Shahin Subaida vs State Of Chhattisgarh
2026 Latest Caselaw 1577 Chatt

Chattisgarh High Court

Shahin Subaida vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 13 April, 2026

Author: Ramesh Sinha

Bench: Ramesh Sinha

                                                       1




                                                                    2026:CGHC:16804-DB
                                                                                   NAFR
ROHIT
KUMAR
CHANDRA                     HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
                                            CRA No. 1274 of 2022
Digitally
signed by
ROHIT KUMAR
CHANDRA

                   Shahin Subaida W/o Jamshed Ansari, Aged About 27 Years R/o Village
                   Katinda (Nadi Par), Police Station Lakhanpur, District Surguja
                   Chhattisgarh.
                                                                              ... Appellant
                                                    versus
                   State of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station Lakhanpur, District
                   Surguja Chhattisgarh.
                                                                          ... Respondents

(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)

For Appellant : Mr. Ashok Kumar Swarnakar, Advocate For Respondent/State : Mr. Priyank Rathi, Govt. Advocate

Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge

Judgment on Board

Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 13.04.2026

1. This criminal appeal under Section 374(2) of the CrPC is directed

against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of

sentence dated 07.07.2022 passed by the First Additional

ROHIT KUMAR Sessions Judge, Surguja (Amkikapur), District - Surguja (C.G.) in CHANDRA

Sessions Trial No.35/2021, whereby the learned trial Court has

convicted the appellant for offence punishable under Section 302

of the IPC (Three Times) and sentenced her to undergo

imprisonment for life & fine of Rs.1,000/-, in default of payment of

fine additional R.I. for 03 months.

2. The prosecution case, in brief, is that the complainant, Jamshed

Ansari, appeared at Police Station Lakhanpur on 08.04.2020 and

lodged a report stating that his marriage was solemnized in the

year 2013, as per social customs, with Shaheen Subaida, a

resident of Village Bhuswa, Police Station Majhiaon, District

Garhwa, Jharkhand. Out of the said wedlock, they had three

children, namely Khushi alias Nagma Nisha aged about 6 years,

Ashiq Ansari aged about 4 years, and Asif Ansari aged about 2

years. It was further stated that due to domestic issues, frequent

quarrels and disputes used to take place between him and his

wife. On 07.04.2020, his wife questioned him as to why he did not

operate the bore (water pump) on time, which led to a dispute,

during which the complainant slapped his wife 2-3 times. On the

following day, i.e., 08.04.2020, between 8:00 to 9:00 AM, another

quarrel took place between them over domestic matters. Being

upset over the said dispute, at about 2:00 PM, the accused,

Shaheen Subaida, allegedly took all three children along with her

to a muddy water body near Manja Tungi Nala and, with the

intention to kill them, pushed all three children into the water,

resulting in their death. Upon completion of the entire

investigation, an offence under Section 302 IPC was found to be

made out against the accused and accordingly registered. After

completing all necessary investigation, the charge-sheet was filed

before the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Ambikapur on

07.07.2020, from where the case was committed vide order dated

22.01.2021 and thereafter received by the competent Court on

03.02.2021 for proper adjudication.

3. Thereafter, on 22.02.2021, charges were framed against the

accused, Shaheen Subaida, under Section 302 of the Indian

Penal Code (three counts). The accused denied the charges and

claimed to be tried, and her plea was recorded in her own words.

4. In order to prove its case, the prosecution examined a total of 10

witnesses before the trial Court, namely Jamshed Ansari (PW-1),

Lobhan Singh (PW-2), Ashish Bhagat (PW-3), Patwari Nitin

Kumar Tiwari (PW-4), Mehtab Ansari (PW-5), Qurban Ansari (PW-

6), Vakil Ansari (PW-7), Tara Bai (PW-8), Dalsai (PW-9), and

Inspector Manoj Prajapati (PW-10).

