[Cites 20, Cited by 0]
Chattisgarh High Court
Surendra Kumar Verma vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 9 April, 2026
Author: Ramesh Sinha
Bench: Ramesh Sinha
1
2026:CGHC:16332-DB
AFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRA No. 1642 of 2022
Surendra Kumar Verma S/o Dharamdas Verma Aged About 23 Years R/o
Village Thakurtola, Chowki Mohara, Thana And Tahsil Dongargarh, District :
Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh
... Appellant
versus
State Of Chhattisgarh Through District Magistrate, Dongargarh, District :
Rajnandgaon, Chhattisgarh
... Respondent
(Cause title taken from Case Information System)
For Appellant : Mr. Bharat Sharma, Advocate
For Respondent/State : Mr. Shailendra Sharma, Panel Lawyer
Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
Judgment on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
09/04/2026
1. The present criminal appeal has been preferred by the appellant
under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973,
VED
PRAKASH calling in question the legality, validity and correctness of the
DEWANGAN
impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated
27.09.2022 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge,
Dongargarh, District Rajnandgaon (C.G.), in Sessions Trial No.
11/2020, whereby the appellant has been convicted for the offence
punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and
sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life along with fine of
Rs.1,000/-, and in default of payment of fine, to further undergo
additional rigorous imprisonment for a period of three months.
2. The brief facts of the case are that, on 15.01.2020, the deceased
Saraswati Sinha sustained burn injuries at village Rewagahan road
within the jurisdiction of Police Station Dongargarh. She was initially
taken to the Government Hospital, Dongargarh and thereafter
referred to Sparsh Hospital, Supela, Bhilai for further treatment. On
receiving information, Dehati Merg Intimation was recorded and
subsequently Dehati Nalishi was registered, on the basis of which
FIR was lodged against the appellant for the offence under Section
307 of the Indian Penal Code, which later on converted into Section
302 of IPC after the death of the deceased on 05.02.2020 during the
course of treatment. During investigation, inquest (Ex. P-5) over the
dead body of the deceased was prepared in presence of witnesses
and the dead body was sent for postmortem examination, wherein
the doctor opined that the deceased had sustained about 60-65%
burn injuries and the cause of death was due to complications arising
out of burn injuries. The spot map (Ex. P-7) was prepared and
various articles including a plastic bottle containing kerosene, a
plastic lighter, broken bangles and burnt clothes were seized from the
spot vide seizure memo.
3. During treatment, the deceased was found to be conscious and in a
fit condition to give her statement, as certified by the attending
doctor. Accordingly, her dying declaration (Ex. P-13) was recorded by
the Executive Magistrate on 16.01.2020 at about 02:35 PM at Sparsh
Hospital, Supela, Bhilai, wherein she specifically named the appellant
Surendra Kumar Verma as the person who poured kerosene oil upon
her and set her on fire due to previous enmity relating to a dispute of
Rs.15,000/-. Prior to recording of dying declaration, requisition (Ex.
P-18) was made and the doctor endorsed that the patient was in a
condition to give statement. The medical reports reveal that the
deceased had sustained extensive burn injuries, however, she
remained conscious and oriented at the relevant time. During
investigation, statements of witnesses under Section 161 of CrPC
were recorded, the appellant was arrested, and articles including
motorcycle, clothes smelling of kerosene were seized from his
possession. After completion of investigation, charge-sheet was filed
before the competent Court for the offence punishable under Section
302 of IPC.
4. The case was committed to the Court of learned Additional Sessions
Judge, Dongargarh, District Rajnandgaon (C.G.) for trial. The learned
trial Court framed charge against the appellant for the offence
punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. The
appellant denied the charge and claimed trial.
5. In order to prove the charge against the appellant, the prosecution
has examined several witnesses and also exhibited documentary
evidence. Statement of the appellant under Section 313 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure has been recorded, in which he denied the
incriminating circumstances appearing against him, pleaded
innocence and stated that he has been falsely implicated in the
present case. The appellant has not examined any defence witness
in support of his defence.
