Milan Bargah vs State Of Chhattisgarh
2026 Latest Caselaw 1652 Chatt

Chattisgarh High Court

Milan Bargah vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 15 April, 2026

Author: Ramesh Sinha

Bench: Ramesh Sinha

                                                      1




MANPREET
                                                                  2026:CGHC:17113-DB
KAUR

Digitally signed
by MANPREET
KAUR
                                                                                  NAFR
Date: 2026.04.16
11:05:41 +0530




                            HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
                                           CRA No. 126 of 2024


                   Milan Bargah S/o Late Bhola Ram Bargah Aged About 46 Years
                   Profession - Agriculture And Laborer, R/o Village Kedma, Khalpara,
                   Police Chowki Kedma, Thana Udaipur, District Surguja (C.G.)
                                                                           ... Appellant(s)
                                                  versus


                   State Of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station Udaipur, District Surguja
                   (C.G.)
                                                                        ... Respondent(s)

For Appellant(s) : Mr. Ashok Kumar Dewangan, Advocate For Respondent(s) : Mr. Priyank Rathi, Government Advocate

Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge

Judgment on Board

Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice

15.04.2026

1. Heard Mr. Ashok Kumar Dewangan, learned counsel for the

appellant as well as Mr. Priyank Rathi, learned Government

Advocate, appearing for respondent / State.

2. This criminal appeal filed by the appellant under Section 374(2) of

the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, 'Cr.P.C.') is

directed against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of

sentence dated 25.11.2023 passed by the learned Sessions

Judge, Sarguja (Ambikapur), District- Surguja (C.G.) in Sessions

Trial No. 185/2022, whereby the appellant have been convicted

for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal

Code (IPC) and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and

fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default of payment of fine, additional R.I. for

03 months.

3. The prosecution case, in brief, is that the accused Milan Bargah

was married to Moti Bai, the sister of the deceased Samundar

Yadav, about 12 years prior to the date of incident in Village

Kedama. After the marriage, the father of Moti Bai had given a

piece of land adjacent to his house to the accused, where the

accused constructed a house and started residing with his family.

It is further alleged that the accused intended to acquire more

land from his father-in-law. On account of such intention, disputes

frequently arose between the accused and the deceased

Samundar Yadav, who objected to the accused allegedly

encroaching upon the land.

4. On 23.10.2022, the deceased Samundar Yadav was sitting in front

of his house, while his mother Siddhi Bai was present nearby. At

that time, the accused Milan Bargah reached there in an

intoxicated condition. On seeing the accused, the deceased

objected and stated that the land belonged to him and accused

Milan was trying to usurp the same. This led to a quarrel between

them. During the course of the altercation, the accused took out a

knife and inflicted a stab injury on the chest of the deceased, due

to which the deceased fell down outside the courtyard and

sustained serious injuries. It is also the case of the prosecution

that immediately after the incident, the accused went to his father-

in-law Bhanwarsai, holding a blood-stained knife, and stated that

since Samundar Yadav was accusing him of occupying his land

and attempting to grab it, he had stabbed him near the house and

killed him. Upon hearing this, Bhanwarsai rushed to the spot and

found his son Samundar Yadav lying in a pool of blood with injury

on his chest. Despite efforts, the deceased did not respond.

5. Thereafter, with the help of neighbours namely Sushil Tirkey, Rohit

Yadav and Sukhu Bargah, the injured was taken to PHC Kedma,

where the doctor examined him and declared him dead. The

information regarding the death of Samundar Yadav was given by

Bhanwarsai at Police Outpost Kedma, on the basis of which an

unnumbered FIR (Ex.P-1) was registered, followed by registration

of offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. The said

information was forwarded to Police Station Udaipur, where FIR

No. 171/2022 (Ex.P-24) under Section 302 IPC was formally

registered against the accused.

