Smt. Kaushalya Devi Mali vs Bharat Aluminum Company Ltd. (Balco)
2025 Latest Caselaw 2680 Chatt

Chattisgarh High Court

Smt. Kaushalya Devi Mali vs Bharat Aluminum Company Ltd. (Balco) on 26 March, 2025

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SMT
NIRMALA
RAO




                                                                               2025:CGHC:14674

                                                                                           NAFR

                       HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR

                                          WPC No. 4521 of 2019

          1 - Smt. Kaushalya Devi Mali W/o Kishan Chand Mali Aged About 61
          Years R/o Shanti Nagar Balco, Korba Chhattisgarh., District : Korba,
          Chhattisgarh
                                                               ... Petitioner
                                       Versus

          1 - Bharat Aluminum Company Ltd. (Balco), Through Its Chief Executive
          Officer And Whole Time Director, Bharat Aluminum Company Limited,
          Balco Nagar, Korba, District - Korba, Chhattisgarh., District : Korba,
          Chhattisgarh

          2 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Special Secretary, Department Of
          Industries And Commerce, Government Of Chhattisgarh, Mahanadi
          Bhawan, Naya - Raipur, Chhattisgarh., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh

          3 - Collector - Korba, Korba, District Korba Chhattisgarh., District : Korba,
          Chhattisgarh

          4 - Tehsildar - Korba Korba District Korba Chhattisgarh., District : Korba,
          Chhattisgarh

                                                                                  ---- Respondents
          ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

For Petitioner : Shri Ashutosh Shukla, Advocate. For Respondent No.1 : Shri Abhishek Sinha, Senior Advocate along with Ms. Khushboo Dua, Advocate.

For Respondent/State : Ms. Shailja Shukla, Dy. G.A.

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Hon'ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Order on Board 26.03.2025

1. Heard on admission.

2. The petitioner has challenged the order dated 31.8.2019 passed

by the Tehsildar, Korba in Revenue Case No. 8/A-70/2017-18

Village Risda, whereby an application moved by respondent No.1

under Section 250 of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code was

allowed, and an order of eviction was passed.

3. The facts of the present case are that the petitioner was the owner

of Survey No. 321/22, admeasuring 1800 sq.ft. situated at Village

Risda, Patwari Circle No.10, Shanti Nagar, Balco, Korba. The

petitioner executed a sale-deed on 26.8.2015 in favor of

respondent No. 1. It is pleaded by the petitioner that assurance of

rehabilitation was given by respondent No.1 to the petitioner at the

time of taking over the possession of the property. It is further

pleaded that when no action was taken by respondent No.1 with

regard to the rehabilitation and payment of compensation,

WP(PIL) No. 27 of 2013 was filed and it was disposed of vide

order dated 28.11.2023 directing respondent No.1 to consider the

claim of the petitioner with regard to payment of adequate

compensation and to take steps for rehabilitation.

4. When respondent No.1 failed to take any initiative with regard to

payment of compensation and rehabilitation, WP(PIL) No.129 of

2017 was filed and it was disposed of vide order dated 8.5.2018. It

is further pleaded that despite two rounds of public interest

litigation, respondent No.1 failed to comply with the assurance

given before the Hon'ble Division Bench and thus respondent No.

1 moved an application for eviction under Section 250 of the

Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code. It is pleaded that the petitioner

has no alternative accommodation, therefore, the order passed by

the Tehsildar under the provisions of Section 250 of CGLRC dated

31.8.2019 is bad in law.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner would argue that respondent

No.1 had given an undertaking to rehabilitate the petitioner. He

would submit that WP(PIL) No. 27 of 2013 was disposed of based

on the undertaking given by respondent No.1. He would further

submit that contrary to the undertaking, respondent No.1 moved

an application under Section 250 of the CGLRC before the

Tehsildar, Korba and the same was allowed vide order dated

31.8.2019. He would contend that the petitioner has no alternative

accommodation and is currently operating a flour mill at the site,

which is the only source of his livelihood. He would pray to quash

the order passed by the Tehsildar dated 31.8.2019.

6. On the other hand, learned Senior counsel would submit that the

petitioner assailed the order dated 31.8.2019 by filing an appeal

before the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue), Korba according to

the provisions of CGLRC on 18.10.2019. He would contend that

the petitioner preferred this petition on 20.11.2019 suppressing the

fact that the appeal was already preferred on 18.10.2019 before

the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue). Learned Senior counsel

would further submit that the interim order was passed in favour of

the petitioner on 19.2.2020 and even on that date, the petitioner

failed to disclose the pendency of the appeal before the Sub-

Divisional Officer (Revenue). He would further contend that the

appeal preferred by the petitioner was allowed by the Sub-

Divisional Officer (Revenue) vide order dated 17.7.2020, whereby

the order passed by the Tehsildar dated 31.8.2019 was set aside,

and the matter was remitted back to the Tehsildar to decide it

afresh. He would further argue that Writ Petition (C) No. 1998 of

2014 was filed by the petitioner claiming rehabilitation and

compensation and later on, that writ petition was withdrawn on

1.7.2015 without any liberty. He would also contend that this fact

has been suppressed by the petitioner in the present petition.