5. In her statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure, the accused stated that she is innocent and

has been falsely implicated in the present case. She further stated

that she does not wish to adduce any evidence in her defence.

6. The trial Court after appreciating oral and documentary evidence

available on record, by its judgment dated 07.07.2022, convicted

the appellant for offence under Sections 302 of the IPC (three

counts) and sentenced her as mentioned in opening paragraph of

this judgment, against which, this criminal appeal has been

preferred by the accused/appellant.

7. Mr. Ashok Kumar Swarnakar, learned counsel for the appellant

submitted that the prosecution case rests entirely on

circumstantial evidence and suffers from serious infirmities,

rendering the conviction unsustainable in law. He further

submitted that the most significant piece of evidence against the

appellant is the "last seen together" theory, as stated by PW-9

Dalsai, who testified that he saw the accused with the three

deceased children near the well on the day of the incident.

However, this testimony is insufficient to establish the appellant's

involvement in the children's deaths. PW-9 clearly stated that he

neither saw the appellant throw the children into the well nor did

he hear any accounts from villagers regarding the same. His

statement merely corroborates the fact that he saw the children

with the appellant near the well, which is not conclusive proof of

any criminal intent. The appellant's question to him about the

depth of the well, which the prosecution claims indicates her

premeditated intentions, is far from conclusive. It is equally

plausible that she was simply asking out of curiosity, and the

prosecution has failed to link this innocuous question with the act

of murder beyond speculation. He also submitted that the

testimony of PW-2 Lobhan Singh and PW-3 Ashish Bhagat, who

are witnesses to the appellant's condition after the incident, is also

far from incriminating. Both witnesses were declared hostile by

the prosecution, and despite their initial statements indicating

distress and the appellant's statements about the children falling

into the well, these witnesses have retracted their earlier versions.

PW-2 Lobhan Singh admitted that the appellant, while in a

distressed state, did mention that the children had fallen into the

well, but this statement, made in a moment of panic, cannot be

construed as a confession. Similarly, PW-3 Ashish Bhagat testified

that he found the appellant sitting in a wet condition holding a

child who was not breathing, and while she was unconscious, she

muttered about the children having drowned. These statements,

while tragic, do not conclusively demonstrate that the appellant

intentionally caused the deaths of her children. Additionally, the

appellant's behavior after the incident, as described by both these

witnesses, is consistent with someone in shock, rather than a

person trying to cover up a deliberate act.

8. Mr. Swarnakar further argued that the testimony of PW-5 Mahtab

Ansari, who is the brother-in-law of the appellant, is also crucial to

the defense. He specifically stated that he did not believe the

appellant intentionally threw the children into the well. His

testimony points to the fact that the family had been living happily

and that there was no apparent motive for such an extreme act.

Although he was declared hostile and admitted certain portions of

his police statement, his overall testimony supports the defense

theory that the deaths of the children could have been an

unfortunate accident, and not a premeditated murder. He

contended that the prosecution has failed to establish a clear

chain of circumstantial evidence linking the appellant to the crime.

The "last seen together" theory, which is often relied upon in

cases with no direct eyewitnesses, is not conclusive on its own.

The appellant's alleged premeditation and intention to drown her

children, as inferred from her question about the depth of the well,

is speculative and unsupported by any solid evidence. Moreover,

the hostile witnesses and the retracted statements further

undermine the prosecution's case. It is submitted that the

conviction of the appellant is not based on a sound foundation of

evidence. The benefit of doubt must be extended to the appellant,

as the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond a

reasonable doubt. Therefore, it is prayed that the conviction be

set aside, and the appellant be acquitted of all charges.

