Vakeel Ahmad vs Union Of Bharat
2026 Latest Caselaw 1468 Chatt

Chattisgarh High Court

Vakeel Ahmad vs Union Of Bharat on 9 April, 2026

            Digitally signed
YOGESH by YOGESH
       TIWARI
TIWARI Date: 2026.04.15
       10:18:14 +0530




                                                                      1




                                                                                    2026:CGHC:16503
                                                                                                NAFR

                                         HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

                                                          WPC No. 1428 of 2020
                           Vakeel Ahmad S/o Shri Hatim Kahn, Aged About 57 Years R/o House
                           No. 90, Gaji Nagar, Birgaon, Raipur Chhattisgarh
                                                                               ... Petitioner
                                                           versus

                           1 - Union of Bharat Through Its Secretary Ministry of Road, Transport
                           And Highway, New Delhi
                           2 - National Highway Authority of India Through Project Director And
                           Project Implementation Unit 51/96, Behind B T I College, Shankar
                           Nagar, Raipur Chhattisgarh
                           3 - Regional Officer National Highway Authority of India, Anupam Nagar
                           Raipur Chhattisgarh
                           4 - The Land Acquisition Officer Cum Sub Divisional Officer (Revenue)
                           Raipur Chhattisgarh
                                                                                   ... Respondents

(Cause-title taken from Case Information System) For Petitioner : Mr. Shivam Mishra, Advocate on behalf of Mr. Kishan Lal Sahu, Advocate For Respondents No.2 & 3 : Mr. B. Gopa Kumar, Advocate For State/Respondent No.4 : Mr. Siddharth Sharma, Panel Lawyer

Hon'ble Shri Amitendra Kishore Prasad, Judge Order on Board 09.04.2026

1. By filing the present petition, the petitioner calls in question the

inaction and arbitrary conduct of the respondent authorities in

failing to deposit the compensation awarded under the

supplementary award dated 11.04.2018, despite acquisition of the

petitioner's land for the widening of National Highway No. 30/200

Raipur-Bilaspur Project, thereby depriving the petitioner of the

justly entitled compensation for the loss of property. The petitioner

has prayed for following relief(s) :-

"10.1 To call the entire records of the case for kind perusal of the this Hon'ble Court in respect of the petitioner.

10.2 To issue an appropriate writ of Mandamus or direction to the respondent authority to pay compensation in the respect of the property affected in the proceeding of land acquisition and property been demolished by the respondents with interest rate of 18%.

10.3 To direct the respondent No. 1 to 3 to deposit compensation according to the supplymentory award dated 11.04.2018 before the competent authority.

10.4 Any other relief deemed fit in the facts and circumstance of the case may also granted."

2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the respondents

acquired the petitioner's land under the provisions of the National

Highway Act, 1956 (for short, 'Act of 1956'), through a land

acquisition proceeding initiated in the year 2012 for the purpose of

widening National Highway No. 30/200. At the time of acquisition,

the petitioner had constructed and was running a shop on the said

land. Despite repeated claims and complaints made before the

competent authorities, the petitioner has not been compensated

for the loss of property, including the superstructure constructed

on the land. It is submitted that the petitioner, along with other

affected persons from village Sankra Saddu, approached the

competent authority seeking redressal of the loss suffered due to

the acquisition. The competent authority, respondent No. 4,

directed the Executive Engineer of the Rural Engineering Service

to evaluate the petitioner's loss. Pursuant to this direction, a

report evaluating the property loss was submitted, which

culminated in the issuance of a supplementary award dated

11.04.2018 granting the petitioner due compensation for the loss

of property.

