[Cites 7, Cited by 0]
Chattisgarh High Court
State Of Chhattisgarh vs Shiv Prasad Kewat on 7 April, 2026
1
SUNITA
GOSWAMI
Digitally signed
by SUNITA
GOSWAMI
Date: 2026.04.08
16:15:05 +0530
2026:CGHC:15910
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
ACQA No. 313 of 2022
State Of Chhattisgarh, Through Its Station House Officer, Police Station AJK,
District Korba Chhattisgarh
... Appellant
versus
1 - Shiv Prasad Kewat S/o Shri Mayaram Kewat, Aged About 33 Years,
2 - Ramprasad Kewat S/o Shri Mayaram Kewat Aged About 37 Years
Both Are Resident Of Village Kothari, Police Station Urga, District Korba
Chhattisgarh.
... Respondents
For Appellant/State : Mr. Dharmesh Shrivastava, Dy. Advocate
General appears along with Ms. K. Radhika,
Panel Lawyer for the Appellant/State.
For Respondents : Mr. Praveen K. Dhurandhar, counsel for the
Respondents.
Single Bench : Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay S. Agrawal
Order On Board
07.04.2026
1. Heard on I.A.No.1/2022, an application for condonation of delay of 268
days in preferring this appeal.
2. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant submits that immediately
after passing of the impugned judgment dated 23.11.2021, the copy of
the same was communicated by the concerned Government Pleader to
the Law Department through the Collector and after receiving the
same, the Department of Law has accorded its sanction for preferring
an appeal on 29.07.2022 and, after obtaining the sanction as such, it
was sent to the office of Advocate General in the month of August,
2022. It is contended further that after receiving the communication
from the Department of Law, the same has been intimated to the
District Magistrate and also asked for appointment of the Officer-in-
Charge for sharing the affidavit in support of the application for
condonation of delay. Further contention of the counsel appearing for
the appellant is that, the copy of deposition and exhibited documents
are required to be filed along with memo of appeal as per the High
Court of Chhattisgarh Rules, 2007, therefore, the Officer-in-Charge,
who was appointed in the month of August, 2022, is requested to
provide the same, which have subsequently been provided and after
receiving the same, the appeal has been filed on 16.11.2022.
Therefore, the delay of 268 days in preferring the appeal, which has
been occurred bonafidely in view of the aforesaid circumstances, may
be condoned in order to provide substantial justice to the parties.
3. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondents
submits that the delay in preferring the appeal has not been explained
properly, as the copy of the impugned judgment has been
communicated to the Law Department only in the month of June, 2022,
i.e. much after the expiry of the period of limitation in preferring the
appeal. It is contested further on the ground that despite the sanction
was accorded by the Law Department on 29.07.2022, yet the appeal
was not filed immediately thereafter and instead, it was filed only on
16.11.2022 even without any explanation to this effect. The application
as framed, therefore, deserves to be rejected.
4. From perusal of the record, it appears that by virtue of the impugned
judgment dated 23.11.2021, the Special Judge, SC and ST (Prevention
of Atrocities) Act, Korba, District Korba has acquitted the respondents
with regard to the offence punishable under Sections 456/34, 354, 354-
A, 354-B and 323/34 of IPC read with Sections 3(1)(w), 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s)
and 3(2)(va) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes
(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act,
1989').
5. It appears that after passing of the impugned judgment on 23.11.2021,
the communication of the said order was sent by the concerned
Government Pleader through the Collector to the Department of Law
on 09.06.2022, where permission for preferring an appeal was
accorded on 29.07.2022 and, thereafter sent to the office of the
Advocate General only in the month of August, 2022 for preferring an
appeal and, the Officer-in-Charge was appointed sometimes in the
month of August, 2022 even without disclosing the date when he was
appointed.
6. What is, therefore, reflected from the aforesaid facts that no
explanation, whatsoever, has virtually been offered by the appellant
before the expiry of the limitation period and, instead, what was offered
was much after the expiry of the statutory period of limitation of 90
days provided under sub-section (3) of Section 14-A of the Act, 1989
for preferring an appeal and, that too without proper explanation.
7. In view of such circumstances, the inordinate delay of 268 days
cannot be held to be sufficient, in view of the principles laid down by
the Supreme Court in the matter of State of Madhya Pradesh Vs.
Ramkumar Choudhary, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine 3612, wherein,
at para 7, it has been held as under :-
"7. There is one another aspect of the matter which
we must not ignore or overlook. Over a period of time,
we have noticed that whenever there is a plea for
condonation of delay be it at the instance of a private
litigant or State the delay is sought to be explained
right from the time, the limitation starts and if there is
a delay of say 2 years or 3 years or 4 years till the end
of the same. For example if the period of limitation is
90 days then the party seeking condonation has to
explain why it was unable to institute the proceedings
within that period of limitation. What events occurred
after the 91st day till the last is of no consequence.
The court is required to consider what came in the
way of the party that it was unable to file it between
the 1st day and the 90th day. It is true that a party is
entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for filing
an appeal. But when it allows the limitation to expire
and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal
earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that
because of some event or circumstance arising before
the limitation expired it was not possible to file the
appeal within time. No event or circumstance arising
after the expiry of limitation can constitute such
sufficient cause. There may be events or
circumstances subsequent to the expiry of limitation
which may further delay the filing of the appeal. But
that the limitation has been allowed to expire without
the appeal being filed must be traced to a cause
arising within the period of limitation. (See: Ajit Singh
Thakur Singh and Anr. v. State of Gujarat
MANU/SC/0109/1981 1981:INSC:9: AIR 1981 SC
733)".
8. Consequently, the application (I.A.No.1/2022) seeking condonation of
delay in preferring this appeal is rejected and, consequent upon that,
the appeal is dismissed.
SD/- Sd/-
(Sanjay S. Agrawal)
JUDGE
sunita
