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Rohit Nag vs State Of Chhattisgarh
2022 Latest Caselaw 6400 Chatt

Citation : 2022 Latest Caselaw 6400 Chatt
Judgement Date : 20 October, 2022

Chattisgarh High Court
Rohit Nag vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 20 October, 2022
                                     1

                                                                      NAFR

             HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR

                     Criminal Appeal No.977 of 2022

Dayashanker Mishra, S/o Shri Ramgopal Mishra, aged about 40 years,
R/o Village Dihuki, Tahsil Churhat, District Sidhi (M.P.)
                                                                (In Jail)
                                                          ---- Appellant

                                  Versus

State of Chhattisgarh, Through Station House Officer, Police Station
Siksod, District North Bastar Kanker (C.G.)
                                                     ---- Respondent

                     Criminal Appeal No.1004 of 2022

   1. Suresh Sharnagat, S/o Shri Bhagchand Sharnagat, aged about 31
      years, R/o Ward No.9, Pandegada, Samariya Bazar, Police Station
      Lalbarra, District Balalghat (M.P.)

   2. Sushil Sharma, S/o Ranjeet Sharma, aged about 50 years, R/o
      Shiv Shakti Vihar, Garh Road, Merath L.L. R.M. Road, Main Road
      College Merath, District Merath (U.P.)
                                                               (In Jail)
                                                        ---- Appellants

                                  Versus

      State of Chhattisgarh, Through Station House Officer, Police
      Station Siksod, District North Bastar Kanker (C.G.)
                                                          ---- Respondent

                                    AND

                     Criminal Appeal No.1007 of 2022

Rohit Nag, S/o Sakharam Nag, aged about 53 years, R/o Village
Koilibeda, Police Station Koilibeda, District North Bastar Kanker (C.G.)
                                                                    (In Jail)
                                                              ---- Appellant

                                  Versus

State of Chhattisgarh, Through Station House Officer, Police Station
Siksod, District North Bastar Kanker (C.G.)
                                                     ---- Respondent
                                                 2

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For Appellants: Mr. T.K. Tiwari and Ms. Ritika Choubey, Advocates.
For Respondent / State: -
                        Mr. Ashish Tiwari, Govt. Advocate.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                        Hon'ble Shri Sanjay K. Agrawal and
                       Hon'ble Shri Deepak Kumar Tiwari, JJ.

Judgment on Board (20/10/2022)

Sanjay K. Agrawal, J.

1. Since all the three criminal appeals have arisen though from

different orders, but from one and same crime number i.e. Crime

No.9/2020 registered at Police Station Siksod, District North Bastar

Kanker, therefore, they have been clubbed together, heard together

and are being disposed of by this common judgment.

2. These criminal appeals under Section 21(4) of the National

Investigation Agency Act, 2008 are directed against order dated 7-

4-2022 (in respect of Dayashanker Mishra) and orders dated 30-5-

2022 (in respect of Rohit Nag, Suresh Sharnagat & Sushil Sharma)

passed by the Special Judge (NIA Act), Kanker, District North

Bastar Kanker in Bail Applications No.92/2022, 135/2022 &

131/2022, respectively, by which the appellants' applications under

Section 439 of the CrPC seeking bail for offences under Sections

10, 13, 17, 38(1)(2), 22-A, 22-C & 40 of the Unlawful Activities

Prevention Act, 1967 (for short, 'the UAPA'); Section 8(2)(3)(5) of

the Chhattisgarh Vishesh Jan Surksha Adhiniyam, 2005 (for short,

'the Act of 2005'); and Sections 120B, 201 and 149/34 of the IPC

have been rejected finding no merit.

3. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 24-3-2020, on the basis

of secret information, the respondent searched a vehicle bearing

registration No.CG-07/AH-6555 driven by Tapas Kumar Palit. In

that search, 95 pairs of shoes, green black printed cloths for

uniform, 2 bundles of electric wires each of 100 meter, LED lens,

walki talki and other articles were found in his possession (Tapas

Kumar Palit). Seizure was made accordingly. It is the further case

of the prosecution that these articles were to be supplied by Tapas

Kumar Palit to naxalites in order to support their illegal and

disruptive activities. It is also the case of the prosecution that said

Tapas Kumar Palit was working with Rudransh Earth Movers Road

Construction Company, a partnership firm of Ajay Jain and Komal

Verma. It is also the case of the prosecution that Tapas Kumar

Palit provided information that articles were being provided on the

instructions/ consent of Ajay Jain and Komal Verma, who were

given consent/permission to do so by Varun Jain, Director of M/s

Landmark Royal Engineering (India) Private Limited. It is also the

case of the prosecution that the accused were providing funds as

well to naxalites though no cash was recovered on the said date,

but the police arrested all of them on 23.4.2020. It is also the case

of the prosecution that Ajay Jain and Komal Verma were working as

sub-contractors for road construction of PMGSY Road work

originally given to M/s Landmark Royal Engineering Private Limited.

FIR under Crime No.9/2020 was registered and they were charge-

sheeted for the aforesaid offences on 8-9-2020 and thereafter

charges have been framed on 5-8-2021 and out of 100 listed

witnesses, only 13 witnesses have been examined and seizure

witnesses namely Mantesh Dhruw and Rajesh Sahu have also

been examined. Pursuant to the memorandum statement of

appellant Dayashanker Mishra (Cr.A.No.977/2022), who was

Accountant in Rudransh Earth Movers Road Construction

Company, seven pairs of plastic shoes and 15 meters of military

cloth have been seized from his possession and similarly, from the

possession of appellant Suresh Sharnagat (appellant No.1 in Cr.A.

No.1004/2022), who was working as Operator in the said Company,

one mobile, CD & motorcycle have been seized. From the

possession of appellant Sushil Sharma (appellant No.2 in Cr.A.

No.1004/2022), who was working as Clerk in the said Company,

mobile, rent agreement & register have been seized and from the

possession of appellant Rohit Nag (Cr.A.No.1007/2022), who was

Labourer, mobile has been seized. Thus, the present appellants

along with other co-accused persons have committed the offences

as mentioned in the second paragraph of this judgment.

4. The appellants herein have filed applications under Section 439 of

the CrPC for grant of bail before the Special Court under NIA Act,

which have been rejected by the impugned orders finding no merit

against which these criminal appeals have been filed.

5. Mr. T.K. Tiwari, learned counsel appearing for the appellants in all

the three appeals, submits that the case of these appellants stands

on the same footing as that of Ajay Jain to whom this Court has

granted bail in Cr.A.No.328/2022 on 4-5-2022 and further, the case

of the appellants herein also stands on the same footing as that of

Shailendra Bhadouriya & Komal Verma to whom bail has been

granted on 13-5-2022 in Cr.A.No.706/2022. He would further

submit that Nishant Jain was the original contractor for construction

of road who gave sub-contract to Rudransh Earth Movers Road

Construction Company of which Ajay Jain & Komal Verma were

partners and Shailendra Bhadouriya was Superivsor and they have

already been enlarged on bail as mentioned herein-above. He

would also submit that Dayashanker Mishra - appellant in

Cr.A.No.977/2022 was only Accountant in that Construction

Company, whereas Suresh Sharnagat & Sushil Sharma -

appellants in Cr.A.No.1004/2022 were Operator & Clerk,

respectively, in the said Company while Rohit Nag - appellant in

Cr.A.No.1007/2022 was a labourer in the same Company, except

some seizure, nothing specific has been seized from them. The

appellants are in jail since 23-4-2020 and therefore the appeals

deserve to be allowed by setting aside the impugned orders and the

appellants be enlarged on bail.

6. Mr. Ashish Tiwari, learned State counsel, would submit that

pursuant to the memorandum statement of appellant Dayashanker

Mishra, who was Accountant in Rudransh Earth Movers Road

Construction Company, seven pairs of plastic shoes and 15 meters

of military cloth have been seized from his possession and similarly,

from the possession of appellant Suresh Sharnagat, who was

working as Operator in the said Company, one mobile, CD &

motorcycle have been seized. He would further submit that from

the possession of appellant Sushil Sharma, who was working as

Clerk in the said Company, mobile, rent agreement & register have

been seized and from the possession of Rohit Nag, who was

Labourer, mobile has been seized. Seizure of above articles from

the appellants has duly been recorded in the charge-sheet.

Therefore, the appeals of these appellants deserve to be

dismissed.

7. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties,

considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also

went through the records with utmost circumspection.

8. The applications filed by the appellants herein under Section 439 of

the CrPC have been rejected by the learned Special Judge (NIA

Act). Section 43D(5) of the UAPA provides that an accused of an

offence punishable under the provisions of the UAPA shall not be

on bail or on his own bond if the Court, on a perusal of the case

diary or the report made under Section 173 of the CrPC is of the

opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the

accusation against such person is prima facie true. Sub-section (6)

of Section 43D of the UAPA further provides that the restrictions on

granting of bail specified in sub-section (5) is in addition to the

restrictions under the CrPC or any other law for the time being in

force on granting of bail. However, the bar provided in Section

43D(5) of the UAPA does not operate against the Constitutional

Courts power to ensure fundamental rights guaranteed under Part

III of the Constitution of India.

9. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the matter of Thwaha

Fasal v. Union of India1 have held that the restrictions imposed by

sub-section (5) of Section 43D of the UAPA per se do not prevent a

1 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1000

Constitutional Court from granting bail on the ground of violation of

Part III of the Constitution. It was observed as under:-

"26. While we deal with the issue of grant of bail to the accused nos.1 and 2, we will have also to keep in mind the law laid down by this Court in the case of K.A. Najeeb (supra) holding that the restrictions imposed by sub-section (5) of Section 43D per se do not prevent a Constitutional Court from granting bail on the ground of violation of Part III of the Constitution.

42. As held in the case of K.A. Najeeb (supra), the stringent restrictions imposed by sub-section (5) of Section 43D, do not negate the power of Constitutional Court to grant bail keeping in mind violation of Part III of the Constitution. It is not disputed that the accused no.1 is taking treatment for a psychological disorder. The accused no.1 is a student of law. Moreover, 92 witnesses have been cited by the prosecution. Even assuming that some of the witnesses may be dropped at the time of trial, there is no possibility of the trial being concluded in a reasonable time as even charges have not been framed. There is no minimum punishment prescribed for the offences under Sections 38 and 39 of the 1967 Act and the punishment can extend to 10 years or only fine or with both. Hence, depending upon the evidence on record and after consideration of relevant factors, the accused can be let off even on fine. As regards the offence under Section 13 alleged against accused no.2, the maximum punishment is of imprisonment of 5 years or with fine or with both. The accused no.2 has been in custody for more than 570 days."

10. Apart from this, proviso to Section 43D(5) of the UAPA would be

applicable of a person accused of an offence punishable under

Chapters V and VI of the UAPA. The appellants have been

charged for offences under Sections 10,13, 17, 38(1)(a) and 40 of

the UAPA Act.

11. Now, the appellants have also been charged under Sections 38(1)

(a) and 40 of the UAPA as the case against the appellants is that

they paid levy/ extortion money to naxalites for undertaking road

construction work in Kanker district. It is the case of the appellants

that they have been implicated merely on the basis of confessional

statement recorded during the investigation. No incriminating

material like money, cloths, wireless sets etc. were recovered from

the possession of the present appellants and even if the charge-

sheet is taken as it is in its face value along with other material

available on record that the appellants were paying extortion money

for letting them road construction work smoothly in the said area,

no offences under Sections 38 and 40 of the UAPA would be made

out. Reliance has been placed in the matter of Sudesh Kedia v.

Union of India2.

12. In Sudesh Kedia (supra) it has been observed by their Lordships of

the Supreme Court that payment of extortion money to a

banned/terror organization does not amount to terror funding. It

was observed as under:-

"13. While considering the grant of bail under Section 43-D(5), it is the bounden duty of the Court to apply its mind to examine the entire material on record for the purpose of satisfying itself, whether a prima facie case is made out against the accused or not. We have gone through the material on record and are satisfied that the Appellant is entitled for bail and that the Special Court and High Court erred in not granting bail to the Appellant for the following reasons:

13.1 A close scrutiny of the material placed before the Court would clearly shows that the main accusation against the appellant is that he paid levy/ extortion amount to the terrorist organization. Payment of extortion money does not amount to terror funding. It is clear from the supplementary charge-sheet and the other material

2 (2021) 4 SCC 704

on record that other accused who are members of the terrorist organisation have been systematically collecting extortion amounts from businessmen in Amrapali and Magadh areas. The appellant is carrying on transport business in the area of operation of the organisation. It is alleged in the second supplementary charge-sheet that the appellant paid money to the members of the TPC for smooth running of his business. Prima facie, it cannot be said that the appellant conspired with the other members of the TPC and raised funds to promote the organisation.

