footing, having consistently asserted ownership based on

a registered sale deed of the year 1944. The application of the

same reasoning to the petitioner's case is therefore legally

untenable. He contended that the writ petition and the writ appeal

of the review petitioner were decided along with other matters

involving railway licensees, without appreciating the distinguishing

feature of the petitioner's case, namely, the independent claim of

ownership. As a result, the review petitioner has been erroneously

treated at par with licensees, which is a manifest error apparent

on the face of the record. The matter would have required an

independent examination on the issue of title, including the validity

and effect of the registered sale deed of 1944. The failure to do so

has resulted in a miscarriage of justice, thereby warranting

interference in review jurisdiction. The impugned judgment

proceeds on the assumption that the petitioner is an unauthorized

occupant solely on the ground that there is no subsisting lease.

This finding overlooks the petitioner's categorical case that his

possession flows from independent ownership rights. In such

circumstances, the provisions of the Public Premises (Eviction of

Unauthorized Occupants) Act, 1971 could not have been invoked

without first adjudicating the question of title. The failure to

consider this aspect vitiates the impugned judgment. As such, the

review petition deserves to be allowed and the order dated

11.02.2026 passed in Writ Appeal No.132/2026 be recalled and

be restored in its original number for fresh consideration.

5. On the other hand, the learned Deputy Solicitor General

appearing for the respondents opposed the submissions

advanced by learned counsel for the review petitioners. He

submitted that the common judgment passed by this Court in Writ

Appeal Nos. 131/2026 and 132/2026 was challenged by one of

the parties, namely Aslam Hussain, before the Hon'ble Supreme

Court by way of SLP No. 7859/2026. The Hon'ble Supreme Court,

vide judgment dated 26.02.2026, dismissed the said SLP. Thus,

the common judgment dated 11.02.2026 passed by this Court in

the aforesaid writ appeals stands affirmed by the Hon'ble

Supreme Court.

6. We have heard learned counsel for the the parties, perused the

judgment under review and other documents.

7. On a pointed query being made to learned counsel for the

petitioner as to why the review petition has been filed by a new

counsel, whereas he was not the counsel in writ appeal, he stated

that, on instructions from his client, he has filed the present review

petition.

8. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Tamil Nadu

Electricity Board & Anr vs N. Raju Reddiar & Anr, reported in

(1997) 9 SCC 736, has deprecated the practice of filing

successive applications after decision of the case and that too, by

engaging different Counsel. The aforesaid judgment is being

reproduced below:

"1. It is a sad spectacle that a new practice unbecoming and not worthy of or conducive to the profession is cropping up. Mr Mariaputham, Advocate-on-Record had filed vakalatnama for the petitioner-opposite party when the special leave petition was filed. After the matter was disposed of, Mr V. Balachandran, Advocate had filed a petition for review. That was also dismissed by this Court on 24-4-1996. Yet another advocate, Mr S.U.K. Sagar, has now been engaged to file the present application styled as "application for clarification", on the specious plea that the order is not clear and unambiguous. When an appeal/special leave petition is dismissed, except in rare cases where error of law or fact is apparent on the record, no review can be filed; that too by the Advocate-on-Record who neither appeared nor was party in the main case. It is salutary to note that the court spends valuable time in deciding a case. Review petition is not, and should not be, an attempt for hearing the

matter again on merits. Unfortunately, it has become, in recent time, a practice to file such review petitions as a routine; that too, with change of counsel, without obtaining consent of the Advocate-on-Record at earlier stage. This is not conducive to healthy practice of the Bar which has the responsibility to maintain the salutary practice of profession. In Review Petition No. 2670 of 1996 in CA No. 1867 of 1992, a Bench of three Judges to which one of us, K. Ramaswamy, J., was a member, had held as under:

"The record of the appeal indicates that Shri Sudarsh Menon was the Advocate- on-Record when the appeal was heard and decided on merits. The review petition has been filed by Shri Prabir Chowdhury who was neither an arguing counsel when the appeal was heard nor was he present at the time of arguments. It is unknown on what basis he has written the grounds in the review petition as if it is a rehearing of an appeal against our order. He did not confine to the scope of review. It would not be in the interest of the profession to permit such practice. That apart, he has not obtained ''No Objection Certificate' from the Advocate-on- Record in the appeal, in spite of the fact that Registry had informed him of the requirement for doing so. Filing of the ''No Objection Certificate' would be the basis for him to come on record.

Otherwise, the Advocate-on-Record is answerable to the Court. The failure to obtain the ''No Objection Certificate' from the erstwhile counsel has disentitled him to file the review petition. Even otherwise, the review petition has no merits. It is an attempt to reargue the matter on merits.

On these grounds, we dismiss the review petition."

9. The observation made in N. Raju Reddiar (supra) has been

further relied upon by the Allahabad High Court in the recent

judgment in the matter of Jai Singh vs The State of U.P.

through its Principal decided on 13 April, 2023.

10. Coming to the merits of the case, it is not in dispute that the

common judgment dated 11.02.2026 passed by this Court was

carried in challenge before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the

same has been affirmed by dismissal of SLP No. 7859/2026 on

26.02.2026. Though dismissal of an SLP does not, in all cases,

bar a review petition, it nonetheless reinforces the finality attached

to the judgment under review and requires this Court to exercise

its review jurisdiction with utmost circumspection.

11. The principal ground urged by the review petitioner relates to

alleged non-consideration of his claim of ownership based on a

sale deed of the year 1944. However, upon careful consideration,

this Court finds that the said contention essentially invites a

reappreciation of the case on merits.

12. It is well settled that the scope of review under Section 114 read

with Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC is extremely limited. A review

petition cannot be treated as an appeal in disguise, nor can it be

used to reargue the matter or to persuade the Court to take a

different view on the same set of facts.

13. The plea of ownership raised by the review petitioner involves

disputed questions of fact and title, which cannot be adjudicated

in review jurisdiction. The findings recorded in the judgment under

review do not suffer from any error apparent on the face of the

record.

14. This Court also finds that the present review petition is an attempt

to reopen and re-agitate the issues which have already been

considered and decided by this Court and affirmed by the Hon'ble

Supreme Court. Such an exercise is clearly impermissible in law.

15. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the considered

opinion that no ground for review is made out and the petition is

devoid of merit.

16. Accordingly, the review petition is hereby dismissed. However,

considering the manner in which the present review petition has

been filed after dismissal of the SLP on 13.04.2026 and by

engaging a new counsel, we deem it appropriate to impose costs.

The review petitioner is directed to pay costs of Rs. 10,000/-

(Rupees Ten Thousand only), which shall be deposited before

the Registry of this Court within a period of one month from today.

The said amount shall be transmitted to the Children Observation

Home, Bilaspur. In case of failure to deposit the aforesaid amount

within the stipulated period, the same shall be recovered from the

review petitioner by the Registrar General of this Court in

accordance with law. The petitioner is further cautioned to be

careful in future and not to misuse the process of law or waste the

precious time of the Court.

                Sd/-                                          Sd/-

        (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal)                       (Ramesh Sinha)
              Judge                                     Chief Justice




Bablu