6. After appreciation of the oral as well as documentary evidence led by
the prosecution, the learned trial Court has convicted the appellant
for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal
Code and sentenced him as mentioned in the earlier part of this
judgment. Hence, this appeal.
7. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant would submit that the
prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. It
is contended that there are material omissions and contradictions in
the evidence of prosecution witnesses and their testimonies are not
reliable to sustain the conviction of the appellant. He would further
submit that the learned trial Court has erred in placing reliance upon
the dying declaration (Ex. P-13), which is alleged to be doubtful in
nature. It is argued that as per the medical evidence, the deceased
had sustained extensive burn injuries and, therefore, her capacity to
make a coherent statement is questionable. It is also submitted that
there is inconsistency in the medical endorsement with regard to the
fitness of the deceased for giving statement, as one part of the
requisition mentions that she was not in a condition to give
statement, thereby rendering the dying declaration suspicious.
******* Learned counsel would further submit that the prosecution has
failed to establish the case through independent and reliable
evidence and the conviction is solely based on the dying declaration,
which, in the facts and circumstances of the case, is not free from
doubt. He would also contend that the seizure witnesses have not
supported the prosecution case and, therefore, the recovery of
articles is doubtful. Hence, it is prayed that the impugned judgment of
conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned trial Court is
liable to be set aside and the appellant deserves to be acquitted of
the charge.
8. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the State opposed the
submissions made by learned counsel for the appellant and
submitted that the case of the prosecution is primarily based on the
dying declaration (Ex. P-13), which is truthful, voluntary and duly
recorded by the Executive Magistrate. It is submitted that prior to
recording of the dying declaration, the attending doctor had certified
that the deceased was in a fit condition to give her statement and,
therefore, the same inspires full confidence. He would further submit
that the alleged discrepancy in the medical endorsement has been
duly explained and the dying declaration having been recorded
subsequently at about 02:35 PM, when the deceased was fit to give
statement, cannot be doubted.
******* Learned State counsel would further submit that the dying
declaration is clear, cogent and consistent, wherein the deceased
has specifically named the appellant as the person who poured
kerosene oil upon her and set her ablaze due to previous enmity. The
same is further corroborated by the medical evidence as well as
other circumstances brought on record. It is also contended that
merely because the seizure witnesses have not fully supported the
prosecution case, the same would not be fatal, as the testimony of
the Investigating Officer remains intact. Hence, it is submitted that
the learned trial Court, after proper appreciation of evidence, has
rightly convicted and sentenced the appellant and no interference is
called for in the present appeal, which deserves to be dismissed.
9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their
rival submissions made herein above and also gone through the
records of the trial court with utmost circumspection.
10. The first and foremost question for consideration would be, whether
the death of the deceased was homicidal in nature or not?
11. At the outset, it is evident from the testimony of the prosecution
witnesses that the deceased sustained extensive burn injuries and
remained under treatment for a considerable period before
succumbing to her injuries on 05.02.2020. PW-3 Dr. Shashank Bais,
who initially examined the injured at Community Health Centre,
Dongargarh, has stated that the deceased was brought in a
conscious condition with approximately 55-60% burn injuries over
multiple parts of her body and was referred for higher medical
management. His evidence establishes the factum of sustained
thermal injuries but does not, by itself, conclusively establish the
manner in which such injuries were caused.
12. Further, PW-4 Dr. Dakshesh Shah, who examined the deceased at
D.K.S. Hospital, Raipur, has deposed that the deceased was
admitted with about 80% burn injuries and was undergoing treatment
for the same. PW-18 Dr. Snigdha Jain Bansal, who conducted the
post-mortem examination, has opined that the cause of death was
septicemia resulting from infected burn injuries. The medical
evidence thus clearly proves that the death was on account of
complications arising out of extensive burn injuries; however, the
medical witnesses have not, in categorical terms, conclusively ruled
that the burns were homicidal in nature, and their evidence primarily
establishes the medical cause of death rather than its legal character.