6. During the course of investigation, inquest proceedings were

conducted and inquest report (Ex.P-5) was prepared. The dead

body was sent for postmortem examination, which was conducted

by Dr. B.M. Kamre and report (Ex.P-13) was obtained. Blood-

stained clothes of the deceased and other articles were seized

vide seizure memo (Exhibit P-12). Blood-stained and plain soil

were also seized from the spot (Exhibit P-18), and the spot map

was prepared (Exhibit P-3). During investigation, the accused was

taken into custody and his memorandum statement (Exhibit P-15)

was recorded, pursuant to which the knife used in the commission

of offence was seized at his instance (Exhibit P-16). The blood-

stained shirt worn by the accused at the time of the incident was

also seized (Exhibit P-19). The accused was formally arrested

vide arrest memo (Exhibit P-20). The seized articles were sent for

forensic examination to FSL Ambikapur, from where report

(Exhibit P-27) was received. The medical query report also

confirmed that the injuries sustained by the deceased could be

caused by the seized knife.

7. Statements of witnesses were recorded under Section 161 of the

Code of Criminal Procedure. After completion of investigation,

charge-sheet was filed before the Court of Judicial Magistrate

First Class, Ambikapur, from where the case was committed to

Sessions Court for trial.

8. On the basis of evidence presented in the case, when the

statement of the accused was examined in the form of a

questionnaire under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, the accused expressed his innocence, but did not

produce any witness in his defence.

9. In order to bring home the offence, the prosecution examined as

many as 14 witnesses and exhibited 25 documents Exs.P-1 to P-

25.

10. The trial Court upon appreciation of oral and documentary

evidence available on record, by its judgment dated 25.11.2023,

convicted the appellant for offence under Section 302 of the IPC

and sentenced him as aforementioned, against which, this

criminal appeal has been preferred by the accused / appellant.

11. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the impugned

judgment of conviction passed by the learned trial Court is wholly

erroneous, illegal and contrary to the settled principles of criminal

jurisprudence. It is contended that the learned trial Court has

gravely erred in convicting the appellant by adopting a selective

approach in appreciation of evidence, inasmuch as it has ignored

the material portions of testimony of witnesses which were

favourable to the defence and has relied only upon such parts as

suited the prosecution, thereby adopting a "pick and choose"

method to secure conviction. It is further submitted that although

the prosecution examined as many as 14 witnesses, there exist

material contradictions and inconsistencies in their statements

regarding the incident as well as the manner in which the

investigation was conducted, which renders the prosecution case

doubtful, yet the learned trial Court, despite noticing such

discrepancies, has perversely proceeded to convict the appellant.

Learned counsel further argues that the prosecution has failed to

adduce cogent, reliable and sufficient evidence to prove the

charge beyond reasonable doubt, and the conviction based on

such insufficient evidence is unsustainable in the eyes of law. It is

also contended that even as per the prosecution story, the

incident occurred on account of sudden provocation during a

quarrel, when the appellant was under the influence of alcohol,

and there was no premeditation or intention to commit murder

rather, the act, if any, was committed in the heat of passion. It is

further urged that the prosecution has failed to establish the chain

of circumstances conclusively and the case appears doubtful. In

the alternative, it is prayed that even if the prosecution case is

accepted in its entirety, the offence would not fall under Section

302 IPC but would at best be covered under Section 304 of the

Indian Penal Code, as the essential ingredients of murder are not

made out. Hence, the impugned judgment of conviction and

sentence deserves to be set aside, or in the alternative, the

conviction be altered from Section 302 IPC to Section 304 IPC

with appropriate modification of sentence.

12. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the

respondent/State supports the impugned judgment and submits

that the appellant has caused murder of deceased by deadly

attacking him with knife due to which, he succumbed to his

injuries, therefore, the learned trial Court has rightly convicted the

appellant under Section 302 of the IPC and it is not a case where

the appellant's conviction under Section 302 of the IPC can be

altered/converted under Section 304 Part-I or Part-II IPC and as

such, the instant criminal appeal deserves to be dismissed.

13. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties,

considered their rival submissions made hereinabove and also

went through the records with utmost circumspection.

14. The first question for consideration would be whether the

deceased died under unnatural circumstances ?

