Citation : 2026 Latest Caselaw 1506 Chatt
Judgement Date : 9 April, 2026
1
2026:CGHC:16336-DB
NAFR
Digitally
signed by
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
BABLU
BABLU RAJENDRA
RAJENDRA BHANARKAR
BHANARKAR Date:
2026.04.10
10:10:29
+0530
CRMP No. 2474 of 2023
State Of Chhattisgarh Through- Police Outpost-Dashrangpur, P.S.
Pipariya, District Kabirdham, Chhattisgarh
... Petitioner(s)
versus
Gautam Bhardwaj S/o Ram Kewal Aged About 25 Years R/o Mahul,
Distt. Ajamgarh (U.P.) Presently R/o Gyanpur, Police Outpost
Dashrangpur, Police Station Pipariya, District : Kabirdham, Chhattisgarh
... Respondent(s)
(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)
For Petitioner : Mr. Soumya Rai, Deputy Government Advocate
Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
Order on Board Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice 09.04.2026
1. Heard Mr. Soumya Rai, learned Deputy Government Advocate for
the appellant/State on I.A. No.01 of 2023, which is an application for
condonation of delay.
2. Learned Deputy Government Advocate appearing for the
State/petitioner submits that the judgment of acquittal dated 4.3.2023
has been passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Kabirdham,
and the Law & Legislative Affairs Department, Government of
Chhattisgarh, Mantralaya, Naya Raipur vide its memo dated 24.08.2023
sent a proposal to the office of the Advocate General to file a acquittal
against the impugned judgment dated 4.3.2023. Thereafter, the case
was placed before the Advocate General on 8.9.2023 and then the case
was marked for drafting and as per the above proposal, the office has
initiated proceeding and certified copy of the impugned judgment and
other relevant exhibited documents have been received from the
concerned Department and thereafter, the instant prepared was
prepared and filed before this Court.
3. It has been contended that the State, after obtaining necessary
documents and information with respect to the case, however, some
delay was occurred due to fulfillment of various departmental formalities
and working of the Government machinery because the State
Government is a multi functioning body, hence, at times the fulfillment of
departmental formalities takes unexpected long time. Therefore, in
some cases the State is prevented from filing the case within the
prescribed period of limitation, which is bonafide and not deliberate. The
instant appeal is, therefore, being filed after a delay of 105 days from
the prescribed period of limitation. Reliance has been placed upon the
judgment rendered by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of
Haryana v. Chandra Mani and others, (1996) 3 SCC 132, to buttress
his submissions. As such, the learned State counsel prays that the
delay of 255 days in preferring the petition may be condoned.
4. The question for determination before this Court is whether the
provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (i.e. Act 9 of 1908 i.e.
the old Limitation Act) would apply to an application for leave to appeal
from an order of acquittal.
5. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Postmaster General
and others v. Living Media India Limited and another, (2012) 3 SCC
563, has dealt with the limitation issue and held as under:-
"27. It is not in dispute that the person(s)
concerned were well aware or conversant
with the issues involved including the
prescribed period of limitation for taking up
the matter by way of filing a special leave
petition in this Court. They cannot claim that
they have a separate period of limitation
when the Department was possessed with
competent persons familiar with court
proceedings. In the absence of plausible
and acceptable explanation, we are
posing a question why the delay is to be
condoned mechanically merely because
the Government or a wing of the
Government is a party before us.
28. Though we are conscious of the fact that
in a matter of condonation of delay when
there was no gross negligence or deliberate
inaction or lack of bonafide, a liberal
concession has to be adopted to advance
substantial justice, we are of the view that in
the facts and circumstances, the
Department cannot take advantage of
various earlier decisions. The claim on
account of impersonal machinery and
inherited bureaucratic methodology of
making several notes cannot be accepted
in view of the modern technologies being
used and available. The law of limitation
undoubtedly binds everybody including
the Government.
29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all
the government bodies, their agencies and
instrumentalities that unless they have
reasonable and acceptable explanation for
the delay and there was bonafide effort,
there is no need to accept the usual
explanation that the file was kept pending for
several months/years due to considerable
degree of procedural red-tape in the process.
The government departments are under a
special obligation to ensure that they perform
their duties with diligence and commitment.
Condonation of delay is an exception and
should not be used as an anticipated benefit
for government departments. The law
shelters everyone under the same light and
should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.
30. Considering the fact that there was no
proper explanation offered by the
Department for the delay except mentioning
of various dates, according to us, the
Department has miserably failed to give any
acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to
condone such a huge delay. Accordingly, the
appeals are liable to be dismissed on the
ground of delay."
6. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of Madhya
Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary, 2024 INSC 932, while considering
the delay, issued some directions and observed as follows:-
"5. The legal position is that where a case
has been presented in the Court beyond
limitation, the petitioner has to explain the
Court as to what was the "sufficient cause"
which means an adequate and enough
reason which prevented him to approach the
Court within limitation. In Majji Sannemma v.
Reddy Sridevi, 2021 SCC Online SC 1260, it
was held by this Court that even though
limitation may harshly affect the rights of a
party, it has to be applied with all its rigour
when prescribed by statute. A reference was
also made to the decision of this Court in Ajay
Dabra v. Pyare Ram, 2023 SCC Online 92
wherein, it was held as follows:
"13. This Court in the case of Basawaraj v.
Special Land Acquisition Officer [(2013) 14
SCC 81] while rejecting an application for
condonation of delay for lack of sufficient
cause has concluded in Paragraph 15 as
follows:
"15. The law on the issue can be
summarised to the effect that where a case
has been presented in the court beyond
limitation, the applicant has to explain the
court as to what was the "sufficient cause"
which means an adequate and enough
reason which prevented him to approach
the court within limitation. In case a party is
found to be negligent, or for want of bona
fide on his part in the facts and
circumstances of the case, or found to
have not acted diligently or remained
inactive, there cannot be a justified ground
to condone the delay. No court could be
justified in condoning such an inordinate
delay by imposing any condition
whatsoever. The application is to be
decided only within the parameters laid
down by this Court in regard to the
condonation of delay. In case there was no
sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to
approach the court on time condoning the
delay without any justification, putting any
condition whatsoever, amounts to passing
an order in violation of the statutory
provisions and it tantamounts to showing
utter disregard to the legislature."
14. Therefore, we are of the considered
opinion that the High Court did not commit
any mistake in dismissing the delay
condonation application of the present
appellant."
Thus, it is crystal clear that the discretion to
condone the delay has to be exercised
judiciously based on facts and
circumstances of each case and that, the
expression 'sufficient cause' cannot be
liberally interpreted, if negligence, inaction
or lack of bona fides is attributed to the
party.
5.1. In Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji
Jeejeebhoy (D) through his legal heir, 2024
INSC 262, wherein, one of us
(J.B.Pardiwala, J) was a member, after
referring to various decisions on the issue,
it was in unequivocal terms observed by
this Court that delay should not be excused
as a matter of generosity and rendering
substantial justice is not to cause prejudice
to the opposite party. The relevant passage
of the same is profitably extracted below:
"24. In the aforesaid circumstances, we
made it very clear that we are not going to
look into the merits of the matter as long as
we are not convinced that sufficient cause
has been made out for condonation of such
a long and inordinate delay.
25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a
private party or a State or Union of India
when it comes to condoning the gross
delay of more than 12 years. If the litigant
chooses to approach the court long after
the lapse of the time prescribed under the
relevant provisions of the law, then he
cannot turn around and say that no
prejudice would be caused to either side by
the delay being condoned. This litigation
between the parties started sometime in
1981. We are in 2024. Almost 43 years
have elapsed. However, till date the
respondent has not been able to reap the
fruits of his decree. It would be a mockery
of justice if we condone the delay of 12
years and 158 days and once again ask
the respondent to undergo the rigmarole of
the legal proceedings.
26. The length of the delay is a relevant
matter which the court must take into
consideration while considering whether
the delay should be condoned or not. From
the tenor of the approach of the appellants,
it appears that they want to fix their own
period of limitation for instituting the
proceedings for which law has prescribed a
period of limitation. Once it is held that a
party has lost his right to have the matter
considered on merits because of his own
inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed
to be non-deliberate delay and in such
circumstances of the case, he cannot be
heard to plead that the substantial justice
deserves to be preferred as against the
technical considerations. While considering
the plea for condonation of delay, the court
must not start with the merits of the main
matter. The court owes a duty to first
ascertain the bona fides of the explanation
offered by the party seeking condonation. It
is only if the sufficient cause assigned by
the litigant and the opposition of the other
side is equally balanced that the court may
bring into aid the merits of the matter for
the purpose of condoning the delay.
27. We are of the view that the question of
limitation is not merely a technical
consideration. The rules of limitation are
based on the principles of sound public
policy and principles of equity. We should
not keep the 'Sword of Damocles' hanging
over the head of the respondent for
indefinite period of time to be determined at
the whims and fancies of the appellants.
xxx xxx xxx
34. In view of the aforesaid, we have
reached to the conclusion that the High
Court committed no error much less any
error of law in passing the impugned order.