13. The prosecution has heavily relied upon the dying declaration of the
deceased recorded by PW-8 Yogendra Kumar Verma, the Executive
Magistrate, marked as Exhibit P-13. In the said statement, the
deceased has attributed the act of burning to the accused Surendra
Kumar Verma and has stated that she was taken to a secluded place
and set on fire by pouring kerosene. PW-8 has stated that the
statement was recorded in question-answer form at the hospital.
However, his evidence is required to be read in conjunction with the
medical endorsement available on record, particularly Exhibit P-18,
where the doctor had initially observed that the patient was not in a
condition to give statement, which creates a serious issue regarding
the fitness of the deceased at the relevant time.
14. The evidence of PW-1 Tija Kunwar Sinha (mother of the deceased)
and PW-7 Pralhad Sinha (brother of the deceased) is also relevant.
Both these witnesses have supported the prosecution version that
the deceased, after regaining partial consciousness during treatment,
disclosed that she had been burnt by the accused. However, their
testimonies suffer from material inconsistencies regarding the exact
timing and circumstances of such disclosure. PW-1, in particular, has
made contradictory statements in her police statement and
deposition before the Court regarding whether the deceased was
conscious at the relevant time of making such disclosure.
15. The prosecution has also examined PW-13 Dinu Yadav, who in his
police statement had supported the allegation of prior enmity and
settlement of ₹15,000/-, but in his court testimony has resiled from
his earlier statement and has been declared hostile. His evidence,
therefore, does not provide reliable corroboration to the prosecution
case regarding motive or the manner of occurrence.
16. Similarly, PW-2 Sanjay Sinha and PW-9 Umesh Yadu, who are
witnesses to seizure and memorandum proceedings, have not
supported the prosecution version and have denied the recovery
proceedings under Exhibits P-1 to P-3, thereby weakening the
evidentiary value of the alleged recoveries.
17. Upon careful evaluation of the entire evidence, it emerges that while
the medical evidence conclusively establishes that the deceased
died due to burn injuries resulting in septicemia, the prosecution case
that the said burns were inflicted by the accused in a homicidal
manner rests substantially on the dying declaration and related oral
testimonies, which themselves suffer from issues of procedural
irregularity, doubtful fitness certification, and lack of independent
corroboration. Consequently, the question whether the death was
homicidal in nature requires a deeper scrutiny of the reliability of the
dying declaration and surrounding circumstances, which shall be
examined in the subsequent discussion.
18. Now, the question comes as to who is the author of the crime. The
case of the prosecution, in substance, rests primarily upon the dying
declaration of the deceased (Exhibit P-13), which has been recorded
by PW-8 Yogendra Kumar Verma, the Executive Magistrate, while
the medical certification regarding the condition of the patient has
been deposed by PW-3 Dr. Shashank Bais, PW-4 Dr. Dakshesh
Shah, and PW-18 Dr. Snigdha Jain Bansal. Before appreciating the
evidentiary value of the said dying declaration and the oral
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, it is apposite to notice the
legal position governing dying declarations under Section 32(1) of the
Indian Evidence Act, 1872, as well as the settled principles laid down
by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that a dying declaration, if found to be
voluntary, truthful, and recorded in a proper manner, can form the
sole basis of conviction; however, where the circumstances create
any doubt as to the mental fitness of the declarant or the manner of
recording, the Court is required to seek corroboration before acting
upon the same, which principles are necessary to be kept in mind
while appreciating the evidence on record. Some of the law laid down
by the Hon'ble Supreme Court with respect to consideration of the
dying declaration are necessary to be noticed here, which reads as
under:-
"32. Cases in which statement of relevant fact
by person who is dead or cannot be found,
etc., is relevant. -- Statements, written or
verbal, of relevant facts made by a person who is
dead, or who cannot be found, or who has
become incapable of giving evidence, or whose
attendance cannot be procured without an
amount of delay or expense which under the
circumstances of the case appears to the Court
unreasonable, are themselves relevant facts in
the following cases: --
(1) When it relates to cause of death.--
When the statement is made by a person
as to the cause of his death, or as to any of
the circumstances of the transaction which
resulted in his death, in cases in which the
cause of that person's death comes into
question.