9. On the other hand, Mr. Priyank Rathi, learned Government

Advocate, appearing for the State/respondent opposed the

aforesaid submissions and would submit that the conviction

recorded by the learned trial Court is fully justified and based on a

complete chain of circumstantial evidence which unerringly points

towards the guilt of the accused. The prosecution has clearly

established that the accused was last seen in the company of all

three deceased children near the water body shortly before their

deaths, as deposed by PW-9. The time gap between the accused

being seen with the children and the occurrence is so minimal that

the possibility of any third-party intervention is completely ruled

out. In such circumstances, the burden shifted upon the accused

to explain how the children, who were in her exclusive custody,

met with such an unnatural death. However, the accused has

failed to offer any plausible explanation in her statement under

Section 313 CrPC, thereby inviting an adverse inference. Further,

her presence at the scene in a wet condition and her statements

before witnesses regarding the children falling into the water form

important incriminating circumstances. Even though certain

witnesses turned hostile, their testimonies cannot be discarded in

toto, and the material portions supporting the prosecution case,

particularly regarding the presence and condition of the accused,

remain intact and lend corroboration. It is further submitted that

the prosecution has also successfully established motive, as there

were frequent domestic quarrels between the accused and her

husband, including incidents immediately preceding the

occurrence, which indicate a disturbed mental state. The defence

theory of accidental drowning is wholly improbable, as it is

inconceivable that three minor children of different ages would

simultaneously fall into a water body without any external

intervention. The circumstances on record, including last seen

evidence, conduct of the accused, motive, and failure to explain,

form a complete and unbroken chain consistent only with the

hypothesis of guilt. He further submitted that the learned trial

Court has meticulously appreciated both oral and documentary

evidence and has rightly arrived at the finding of guilt without any

perversity or illegality. Therefore, the present appeal being devoid

of merit deserves to be dismissed, and the conviction and

sentence under Section 302 IPC (three counts) ought to be

affirmed.

10. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties,

considered their rival submissions made hereinabove and also

went through the records with utmost circumspection.

11. As per the prosecution case, the appellant, following domestic

disputes with her husband, allegedly took her three minor children

to a water body on 08.04.2020 and pushed them into it, resulting

in their death. The case of the prosecution is based entirely on

circumstantial evidence, primarily the "last seen together" theory

and the alleged conduct of the appellant.

12. At this juncture, the following points arise for consideration in this

appeal:

1. Whether the prosecution has successfully established a

complete chain of circumstances pointing unerringly towards the

guilt of the appellant?

2. Whether the conviction based on the "last seen together"

theory and other circumstantial evidence is sustainable in law?

3. Whether the appellant is entitled to the benefit of doubt?

13. The Supreme Court in the matter of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda

v. State of Maharashtra 1 has clearly laid down the factors to be

taken into account in adjudication of cases of circumstantial

evidence, which states as under :-

1 (1984) 4 SCC 116

"(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established.

The circumstances concerned "must" or "should" and not "may be" established;

(2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty;

(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency;

(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved; and

(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused."

14. In the matter of Arjun Marik v. State of Bihar2, it has been held

by their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that conviction

cannot be made solely on the basis of theory of 'last seen

together' and observed in paragraph 31 as under :-

"31. Thus the evidence that the appellant had gone to Sitaram in the evening of 19-7-1985 and had stayed in the night at the house of deceased Sitaram is very shaky and inconclusive. Even if it is accepted that they were there it would at best amount to though a number of witnesses have 2 1994 Supp (2) SCC 372

been examined be the evidence of the appellants having been seen last together with the deceased. But it is settled law that the only circumstance of last seen will not complete the chain of circumstances to record the finding that it is consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and, therefore, no conviction on that basis alone can be founded."

