[Cites 22, Cited by 0]
Chattisgarh High Court
Ramkumar vs Tekram on 15 April, 2026
Author: Sanjay K. Agrawal
Bench: Sanjay K. Agrawal
Page No.1 of 12
IN
FA-6-2026
Digitally
SAIFAN signed by
KHAN SAIFAN
KHAN 2026:CGHC:17138-DB
AFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
First Appeal No. 6 of 2026
Judgment Reserved on : 10.04.2026
Judgment Pronounced on : 15.04.2026
Judgment (Full) Uploaded on: 15.04.2026
Ramkumar, S/o Puran Lal, aged about 52 years, R/o Birkoni, Tehsil
and District Mahasamund (Chhattisgarh)
... Appellant
Versus
Tekram, S/o Dharmu, aged about 50 years, R/o Operator/Owner of
Sahu Furnututre, in front of Revenue Court, Janpad Panchayat and
Veterinary Hospital Compound, Mahasamund, Tehsil and District
Mahasamund (Chhattisgarh)
... Respondent
[Cause-title taken from Case Information System (CIS)]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For Appellant : Mr. Shubhank Tiwari, Advocate
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Division Bench
Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal and
Hon'ble Shri Justice Sachin Singh Rajput
CAV Judgment
Sanjay K. Agrawal, J
Present Appeal
1. In this appeal filed under Section 96 read with Order 41 Rule 1
of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short the "CPC") the
appellant/plaintiff is calling in question legality, validity and
IN
FA-6-2026
correctness of impugned judgment and order dated 30.10.2025,
passed in Civil Suit No.Unregistered B/2025 (Ramkumar v. Tekram)
by the Principal District Judge, Mahasamund (CG), whereby his suit
has been dismissed finding no merit.
Factual Matrix:
2. The respondent/defendant filed a complaint under Section 138
of the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 (for short the "NI Act")
against the appellant/plaintiff complaining that the
appellant/plaintiff has borrowed Rs.6,00,000/- from him on
14.03.2014 and promised to pay back within a period of two months,
which he did not pay back and, when the respondent/defendant
demanded the money from the appellant/plaintiff, he gave a cheque
dated 02.06.2014 of Corporation Bank vide No.002942, which stood
dishonoured on being presented at the Bank. Thereafter, the
respondent/defendant after serving legal notice on the
appellant/plaintiff filed complaint in the Court of Judicial
Magistrate First Class, Mahasamund (for short "JMFC") being
Criminal Case No.12/2014 (Tekram v. Ramkumar). The said criminal
Court by judgment and order dated 17.02.2020 held the
appellant/plaintiff guilty for offence under Section 138 of the NI Act
and sentenced him for six months simple imprisonment and, further,
in light of Section 357(3) of CrPC ordered the appellant/plaintiff to
pay Rs.6,50,000/- to the respondent/defendant as compensation.
IN
FA-6-2026
3. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 17.02.2020,
passed by the learned JMFC, the appellant/plaintiff preferred an
appeal before the Appellate Court. The appellate Court vide its
judgment and order dated 06.08.2024 though dismissed the appeal of
the appellant/plaintiff but the sentence of six months simple
imprisonment was modified to till the rising of the Court and
fine/compensation amount was also enhanced to Rs.12,00,000/-.
4. The appellant/plaintiff instead of questioning the aforesaid
orders passed by the Criminal Court as well as by the appellate
Court dated 17.02.2020 & 06.08.2024 respectively before this Court
in revisional jurisdiction decided to file a civil suit before the Civil
Court, Mahasamund on the ground that he is not the debtor of the
respondent/defendant and there is no legally enforceable debt or
liability upon him and, therefore, the judgment and order passed by
the learned JMFC dated 17.02.2020, affirmed by the appellate Court
vide order dated 06.08.2024, be set aside.