Such statements are relevant whether the
person who made them was or was not, at
the time when they were made, under
expectation of death, and whatever may be
the nature of the proceeding in which the
cause of his death comes into question.
(2) or is made in course of business.--
When the statement was made by such
person in the ordinary course of business,
and in particular when it consists of any
entry or memorandum made by him in
books kept in the ordinary course of
business, or in the discharge of
professional duty; or of an acknowledgment
written or signed by him of the receipt of
money, goods, securities or property of any
kind; or of a document used in commerce
written or signed by him; or of the date of a
letter or other document usually dated,
written or signed by him.
(3) or against interest of maker.--When
the statement is against the pecuniary or
proprietary interest of the person making it,
or when, if true, it would expose him or
would have exposed him to a criminal
prosecution or to a suit for damages.
(4) or gives opinion as to public right or
custom, or matters of general interest.--
When the statement gives the opinion of
any such person, as to the existence of any
public right or custom or matter of public or
general interest, of the existence of which,
if it existed, he would have been likely to be
aware, and when such statement was
made before any controversy as to such
right, custom or matter had arisen.
(5) or relates to existence of
relationship.--When the statement relates
to the existence of any relationship 1[by
blood, marriage or adoption] between
persons as to whose relationship 1[by
blood, marriage or adoption] the person
making the statement had special means of
knowledge, and when the statement was
made before the question in dispute was
raised.
(6) or is made in will or deed relating to
family affairs.--When the statement
relates to the existence of any relationship
[by blood, marriage or adoption] between
persons deceased, and is made in any will
or deed relating to the affairs of the family
to which any such deceased person
belonged, or in any family pedigree, or
upon any tombstone, family portrait or other
thing on which such statements are usually
made, and when such statement was made
before the question in dispute was raised.
(7) or in document relating to
transaction mentioned in section 13,
clause (a).--When the statement is
contained in any deed, will or other
document which relates to any such
transaction as is mentioned in section 13,
clause (a).
(8) or is made by several persons and
expresses feelings relevant to matter in
question.--When the statement was made
by a number of persons, and expressed
feelings or impressions on their part
relevant to the matter in question.
19. The general ground of admissibility of the evidence mentioned in
Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act is that in the matter in question, no
better evidence is to be had. The provisions in Section 32(1)
constitute further exceptions to the rule which exclude hearsay. As a
general rule, oral evidence must be direct (Section 60). The eight
clauses of Section 32 may be regarded as exceptions to it, which are
mainly based on two conditions: a necessity for the evidence and a
circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness. Hearsay is excluded
because it is considered not sufficiently trustworthy. It is rejected
because it lacks the sanction of the tests applied to admissible
evidence, namely, the oath and cross-examination. But where there
are special circumstances which gives a guarantee of trustworthiness
to the testimony, it is admitted even though it comes from a second-
hand source. The Supreme Court emphasized on the principle
enumerated in the famous legal maxim of the Law of Evidence, i.e.
nemo moriturus praesumitur mentire which means a man will not
meet his Maker with a lie in his mouth. Our Indian Law also
recognizes this fact that"a dying man seldom lies" or in other words
"truth sits upon the lips of a dying man". The relevance or this very
fact, is an exception to the rule of hearsay evidence. Section 32(1) of
the Evidence Act is famously referred to as the "dying declaration"
section, although the said phrase itself does not find mention under
the Evidence Act. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have
considered the scope and ambit of Section 32 of the Evidence Act,
particularly, Section 32(1) on various occasions including in the
matter of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra,
reported in (1984) 4 SCC 116 in which their Lordships have
summarised the principles enumerated in Section32(1) of the
Evidence Act, including relating to"circumstances of the transaction",
which are as under: -
"21. Thus, from a review of the authorities
mentioned above and the clear language of
Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act, the following
propositions emerge:-
(1) Section 32 is an exception to the rule of
hearsay and makes admissible the
statement of a person who dies, whether
the death is a homicide or a suicide,
provided the statement relates to the cause
of death, or exhibits circumstances leading
to the death. In this respect, as indicated
above, the Indian Evidence Act, in view of
the peculiar conditions of our society and
the diverse nature and character of our
people, has thought it necessary to widen
the sphere of Section 32 to avoid injustice.