15. In order to determine the aforesaid issue, the prosecution has

relied upon the testimony of Assistant Sub-Inspector Manoj Singh

(PW-14), who has stated that upon receiving information, he

reached the place of occurrence at Village Kedama, inspected the

dead body of the deceased and issued notice (Exhibit P-4) for

conducting the inquest proceedings. He thereafter prepared the

inquest report (Exhibit P-5) and sent the dead body for

postmortem examination to PHC Kedma through Constable Suraj

Rai along with requisition (Exhibit P-13A).

16. The prosecution has further examined Dr. B.M. Kamre (PW-6),

who conducted the postmortem examination of the deceased on

24.10.2022 at PHC Kedma. The witness has deposed that the

body was brought by Constable Suraj Rai and was duly identified

by the family members of the deceased. Upon external

examination, the doctor found that the deceased was wearing a

blue-yellow T-shirt and brown underwear. Rigor mortis was

present throughout the body. A stab wound measuring 3 x 1.5 cm

was found on the left side of the chest between the fourth and fifth

ribs. On internal examination, the doctor found that there was a

stab injury penetrating into the chest cavity, resulting in

accumulation of blood. Notably, a stab wound measuring about

1.5 cm was present in both chambers of the heart, which had

caused profuse internal bleeding. The internal organs such as

lungs, liver, spleen and kidneys were found congested.

17. The doctor opined that the cause of death was shock and

asphyxia due to internal and external bleeding resulting from the

chest injury, and that the death was homicidal in nature. He

further stated that the injuries were caused by a hard and sharp

object and were inflicted approximately 14 to 18 hours prior to the

post-mortem examination. The post-mortem report prepared by

him is Exhibit P-13.

18. In his cross-examination, the doctor has specifically denied the

suggestion that such injuries could be caused by a fall on a sharp

object, stone or rod. His testimony on material aspects has

remained unshaken and no contradiction or infirmity has been

brought on record to discredit his medical opinion.

19. The medical evidence, thus, clearly establishes that the death of

the deceased was not accidental or natural, but was caused by a

deliberate stab injury inflicted on a vital part of the body, resulting

in fatal internal bleeding.

20. In view of the aforesaid evidence, particularly the unimpeached

testimony of the medical expert and the postmortem report, this

Court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution has

successfully proved that the death of the deceased Samundar

Yadav was homicidal in nature.

21. Now, the question for consideration would be whether the

accused-appellant herein is the perpetrator of the crime in

question?

22. In this regard, the prosecution has examined Sidhi Bai (PW-2),

mother of the deceased and mother-in-law of the accused, as an

eyewitness. She has categorically stated in her examination-in-

chief that on the date of incident at about 6:00 p.m., while she was

sitting outside her house along with her son Samundar Yadav, the

accused Milan came there, caught hold of her son and assaulted

him on the chest with a sharp object, as a result of which he fell

down and blood started oozing out. The accused thereafter fled

from the spot. Her testimony has remained intact in cross-

examination and nothing material has been elicited to discredit

her version. Being a natural witness present at the spot, her

testimony inspires confidence.

23. The other alleged eyewitnesses, namely Mansi Bai (PW-3),

daughter of the accused, and Moti Bai (PW-4), wife of the

accused, have not supported the prosecution case and have been

declared hostile. However, it is well settled that merely because

certain witnesses have turned hostile, the entire prosecution case

does not fail, and the testimony of reliable witnesses can be safely

relied upon. In the present case, their hostility appears to be

natural considering their close relationship with the accused.

24. The prosecution has further relied upon the testimony of Bhanwar

Sai (PW-1), father of the deceased and father-in-law of the

accused, who has stated that while he was sitting at the house of

Sushil Tirkey, the accused came there holding a blood-stained

knife and confessed that he had killed Samundar Yadav. Upon

hearing this, he rushed to the spot and found his son lying in a

pool of blood. His testimony regarding extra-judicial confession

has remained unshaken in cross-examination and there is no

reason for him to falsely implicate his own son-in-law.

