Suresh Gond vs State Of Chhattisgarh
2026 Latest Caselaw 1655 Chatt

Chattisgarh High Court

Suresh Gond vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 15 April, 2026

                                  1




                                                2026:CGHC:17067


                                                             NAFR
         HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR


                       CRA No. 1255 of 2016

      Suresh Gond, S/o Sonaram Gond, aged about 22 years,
       R/o village Pendri, Police Station Pamgarh, District Janjgir-
       Champa (C.G.).
                                                      ---- Appellant
                              Versus


      State of Chhattisgarh Through : Station House Officer,
       Police Station Pamgarh, District Janjgir-Champa (C.G.)
                                                   ---- Respondent

For Appellant. - Mr. H.B. Agrawal, Sr. Advocate with Mrs. Preeti Yadav, Advocate.

For Respondent - Mr. Kanhaiya Ram Yadav, P.L.

Hon'bel Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey

(Judgment On Board ) 15/04/2026

1. This appeal arises out of the judgment of conviction and

order of sentence dated 2209.2016 passed by the Additional

Sessions Judge (F.T.C.), Janjgir, District Janjgir-Champa

(C.G.) in Special Sessions Trial No. 64/2015 convicting and

sentencing the accused/appellant as under :-

CONVICTION SENTENCE Section 8 of Protection of R.I. for 04 years and fine of Children from Sexual Offiences Rs.5,000/-, in default of Act, 2012 payment of fine amount, additional R.I. for 03 months.

Section 342/34 of IPC R.I. for 06 months with fine of Rs.500/-, in default of payment of fine amount, additional R.I. for 15 months.

All the sentences were directed to run concurrently and in default of payment of fine, sentenced will run separately.

2. Prosecution case, in brief, is that on 25.09.2015 at about

6:00 PM, the prosecutrix (PW-1), after leaving bicycle at the

house of accused Suresh, was returning, at the same time

accused, Suresh Gond, with the intention of outraging her

modesty, caught hold of her hand and forcibly dragged her

inside his house, where a juvenile in conflict with law, Vijay

Verma, was also present. Both the accused persons

attempted to outrage the modesty of the prosecutrix. When

the prosecutrix raised an alarm, accused Suresh Gond

gagged her mouth, while the juvenile Vijay Verma closed the

door, at the relevant time, the prosecutrix's brother (PW-3)

arrived searching her and called out. Upon hearing his

voice, the accused persons hide the prosecutrix under a

wooden bed and covered her with a blanket. Thereafter,

Sunil (PW-2), uncle of prosecutrix, (PW-3) brother of

prosecutrix got the door opened and took the prosecutrix

back home. On the report of the prosecutrix (PW-1), a FIR

(Ex.P-1) was registered against the accused persons for the

offence under Sections 354, 342, 34 345(b) of IPC and 8 of

POCSO Act & the matter was taken up for investigation.

During the course of investigation, the statement of

prosecutrix under Section 164 of CrPC was recorded vide

Ex.P-2. Spot map was prepared vide Ex.P-3. The accused

persons were arrested and sent on remand. School

admission register was seized vide Ex.P-8, according to

which, date of birth of the prosecutrix was 05.03.2001.

3. After investigation, charge sheet was filed against the

accused/appellant under Sections 354, 354(b), 342, 34 of

IPC and Section 8 of POCSO Act and the learned Trial

Court framed charge against the accused under Sections 8

of POCSO Act and 342/34 of IPC to which the

accused/appellant abjured his guilt and pleaded for trial. The

juvenile accused was tried separately by the Juvenile

Justice Board.

4. So as to hold the accused/appellant guilty, the prosecution

examined as many as 05 witnesses. Statement of the

accused/appellant was also recorded under Section 313 of

Cr.P.C. in which he denied the incriminating circumstances

appearing against him in the prosecution case, pleaded

innocence and false implication.

5. The trial Court after hearing counsel for the respective

parties and considering the material available on record has

convicted and sentenced the accused/appellant as

mentioned in para-1 of this judgment. Hence, this appeal.

6. Learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant submits

that the impugned judgment passed by the learned Trial

Court is contrary to law and facts on record and is liable to

be set aside. It is contended that the learned Trial Court has

erred in not properly appreciating the mandatory provisions

contained in Chapter VI of the Protection of Children from

Sexual Offences Act, 2012. The statements of child

witnesses were not recorded before the Magistrate, and

there is no evidence on record to show that the police

officials were not in uniform while recording the statements

of the children. Further, the mandatory requirement under

Section 24(1) of the Act, that the statement of the child

should be recorded by a woman police officer not below the

rank of Sub-Inspector, has not been complied with. It is

further submitted that the investigating agency has also

failed to adhere to the procedure prescribed under Sections

25, 26, and 27 of the Act, which are mandatory in nature

and intended to safeguard the interests of the child. Non-

compliance with these provisions vitiates the entire

prosecution case, as the investigation has been conducted

in violation of the statutory mandate. Therefore, the

prosecution case becomes unreliable and unsustainable in

the eyes of law, and the appellant is entitled to be acquitted.