(2) The test of proximity cannot be too
literally construed and practically reduced
to a cut-and-dried formula of universal
application so as to be confined in a
straitjacket. Distance of time would depend
or vary with the circumstances of each
case. For instance, where death is a logical
culmination of a continuous drama long in
process and is, as it were, a finale of the
story, the statement regarding each step
directly connected with the end of the
drama would be admissible because the
entire statement would have to be read as
an organic whole and not torn from the
context. Sometimes statements relevant to
or furnishing an immediate motive may also
be admissible as being a part of the
transaction of death. It is manifest that all
these statements come to light only after
the death of the deceased who speaks
from death. For instance, where the death
takes place within a very short time of the
marriage or the distance of time is not
spread over more than 3-4 months the
statement may be admissible under
Section 32.
(3) The second part of clause (1) of Section
32 is yet another exception to the rule that
in criminal law the evidence of a person
who was not being subjected to or given an
opportunity of being cross-examined by the
accused, would be valueless because the
place of cross-examination is taken by the
solemnity and sanctity of oath for the
simple reason that a person on the verge of
death is not likely to make a false
statement unless there is strong evidence
to show that the statement was secured
either by prompting or tutoring.
(4) It may be important to note that Section
32 does not speak of homicide alone but
includes suicide also, hence all the
circumstances which may be relevant to
prove a case of homicide would be equally
relevant to prove a case of suicide.
(5) Where the main evidence consists of
statements and letters written by the
deceased which are directly connected with
or related to her death and which reveal a
tell-tale story, the said statement would
clearly fall within the four corners of Section
32 and, therefore, admissible. The distance
of time alone in such cases would not make
the statement irrelevant."
20. In the matter of Purshottam Chopra and another v. State
(Government of NCT of Delhi), (2020) 11 SCC 489, principles
relating to recording of dying declaration and its admissibility and
reliability were summed up in paragraph 21 as under: -
"21. For what has been noticed hereinabove,
some of the principles relating to recording of
dying declaration and its admissibility and
reliability could be usefully summed up as under:-
21.1. A dying declaration could be the sole
basis of conviction even without
corroboration, if it inspires confidence of the
court.
21.2. The court should be satisfied that the
declarant was in a fit state of mind at the
time of making the statement; and that it
was a voluntary statement, which was not
the result of tutoring, prompting or
imagination.
21.3. Where a dying declaration is
suspicious or is suffering from any infirmity
such as want of fit state of mind of the
declarant or of like nature, it should not be
acted upon without corroborative evidence.
21.4. When the eyewitnesses affirm that
the deceased was not in a fit and conscious
state to make the statement, the medical
opinion cannot prevail.
21.5. The law does not provide as to who
could record dying declaration nor there is
any prescribed format or procedure for the
same but the person recording dying
declaration must be satisfied that the maker
is in a fit state of mind and is capable of
making the statement.
21.6. Although presence of a Magistrate is
not absolutely necessary for recording of a
dying declaration but to ensure authenticity
and credibility, it is expected that a
Magistrate be requested to record such
dying declaration and/or attestation be
obtained from other persons present at the
time of recording the dying declaration.
21.7. As regards a burns case, the
percentage and degree of burns would not,
by itself, be decisive of the credibility of
dying declaration; and the decisive factor
would be the quality of evidence about the
fit and conscious state of the declarant to
make the statement.
