[Cites 2, Cited by 0]
Chattisgarh High Court
Basant Kumar Nande vs Bishmdev @ Vedprakash Nande on 8 April, 2026
1
2026:CGHC:15973
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
SA No. 433 of 2016
Basant Kumar Nande S/o Late Shankar Nande, Aged About 57 Years
Caste- Brahmin,, Occupation- Agriculture And Purohiti, R/o- Village-
Digitally
signed by
SHOAIB
Lahangapali, Midmida, Tahsil- Pussour, District- Raigarh,
SHOAIB ANWAR
ANWAR Date:
Chhattisgarh, Details Of The Parties Mentioned As Per The Certified
2026.04.09
17:07:59
+0530
Copy Of Appellate Judgment,......Plaintiff., Chhattisgarh
... Appellant
versus
1 - Bishmdev @ Vedprakash Nande S/o Late Krishnaram Nande,
Aged About 25 Years R/o- Beladula, Raigarh, Tahsil And District-
Raigarh, Chhattisgarh
2 - Chandramani Nande, S/o Late Shanker Nande, Aged About 41
Years Occupation- Agriculture And Purohiti, R/o- Village-
Loharsingh, Tahsil- Pussour, District- Raigarh, Chhattisgarh.,
3 - State Of Chhattisgarh, Through District Collector, Raigarh,
Chhattisgarh.,
4 - Smt. Jayanti Nande, W/o Shri Basant Kumar Nande, Aged About
50 Years Occupation- Agriculture And House Work, R/o- Village-
2
Lahangapali Midmida, Tahsil- Pussour, District- Raigarh,
Chhattisgarh,
... Respondent(s)
(Cause title taken from CIS)
For Appellant :Shri Kaushal Yadav, Advocate appears
on behalf of Shri C. Jayant K. Rao,
Advocate
For Respondent/State :Shri Lekhram Dhruv, Panel Lawyer
Hon'ble Shri Bibhu Datta Guru, Judge
Judgment on Board
08.04.2026
1. By the present appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, the appellant/plaintiff challenges the impugned
common judgment and decree dated 02.05.2016 passed by
the learned Third Additional District Judge, Raigarh, District
Raigarh (C.G.) in Civil Appeal No. 16-A/2012, arising out of the
common judgment and decree dated 27.01.2012 passed by
the learned Second Civil Judge, Class-II, Raigarh in Civil Suit
No. 9-A/2008 (Basant Kumar Nande vs. Bhismdev & Others).
For the sake of convenience, the parties shall be referred to as
per their status before the learned Trial Court.
2. It is noteworthy that the counter-claim filed by respondent No.
4 was also dismissed by the learned Trial Court vide the
aforesaid judgment and decree dated 27.01.2012. Against the
said judgment and decree, both the appellant/plaintiff as well
as respondent No. 4 preferred separate appeals before the
First Appellate Court.
3. The learned First Appellate Court, by the impugned common
judgment and decree dated 02.05.2016, dismissed both the
appeals filed by the appellant/plaintiff as well as respondent
No. 4.
4. The plaintiff has instituted the suit seeking declaration of title
over the suit land admeasuring 1.691 hectares described in
Schedule 'A', along with a declaration that the sale deeds
dated 10.06.1981, 28.04.1982, 21.06.1982 and 16.04.1983
executed in favour of Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 are null and
void, and further seeking permanent injunction restraining
interference with his possession.
5. The Defendant No. 4, wife of the plaintiff, has filed a counter-
claim claiming title and possession over part of the suit land
admeasuring 1.205 hectares (Khasra Nos. 761, 763, 872, 873,
775 and 811), asserting the same to be her stridhan property,
and similarly seeking declaration and injunction against the
plaintiff and Defendant Nos. 1 and 2.
6. It is an admitted position that the parties belong to the same
Hindu joint family and that the suit lands stand recorded in
the names of the plaintiff and Defendant Nos. 1 and 2. It is
also admitted that earlier partition proceedings initiated by
Defendant No. 1 before the Revenue Court were dismissed.
The plaintiff's case is that the lands were purchased from his
self-earned income and by selling his wife's ornaments, and
that the inclusion of the names of his brothers in the sale
deeds was out of love and by mistake. He claims exclusive
possession for over 22 years and denies any right of
Defendant Nos. 1 and 2. He further admits the claim of
Defendant No. 4 in respect of her counter-claim.
7. The Defendant No. 1, on the other hand, contended that the
suit property was acquired from joint family income and thus
constitutes joint family property, denying the plaintiff's
exclusive ownership as well as the alleged mortgage and
other assertions, and also disputing the claim of Defendant
No. 4.
8. The Defendant No. 4, in her counter-claim, has pleaded that
she had sold her ornaments i.e. 6 tolas of gold and 15 tolas of
silver, for a sum of Rs. 9,000/- and Rs. 1,500/- respectively and
from the said sale proceeds, purchased land admeasuring
1.205 hectares by virtue of sale deeds dated 10.06.1981 and
21.06.1982. It is her case that although the said land was
intended to be purchased in her name, the same was not
recorded accordingly. She has further asserted that she has
been in possession of the said land through her husband and
son since the date of its purchase. It is also contended that
the said property constitutes her stridhan, and therefore, the
plaintiff and Defendant Nos. 1 and 2 have no right, title or
interest therein. She has further pleaded that, being a lady not
conversant with legal and revenue matters, she became
aware only recently that her name was not reflected in the
revenue records.