Learned counsel also submits that there is an unexplained

and inordinate delay in lodging the FIR. The alleged incident

is stated to have occurred on 25.09.2015 at about 6:00 p.m.,

whereas the FIR was lodged only on 26.09.2015 at about

2:00 p.m. This delay has not been satisfactorily explained by

the prosecution and raises serious doubts regarding the

authenticity of the prosecution story. It is argued that such

delay provides sufficient scope for deliberation and

concoction of a false case and it is well settled by the

Hon'ble Apex Court that the unexplained delay in lodging

the FIR may be fatal to the prosecution case. So, the appeal

be allowed and, set aside the impugned judgment of

conviction and sentence, and acquit the appellant of all the

charges levelled against him.

In support of his submission, learned senior counsel

placed reliance on the decisions of Hon'ble Apex Court in

the matter of Jinish Lal Sah v. State of Bihar reported in

2002 Supreme (MP) 1169 and this Court's order dated

28.01.2026 passed in CRA No.625/2016 [in the matter

Pardeshi Das Mahant vs. State of Chhattisgarh]

7. On the other hand, learned State counsel supporting the

impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence

submits that the learned trial Court minutely appreciated oral

and documentary evidence and has rightly convicted the

appellant. So, the appeal being without any merit is liable to

be dismissed.

8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused

the material available on record.

9. It is clear from the record of the learned trial Court that the

learned trial Court framed charges against the

accused/appellant and other accused person under Section

8 of the POCSO Act and 342 read with section 34 of IPC &

after appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, the

learned trial Court convicted the accused/appellant under

Section 8 of POCSO Act and 342/34 of IPC.

10. The question for consideration before this Court is that

whether the prosecutrix on the date of incident was minor or

not.

11. As per the prosecution, the Prosecutrix (PW/1) was aged

about 15 years at the time of incident and the Prosecutrix

(PW-1) mentioned her age in FIR (Ex.P-1) to be 15 years.

12. Rakesh Kumar Ghritlahare (PW-5) who is the Principal of

Govt. Primary School, Pendri has stated that as per the

school admission register (Ex.P-8) of school, the date of

birth of the prosecutrix at Sl. No.1357 is recorded as

05.03.2001 and he also issued a certificate to this effect

vide Ex.P-6 and admitted his signature on 'A to A' part.

13. In cross-examination, the witness admitted that whitener

had been used at Serial No. 1357, which pertains to the

prosecutrix. It was further admitted that whitener was also

used in Exhibit P-8A, specifically in the 'School Leaving'

column. Additionally, Exhibit P-8 does not disclose the basis

on which the said entry was made.

14. In order to establish the age or date of birth of the

prosecutrix, the prosecution had to examine any of the

parent of the prosecutrix but it has failed to do so. Neither

father nor mother of the prosecutrix was examined in the

case, and only on the basis of school admission register

(Ex.P-8), which itself appears to have tampered with using

whitener, the learned Trial Court recorded its finding that on

the date of incident the prosecutrix (PW-1) was below 16

years.

15. The Hon'ble Apex Court while dealing with the issue of

determination of age, in P. Yuvaprakash vs. State

represented by Inspector of Police reported in 2023 (SCC

Online) SC 846 : (2024) 17 SCC 684 held in paras 14 to 17

as under :-

"14. In view of Section 34(1) of the POCSO Act, Section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 becomes relevant, and applicable. That provision is extracted below :

"94. Presumption and determination of age. - (1) where, it is obvious to the Committee or the Board, based on the appearance of the person brought before it under any of the provisions of this Act (other than for the purpose of giving evidence) that the said person is a child, the Committee or the Board shall record such observation stating the age of the child as nearly as may be and proceed with the inquiry under Section 14 or Section 36, as the case may be, without waiting for further confirmation of the age.

(2) In case, the Committee or the Board has reasonable grounds for doubt regarding whether the person brought before it is a child or not, the Committee or the Board, as the case may be, shall undertake the process of age

determination, by seeking evidence by obtaining -

(i) the date of birth certificate from the school, or the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the examination Board concerned, if available; and in the absence thereof;

(ii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat;

(iii) and only in the absence of (I) and (ii) above, age shall be determined by ossification test or any other latest medical age determination test conducted on the orders of the Committee or the Board;

Provided such age determination test conducted on the order of the Committee or the Board shall be completed within fifteen days from the date of such order.