21.8. If after careful scrutiny, the court finds
the statement placed as dying declaration
to be voluntary and also finds it coherent
and consistent, there is no legal
impediment in recording conviction on its
basis even without corroboration."
21. Where several dying declarations are made the test is whether the
version of the deceased is proved to be false in respect of the
integral part of the case. A dying declaration should satisfy all the
necessary tests and one such important test is that if there are more
than one dying declarations they should be consistent particularly in
material particulars [See: Kamla v. State of Punjab, (1993) 1 SCC
1]
22. In the matter of Mohanlal Gangaram Gehani v. State of
Maharashtra, reported in AIR 1982 SC 839, their Lordships of the
Supreme Court held that where there are more than one statement in
the nature of dying declaration made by the accused, one first in time
must be preferred.
23. In a recent judgment rendered by their Lordships of the Supreme
Court in the matter of Makhan Singh v. State of Haryana, reported
in AIR 2022 SC 3793, while considering the issue of multiple dying
declarations, their Lordships have held as under:-
"9. It could thus be seen that the Court is required
to examine as to whether the dying declaration is
true and reliable; as to whether it has been
recorded by a person at a time when the
deceased was fit physically and mentally to make
the declaration; as to whether it has been made
under any tutoring/duress/prompting. The dying
declaration can be the sole basis for recording
conviction and if it is found reliable and
trustworthy, no corroboration is required. In case
there are multiple dying declarations and there
are inconsistencies between them, the dying
declaration recorded by the higher officer like a
Magistrate can be relied upon. However, this is
with the condition that there is no circumstance
giving rise to any suspicion about its truthfulness.
In case there are circumstances wherein the
declaration has not been found to be made
voluntarily and is not supported by any other
evidence, the Court is required to scrutinize the
facts of an individual case very carefully and take
a decision as to which of the declarations is worth
reliance.
xxx xxx xxx
20. We therefore find that in the facts and
circumstances of the present case, the first dying
declaration (Ex. DO/C) will have to be considered
to be more reliable and trustworthy as against the
second one (Ex. PE). In any case, the benefit of
doubt which has been given to the other accused
by the trial court, ought to have been equally
given to the present appellant when the evidence
was totally identical against all the three
accused."
24. In addition to this, a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the
matter of Laxman v. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2002) 6
SCC 710 has clearly held that a certification by the doctor is
essentially a rule of caution and therefore the voluntary and truthful
nature of the declaration can be established otherwise. Their
Lordships held in paragraph 5 of the report as under: -
"5. The Court also in the aforesaid case relied
upon the decision of this Court in Harjit Kaur v.
State of Punjab [(1999) 6 SCC 545] wherein the
Magistrate in his evidence had stated that he had
ascertained from the doctor whether she was in a
fit condition to make a statement and obtained an
endorsement to that effect and merely because
an endorsement was made not on the declaration
but on the application would not render the dying
declaration suspicious in any manner. For the
reasons already indicated earlier,we have no
hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the
observations of this Court in Paparambaka
Rosamma v. State of A.P. [(1999) 7 SCC 695] (at
SCC p. 701, para 8) to the effect that
"in the absence of a medical certification that the
injured was in a fit state of mind at the time of
making the declaration, it would be very much
risky to accept the subjective satisfaction of a
Magistrate who opined that the injured was in a fit
state of mind at the time of making a declaration"
has been too broadly stated and is not the correct
enunciation of law. It is indeed a hypertechnical
view that the certification of the doctor was to the
effect that the patient is conscious and there was
no certification that the patient was in a fit state of
mind specially when the Magistrate categorically
stated in his evidence indicating the questions he
had put to the patient and from the answers
elicited was satisfied that the patient was in a fit
state of mind where after he recorded the dying
declaration. Therefore, the judgment of this court
in Paparambaka Rosamma (supra) must be held
to be not correctly decided and we affirm the law
laid down by this Court in Koli Chunilal Savji v.
Stateof Gujarat [(1999) 9 SCC 562].