3. Learned counsel further submits that despite the issuance of the

supplementary award, respondents No. 1 to 3 have failed to

deposit the awarded amount with the competent authority. Even

after the petitioner sent a reminder dated 28.09.2018 to

respondent No. 3, there has been no action taken by the

respondents to release the due compensation. The inaction and

omission on the part of the respondents have caused continued

harassment and undue hardship to the petitioner. It is submitted

that the failure of the respondents to pay the compensation

amounts to a violation of the petitioner's constitutional right to

property, recognized under the law, and constitutes arbitrary and

unlawful behavior. The respondents, by taking possession of the

land and allowing the destruction of the petitioner's property

without releasing the due compensation, have acted in a manner

that is both oppressive and legally impermissible.

4. In view of the foregoing, learned counsel for the petitioner submits

that the inaction of the respondents is bad in law and liable to be

corrected by this Court. It is, therefore, prayed that the

respondents be directed to pay the due compensation to the

petitioner within a stipulated period and take all necessary steps

to ensure compliance with the supplementary award dated

11.04.2018.

5. Learned counsel for respondents No. 2 and 3 vehemently

opposes the submissions made by learned counsel for the

petitioner and submits that the present petition is misconceived,

legally untenable, and not maintainable. At the outset, it is

submitted that every adverse contention raised in the petition, in

so far as it relates to the answering respondents, is denied unless

specifically admitted. The respondents reserve the right to file

additional or supplementary replies, if necessary, in the interest of

justice. It is submitted that the petitioner's claim primarily

challenges the so-called supplementary award dated 11.04.2018

in respect of land acquired for the widening of National Highway

No.30/200. The respondents submit that the supplementary

award was passed without following the statutory procedure

prescribed under the Act of 1956, and without providing the

respondents an opportunity to be heard. There is no provision

under the Act of 1956 that empowers the competent authority to

issue a supplementary award once the original award, passed in

2012, had become final and executed.

6. Learned counsel submits that the original award of 2012 had

already included compensation for the loss of property and

infrastructure on the acquired land. The compensation was

deposited in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 1956,

and the respondents have consistently complied with all legal

obligations in this regard. Any attempt to pass a supplementary

award after a lapse of six years, without verifying the correctness

of the original award, is contrary to law and amounts to an

unauthorized exercise of powers by the competent authority. It is

further submitted that under Section 3G(5) of the Act of 1956, if

any grievance arises regarding the payment or determination of

the compensation amount, the aggrieved party is required to

approach the arbitrator appointed under the Act of 1956. The

petitioner has not availed of this statutory remedy and has

approached this Court directly, which is not permissible under the

law. The statutory procedure is exclusive, and no alternate mode

of litigation is permissible in this regard. It is also submitted that

the concept of a supplementary award is a misnomer and is not

recognized under the Act of 1956. Once the original award was

passed in 2012, the Land Acquisition Officer became functus

officio and had no jurisdiction to modify or rewrite the award

except for correcting clerical or arithmetic errors. The

supplementary award, therefore, is ultra vires and legally void.

The respondents had duly filed an application under Section

3G(5) before the Divisional Commissioner, Raipur, acting as the

notified arbitrator, challenging the supplementary award and

seeking its invalidation.

7. Lastly, learned counsel for respondents No. 2 and 3 submits that

the petition filed by the petitioner is legally untenable and liable to

be dismissed. The respondents have acted strictly in accordance

with the provisions of the Act of 1956, and there is no occasion for

interference by this Court. The petitioner has an efficacious

statutory remedy under the Act of 1956, which has not been

availed, and therefore, the present petition is liable to be rejected.

8. Learned counsel for the State/respondent No. 4 submits that the

present petition is not maintainable as the land of the petitioner

was acquired for the widening and upgradation of National

Highway No. 30/200 Raipur-Bilaspur Project under the provisions

of the Act of 1956. The original award in Land Acquisition Case

No. 15(2)/A-82 Year 2010-11 was passed on 28.05.2012 by the

Land Acquisition Officer-Cum-Sub Divisional Officer, Raipur, after

due process. It is submitted that complaints regarding

determination of compensation for assets on the acquired land

were considered, and a supplementary award dated 11.04.2018

was passed after technical evaluation by the Executive Engineer,

Rural Engineering Services, Raipur, and examination of the

Tahsildar's enquiry report. The respondents No. 2 & 3/NHAI have

not disbursed the amount pending adjudication of their application

under Section 3G(5) of the Act of 1956 before the Divisional

Commissioner, Raipur, who is the notified arbitrator. As such, the

petition filed by the petitioner against the State/respondent No. 4

is not tenable.

9. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and

have carefully perused the pleadings, documents, and other

material available on record.

10. In order to appreciate the issue on hand it would be apposite to

first extract the provisions of Section 3-G(5) and 3-G(6) of the

National Highways Act and Section 34 of the Arbitration and

Conciliation Act.

"Section 3-G(5) If the amount determined by the competent authority under sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) is not acceptable to either of the parties, the amount shall, on an application by either of the parties, be determined by the arbitrator to be appointed by the Central Government. Section 3-G(6) Subject to the provisions of this Act, the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996) shall apply to every arbitration under this Act.

Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. Application for setting aside arbitral award.-(1) Recourse to a Court against an

arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award in accordance with sub-section (2) and sub-

section (3).

(2) An arbitral award may be set aside by the Court only if-

(a) the party making the application 1 [establishes on the basis of the record of the arbitral tribunal that)-

(i) a party was under some incapacity, or

(ii) the arbitration agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication. thereon, under the law for the time being in force; or

(iii) the party making the application was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or

(iv) the arbitral award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration:

Provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, only that part of the arbitral award which contains decisions on matters not submitted to arbitration may be set aside; or

(v) the composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, unless such agreement was in conflict with a provision of this Part from which the parties cannot derogate, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with this Part; or

(b) the Court finds that-

(1) the subject matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law for the time being in force, or

(ii) the arbitral award is in conflict with the public policy of India

[Explanation 1. For the avoidance of any doubt, it is clarified that an award is in conflict with the public policy of India, only if-

(i) the making of the award was induced or affected by fraud or corruption or was in violation of section 75 or section 81: or

(ii) it is in contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law; or

(iii) it is in conflict with the most basic notions of morality or Justice.

Explanation 2.-For the avoidance of doubt, the test as to whether there is a contravention with the fundamental policy of Indian law shall not entail a review on the merits of the dispute.

[(2A) An arbitral award arising out of arbitrations other than international commercial

arbitrations, may also be set aside by the Court, if the Court finds that the award is vitiated by patent illegality appearing on the face of the award: Provided that an award shall not be set aside merely on the ground of an erroneous application of the law or by reappreciation of evidence.)

(3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal:

Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter.

(4) On receipt of an application under sub-

section (1), the Court may, where it is appropriate and it is so requested by a party, adjourn the proceedings for a period of time determined by it in order to give the arbitral tribunal an opportunity to resume the arbitral proceedings or to take such other action as in the opinion of arbitral tribunal will eliminate the grounds for setting aside the arbitral award.

((5) An application under this section shall be filed by a party only alter issuing a prior notice

to the other party and such application shall be accompanied by an affidavit by the applicant endorsing compliance with the said requirement.

(6) An application under this section shall be disposed of expeditiously, and in any event, within a period of one year from the date on which the notice referred to in sub-section (5) is served upon the other party.)"

11. A reading of Section 3-G(6) of the Highways Act clearly provides

that, in respect of every arbitration under the Highways Act, the

provisions of the Arbitration Act would apply. The language of

Section 3G is unambiguous. Therefore, it is clear that against the

award passed under Section 3-G(5) it is only an application under

Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act to set aside the

same can be filed.