9. After appreciating the evidence available on record and after
framing the issues, the learned trial Court by judgment and
decree dated 27.01.2012 dismissed the suit of the plaintiff
holding that that the plaintiff failed to prove exclusive
ownership or that the impugned sale deeds were invalid. It
was further held that no partition of the suit property was
established on record. Accordingly, the suit land was held to
be the joint property of the plaintiff and Defendant Nos. 1 and
2, with possession deemed to be on behalf of all co-owners.
By the same judgment and decree, the counter claim of
defendant No.4 has also been dismissed. Thereagainst, two
separate Civil Appeals preferred by the plaintiff as also the
defendant No.4, which have been dismissed vide common
impugned judgment and decree by the learned First Appellate
Court. The present appeal preferred by the plaintiff.
10. Learned counsel for the appellant/plaintiff submits that the
learned Trial Court and the learned First Appellate Court have
committed grave errors of law in dismissing the suit by
refusing to declare the impugned sale deeds as null and void,
despite the same being merely nominal transactions not
executed in substance by the concerned defendants. It is
further submitted that the dismissal of the suit on the ground
of limitation is erroneous, as the cause of action arose only
upon dismissal of the partition proceedings by the revenue
authorities. Learned counsel contends that the appellant had
proved by cogent evidence that the suit property was
purchased from his self-acquired funds, however, the Courts
erroneously shifted the burden of proof upon the appellant
and wrongly presumed the property to be joint family
property without any legal basis. It is thus urged that the
impugned findings suffer from illegality and perversity,
warranting interference in second appeal, and that such other
substantial questions of law as deemed fit may also be
framed.
11. I have heard learned counsel for the appellants, perused the
material available on record.
12. Upon due consideration of the entire material available on
record, it is found that the learned Trial Court has
meticulously appreciated both oral and documentary
evidence and has rightly disbelieved the plaintiff's plea
regarding the alleged family arrangement of the Loharsingh
land. The certificate (Ex. P-7) relied upon by the plaintiff
remained unproved as the author thereof was not examined,
and the statements of supporting witnesses were found
unreliable due to lack of personal knowledge. Further, from
perusal of the observation made by the learned trial Court in
its judgment at para 30, it is manifest that the document (Ex.
P-8) shows that the land recorded in the name of the temple,
thereby not supporting the plaintiff's claim of inheritance. The
Trial Court has also rightly held that the plaintiff failed to
prove that the impugned sale deeds were nominal or liable to
be declared null and void, and further failed to establish
exclusive ownership or any prior partition of the suit property.
Consequently, the suit property was correctly held to be joint
property of the plaintiff and Defendant Nos. 1 and 2, and
possession of the plaintiff was treated as that of a co-owner.
13. The learned First Appellate Court, upon re-appreciation of the
entire evidence, has affirmed the findings recorded by the
Trial Court, and the same are concurrent findings of fact
based on proper appreciation of evidence on record. No
perversity, illegality or misapplication of law has been
demonstrated by the appellant so as to warrant interference
in second appeal.
14. It is well settled that in a second appeal under Section 100
CPC, interference is permissible only when a substantial
question of law arises. In the present case, the findings
recorded by the Trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court
are based on proper appreciation of evidence, are neither
perverse nor contrary to law, and do not give rise to any
substantial question of law.
7. Even otherwise, the scope of interference in a Second Appeal
under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is extremely
limited. Interference is permissible only when the appeal
involves a substantial question of law. Concurrent findings of
fact recorded by both the Courts cannot be interfered with
unless such findings are shown to be perverse, based on no
evidence, or contrary to settled principles of law.
8. In the present case, both the Trial Court and the First Appellate
Court have concurrently recorded findings, on the basis of
evidence available on record, that the appellant failed to
establish their case by placing cogent and sufficient material.
The appellant has failed to demonstrate any perversity,
illegality, or misapplication of law in the findings so recorded.
9. The questions sought to be raised in the present Second
Appeal essentially relate to re-appreciation of evidence and
challenge to concurrent findings of fact. Such questions do
not give rise to any substantial question of law within the
meaning of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
10. It is well established that when there is a concurrent finding
of fact, unless it is found to be perverse, the Court should not
ordinarily interfere with the said finding.
11. In the matter of State of Rajasthan and others Vs. Shiv Dayal
and another, reported in (2019) 8 SCC 637, reiterating the
settled proposition, it has been held that when any concurrent
finding of fact is assailed in second appeal, the appellant is
entitled to point out that it is bad in law because it was
recorded de hors the pleadings or based on misreading of
material documentary evidence or it was recorded against any
provision of law and lastly, the decision is one which no Judge
acting judicially could reasonably have reached.
12. Be that as it may, the argument advanced by learned counsel
for the appellant and the proposed question of law cannot be
regarded as satisfying the test of being 'substantial question
of law' within the meaning of Section 100 of CPC. These
questions, in my view, are essentially question of facts. The
appellants failed to raise any substantial question of law
which is required under Section 100 of the CPC in. In any
event, the Second Appeal did not involve any substantial
question of law as contemplated under Section 100 of the
CPC, no case is made out by the appellants herein. The
judgments impugned passed by the learned trial Court as well
as First Appellate Court are just and proper and there is no
illegality and infirmity at all.
13. Accordingly, the present appeal is liable to be and is hereby
dismissed at the motion stage itself.
Sd/-
(Bibhu Datta Guru)
Judge
Shoaib/Gowri