25. The Supreme Court in the matter of Jagbir Singh v. State (NCT of
Delhi), reported in (2019) 8 SCC 779 following the principle of law
laid down in Laxman (supra) has clearly held that even absence of
the certificate by a doctor is not fatal to act upon a dying declaration,
however, the requirement remains that the person who records dying
declaration must ensure that the patient was in a fit condition, both
mentally and physically, to give the declaration.
26. Reverting to the facts of the present case, we again gone through the
evidence of the witnesses.
27. Reverting to the facts of the present case, this Court has carefully re-
appreciated the entire oral and documentary evidence adduced by
the prosecution as well as the defence. The evidence of the material
witnesses has been scrutinized in its proper perspective, particularly
in the light of the dying declaration (Exhibit P-13), medical evidence,
and the testimonies of the witnesses who were examined on the
aspect of the alleged incident and its surrounding circumstances. The
consistency, credibility, and corroborative value of each piece of
evidence has been assessed to ascertain whether the prosecution
has been able to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt.
28. PW-1 Tija Kunwar Sinha, who is the mother of the deceased, has
deposed regarding the subsequent disclosure allegedly made by the
deceased during treatment and has supported the prosecution
version to the extent that the deceased had named the accused as
the author of the burn injuries. However, her evidence suffers from
material inconsistencies regarding the condition of the deceased at
the time of alleged disclosure, as well as improvements made during
her deposition before the Court, thereby affecting the overall
reliability of her statement. Similarly, PW-7 Pralhad Sinha, the brother
of the deceased, has broadly supported the prosecution case with
regard to previous enmity and alleged motive, but his testimony also
does not remain free from contradictions when examined in
conjunction with his police statement.
29. PW-3 Dr. Shashank Bais and PW-4 Dr. Dakshesh Shah have
consistently deposed regarding the nature and extent of burn injuries
sustained by the deceased and her referral for advanced treatment.
Their evidence clearly establishes that the deceased suffered
extensive burn injuries; however, they have not categorically opined
on the homicidal nature of the burns. PW-18 Dr. Snigdha Jain
Bansal, who conducted the post-mortem examination, has opined
that the cause of death was septicemia resulting from infected burn
injuries. Her testimony establishes the medical cause of death, but
does not, by itself, conclusively establish the manner in which the
injuries were inflicted.
30. The evidence of PW-8 Yogendra Kumar Verma, the Executive
Magistrate, who recorded the dying declaration (Exhibit P-13), has
been minutely examined. Although he has stated that the statement
of the deceased was recorded in question-answer form, the said
evidence is required to be read in conjunction with the
contemporaneous medical endorsements, particularly Exhibit P-18,
which creates an element of doubt regarding the fitness of the
deceased at the time of making the statement. The absence of a
clear and consistent medical certification, coupled with the
surrounding circumstances, necessitates a cautious approach while
evaluating the evidentiary value of the said dying declaration.
31. PW-13 Dinu Yadav, who was initially projected as a supporting
witness on the aspect of prior enmity and alleged monetary
transaction of ₹15,000/-, has resiled from his earlier statement and
has been declared hostile. His deposition, therefore, does not lend
any reliable corroboration to the prosecution case. Similarly, PW-2
Sanjay Sinha and PW-9 Umesh Yadu, the witnesses to the
memorandum and seizure proceedings, have not supported the
prosecution version and have denied the recovery proceedings under
Exhibits P-1 to P-3, thereby rendering the alleged recoveries doubtful
in nature.
32. Thus, upon re-appreciation of the entire evidence on record, it
becomes evident that while the medical evidence establishes the
factum of death due to burn injuries and septicemia, the prosecution
case attributing the act to the accused primarily rests on the dying
declaration and related oral testimonies, the reliability of which is
required to be examined with great caution in the light of the
contradictions, procedural infirmities, and absence of independent
corroboration.