5. The trial Court by its impugned order dated 30.10.2025
dismissed the suit of the appellant/plaintiff holding that the order of
the criminal Court dated 17.02.2020 as well as order of the appellate
Court dated 06.08.2024, are challengeable before this Court under
revisional jurisdiction and a suit for the said purpose cannot be
entertained. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order dated
30.10.2025, passed by the trial Court, whereby appellant/plaintiff 's
suit for declaration of orders dated 17.02.2020 & 06.08.2024, passed
IN
FA-6-2026
by the learned Criminal Court and Appellate Court as void and
illegal, has been dismissed, this appeal has been filed.
Submission of appellant/plaintiff :
6. Mr. Shubhank Tiwari, learned counsel for the
appellant/plaintiff submits that the learned Civil Court is absolutely
unjustified in rejecting the suit without being registering the same,
as it ought to have been registered and then it ought to have been
heard on admission as per Order 4, 5, 6 & 7 of CPC and Rule 37 to
41 of the Civil Court Rules and the same could not have been
rejected invoking Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC. As such, the order
impugned dated 30.10.2025 be set aside and matter be remanded
back to the Civil Court for hearing and disposal of the suit afresh in
accordance with law.
7. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant, considered
the rival submissions made on behalf of the appellant/plaintiff
hereinabove and went through the record with utmost
circumspection.
Jurisdiction of Civil Court under section 9 of the CPC:
8. Section 9 of the CPC reads as under:
"9. Courts to try all civil suits unless barred .-
The Courts shall (subject to the provisions herein
contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil
nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is
either expressly or impliedly barred.
Explanation-I -A suit in which the right to property or to
an office is contested is a suit of a civil nature,
IN
FA-6-2026
notwithstanding that such right may depend entirely on
the decision of questions as to religious rites or
ceremonies.
Explanation II .-For the purposes of this section, it is
immaterial whether or not any fees are attached to the
office referred to in Explanation I or whether or not
such office is attached to a particular place."
9. A focus perusal of Section 9 aforesaid would show that it is
clear wherever the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is expressly or
impliedly barred, the Civil Court will have no jurisdiction to
entertain suit.
10. The Supreme Court in the matter of Firm Seth Radha Kishan
v. Administrator, Municipal Committee, Ludhiana1 held that even if
there is no specific exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court,
but if it creates a liability not existing before and gives a special and
particular remedy for the aggrieved party, the remedy provided by it
must be followed and observed in Para-7 & 8 as under:
"7. Under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure the
Court shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil
nature excepting suits of which cognizance is either
expressly or impliedly barred. A statute, therefore,
expressly or by necessary implication, can bar the
jurisdiction of civil Courts in respect of a particular
matter. The mere conferment of special jurisdiction on a
tribunal in respect of the said matter does not in itself
exclude the jurisdiction of civil courts. The statute may
specifically provide for ousting the jurisdiction of civil
Courts ; even if there was no such specific exclusion, if it
creates a liability not existing before and gives a special
and Particular remedy for the aggrieved party, the
1 1963 SCC Online SC 138
IN
FA-6-2026
remedy provided by it must be followed. The same
principle would apply if the statute had provided for the
particular forum in which the said remedy could be had.
Even in such cases, the Civil Court's jurisdiction is not
completely ousted. A suit in a civil Court will always lie
to question the order of a tribunal created by a statute,
even if its order is, expressly or by necessary implication,
made final, if the said tribunal abuses its power or does
not act under the Act but in violation of its provisions.
8. Let us now apply the said principles to the facts of
the present case. The liability to pay terminal tax is
created by the Act and remedy is given to a party
aggrieved in the enforcement of that liability. As has
been already indicated, against the order of the
municipal committee levying terminal tax an appeal lies
to the Deputy Commissioner and a reference to the High
Court. Applying one of the principles stated supra, the
party aggrieved can only pursue the remedy provided by
the Act and he cannot file a suit in a civil Court in that
regard. Provisions of Sections 84 and 86 of the Act
exclude the jurisdiction of the civil Court in respect of
the tax levied or the assessment made under the Act."