25. The testimony of Sushil Kumar Tirkey (PW-4) also lends

corroboration to the statement of Bhanwar Sai (PW-1), as he has

stated that the accused came there and made a statement

indicating that he had finished Samundar over a land dispute.

Though he has not seen the actual assault, he is a witness to the

extra-judicial confession and the circumstances immediately

thereafter.

26. Similarly, Rohit Kumar (PW-7) has stated that when he reached

the spot, he saw the accused holding a knife and moving near the

place of occurrence. Though his statement regarding the accused

uttering he has kill him suffers from omission in police statement,

his testimony that he saw the accused with a knife immediately

after the incident remains uncontroverted and supports the

prosecution case.

27. The extra-judicial confession made by the accused before

Bhanwar Sai (PW-1) stands corroborated by surrounding

circumstances, including the presence of the accused with a knife

immediately after the incident, as seen by witnesses, and the

prompt conduct of Bhanwar Sai in rushing to the spot and

reporting the matter to the police. There is nothing on record to

suggest that the said confession was obtained by coercion or

inducement. Hence, the same is found to be voluntary and

reliable.

28. The medical evidence adduced by Dr. B.M. Kamre (PW-6) clearly

establishes that the deceased sustained a stab injury on the

chest, which penetrated vital organs including the heart, resulting

in death due to shock and hemorrhage. The doctor has also

opined that such injuries could be caused by a knife like the one

seized in the present case.

29. The recovery of the knife at the instance of the accused and

seizure of his blood-stained clothes, though not fully supported by

independent witnesses, still gain significance in light of the FSL

report (Exhibit P-27), which shows that human blood of the same

group "AB" was found on the knife, the clothes of the accused and

the clothes of the deceased. The accused has failed to offer any

explanation for the presence of such blood on his clothes and the

weapon.

30. The prompt lodging of FIR also supports the prosecution case, as

the incident occurred around 6:00 p.m. and was reported without

undue delay, ruling out possibility of false implication.

31. On a cumulative appreciation of the evidence of eyewitness Sidhi

Bai (PW-2), extra-judicial confession before Bhanwar Sai (PW-1),

corroboration by Sushil Tirkey (PW-4) and Rohit Kumar (PW-7),

medical evidence, and FSL report, this Court finds that the

prosecution has successfully established beyond reasonable

doubt that it was the accused who inflicted the fatal injury on the

deceased.

32. The aforesaid finding brings us to the next question for

consideration, whether the case of the appellant is covered within

Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC vis-a-vis culpable homicide

not amounting to murder and his conviction can be converted to

Section 304 Part-I or Part-II of the IPC, as contended by learned

counsel for the appellant?

33. The cause of death assigned in the postmortem report of the

deceased is already noticed are 'the cause of death was shock

and asphyxia due to internal and external bleeding resulting from

the chest injury, and that the death was homicidal in nature'. It is

a trite law that "culpable homicide" is a genus and "murder" is its

species and all "murders" are "culpable homicides, but all

"culpable homicides are not "murders" as held by the Hon'ble

Supreme Court in Rampal Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh 1.

The intention of the accused must be judged not in the light of

actual circumstances, but in the light of what is supposed to be

the circumstances.

34. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Basdev Vs. State of

Pepsu2 has made the following observations :

"Of course, we have to distinguish between motive, intention and knowledge. Motive is something which prompts a man to form an intention and knowledge is an awareness of the consequences of the act. In many cases intention and knowledge merge into each other and mean the same thing more or less and intention can be presumed from knowledge. The demarcating line between knowledge and intention is no doubt thin but it is not difficult to perceive that they connote different things. Even in some English decisions, the three ideas are used interchangeably and this has led to a certain amount of confusion."