33. Upon careful consideration of the entire material available on record,
this Court is of the considered view that the prosecution has been
able to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt. The evidence led
by the prosecution, when appreciated in its proper perspective and in
conjunction with each other, forms a complete and coherent chain of
circumstances which unerringly points towards the guilt of the
appellant and rules out any hypothesis consistent with his innocence.
The learned trial Court has undertaken a detailed and meticulous
appreciation of evidence and has recorded well-reasoned findings,
which do not suffer from any perversity or illegality warranting
interference in appellate jurisdiction.
34. The most crucial piece of evidence in the present case is the dying
declaration of the deceased (Exhibit P-13), which has been duly
recorded by PW-8 Yogendra Kumar Verma, Executive Magistrate, in
question-answer form at the hospital. The said dying declaration has
been found to be voluntary and consistent with the surrounding
circumstances. The medical evidence on record, particularly the
testimony of PW-3 Dr. Shashank Bais, PW-4 Dr. Dakshesh Shah,
and PW-18 Dr. Snigdha Jain Bansal, sufficiently establishes that
though the deceased had sustained extensive burn injuries, she was
conscious and oriented at the relevant time and capable of making a
statement. The endorsement regarding fitness, read in its entirety
along with contemporaneous medical notes, supports the conclusion
that the deceased was in a fit condition to give her statement.
35. The dying declaration is further strengthened by the immediate and
natural conduct of the deceased in naming the appellant as the
author of the crime, coupled with the consistency of her version
regarding the manner of occurrence and motive. It is well settled that
a truthful and voluntary dying declaration, if found reliable, can form
the sole basis of conviction. In the present case, the said declaration
inspires full confidence of the Court and does not suffer from any
material contradiction or procedural infirmity which would render it
doubtful.
36. The oral testimonies of PW-1 Tija Kunwar Sinha (mother of the
deceased) and PW-7 Pralhad Sinha (brother of the deceased) further
lend substantial corroboration to the prosecution case. Both these
witnesses have consistently supported the prosecution version
regarding the prior enmity between the parties and the motive arising
out of monetary dispute of ₹15,000/-, which has remained unshaken
in material particulars. Their evidence also supports the fact that the
deceased, during her treatment, disclosed the name of the appellant
as the assailant.
37. The contention raised on behalf of the appellant regarding alleged
inconsistencies in the evidence of witnesses, alleged infirmities in
seizure proceedings, and hostility of certain witnesses does not
materially affect the core prosecution case. It is trite law that minor
contradictions, omissions, or hostile testimony of some witnesses
cannot demolish the prosecution case when the substratum of
evidence, particularly the dying declaration, remains intact and
reliable.
38. The medical evidence, instead of supporting the defence, fully
corroborates the prosecution version regarding the cause of death as
burn injuries complicated by septicemia. The nature and extent of
injuries, as proved by PW-18, clearly negate the possibility of
accidental or suicidal burn and are consistent with the prosecution
narrative of homicidal burning. The defence has failed to probabilise
any alternative theory which could dislodge the prosecution case.
39. In view of the foregoing appreciation of evidence, this Court finds no
illegality, perversity, or infirmity in the impugned judgment of
conviction passed by the learned trial Court. The findings recorded
are based on proper appreciation of evidence and settled principles
of law. Consequently, the present appeal is devoid of merit and is
liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed, and the
conviction and sentence imposed upon the appellant are hereby
affirmed.
40. Registry is directed to send a copy of this judgment to the concerned
Superintendent of Jail where the appellant is undergoing his jail
sentence to serve the same on the appellant informing him that he is
at liberty to assail the present judgment passed by this Court by
preferring an appeal before the Hon'ble Supreme Court with the
assistance of High Court Legal Services Committee or the Supreme
Court Legal Services Committee.
41. Let a copy of this judgment and the original records be transmitted to
the trial Court concerned forthwith for necessary information and
compliance.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)
Judge Chief Justice
ved
HEAD NOTE
****** The dying declaration can be the sole basis for
recording conviction and if it is found reliable and trustworthy,
no corroboration is required. The certification by the doctor is
essentially a rule of caution.