11. Similarly, the Supreme Court in the matter of Jitendra Nath
Biswas vs. M/s. Empire of India and Ceylone Tea Co. and another 2
while considering the scope of jurisdiction of the Civil Court qua
Section 9 of the CPC has held that when the relief of reinstatement
and back-wages is available under the provisions of the Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 such a relief cannot be granted by the Civil
Court, as the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947
impliedly excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Court with regard to
such a relief and observed patiently as under:
2 AIR 1990 SC 255
IN
FA-6-2026
"5. ...... It is therefore clear that this Act i.e. Industrial
Disputes Act not only confers the right on a worker for
reinstatement and backwages if the order of termination
or dismissal is not in accordance with the Standing
Orders but also provides a detailed procedure and
machinery for getting this relief. Under these
circumstances therefore there is an apparent implied
exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court. In
Dhulabhai's case a five-Judges Bench of this Court
considered the language of Section 9 and the scope
thereof in respect of exclusion of jurisdiction and it was
observed:
"Where there is no express exclusion the
examination of the remedies and the scheme of the
particular Act to find out the intendment becomes
necessary and the result of the in- quiry may be decisive.
In the latter case, it is necessary to see if the statute
creates a special right or a liability and provides for the
determination of the right or liability and further lays
down that all questions about the said right and liability
shall be deter- mined by the tribunals so constituted, and
whether remedies normally associated with actions in
civil courts are prescribed by the said statute or not."
It is therefore clear that the scheme of the Industrial
Disputes Act clearly excludes the jurisdiction of the civil
court by implication in respect of remedies which are
available under this Act and for which a complete
procedure and machinery has been provided in this Act."
12. Similarly, in Ramkanya Bai and another v. Jagdish and
others3, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that the
Civil Court can entertain any suit of civil nature except those,
cognizance of which is expressly or impliedly barred and observed as
under:
"15. Having regard to section 9 of the Code of Civil
3 (2011) 7 SCC 452
IN
FA-6-2026
Procedure, a civil court can entertain any suit of civil
nature except those, cognizance of which is expressly or
impliedly barred. In Kamala Mills Ltd. v. State of
Bombay [AIR 1965 SC 1942] this court held in Para-13 &
32 :
"13. .... the normal rule prescribed by section 9 of
the Code of Civil Procedure is that the courts shall
(subject to the provisions contained in the Code)
have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature
excepting suits of which their cognizance is either
expressly or impliedly barred.........
32. Whenever it is urged before a civil court that
its jurisdiction is excluded either expressly or by
necessary implication to entertain claims of a civil
nature, the Court naturally feels inclined to
consider whether the remedy afforded by an
alternative provision prescribed by a special statute
is sufficient or adequate. In cases where the
exclusion of the civil Courts' jurisdiction is expressly
provided for, the consideration as to the scheme of
the statute in question and the adequacy or the
sufficiency of the remedies provided for by it may be
relevant but cannot be decisive. But where exclusion
is pleaded as a matter of necessary implication,
such considerations would be very important, and in
conceivable circumstances, might even become
decisive. If it appears that a statute creates a
special right or a liability and provides for the
determination of the right and liability to be dealt
with by tribunals specially constituted in that
behalf, and it further lays down that all questions
about the said right and liability shall be
determined by the tribunals so constituted, it
becomes pertinent to enquire whether remedies
normally associated with actions in civil Courts are
prescribed by the said statute or not."
13. The Supreme Court in the matter of KS Venkataraman and Co.
IN
FA-6-2026
(P) Ltd. v. State of Madras4 has held that where a right is created by
statute and a method of enforceing the right or of redressing
grievance caused in exercise of enforcement of the right is pointed
out by the statute creating such right, then the general remedy of
suit will be impliedly barred.
Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881:
14. NI Act has been brought into force to define and amend the law
relating to promissory notices, bills of exchange and cheques.
Chapter XVIII (Section 138 to 148) provides for penalties in case of
dishonour of certain cheques for insufficiency of funds in the
accounts. Section 138 read with Section 142 of the NI Act, 1881
specifically provides that in case of a person issues a cheque for the
discharge of any debt or liability is returned by the bank unpaid on
the account of insufficiency of funds or that it exceeds the amount
arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with
the bank, then such person shall be deemed to have committed an
offence. The cause of action for the said offence shall arise on the
fulfillment of the conditions provided in the proviso to section 138
and Section 142 of the NI Act. Section 142 provides for cognizance of
offences. It provides that the cognizance shall be taken by the
Judicial Magistrate First Class or Metropolitan Magistrate on a
complaint in writing made by the payee or the holder in due course.