Even otherwise, the High Court was
exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court,
it has been said that delay should not be
excused as a matter of generosity.
Rendering substantial justice is not to
cause prejudice to the opposite party. The
appellants have failed to prove that they
were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the
matter and this vital test for condoning the
delay is not satisfied in this case.
36. For all the foregoing reasons, this
appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. There
shall be no order as to costs."
Applying the above legal proposition to the
facts of the present case, we are of the
opinion that the High Court correctly refused
to condone the delay and dismissed the
appeal by observing that such inordinate
delay was not explained satisfactorily, no
sufficient cause was shown for the same, and
no plausible reason was put forth by the
State. Therefore, we are inclined to reject this
petition at the threshold.
6. At the same time, we cannot simply
brush aside the delay occurred in
preferring the second appeal, due to
callous and lackadaisical attitude on the
part of the officials functioning in the
State machinery. Though the Government
adopts systematic approach in handling
the legal issues and preferring the
petitions/applications/appeals well within
the time, due to the fault on the part of the
officials in merely communicating the
information on time, huge revenue loss
will be caused to the Government
exchequer. The present case is one such
case, wherein, enormous delay of 1788
days occasioned in preferring the second
appeal due to the lapses on the part of the
officials functioning under the State,
though valuable Government lands were
involved. Therefore, we direct the State to
streamline the machinery touching the
legal issues, offering legal opinion, filing
of cases before the Tribunal / Courts, etc.,
fix the responsibility on the officer(s)
concerned, and penalize the officer(s),
who is/are responsible for delay,
deviation, lapses, etc., if any, to the value
of the loss caused to the Government.
Such direction will have to be followed by
all the States scrupulously.
7. There is one another aspect of the matter
which we must not ignore or overlook. Over a
period of time, we have noticed that
whenever there is a plea for condonation of
delay be it at the instance of a private litigant
or State the delay is sought to be explained
right from the time, the limitation starts and if
there is a delay of say 2 years or 3 years or 4
years till the end of the same. For example if
the period of limitation is 90 days then the
party seeking condonation has to explain why
it was unable to institute the proceedings
within that period of limitation. What events
occurred after the 91st day till the last is of no
consequence. The court is required to
consider what came in the way of the party
that it was unable to file it between the 1st
day and the 90th day. It is true that a party is
entitled to wait until the last day of limitation
for filing an appeal. But when it allows the
limitation to expire and pleads sufficient
cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the
sufficient cause must establish that because
of some event or circumstance arising before
the limitation expired it was not possible to file
the appeal within time. No event or
circumstance arising after the expiry of
limitation can constitute such sufficient cause.
There may be events or circumstances
subsequent to the expiry of limitation which
may further delay the filing of the appeal. But
that the limitation has been allowed to expire
without the appeal being filed must be traced
to a cause arising within the period of
limitation. (See: Ajit Singh Thakur Singh and
Another v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1981 SC
733)."
7. Taking into account the facts and circumstances of the present
case, in the light of aforementioned judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the matters of Postmaster General (supra) and Ramkumar
Choudhary (supra), it is evident that Government departments are
under a special obligation to discharge their duties with due diligence
and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception, not the rule,
and cannot be claimed as a matter of right or anticipated privilege by
Government entities. The law casts its protection equally upon all
litigants and cannot be distorted to confer undue advantage upon a
select few.
8. Upon considering the matter in its entirety, we find that the State
has failed to provide any proper or satisfactory explanation for the delay
in filing the present petition. The only reason cited is that the Law &
Legislative Affairs Department, Government of Chhattisgarh,
Mantralaya, Naya Raipur, had forwarded a proposal to the Office of the
Advocate General for initiating an appeal against the impugned acquittal
order dated 4.3.2023. Thereafter, the case was processed, and the
present petition was ultimately filed. However, this sequence of events,
lacking in specificity or justifiable cause, does not amount to a cogent or
acceptable explanation. Thus, the State has miserably failed to
demonstrate sufficient cause warranting the condonation of an
inordinate delay of 105 days.
9. Consequently, we are not inclined to exercise our discretionary
power under the law to condone such extraordinary delay. The learned
counsel for the State has not been able to establish any convincing or
bona fide reason for the delay. Therefore, there is no justification for
condoning the delay of 105 days in filing the petition against the
judgment of acquittal.
10. In view of the above, the Criminal Miscellaneous Petition seeking
leave to appeal is hereby rejected on the ground of delay and laches.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)
Judge Chief Justice
Bablu
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