(3) The age recorded by the Committee or the Board to be the age of person so brought before it shall, for the purpose of this Act, be deemed to be the true age of that person."

15. It is evident from the conjoint reading of the above provisions that wherever the dispute with respect to the age of a person arises in the context of her or him being a

victim under the POCSO Act, the courts have to take recourse to the steps indicated in Section 94 of the JJ Act. The three documents in order of which the Juvenile Justice Act requires consideration is that the court concerned has to determine the age by considering the following documents :

"94. (2)(i) The date of birth certificate from the school, or the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the examination Board concerned, if available; and in the absence thereof ;

(ii) The birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat;

(iii) And only in the absence of (I) and (ii) above, age shall be determined by an ossification test or any other latest medical age determination test conducted on the orders of the Committee or the Board."

16. Section 94 (2)(iii) of the JJ Act clearly indicates that the date of birth certificate from the school or matriculation or equivalent certificate by the concerned examination board has to be firstly preferred in the absence of which the birth certificate issued by the Corporation or Municipal Authority of Panchayat and it is

only thereafter in the absence of these such documents the age is to be determined through "an ossification test" or "any other latest medical age determination test" conducted on the orders of the concerned authority, i.e. Committee or Board or Court.

17. In the present case, concededly, only a transfer certificate and not the date of birth certificate or matriculation or equivalent certificate was considered. Ex. C1, i.e., the school transfer certificate showed the date of birth of the victim as 11.07.1997. Significantly, the transfer certificate was produced not by the prosecution but instead by the court summoned witness, i.e. CW 1. The burden is always upon the prosecution to establish what it alleges; therefore, the prosecution could not have been fallen back upon a document which it had never relied upon. Furthermore, DW 3, the Revenue Official (Deputy Tahsildar) concerned had stated on oath that the records for the year 1997 in respect to the births and deaths were missing. Since it did not answer to the description of any class of documents mentioned in Section 94(2)(i) as it was a mere transfer certificate, Ext. C-1 could not have been relied upon to hold that 'M' was below 18 years at the time of commission of the offence."

16. Similarly, in Mahadeo v. State of Maharashtra reported in

(2013) 14 SCC 637, the Supreme Court observed that

though school records may be considered, the Court must

be satisfied about their authenticity and reliability,

particularly with respect to the source of the date of birth

mentioned therein.

17. However, in the present case, Ramesh Kumar Ghritlahare

(PW-5), the Principal, admitted that whitener had been used

in the school admission register (Ex.P-8) against the entry of

the prosecutrix's date of birth, thereby rendering the said

entry doubtful. Furthermore, the prosecution has failed to

produce any other authentic document with regard to the

date of birth of the prosecutrix. In such circumstances, the

prosecution has utterly failed to establish the date of birth of

the prosecutrix through legally admissible evidence, and

consequently, the finding of the learned Trial Court holding

the prosecutrix to be a minor is liable to be set aside and it

is accordingly set aside.

18. The next question which arises for consideration before this

Court whether the accused had wrongfully confined the

prosecutrix or not ?

19. The prosecutrix (PW-1) stated that on the date of the

incident, i.e., 25.09.2015, she went to the house of the

accused to keep her bicycle there. While she was returning,

the accused dragged her inside by holding her hand, where

another juvenile accused was already present. Both the

accused/appellant and the juvenile accused attempted to

take her inside a room, and when she tried to raise an

alarm, the accused/appellant gagged her mouth. She further

stated that when her brother (PW-3) and uncle came

searching for her, the accused/appellant hid her under a

wooden bed and falsely told them that she was not in the

house. However, her brother and uncle found her, rescued

her from their custody, and took her home. She also stated

that had her brother and uncle not arrived in time, the

accused/appellant would have outraged her modesty. She

further stated that she lodged a report at the police station

and had also given a statement earlier before the Court at

Akaltara.

20. In cross-examination, the prosecutrix (PW-1) denied this

suggestion of defence that seeing her brother and uncle and

due to fear, she hid in the wooden bed of the accused and

covered blanket. The prosecutrix has denied this suggestion

that her brother and uncle had dispute with accused Suresh

and they filed a report after the accused had filed one,

however, she admitted this suggestion that on the report of

both the parties, the matter is pending consideration before

the Pamgarh Court.