13.2 Another factor taken into account by the Special Court and the High Court relates to the allegation of the Appellant meeting the members of the terror organization. It has been held by the High Court that the appellant has been in constant touch with the other accused. The appellant has revealed in his statement recorded under Section 164 CrPC that he was summoned to meet A-14 and the other members of the organisation in connection with the payments made by him. Prima facie, we are not satisfied that a case of conspiracy has been made out at this stage only on the ground that the appellant met the members of the organisation.

13.3 An amount of Rs. 9,95,000/- (Rupees nine lakh and ninety-five thousand only) was seized from the house of the appellant which was accounted for by the appellant who stated that the amount was withdrawn from the bank to pay salaries to his employees and other expenses. We do not agree with the prosecution that the amount is terror fund. At this stage, it cannot be said that the amount seized from the appellant is proceeds from terrorist activity. There is no allegation that the appellant was receiving any money. On the other hand, the appellant is accused of providing money to the members of TPC."

13. Similarly, the Supreme Court in Thwaha Fasal (supra) has held that

mere association with a terrorist organisation as a member or

otherwise will not be sufficient to attract the offence under Section

38 of the UAPA unless the association is with intention to further its

activities. It was observed as under:-

"13. On plain reading of Section 38, the offence punishable therein will be attracted if the accused associates himself or professes to associate himself with a terrorist organisation included in First Schedule with intention to further its activities. In such a case, he commits an offence relating to membership of a terrorist organisation covered by Section 38. The person committing an offence under Section 38 may be a member of a terrorist organisation or he may not be a member. If the accused is a member of terrorist organisation which indulges in terrorist act covered by Section 15, stringent offence under Section 20 may be attracted. If the accused is associated with a terrorist organisation, the offence punishable under Section 38 relating to membership of a terrorist organisation is attracted only if he associates with terrorist organisation or professes to be associated with a terrorist organisation with intention to further its activities. The association must be with intention to further the activities of a terrorist organisation. The activity has to be in connection with terrorist act as defined in Section 15. Clause (b) of proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 38 provides that if a person charged with the offence under sub-section (1) of Section 38 proves that he has not taken part in the activities of the organisation during the period in which the name of the organisation is included in the First Schedule, the offence relating to the membership of a terrorist organisation under sub-section (1) of Section 38 will not be attracted. The aforesaid clause (b) can be a defence of the accused. However, while considering the prayer for grant of bail, we are not concerned with the defence of the accused.

15. Thus, the offence under sub-section (1) of Section 38 of associating or professing to be associated with the terrorist organisation and the offence relating to supporting a terrorist organisation under Section 39 will not be attracted unless the acts specified in both the Sections are done with intention to further the activities of a terrorist organisation. To that extent, the requirement of mens rea is involved. Thus, mere association with a terrorist organisation as a member or otherwise will not be sufficient to attract the offence under Section 38 unless the association is with intention to further its activities. Even if an accused allegedly supports a terrorist organisation by committing acts referred in

clauses (a) to (c) of sub- section (1) of Section 39, he cannot be held guilty of the offence punishable under Section 39 if it is not established that the acts of support are done with intention to further the activities of a terrorist organisation. Thus, intention to further activities of a terrorist organisation is an essential ingredient of the offences punishable under Sections 38 and 39 of the 1967 Act.