15. Likewise in the matter of State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran 3 the

Supreme Court has held that the circumstance of last seen

together would be a relevant circumstance in a case where there

was no possibility of any other persons meeting or approaching

the deceased at the place of incident or before the commission of

crime in the intervening period. It was observed in paragraph 34

as under :-

"34. From the principle laid down by this Court, the circumstance of last-seen together would normally be taken into consideration for finding the accused guilty of the offence charged with when it is established by the prosecution that the time gap between the point of time when the accused and the deceased were found together alive and when the deceased was found dead is so small that possibility of any other person being with the deceased could completely be ruled out. The time gap between the accused persons seen in the company of the deceased and the detection of the crime would be a material consideration for appreciation of the evidence and placing reliance on it as a circumstance against the accused. But, in 3 (2007) 3 SCC 755

all cases, it cannot be said that the evidence of last seen together is to be rejected merely because the time gap between the accused persons and the deceased last seen together and the crime coming to light is after a considerable long duration. There can be no fixed or straight jacket formula for the duration of time gap in this regard and it would depend upon the evidence led by the prosecution to remove the possibility of any other person meeting the deceased in the intervening period, that is to say, if the prosecution is able to lead such an evidence that likelihood of any person other than the accused, being the author the crime, becomes impossible, then the evidence of circumstance of last seen together, although there is long duration of time, can be considered as one of the circumstances in the chain of circumstances to prove the guilt against such accused persons. Hence, if the prosecution proves that in the light of the facts and circumstances of the case, there was no possibility of any other person meeting or approaching the deceased at the place of incident or before the commission of the crime, in the intervening period, the proof of last seen together would be relevant evidence. For instance, if it can be demonstrated by showing that the accused persons were in exclusive possession of the place where the incident occurred or where they were last seen together with the deceased, and there was no possibility of any intrusion to that place by any third party, then a relatively wider time gap would not affect the prosecution case. "

16. Similarly in the matter of Kanhaiya Lal v. State of Rajasthan 4,

their Lordships of the Supreme Court have clearly held that the

circumstance of last seen together does not by itself and

necessarily lead to the inference that it was the accused who

committed the crime and there must be something more

establishing connectivity between the accused and the crime.

Mere non-explanation on the part of the appellant in our

considered opinion, by itself cannot lead to proof of guilt against

the appellant. It has been held in paragraphs 15 and 16 as

under :-

"15. The theory of last seen - the appellant having gone with the deceased in the manner noticed hereinbefore, is the singular piece of circumstantial evidence available against him. The conviction of the appellant cannot be maintained merely on suspicion, however strong it may be, or on his conduct. These facts assume further importance on account of absence of proof of motive particularly when it is proved that there was cordial relationship between the accused and the deceased for a long time. The fact situation bears great similarity to that in Madho Singh v. State of Rajasthan5.

16. In view of the aforesaid circumstances, it is not possible to sustain the impugned judgment and sentence. This appeal is allowed and the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant-accused Kanhaiya Lal are set aside and he is acquitted of the charge by giving benefit of doubt. He is directed

4 (2014) 4 SCC 715 5 (2010) 15 SCC 588

to be released from the custody forthwith unless required otherwise."

17. Finally in the matter of Anjan Kumar Sarma v. State of Assam 6

their Lordships of the Supreme Court have clearly held that in a

case where other links have been satisfactorily made out and

circumstances point to guilt of accused, circumstance of last seen

together and absence of explanation would provide an additional

link which completes the chain. In absence of proof of other

circumstances the only circumstance of last seen together and

absence of satisfactory explanation, cannot be made basis of

conviction.

18. Reverting to the facts of the present case, Dalsai (PW-9) has

deposed that he did not know the accused by name and had seen

her for the first time on the day of the incident when he had gone

to bath near the Hardidhodga drain. According to him, the woman

was sitting near the well along with three children, who were

stated by her to be her own. He has further stated that after

bathing, he returned home, had dinner, and went to sleep, and

only thereafter came to know that the children had fallen into the

well. Importantly, this witness has categorically admitted in his

cross-examination that he did not see the accused either

assaulting or pushing the children into the well, nor did anyone

from the village inform him that the accused had drowned the

children. His knowledge about the alleged act is thus purely

hearsay in nature. The portion of his statement wherein he 6 (2017) 14 SCC 359

allegedly admitted that the accused had thrown the children into

the well was elicited only through leading questions by the

prosecution after he was declared hostile, thereby significantly

diminishing its evidentiary value.