12. The provisions of Section 3-G(5) of the Highways Act vis-a-vis

Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act was called into

question in a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in

National Highways Authority of India v Sayedabad Tea

Company Limited, (2020) 15 SCC 161 . The question that arose

for consideration was whether the application under Section 11 of

the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 was maintainable in view

of Section 3-G(5) of the National Highways Act which provides for

appointment of an Arbitral Tribunal. In the said case, the land

owner being dissatisfied with the award of compensation

determined by the competent authority under Section 3-G(1) of

the Highways Act had filed an application for appointment of an

Arbitrator in terms of Section 3-G(5) of the Highways Act to the

Central Government. Since there was no response from the

Central Government, the applicant had filed an application under

Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. Thereafter, an

Arbitrator was appointed. The High Court had observed that since

the Central Government had refused to comply with the request of

the applicant, their right to appoint an Arbitrator stood forfeited. A

review application was thereafter filed bringing to the notice of the

Court that as per the Highways Act the procedure for appointment

of an Arbitrator exclusively vested with the Central Government

under Section 3-G(5) of the Highways Act and that the application

under Section 11(6) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act is not

maintainable. However, the review application was dismissed.

Thus aggrieved the National Highways Authorities had moved the

Hon'ble Supreme Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court relying upon

the earlier judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in

National Highways & Infrastructure Development Corpn. Ltd.

v. Prakash Chand Pradhan, (2020) 15 SCC 533 had observed

as follows:-

"18. After analysing the scheme, it can be assumed that the legislature intended the 1956 Act to act as a complete code in itself for the purpose of acquisition until culmination including disbursement and for settlement of

disputes and this conclusion is further strengthened in view of Section 3-J of the Act which eliminates the application of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, to an acquisition under the 1956 Act.

19. It is settled principles of law that when the special law sets out a self-contained code, the application of general law would impliedly be excluded. In the instant case, the scheme of the 1956 Act being a special law enacted for the purpose and for appointment of an arbitrator by the Central Government under Section 3-G(5) of the 1956 Act and sub-section (6) of Section 3-G itself clarifies that subject to the provisions of the 1956 Act, the provisions of the 1996 Act shall apply to every arbitration obviously to the extent where the 1956 Act is silent, the arbitrator may take recourse in adjudicating the dispute invoking the provisions of the 1996 Act for the limited purpose. But so far as the appointment of an arbitrator is concerned. the power being exclusively vested with the Central Government as envisaged under sub-section (5) of Section 3-G of the 1956 Act. Section 11 of the 1996 Act has no application."

13. In another judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in

National Highways Authority of India v. Sheetal Jaidev Vade,

(2022) 16 SCC 391, the Hon'ble Supreme Court was considering

a issue as to whether the High Court exercising power under

Article 226 of the Constitution of India was competent to execute

an award passed by the Arbitrator. The learned Judges had held

as follows in paragraph nos. 11 and 12:-

'11. Therefore, once the original writ petitioner was having an efficacious, alternative remedy to execute the award passed by the learned Arbitral Tribunal/Court, by initiating an appropriate execution proceeding before the competent executing court, the High Court ought to have relegated the original writ petitioners to avail the said remedy instead of entertaining the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India which was filed to execute the award passed by the Arbitral Tribunal/Court. If the High Courts convert itself to the executing court and entertain the writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to execute the award passed by the Arbitral Tribunal/Court, the High Courts would be flooded with the writ petitions to execute awards passed by the learned arbitrator/Arbitral Tribunal/Arbitral Court.

12. We disapprove the entertaining of such writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to execute the award passed by the learned Arbitral Tribunal/Court, without relegating the judgment creditor in whose favour the award is passed to file an execution proceeding before the competent executing Court."

14. A Division Bench of the Hon'ble Karnataka High in the case

reported in National Highways Authority of India v. P.V.

George, 2024 SCC OnLine Ker 4236, was also dealing with the

maintainability of a Writ Petition challenging the decision of the

Arbitrator (The issue of limitation was also an issue before the

Division Bench). With reference to the limitation, the Bench had

observed that the limitation would not apply in arbitration under

the National Highways Act and with reference to the

maintainability of the Writ Petition they had held that the remedy is

to challenge the decision by invoking the provisions of Section 34

of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act.