38. Now the question is whether on the basis of the materials forming part of the charge sheet, there are reasonable grounds for believing that accusation of commission of offences under Sections 38 and 39 against the accused nos.1 and 2 is true. As held earlier, mere association with a terrorist organisation is not sufficient to attract Section 38 and mere support given to a terrorist organisation is not sufficient to attract Section

39. The association and the support have to be with intention of furthering the activities of a terrorist organisation. In a given case, such intention can be inferred from the overt acts or acts of active participation of the accused in the activities of a terrorist organization which are borne out from the materials forming a part of charge sheet. At formative young age, the accused nos.1 and 2 might have been fascinated by what is propagated by CPI (Maoist). Therefore, they may be in possession of various documents/books concerning CPI (Maoist) in soft or hard form. Apart from the allegation that certain photographs showing that the accused participated in a protest/gathering organised by an organisation allegedly linked with CPI (Maoist), prima facie there is no material in the charge sheet to project active participation of the accused nos.1 and 2 in the activities of CPI (Maoist) from which even an inference can be drawn that there was an intention on their part of furthering the activities or terrorist acts of the terrorist organisation. An allegation is made that they were found in the company of the accused no.3 on 30th November, 2019. That itself may not be sufficient to infer the presence of intention. But that is not sufficient at this stage to draw an inference of presence of intention on their part which is an ingredient of Sections 38 and 39 of the 1967 Act. Apart from the fact that overt acts on their part for showing the presence of the required intention or state of mind are not borne out from the charge sheet, prima facie, their constant association or support of the

organization for a long period of time is not borne out from the charge sheet.

39. The act of raising funds for the terrorist organisation has been alleged in charge sheet against both the accused. This is a separate offence under Section 40 of the 1967 Act of raising funds for a terrorist organisation which again contains intention to further the activity of terrorist organisation as its necessary ingredient. The offence punishable under Section 40 has not been alleged in this case."

14. It is pertinent to mention here that two co-accused persons namely

Hitesh Agrawal and Varun Jain have been granted bail (interim) by

their Lordships of the Supreme Court in SLP (Crl.) Nos.8147-

8148/2021 by order dated 3-1-2022 by directing as under:-

"After going through the pleadings, hearing the learned counsel for the parties and considering that the petitioners have been in custody for over 17 months, we deem it appropriate to pass orders directing that the petitioners be granted interim bail on such terms and conditions as may be imposed by the Trial Court as also the conditions (i) the petitioners shall not leave the jurisdiction of the Trial Court without prior leave of the Trial Court; (ii) the petitioners shall surrender their passports, if any; (iii) the Petitioners shall report to the concerned police station at lease twice a week, that is, every Monday and every Friday between 9.30 a.m. to 12.00 Noon, or at any other time as directed by the Officer-in-Charge of the Police Station; and (iv) the Petitioners shall appear in the Trial Court on the dates on which they are required to appear."

15. Considering the fact that two co-accused persons namely Hitesh

Agrawal & Varun Jain, who were Directors of M/s Landmark Royal

Engineering (India) Private Limited being principal employers of

Ajay Jain, have already been granted bail on 3-1-2022 and the sub-

contractor of the said M/s Landmark Royal Engineering (Private)

Limited is Rudransh Earth Movers Road Construction Company

whose partners Ajay Jain & Komal Verma have been granted bail

on 4-5-2022 & 13-5-2022 in Cr.A.Nos.328/2022 & 706/2022,

respectively, and furthermore, Shailendra Bhadouriya, who was

Supervisor in the said Construction Company, was granted bail on

13-5-2022 in Cr.A.No.706/2022 and that the present appellants are

only Accountant, Operator, Clerk & Labourer in the said

Construction Company and further considering their role and that

they are in custody for more than two years and their case is similar

to that of Ajay Jain, Shailendra Bhadouriya & Komal Verma, who

have been granted bail by this Court, we consider it a fit case for

setting aside the orders passed by the learned Special Judge (NIA).

16. Accordingly, the impugned orders are set-aside and the criminal

appeals filed by the appellants under Section 21(4) of the NIA Act

are allowed. It is directed that the appellants shall be released on

bail on their furnishing a personal bond in the sum of ₹ 1,00,000/-

each with one surety in the like sum to the satisfaction of the

concerned Special Judge, for their appearance as and when

directed.

17. It is made clear that any observation made in this judgment is only

for the purpose of deciding the appeals under Section 21(1) of the

NIA Act and this Court has not made any observation on the merits

of the matter and the Special Judge (NIA Act) will decide the matter

strictly as per material available on record without being influenced

by any observation made in this order.

             Sd/-                                                Sd/-
       (Sanjay K. Agrawal)                                (Deepak Kumar Tiwari)
             Judge                                              Judge
Soma
 

 
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