Section 143 provides for the power of the Court try cases summarily.
4 AIR 1966 SC 1089
IN
FA-6-2026
Section 143A provides for the power to direct interim compensation.
Section 145 provides for evidence on affidavit. Section 147 provide
the offences to be compoundable. Section 148 provides for the power
of the Appellate Court to order payment pending appeal against
conviction.
15. Thus, NI Act provides a complete code in respect of the offences
committed with respect to cheques. The NI Act despite prescribing
the penal consequences for an offence under Section 138, does not
prescribe a forum for preferring an appeal following a conviction.
The above mentioned procedural gap is bridged by the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). Under the scheme of the Code,
Section 374 provides the substantive right of appeal to a convicted
person; specifically, Section 374(3) mandates that any person
convicted by a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of
the First Class may prefer an appeal to the Court of Session.
Consequently, in the absence of a contrary provision in the special
statute, the Court of Session remains the appropriate and competent
legal forum to entertain an appeal against a judgment of conviction
under Section 138 of the NI Act and, thereafter, against the order of
Sessions Judge, the revision would lie before this Court under
Section 397/401 of the CrPC (corresponding Section 438/442 of the
Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023). As such, NI
Act creates a liability/Offence and provides a special and particular
IN
FA-6-2026
remedy to the party aggrieved to enforce that remedy, then that
remedy needs to be followed. It is therefore clear that the scheme of
the NI Act impliedly excludes the jurisdiction of the civil court under
Section 9 of the CPC in respect of remedies which are available
under the NI Act and for which a complete procedure and machinery
has been provided in the NI Act.
Brief analysis:
16. A bare perusal of the plaint filed by the appellant/plaintiff
would show that he preferred a civil suit seeking declaration under
Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 that: (i) he is not the
debtor of the defendant and there is no legally enforceable debt or
liability on him and (ii) the judgment and order passed by the
learned JMFC dated 17.02.2020, convicting him for offence under
Section 138 of the NI Act and sentencing him for a period of six
months simple imprisonment with fine/compensation and order
passed by the Appellate Court dated 06.08.2024, whereby though the
conviction of the appellant/plaintiff was affirmed, but sentence was
reduced from six moths SI till the rising of the Court and amount of
compensation has also been enhanced from Rs.6,50,000/- to
Rs.12,00,000/-, be set aside. Since the NI Act creates a
liablity/offence and provides a specific remedy under Section 397/401
of the CrPC (corresponding Section 438/442 of the Bharatiya
Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023) against the order of
IN
FA-6-2026
Appellate Court affirming the conviction passed by the trial
Court/JMFC and modifying the sentence and compensation, then the
aforesaid remedy ought to have been followed by the
appellant/plaintiff. As such, it is clear that the scheme of the NI Act
clearly excludes the jurisdiction of the Civil Court under Section 9 of
CPC in respect of remedies which are available under the NI Act, as
the NI Act is a complete code and, thus, the relief claimed by the
appellant/plaintiff under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963
that the appellant/plaintiff is not debtor of the defendant and there
is no legally enforceable debt or liablity on him, cannot be granted
that too when the same is also contrary to the provisions of the
Specific Relief Act, 1963 and the jurisdiction of Civil Court is
impliedly barred under Section 9 of the CPC.
Conclusion:
17. In view of foreging analysis, we are of the considered opinion
that the learned trial Court absolutely justified in dismissing the
suit of the appellant/plaintiff holding that since specific remedy is
available to him by filing revision before this Court, the civil suit is
not maintainable. We fully agree with the view taken by the learned
trial Court. Accordingly, the presnet appeal is liable to be and is
hereby dismissed summarily without notice to the other side.
sd/- sd/-
(Sanjay K. Agrawal) (Sachin Singh Rajput)
Judge Judge
s@if