15. The Hon'ble Bombay High Court in the judgment reported in

Omanand Industries v. Secretary to the Government of India,

2023 SCC OnLine Bom 784, was considering a batch of Writ

Petitions challenging the award passed by the Arbitrator under

Section 3G5 of the National Highways Act (as in the instant case).

The learned Judge after referring to the various judgments and

after briefly touching upon the scheme of the National Highways

Act relevant to the determination of the compensation, observed

as follows:-

"The mode of conducting the proceedings before the Arbitrator, in case the claimant is not satisfied with the award passed by the Competent Authority, is also governed by the provisions of Section 3 -G (6) of the N.H. Act, which applies the provisions of the A & C Act, to proceedings before the Arbitrator. It is, thus, apparent that a remedy of approaching the

'Court', as defined in Section 2(1)(e) of the A & C Act, has been provided to the claimant, against the award as may be passed by the Arbitrator under Section 3-G-(5) of the N.H. Act, which is a special Statute, governing the acquisition of lands for the National Highways."

16. Reverting to the facts of the case at hand in the light of the above-

stated judgments, it is quite vivid that the controversy raised by

the petitioner revolves around the entitlement to, and enforcement

of, compensation allegedly determined by way of a supplementary

award dated 11.04.2018. The core grievance of the petitioner is

the non-deposit and non-disbursement of the said amount by the

respondent authorities. However, it is equally evident from the

record that the very validity, legality, and enforceability of the said

supplementary award is under challenge at the instance of the

respondents before the statutory Arbitrator appointed under

Section 3-G(5) of the National Highways Act, 1956. Thus, the

dispute between the parties is not merely administrative inaction

simpliciter, but a substantive dispute touching upon the

correctness and sustainability of the determination of

compensation itself.

17. In such a situation, once the statute provides a complete and

efficacious mechanism for adjudication of disputes relating to

compensation including determination by the competent authority,

adjudication by the Arbitrator under Section 3-G(5), and thereafter

a challenge under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation

Act, the parties are bound to adhere to the said statutory

framework. The National Highways Act, being a special

enactment, constitutes a self-contained code governing

acquisition, determination of compensation, and resolution of

disputes arising therefrom. Therefore, any grievance with respect

to the quantum or validity of compensation cannot be permitted to

be agitated dehors the mechanism expressly provided under the

statute.

18. It is also of considerable significance that the proceedings before

the Arbitrator are already stated to be pending at the instance of

respondents No. 2 and 3, wherein the supplementary award itself

is under challenge. In such circumstances, any direction by this

Court for deposit or disbursement of compensation, as prayed for

by the petitioner, would necessarily amount to pre-empting the

outcome of the arbitral proceedings and would render the

statutory remedy illusory. The writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of

the Constitution of India cannot be invoked in a manner that

defeats or bypasses the statutory adjudicatory process,

particularly when disputed questions relating to entitlement and

validity of the award are yet to be conclusively determined.

19. Furthermore, the law is well settled that where an efficacious

alternative remedy is available, especially one which is not only

adequate but also specifically designed by the legislature for

redressal of such grievances, the High Court ought to exercise

restraint in entertaining a writ petition. The present case does not

fall within any of the recognized exceptions warranting

interference under Article 226, such as violation of principles of

natural justice, lack of jurisdiction, or patent illegality apparent on

the face of the record. On the contrary, the issues raised herein

are intrinsically linked with factual adjudication and statutory

interpretation, which are best left to be examined by the

competent forum under the Act of 1956.

20. In view of the aforesaid analysis, this Court is of the considered

opinion that the present writ petition, seeking enforcement of the

supplementary award and consequential directions, is not

maintainable in law at this stage. The petitioner, if aggrieved by

any determination or outcome arising from the arbitral

proceedings, is at liberty to avail the remedy available under

Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, in accordance

with law.

21. Accordingly, the writ petition stands dismissed as not

maintainable. However, it is made clear that the petitioner shall be

at liberty to pursue appropriate remedies as available under the

statutory framework governing the field.

22. There shall be no order as to costs.

Sd/-

(Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Yogesh