19. A careful appreciation of the testimony of this witness

demonstrates that, at best, it establishes that the accused was

present near the well with her children at some point of time.

However, mere presence or the fact of being "last seen together"

cannot, in the absence of any direct evidence or a complete chain

of circumstances, be treated as conclusive proof of guilt. The

prosecution's attempt to attribute premeditation to the accused on

the basis of her alleged query regarding the depth of the well is

wholly speculative and unjustified. Such a question, in ordinary

human conduct, may arise out of curiosity and cannot be

stretched to infer a murderous intent. Moreover, the witness is a

stranger to the accused, belongs to a different village, and has no

knowledge of any prior dispute between the accused and her

husband. His testimony, therefore, does not establish any motive,

intention, or overt act on the part of the accused. In these

circumstances, the evidence of PW-9 falls far short of proving the

prosecution case and, instead, reinforces the reasonable doubt

surrounding the alleged involvement of the appellant.

20. The evidence of prosecution witnesses Lobhan Singh (PW-2),

Ashish Bhagat (PW-3) and Mahtab Ansari (PW-5) does not

support the prosecution case and, in fact, substantially

strengthens the defence of the appellant. Prosecution witness

Lobhan Singh (PW-2), though declared hostile, has merely stated

that upon hearing a commotion, he went to the Sarpanch's house

where he saw the accused, Shaheen Subaida, in a wet condition

holding a child and crying for help, stating that the children had

fallen into the well. Similarly, Ashish Bhagat (PW-3) also deposed

that he saw the accused sitting in a distressed and wet condition

with a child in her lap and later heard her muttering that the

children had drowned. These statements, even if accepted, only

indicate that the accused informed others about the incident after

it occurred and was in a state of panic and distress. There is no

material in their testimony to suggest that the accused had

intentionally caused the children to fall into the well. Their hostile

nature and denial of earlier police statements further weaken the

prosecution's version and render their testimony unreliable for

establishing guilt.

21. Further, the testimony of Mahtab Ansari (PW-5), who is a close

relative of both the accused and the deceased children, clearly

supports the defence. He categorically stated that the accused is

his sister-in-law, that the family was living happily, and that he

does not believe the accused threw the children into the well. He

also admitted his desire for the accused to be released and

reunited with the family, which reflects the absence of any

apparent motive or prior discord. Importantly, he himself

participated in retrieving the bodies from the well and did not

attribute any culpable act to the accused. His testimony creates

serious doubt regarding the prosecution's allegation of intentional

wrongdoing. Taken together, the evidence of these witnesses fails

to establish any direct or circumstantial link implicating the

accused in the alleged offence, thereby entitling the appellant to

the benefit of doubt.

22. In Kali Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh7 the Hon'ble

Supreme Court held that if two views are possible, the one

favorable to the accused must be adopted. The present case

clearly admits of such doubt.

23. Upon a comprehensive evaluation of the evidence on record, this

Court is of the considered opinion that the prosecution has failed

to establish a complete and unbroken chain of circumstances.

The evidence does not conclusively point towards the guilt of the

appellant and leaves room for reasonable doubt. The conviction

recorded by the learned trial Court is therefore unsustainable in

law.

24. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The judgment of conviction

and order of sentence dated 07.07.2022 passed by the learned

trial Court under Section 302 IPC (three counts) are hereby set

aside. The appellant is acquitted of all charges by extending to

her the benefit of doubt. She shall be released forthwith, if not

required in any other case.

7 (1973) 2 SCC 808

25. The appellant is directed to file personal bond and two sureties

each in the like amount to the satisfaction of the Court concerned

in compliance with Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1973 (Section 481 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha

Sanhita, 2023).

26. Let a copy of this judgment and the original record be transmitted

to the trial court concerned forthwith for necessary information

and compliance.

                      Sd/-                                      Sd/-
            (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal)                        (Ramesh Sinha)
                     Judge                                    Chief Justice




Chandra