[Cites 13, Cited by 0]
Chattisgarh High Court
State Of Chhattisgarh vs Raghunath on 9 April, 2026
Author: Ramesh Sinha
Bench: Ramesh Sinha
1
2026:CGHC:16333-DB
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
CRMP No. 867 of 2023
1 - State of Chhattisgarh Through P.S. Pasta, District Balrampur
Ramanujganj, Chhattisgarh
... Petitioner/Appellant
versus
1 - Raghunath S/o Sudhan Kodaku Aged About 28 Years R/o Village
Kharsota, P.S. Pasta, District Balrampur - Ramanujganj, Chhattisgarh
--- Respondent
(Cause-title taken from Case Information System)
For Petitioner/State : Mr. Priyank Rathi, Govt. Advocate.
Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge
Order on Board
Per Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice
09-04-2026
1. Heard Mr. Priyank Rathi, learned Govt. Advocate for the
appellant/State on I.A. No.01/2023, which is an application for
condonation of delay of 35 days.
2. The State/appellant has preferred the instant application for grant
of leave to appeal and appeal against the findings and judgment
of acquittal dated 30.11.2022 passed by learned First Additional
Sessions Judge, Ramanujganj, District Balrampur-Ramanujganj
(CG) in S.T. Case No. R-69/2017, whereby the
respondent/accused has been acquitted from charges punishable
under sections 450, 376 & 506 of IPC.
3. Learned counsel for the appellant / State submits that though the
scope of interference with an order of acquittal is limited, the
appellate Court nonetheless possesses wide powers of
reappreciation of evidence, and where such reappraisal reveals
that the findings of acquittal are unjust, perverse or against the
weight of evidence, the appellate Court is fully empowered to
reverse the same. Learned State counsel submits that the
impugned judgment passed by the learned Trial Court is patently
erroneous, perverse, and contrary to the settled principles of law.
Despite there being ample, cogent, and reliable evidence
available on record establishing the guilt of the
accused/respondent, the learned Trial Court has erroneously
acquitted him on wholly insignificant, unreasonable, and legally
unsustainable grounds. The Court failed to appreciate that, the
charges leveled against the respondent are very serious in nature
like offence of rape and because of this reason the accused is not
entitled for any sympathy by this Court. Learned trial Court failed
to appreciate the circumstances and acquitted the respondent on
account of minor omissions and contradictions.
4. It has been contended that the State, after obtaining necessary
documents and information with respect to the case preferred the
present petition, however, some delay was occurred due to
fulfillment of various departmental formalities and working of the
Government machinery because the State Government is a multi
functioning body, hence, at times the fulfillment of departmental
formalities takes unexpected long time. Therefore, in some cases
the State is prevented from filing the case within the prescribed
period of limitation, which is bonafide and not deliberate. The
instant appeal is, therefore, being filed after a delay of 35 days
from the prescribed period of limitation. Reliance has been placed
upon the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
matter of State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and others, (1996)
3 SCC 132, to buttress his submissions. As such, the learned
State counsel prays that the delay of 35 days in preferring the
petition may be condoned.
5. The question for determination before this Court is whether the
provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (i.e. Act 9 of
1908 i.e. the old Limitation Act) would apply to an application for
leave to appeal from an order of acquittal.
6. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Postmaster General
and others v. Living Media India Limited and another, (2012) 3
SCC 563, has dealt with the limitation issue and held as under:-
"27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well
aware or conversant with the issues involved including the
prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way
of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim
that they have a separate period of limitation when the
Department was possessed with competent persons familiar
with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and
acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the
delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the
Government or a wing of the Government is a party before
us.
28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of
condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or
deliberate inaction or lack of bonafide, a liberal concession has
to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view
that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot
take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on
account of impersonal machinery and inherited
bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot
be accepted in view of the modern technologies being
used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly
binds everybody including the Government.
29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government
bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they
have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and
there was bonafide effort, there is no need to accept the usual
explanation that the file was kept pending for several
months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-
tape in the process. The government departments are under a
special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with
diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an
exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for
government departments. The law shelters everyone under the
same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.
30. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation
offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of
various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably
failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to
condone such a huge delay. Accordingly, the appeals are liable
to be dismissed on the ground of delay."
7. Recently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of State of
Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary, 2024 INSC 932,
while considering the delay, issued some directions and observed
as follows:-
"5. The legal position is that where a case has been presented in
the Court beyond limitation, the petitioner has to explain the
Court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an
adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach
the Court within limitation. In Majji Sannemma v. Reddy Sridevi,
2021 SCC Online SC 1260, it was held by this Court that even
though limitation may harshly affect the rights of a party, it has to
be applied with all its rigour when prescribed by statute. A
reference was also made to the decision of this Court in Ajay
Dabra v. Pyare Ram, 2023 SCC Online 92 wherein, it was held
as follows:
"13. This Court in the case of Basawaraj v. Special Land
Acquisition Officer [(2013) 14 SCC 81] while rejecting an
application for condonation of delay for lack of sufficient
cause has concluded in Paragraph 15 as follows:
"15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the
effect that where a case has been presented in the court
beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court
as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an
adequate and enough reason which prevented him to
approach the court within limitation. In case a party is
found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part
in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to
have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there
cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No
court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate
delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The
application is to be decided only within the parameters
laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of
delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a
litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay
without any justification, putting any condition
whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of
the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing
utter disregard to the legislature."
14. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the
High Court did not commit any mistake in dismissing the
delay condonation application of the present appellant."
Thus, it is crystal clear that the discretion to condone the
delay has to be exercised judiciously based on facts and
circumstances of each case and that, the expression
'sufficient cause' cannot be liberally interpreted, if
negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to
the party.
5.1. In Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D)
through his legal heir, 2024 INSC 262, wherein, one of us
(J.B.Pardiwala, J) was a member, after referring to
various decisions on the issue, it was in unequivocal
terms observed by this Court that delay should not be
excused as a matter of generosity and rendering
substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the
opposite party. The relevant passage of the same is
profitably extracted below:
"24. In the aforesaid circumstances, we made it very clear
that we are not going to look into the merits of the matter
as long as we are not convinced that sufficient cause has
been made out for condonation of such a long and
inordinate delay.
25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or
a State or Union of India when it comes to condoning the
gross delay of more than 12 years. If the litigant chooses
to approach the court long after the lapse of the time
prescribed under the relevant provisions of the law, then
he cannot turn around and say that no prejudice would be
caused to either side by the delay being condoned. This
litigation between the parties started sometime in 1981.
We are in 2024. Almost 43 years have elapsed. However,
till date the respondent has not been able to reap the
fruits of his decree. It would be a mockery of justice if we
condone the delay of 12 years and 158 days and once
again ask the respondent to undergo the rigmarole of the
legal proceedings.
26. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the
court must take into consideration while considering
whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the
tenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears that
they want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting
the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of
limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to
have the matter considered on merits because of his own
inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-
deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case,
he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice
deserves to be preferred as against the technical
considerations. While considering the plea for
condonation of delay, the court must not start with the
merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first
ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the
party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause
assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other
side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid
the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the
delay.
27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is
not merely a technical consideration. The rules of
limitation are based on the principles of sound public
policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the
'Sword of Damocles' hanging over the head of the
respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined
at the whims and fancies of the appellants.
xxx xxx xxx
34. In view of the aforesaid, we have reached to the
conclusion that the High Court committed no error much
less any error of law in passing the impugned order. Even
otherwise, the High Court was exercising its supervisory
jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has been
said that delay should not be excused as a matter of
generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to cause
prejudice to the opposite party. The appellants have failed
to prove that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting
the matter and this vital test for condoning the delay is not
satisfied in this case.
36. For all the foregoing reasons, this appeal fails and is
hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs."
Applying the above legal proposition to the facts of the present
case, we are of the opinion that the High Court correctly refused to
condone the delay and dismissed the appeal by observing that
such inordinate delay was not explained satisfactorily, no sufficient
cause was shown for the same, and no plausible reason was put
forth by the State. Therefore, we are inclined to reject this petition
at the threshold.
6. At the same time, we cannot simply brush aside the delay
occurred in preferring the second appeal, due to callous and
lackadaisical attitude on the part of the officials functioning in
the State machinery. Though the Government adopts
systematic approach in handling the legal issues and
preferring the petitions/applications/appeals well within the
time, due to the fault on the part of the officials in merely
communicating the information on time, huge revenue loss
will be caused to the Government exchequer. The present
case is one such case, wherein, enormous delay of 1788 days
occasioned in preferring the second appeal due to the lapses
on the part of the officials functioning under the State, though
valuable Government lands were involved. Therefore, we
direct the State to streamline the machinery touching the
legal issues, offering legal opinion, filing of cases before the
Tribunal / Courts, etc., fix the responsibility on the officer(s)
concerned, and penalize the officer(s), who is/are responsible
for delay, deviation, lapses, etc., if any, to the value of the loss
caused to the Government. Such direction will have to be
followed by all the States scrupulously.
7. There is one another aspect of the matter which we must not
ignore or overlook. Over a period of time, we have noticed that
whenever there is a plea for condonation of delay be it at the
instance of a private litigant or State the delay is sought to be
explained right from the time, the limitation starts and if there is a
delay of say 2 years or 3 years or 4 years till the end of the same.