35. It requires to be borne in mind that the test suggested in the

aforesaid decision and the fact that the legislature has used two

different terminologies, 'intent' and 'knowledge' and separate

1 (2012) 8 SCC 289

2 AIR 1956 SC 488

punishments are provided for an act committed with an intent to

cause bodily injury which is likely to cause death and for an act

committed with a knowledge that his act is likely to cause death

without intent to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause

death, it would be unsafe to treat 'intent' and 'knowledge' in equal

terms. They are not different things. Knowledge would be one of

the circumstances to be taken into consideration while

determining or inferring the requisite intent. Where the evidence

would not disclose that there was any intention to cause death of

the deceased but it was clear that the accused had knowledge

that his acts were likely to cause death, the accused can be held

guilty under second part of Section 304 IPC. It is in this

background that the expression used in Indian Penal Code

namely "intention" and "knowledge" has to be seen as there being

a thin line of distinction between these two expressions. The act

to constitute murder, if in given facts and circumstances, would

disclose that the ingredients of Section 300 are not satisfied and

such act is one of extreme recklessness, it would not attract the

said Section. In order to bring a case within Part 3 of Section 300

IPC, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that

particular bodily injury which in the ordinary course of nature was

sufficient to cause death. In other words, that the injury found to

be present was the injury that was intended to be inflicted.

36. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Sukhbir Singh v.

State of Haryana3 has observed as under:-

"21. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that in the absence of the existence of common object Sukhbir Singh is proved to have committed the offence of culpable homicide without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and did not act in a cruel or unusual manner and his case is covered by Exception 4 of Section 300 IPC which is punishable under Section 304 (Part I) IPC. The finding of the courts below holding the aforesaid appellant guilty of offence of murder punishable under Section 302 IPC is set aside and he is held guilty for the commission of offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Section 304 (Part I) IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and to pay a fine of Rs.5000. In default of payment of fine, he shall undergo further rigorous imprisonment for one year."

37. The Supreme Court in the matter of Gurmukh Singh v. State of

Haryana4 has laid down certain factors which are to be taken into

consideration before awarding appropriate sentence to the

accused with reference to Section 302 or Section 304 Part II of

the IPC, which state as under :-

"23. These are some factors which are required to be taken into consideration before awarding appropriate

3 (2002) 3 SCC 327 4 (2009) 15 SCC 635

sentence to the accused. These factors are only illustrative in character and not exhaustive. Each case has to be seen fro its special perspective. The relevant factors are as under :

(a) Motive or previous enmity;

(b) Whether the incident had taken place on the spur of the moment;

(c) The intention/knowledge of the accused while inflicting the blow or injury;

(d) Whether the death ensued instantaneously or the victim died after several days;

(e) The gravity, dimension and nature of injury;

(f) The age and general health condition of the accused;

(g) Whether the injury was caused without premeditation in a sudden fight;

(h) The nature and size of weapon used for inflicting the injury and the force with which the blow was inflicted;

(i) The criminal background and adverse history of the accused;

(j) Whether the injury inflicted was not sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death but the death was because of shock;

(k) Number of other criminal cases pending against the accused;

(l) Incident occurred within the family members or close relations;

(m) The conduct and behaviour of the accused after the incident.

Whether the accused had taken the injured/the deceased to the hospital immediately to ensure that he/she gets

proper medical treatment ?

These are some of the factors which can be taken into consideration while granting an appropriate sentence to the accused.

24. The list of circumstances enumerated above is only illustrative and not exhaustive. In our considered view, proper and appropriate sentence to the accused is the bounded obligation and duty of the court. The endeavour of the court must be to ensure that the accused receives appropriate sentence, in other words, sentence should be according to the gravity of the offence. These are some of the relevant factors which are required to be kept in view while convicting and sentencing the accused."

38. Likewise, in the matter of State v. Sanjeev Nanda5, their

Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that once knowledge

that it is likely to cause death is established but without any

intention to cause death, then jail sentence may be for a term

which may extend to 10 years or with fine or with both. It has

further been held that to make out an offence punishable under

Section 304 Part II of the IPC, the prosecution has to prove the

death of the person in question and such death was caused by

the act of the accused and that he knew that such act of his is

likely to cause death.