21. Sunil Kumar Verma (PW-2), the uncle of the prosecutrix,

stated that on the date of the incident, i.e., 25.09.2015, the

brother of the prosecutrix informed him that the accused,

Suresh, had taken the prosecutrix (PW-1) to his room.

Thereafter, he (this witness), along with the brother of the

prosecutrix, went to the house of the accused and called out

to him. Upon being asked whether he had brought the

prosecutrix, the accused denied the same. He further stated

that they then searched the room of the accused using a

mobile torch and found that Vijay Verma and the

accused/appellant had hidden the prosecutrix under a

wooden bed covering blanket. Thereafter, the brother of the

prosecutrix called the aunt of the accused, and after

informing her about the incident, they returned home with

the prosecutrix.

22. In para 4 of his cross-examination, this witness has denied

this suggestion that prosecutrix went to the house of

accused voluntarily. PW-2 has admitted that after he

brought the prosecutrix (PW-1) back from the accused's

house, the accused assaulted him, thereafter, he lodged the

report. He has also admitted that if he had not been

assaulted, he would not have lodged the report at police

station.

23. Brother of the prosecutrix (PW-3) has stated that on the

date of incident i.e. on 25.09.2015, Samaru informed him

that the accused/appellant and Vijay took the prosecutrix

(PW-1) to his house holding her hand, thereafter, he along

with Sunil (PW-3) went to the house of accused/appellant,

called him out and asked whereabouts of prosecutrix, when

the accused replied that the prosecutrix did not come to his

house, thereafter they entered the house of accused,

searched his house and found that accused had hidden the

prosecutrix under the wooden bed covering blanket.

Thereafter, they took the prosecutrix to home and lodged

the report at police station. In cross-examination, this

witness has denied this suggestion that prosecutrix went to

the house of accused voluntarily. He admitted that he had

not seen the accused dragging the prosecutrix holding her

hand.

24. Close scrutiny of the evidence of prosecutrix (PW-1), her

uncle (PW-2) and brother (PW-3) when read in its entirety

clearly shows that the prosecutrix (PW-1) herself went to the

house of accused/appellant and when her brother and uncle

searched the house of accused, they found the prosecutrix

hidden under the wooden bed covering blanket. The

evidence of aforesaid witnesses does not conclusively

establish wrongful confinement or use of criminal force with

the requisite intent. The aforesaid circumstances under

which she was found there do not inspire confidence to

sustain the conviction. Further, there is a delay in lodging

the FIR, which has not been satisfactorily explained.

Moreover, PW-2 has admitted that the report was lodged

only after he was assaulted by the accused/appellant,

thereby creating a serious doubt regarding the genesis of

the prosecution story.

25. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Jinish (supra) held that there is

no doubt that the appellant who was a tuition teacher of PW

1 has misused the trust reposed in him by PW 1's family but

then since the prosecution has failed to establish the fact

that PW 1 was below the age of 18 and the evidence on

record indicates that PW 1 had willingly gone away with the

appellant, and in the absence of any threat, coercion or

inducement, having been established by the prosecution we

think it not possible to rely on the prosecution case to come

to the conclusion that the appellant is guilty of the charges

framed against him under section 366A and 376 IPC or

even section 366 as contended by the learned counsel for

the State.

26. In the light of above judicial pronouncement of Hon'ble Apex

Court, in the present case also, the prosecution has failed to

prove the age of the prosecutrix below 16 years and also

failed to prove this fact that the accused/appellant wrongfully

confined the prosecutrix in his house.

27. In view of the aforesaid infirmities, inconsistencies, and lack

of reliable evidence, this Court is of the considered opinion

that the prosecution has failed to prove the charges against

the accused/appellant beyond reasonable doubt.

Accordingly, the accused/appellant is entitled to the benefit

of doubt.

28. In the result, the appeal is allowed. Conviction of the

accused/appellant under Section 8 of POCSO Act and

342/34 of IPC and sentenced imposed thereunder are

hereby set aside. He is acquitted of the said charges by

extending him benefit of doubt.

29. The appellant is already on bail. Keeping in view the

provisions of Section 437-A Cr.P.C. (new section 481 of the

B.N.S.S.), the appellant is directed to forthwith furnish a

personal bond in terms of Form No.45 prescribed in the

Code of Criminal Procedure of sum of Rs.25,000/- with one

surety in the like amount before the Court concerned which

shall be effective for a period of six months along with an

undertaking that in the event of filing of Special Leave

Petition against the instant judgment for grant of leave, the

aforesaid appellant on receipt of notice thereof shall appear

before the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

30. The trial Court record along with a copy of this judgment be

sent back immediately to the trial Court concerned for

compliance and necessary action.

Sd/-

(Rajani Dubey) JUDGE

pekde