Furthermore, learned Senior counsel would contend that the land

of the petitioner was never acquired rather it was purchased

through a registered sale-deed dated 26.8.2015 for a

consideration of Rs.61,43,206/-. This fact finds a place in the order

passed by the Tehsildar dated 31.8.2020, and therefore, the claim

of the petitioner with regard to rehabilitation appears to be

misconceived. In support thereof, he placed reliance on the

judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of

Auroville Foundation vs. Natasha Storey, 2025 SCC OnLine

SC 556.

7. Learned counsel for the State would support the contention made

by the learned Senior Advocate.

8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the

documents present on the record.

9. Admittedly, the land of the petitioner bearing Survey No. 321/22

was purchased through a registered sale-deed for consideration of

Rs.61,43,206/- by respondent No.1/Balco but possession

remained with the petitioner. In the year 2014, WPC No. 1998 of

2014 was filed by the petitioner claiming therein rehabilitation and

compensation but later on, that petition was withdrawn.

10. The possession of the plot bearing survey No.321/22 remained

with the petitioner, therefore, respondent No.1 moved an

application under Section 250 of the CGLRC and that application

was allowed vide order dated 31.8.2019. The petitioner has

challenged the said order by filing an appeal according to

provisions of Section 44 of the CGLRC before the Sub-Divisional

Officer (Revenue) on 18.10.2019. During the pendency of the

revenue appeal, the petitioner filed this writ petition on 20.11.2019

challenging the very order passed by the Tehsildar dated

31.8.2019 and the interim order was granted in favour of the

petitioner on 19.2.2020.

11. A perusal of the writ petition filed by the petitioner would show that

the petitioner has not disclosed the filing of revenue appeal before

the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue) and filing of the earlier Writ

Petition (C) No.1998 of 2014 and its withdrawal. Annexure-R/1

filed by respondent No.1 would show that the revenue appeal

preferred by the petitioner before the Sub-Divisional Officer

(Revenue) was allowed vide order dated 17.7.2019, whereby the

order passed by the Tehsildar was set aside and the matter was

remitted back to decide it afresh. The petitioner has suppressed

the filing of an appeal before the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue);

filing of WP(C) No.1998 of 2014; withdrawal of WP(C) No.1998 of

2014 and the final order passed in appeal dated 17.7.2020

whereby the case was remitted back to the Tehsildar.

12. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Natasha Storey

(supra) while dealing with a similar issue in paras 9,10 & 11, held

as under:-

"9. It is no more res integra that the Doctrine of "Clean hands and non-suppression of material facts" is applicable with full force to every proceedings before any judicial forum. The party invoking extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India must come with clean hands and disclose all correct and material facts in his Writ Petition. If it is brought to the notice of the Court that the petition has been guilty of suppression of material and relevant facts or has not come with clean hands, such conduct must be seriously viewed by the courts as the abuse of process of law and the petition must be dismissed on

that ground alone without entering into the merits of the matter.

10. As held in S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. Vs. State of Bihar & Ors.1, as a general rule, suppression of material fact by a litigant disqualifies such litigant from obtaining any relief. This rule has been evolved out of the need of the Courts to deter a litigant from abusing the process of court by deceiving it. Similar view has been taken in General Manager, Haryana Roadways Vs. Jai Bhagwan & Anr., in Prestige Lights Ltd. Vs. State Bank of India etc.

11. In the instant case, the Respondent-Natasha Storey had challenged the Office Order dated 01.06.2022 by filing the earlier Writ Petition No. 22895 of 2022, and the High Court while dismissing the same vide its Order dated 13.10.2022 had categorically held, after considering the various provisions of the A.F. Act, that the activities which are provided under Section 19 of the Act, to be undertaken by the Residents' Assembly are only in the nature of supplementing and not supplanting the main powers and functions vested AIR 2004 SC 2421 (2008) 4 SCC 127 (2007) 8 SCC 449 with the Governing Board under the provisions of the Act, and that the writ petitioner could not claim that she being a member of the Assembly, the right of the Assembly was getting affected, or the functions of the Assembly as entrusted through the provisions of the Act were getting affected. Despite the fact that the said judgment and order passed in Writ Petition No. 22895 of 2022 was not challenged by the respondent any further, and had become final, the second Writ Petition was filed by her (i.e., Writ Petition no. 25882/2022 in the present proceedings), seeking substantially the same reliefs without disclosing the said material fact of dismissal of earlier petition. The non-disclosure of the material facts at the instance of the respondent should have been seriously viewed by the High Court, as the abuse of the process of court."

13. Taking into consideration the fact that the order under challenge

was already set aside by the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue)

vide order dated 17.7.2020, no case is made out for interference.

In the present case, the petitioner has suppressed the material

facts and has not approached this Court with clean hands,

therefore, this petition is dismissed with an exemplary cost of

Rs.10,000/- payable to the High Court Legal-Aid Committee.

14. Consequently, this petition fails and is hereby dismissed.

Sd/-

(Rakesh Mohan Pandey) Judge Nimmi