39. Further, the Supreme Court in the matter of Arjun v. State of

Chhattisgarh6 has elaborately dealt with the issue and observed

5 (2012) 8 SCC 450 6 (2017) 3 SCC 247

in paragraphs 20 and 21, which reads as under :-

"20. To invoke this Exception 4, the requirements that are to be fulfilled have been laid down by this Court in Surinder Kumar v. UT, Chandigarh [(1989) 2 SCC 217 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 348], it has been explained as under :(SCC p. 220, para 7)

"7. To invoke this exception four requirements must be satisfied, namely, (I) it was a sudden fight; (ii) there was no premeditation; (iii) the act was done in a heat of passion; and (iv) the assailant had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. The cause of the quarrel is not relevant nor its I relevant who offered the provocation or started the assault. The number of wounds caused during the occurrence is not a decisive factor but what is important is that the occurrence must have been sudden and unpremeditated and the offender must have acted in a fit of anger. Of course, the offender must not have taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner.

Where, on a sudden quarrel, a person in the heat of the moment picks up a weapon which is handy and causes injuries, one of which proves fatal, he would be entitled to the benefit of this exception provided he has not acted cruelly."

21. Further in Arumugam v. State [(2008) 15 SCC 590 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1130], in support of the proposition of law that under what circumstances Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC can be invoked if death is caused, it has been explained as under :

(SCC p. 596, para 9) "9. .... The help of exception 4 can be invoked if death is caused (a) without premeditation; (b) in a sudden fight; (c) without the offender's having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner; and (d) the fight must have been with the person killed. To bring a case within Exception 4 all the ingredients mentioned in it must be found. It is to be noted that the "fight" occurring in Exception

4 to Section 300 IPC is not defined in the Penal Code, 1860. It takes two to make a fight. Heat of passion requires that there must be no time for the passions to cool down and in this case, the parties had worked themselves into a fury on account of the verbal altercation in the beginning. A fight is a combat between two or more persons whether with or without weapons.

It is not possible to enunciate any general rule as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden or not must necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each case. For the application of Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that there was a sudden quarrel and there was no premeditation. It must further be shown that the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in cruel or unusual manner. The expression "undue advantage" as used in the provisions means "unfair advantage".

40. In the matter of Arjun (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has

held that if there is intent and knowledge, the same would be case

of Section 304 Part-I of the IPC and if it is only a case of

knowledge and not the intention to cause murder and bodily

injury, then same would be a case of Section 304 Part-II of the

IPC.

41. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Rambir v.

State (NCT of Delhi)7 has laid down four ingredients which

should be tested to bring a case within the purview of Exception 4

to Section 300 of IPC, which reads as under:

"16. A plain reading of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC shows that the following four ingredients are required:

7 (2019) 6 SCC 122

(i) There must be a sudden fight;

(ii) There was no premeditation;

(iii) The act was committed in a heat of passion; and

(iv) The offender had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner."

42. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in a recent judgment in the case of

Anbazhagan vs. The State represented by the Inspector of

Police in Criminal Appeal No.2043 of 2023 disposed of on

20.07.2023 has defined the context of the true test to be adopted

to find out the intention or knowledge of the accused in doing the

act as under:

"60. Few important principles of law discernible from the aforesaid discussion may be summed up thus:

(1) When the court is confronted with the question, what offence the accused could be said to have committed, the true test is to find out the intention or knowledge of the accused in doing the act. If the intention or knowledge was such as is described in Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the act will be murder even though only a single injury was caused. To illustrate: 'A' is bound hand and foot. 'B' comes and placing his revolver against the head of 'A', shoots 'A' in his head killing him instantaneously.

Here, there will be no difficulty in holding that the intention of 'B' in shooting 'A' was to kill him, though only single injury was caused. The case would, therefore, be of murder falling within Clause (1) of

Section 300 of the IPC. Taking another instance, 'B' sneaks into the bed room of his enemy 'A' while the latter is asleep on his bed. Taking aim at the left chest of 'A', 'B' forcibly plunges a sword in the left chest of 'A' and runs away. 'A' dies shortly thereafter. The injury to 'A' was found to be sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death. There may be no difficulty in holding that 'B' intentionally inflicted the particular injury found to be caused and that the said injury was objectively sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. This would bring the act of 'B' within Clause (3) of Section 300 of the IPC and render him guilty of the offence of murder although only single injury was caused.