For example if the period of limitation is 90 days then the party
seeking condonation has to explain why it was unable to institute
the proceedings within that period of limitation. What events
occurred after the 91st day till the last is of no consequence. The
court is required to consider what came in the way of the party that
it was unable to file it between the 1st day and the 90th day. It is
true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for
filing an appeal. But when it allows the limitation to expire and
pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the
sufficient cause must establish that because of some event or
circumstance arising before the limitation expired it was not
possible to file the appeal within time. No event or circumstance
arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute such sufficient
cause. There may be events or circumstances subsequent to the
expiry of limitation which may further delay the filing of the appeal.
But that the limitation has been allowed to expire without the
appeal being filed must be traced to a cause arising within the
period of limitation. (See: Ajit Singh Thakur Singh and Another v.
State of Gujarat, AIR 1981 SC 733)."
8. Taking into account the facts and circumstances of the present
case, in the light of aforementioned judgments of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in the matters of Postmaster General (supra)
and Ramkumar Choudhary (supra), it is evident that
Government departments are under a special obligation to
discharge their duties with due diligence and commitment.
Condonation of delay is an exception, not the rule, and cannot be
claimed as a matter of right or anticipated privilege by
Government entities. The law casts its protection equally upon all
litigants and cannot be distorted to confer undue advantage upon
a select few.
9. Upon considering the matter in its entirety, we find that the State
has failed to provide any proper or satisfactory explanation for the
delay in filing the present petition. The only reason cited is that the
Law & Legislative Affairs Department, Government of
Chhattisgarh, Mantralaya, Naya Raipur, had forwarded a proposal
to the Office of the Advocate General for initiating an appeal
against the impugned acquittal order dated 30.11.2022.
Thereafter, the case was processed, and the present petition was
ultimately filed. However, this sequence of events, lacking in
specificity or justifiable cause, does not amount to a cogent or
acceptable explanation. Thus, the State has miserably failed to
demonstrate sufficient cause warranting the condonation of an
inordinate delay of 35 days.
10. Consequently, we are not inclined to exercise our discretionary
power under the law to condone such delay. The learned counsel
for the State has not been able to establish any convincing or
bona fide reason for the delay. Therefore, there is no justification
for condoning the delay of 35 days in filing the petition against
acquittal.
11. Even otherwise, when we examined the merits of the case, we
found that the FIR Ex.-P/2 has been lodged after about 12 days of
the date of incident, the victim did not want to lodge report against
the respondent/accused and also the conduct of her husband is
suspicious as he himself asked the respondent/accused to go
away from the place, further it comes on record that there was
previous quarrel between the husband of the victim and father of
the respondent/accused for which the husband of the victim
remained for some time in jail. The allegation against the
respondent/accused that in the night when the victim was
sleeping with her husband, he entered into her room and
committed rape upon her which is highly improbable as no one
can dare in such situation to commit offence of like nature which
is alleged to have been committed in the present case.
12. From the evidence of the victim, PW-1 it further transpires that the
respondent/accused is her nephew. When her husband woke up
and saw the incident in the torchlight the respondent/accused fled
away and thereafter, her husband started beating her by raising
allegation that she called him. Thereafter, she had gone to her
parents house and then to Ambikapur to her daughter's house.
After about 11 days her husband took her back and then she
lodged the report. In cross-examination she admitted that her
husband was in jail in a murder case and during his incarceration
the respondent/accused helped her in her domestic work. She
admitted in para 9 of her cross-examination that her husband has
lodged report against the respondent/accused on suspicion
because the accused fled away after the incident.
13. PW-2, husband of the victim has stated in his evidence that when
he heard the noise of his wife he saw that incident that the
respondent/accused committing rape upon her and then he asked
the respondent/accused to go away from there and he will talk
him in the morning and then the respondent/accused went away
from the place. He asked his wife not to go anywhere, but his wife
too went to her parents house. In cross-examination he admitted
that he and his wife both had consumed liquor on that day and
went for sleep. He admitted that he has not caught the
respondent/accused there, but asked him to go away.
14. The learned trial Court after appreciating the evidence produced
by the prosecution acquitted the respondent/accused by giving
him benefit of doubt.
15. The consideration in the appeal against acquittal is also settled by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan Vs.
Kistoora Ram, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 984, wherein it has been
held that:-
"8. The scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal is very
limited. Unless it is found that the view taken by the Court is
impossible or perverse, it is not permissible to interfere with the
finding of acquittal. Equally if two views are possible, it is not
permissible to set aside an order of acquittal, merely because the
Appellate Court finds the way of conviction to be more probable.
The interference would be warranted only if the view taken is not
possible at all."
16. In view of the above, and also in the settled principle of law laid
down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid case, we are
of the considered opinion that the judgment of acquittal passed by
the learned trial Court is justified and we do not find any perversity
or illegality in the same.
17. Accordingly, the instant petition seeking leave to appeal to file
appeal against acquittal of the respondent is hereby dismissed
and the acquittal appeal is also dismissed.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha)
Judge Chief Justice
Aadil