(2) Even when the intention or knowledge of the accused may fall within Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the act of the accused which would otherwise be murder, will be taken out of the purview of murder, if the accused's case attracts any one of the five exceptions enumerated in that section. In the event of the case falling within any of those exceptions, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder, falling within Part 1 of Section 304 of the IPC, if the case of the accused is such as to fall within Clauses (1) to (3) of Section 300 of the IPC. It would be offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case is such as to fall within Clause (4) of Section 300 of the IPC. Again, the intention or knowledge of the accused may be such that only 2nd or 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC, may be attracted but not any of the clauses of Section 300 of the IPC. In that situation also, the

offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 of the IPC. It would be an offence under Part I of that section, if the case fall within 2nd part of Section 299, while it would be an offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case fall within 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC.

(3) To put it in other words, if the act of an accused person falls within the first two clauses of cases of culpable homicide as described in Section 299 of the IPC it is punishable under the first part of Section

304. If, however, it falls within the third clause, it is punishable under the second part of Section 304. In effect, therefore, the first part of this section would apply when there is 'guilty intention,' whereas the second part would apply when there is no such intention, but there is 'guilty knowledge'.

(4) Even if single injury is inflicted, if that particular injury was intended, and objectively that injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the requirements of Clause 3rdly to Section 300 of the IPC, are fulfilled and the offence would be murder.

(5) Section 304 of the IPC will apply to the following classes of cases : (i) when the case falls under one or the other of the clauses of Section 300, but it is covered by one of the exceptions to that Section, (ii) when the injury caused is not of the higher degree of likelihood which is covered by the expression 'sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death' but is of a lower degree of likelihood which is

generally spoken of as an injury 'likely to cause death' and the case does not fall under Clause (2) of Section 300 of the IPC, (iii) when the act is done with the knowledge that death is likely to ensue but without intention to cause death or an injury likely to cause death.

To put it more succinctly, the difference between the two parts of Section 304 of the IPC is that under the first part, the crime of murder is first established and the accused is then given the benefit of one of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC, while under the second part, the crime of murder is never established at all. Therefore, for the purpose of holding an accused guilty of the offence punishable under the second part of Section 304 of the IPC, the accused need not bring his case within one of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC.

(6) The word 'likely' means probably and it is distinguished from more 'possibly'. When chances of happening are even or greater than its not happening, we may say that the thing will 'probably happen'. In reaching the conclusion, the court has to place itself in the situation of the accused and then judge whether the accused had the knowledge that by the act he was likely to cause death.

(7) The distinction between culpable homicide (Section 299 of the IPC) and murder (Section 300 of the IPC) has always to be carefully borne in mind while dealing with a charge under Section 302 of the IPC. Under the category of unlawful homicides, both,

the cases of culpable homicide amounting to murder and those not amounting to murder would fall. Culpable homicide is not murder when the case is brought within the five exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC. But, even though none of the said five exceptions are pleaded or prima facie established on the evidence on record, the prosecution must still be required under the law to bring the case under any of the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC to sustain the charge of murder. If the prosecution fails to discharge this onus in establishing any one of the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC, namely, 1stly to 4thly, the charge of murder would not be made out and the case may be one of culpable homicide not amounting to murder as described under Section 299 of the IPC.

(8) The court must address itself to the question of mens rea. If Clause thirdly of Section 300 is to be applied, the assailant must intend the particular injury inflicted on the deceased. This ingredient could rarely be proved by direct evidence. Inevitably, it is a matter of inference to be drawn from the proved circumstances of the case. The court must necessarily have regard to the nature of the weapon used, part of the body injured, extent of the injury, degree of force used in causing the injury, the manner of attack, the circumstances preceding and attendant on the attack.

(9) Intention to kill is not the only intention that makes a culpable homicide a murder. The intention to cause injury or injuries sufficient in the ordinary cause of

nature to cause death also makes a culpable homicide a murder if death has actually been caused and intention to cause such injury or injuries is to be inferred from the act or acts resulting in the injury or injuries.

(10) When single injury inflicted by the accused results in the death of the victim, no inference, as a general principle, can be drawn that the accused did not have the intention to cause the death or that particular injury which resulted in the death of the victim. Whether an accused had the required guilty intention or not, is a question of fact which has to be determined on the facts of each case.

(11) Where the prosecution proves that the accused had the intention to cause death of any person or to cause bodily injury to him and the intended injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, then, even if he inflicts a single injury which results in the death of the victim, the offence squarely falls under Clause thirdly of Section 300 of the IPC unless one of the exceptions applies.

(12) In determining the question, whether an accused had guilty intention or guilty knowledge in a case where only a single injury is inflicted by him and that injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the fact that the act is done without premeditation in a sudden fight or quarrel, or that the circumstances justify that the injury was accidental or unintentional, or that he only intended a simple injury, would lead to the inference of guilty knowledge, and

the offence would be one under Section 304 Part II of the IPC."

43. Reverting to the facts of the present case in light of principles of

law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the

above-stated judgments (supra), it is quite vivid that the incident

occurred suddenly in the course of a quarrel between the accused

and the deceased over a land dispute. The prosecution evidence

itself indicates that there was a verbal altercation immediately

preceding the incident. It is also evident that the accused was

under the influence of alcohol at the time of the incident, and the

act was committed in the heat of passion upon sudden

provocation without any premeditation. There is nothing on record

to show that the accused had any prior intention or preplanned

design to commit the murder of the deceased. The incident

appears to have occurred on the spur of the moment.

44. Although the injury was inflicted on a vital part of the body, namely

the chest, the surrounding circumstances clearly indicate that the

act falls within the ambit of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC, as it

was committed without premeditation, in a sudden fight, in the

heat of passion, as such, his case would falls within the purview of

Exception 4 of Section 300 of IPC, as the act of appellant herein

completely satisfies the four necessary ingredients of Exception 4

to Section 300 IPC i.e. (i) there must be a sudden fight; (ii) there

was no premeditation; (iii) the act was committed in a heat of

passion and (iv) the appellant had not taken any undue advantage

or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.

45. Thus, upon careful consideration of the entire evidence on record,

including the reliable testimony of eyewitness Sidhi Bai (PW-2),

the extra-judicial confession made by the accused before

Bhanwar Sai (PW-1) duly corroborated by Sushil Tirkey (PW-4),

the presence of the accused with a knife immediately after the

incident as seen by Rohit Kumar (PW-7) and other witnesses, the

medical evidence establishing that the death was caused by a

stab injury on a vital part of the body, and the FSL report (Ex.P-

25) confirming presence of human blood of the same group on the

weapon and clothes of the accused, this Court is of the

considered opinion that the prosecution has successfully proved

beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is the author of the

injury which resulted in the death of Samundar Yadav. However,

considering the circumstances in which the incident occurred,

namely a sudden quarrel without premeditation and in the heat of

passion, the act of the accused would fall within the ambit of

culpable homicide not amounting to murder.

46. Accordingly, conviction of the appellant under Section 302 of the

IPC is set aside, however, he is convicted under Section 304 Part-

I of the IPC and sentenced to undergo RI for 7 years.

47. The appellant is stated to be in jail since 24.10.2022 being the

date of arrest. He is directed to serve out the sentence as

modified above.

48. The criminal appeal is partly allowed to the extent indicated

herein-above.

49. Registry is directed to send a copy of this judgment to the

concerned Superintendent of Jail where the Appellant is

undergoing the jail term, to serve the same on the Appellant

informing him that he is at liberty to assail the present judgment

passed by this Court by preferring an appeal before the Hon'ble

Supreme Court with the assistance of High Court Legal Services

Committee or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee.

50. Let a copy of this judgment and the original record be transmitted

to the trial court concerned forthwith for necessary information

and compliance.

                 Sd/-                                    Sd/-

           (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal)                 (Ramesh Sinha)
                 Judge                               Chief Justice




Manpreet