Chattisgarh High Court

State vs Gajalal Chandrakar on 14 October, 2022

                                          1

                                                                          NAFR

             HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR

                            ACQA No.218 of 2009

                       Order reserved on : 24.08.2022

                       Order delivered on : 14.10.2022

      State of Chhattisgarh, Anti Corruption Bureau, Raipur through
       Branch of Special Police Establishment, Lokayukt, Jagdalpur,
       District Bastar (C.G.)

                                                                  ---- Appellant

                                       Versus

      Gajalal Chandrakar, S/o R. R. Chandrakar, aged about 37 years,
       Occupation Suspended Head Constable, R/o Raja Para, Kanker,
       District Kanker (C.G.)

                                                               ---- Respondent

For Appellant                Mr. Ali Asgar, Dy. AG
For Respondent               None


                   Hon'ble Justice Smt. Rajani Dubey

                                     C A V Order


1.     The   present     acquittal    appeal    has   been   preferred   by   the

       appellant/State    challenging the judgment of acquittal           dated

12.02.2008 passed by the learned Special Judge, Prevention of

Corruption Act, 1988, Kanker, District North Bastar Kanker (C.G.) in

Special Case No.10/2006, whereby the respondent has been

acquitted of the charges punishable under Sections 7, 13 (1) (d)

read with Section 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

2. Brief facts of the case are that the complainant Hariram Sahu (PW-

4) lodged a written report before the Lokayukt Office, Special Police

Establishment, Bastar Division, Jagdalpur on 21.02.20222 stating

therein that his father Late Ramesh Kumar Sahu had sold the land

to one Chamraram in the year 1985 but later on a false report was

lodged by the said Chamrarm regarding the said land, which stood

dismissed. It is further stated by the complainant that one day on the

occasion of Punnu Khichdi Dusra Parva, when Chamraram and the

complainant Hariram met each other, the complainant commented

on the caste of Chamaram. Subsequently upon notice being issued

to the complainant through Police Station Narharpur, he presented

before the Sub Divisional Officer, Police, Kanker and came to know

that a complaint has been registered against him by Chamraram for

commenting on his caste. Thereafter, statements of the complainant

and one Sangram Singh were recorded by the respondent Gajalal

Chandrakar and it was told by the respondent that if the complainant

wants to escape from the case lodged against him, bribe of

Rs.1,000/- be given to him, upon which the complainant said that

only Rs.5,00/- can be arranged and thereafter he was told to

manage the entire money within a week. Subsequently on

13.02.2002, an application regarding false complaint by Chamruram

was given to the SDO, Police Kanker by the complainant and on

19.02.2002 when the complainant met the respondent in his office,

he was again asked to give bribe of Rs.1,000/- in his office at

Kanker.

3. Upon complaint of the complainant, the preliminary enquiry was

done and a trap team was directed to be constituted by the Office of

Lokayukt. The tape recorder was given to the complainant to record

the conversation between him and the respondent/accused. On

22.02.2022 at about 9:45 am, trap team reached at respondent's

office at Kanker. The complainant Hariram (PW-4) was sent to the

respondent's house along with his companion Dev Narayan

Bhardwaj as shadow witness. The complainant gave Rs.500/- bribe

money to the respondent and the same was put by him in a file

along with pad and was kept in the along side table. Thereafter the

trap team came there and the respondent was caught red handed

and on search, Rs.500/- was seized from his possession. The

solution of sodium carbonate was prepared and on wash, the colour

of respondent's hand changed to pink. After completion of other

enquiry and procedures, charge sheet was filed against the

respondent. The charges were framed against the respondent under

Section 7 and 13 (1) (d) read with Section 13 (2) of the Prevention

of Corruption Act, 1988.

4. In order to bring home the charges, the prosecution examined as

many as 13 witnesses. The statement of the accused was also

recorded under Section 313 of CrPC., in which he denied the

circumstances appearing against him in the prosecution case,

pleaded innocence and false implication.

5. The Trial Court after appreciating the oral and documentary

evidence available on record acquitted the respondent of the

charges punishable under Sections 7 & 13 (1) (d) read with Section

13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Hence, this appeal has

been preferred by the appellant/State.

6. Learned counsel for the appellant/State submits that the learned

Special Judge is absolutely unjustified in acquitting the respondent

of the aforesaid charges levelled against him by recording a finding

perverse to the record, as the prosecution has proved its case

against the respondent beyond all reasonable doubt. He further

submits that the learned court below has erred in disbelieving the

statement of the complainant Hariram Sahu, who has categorically

stated the manner in which the offence was committed. PW-3 Dr.

Krishna Kumar Dev and PW-6 Devnarayan Bhardwaj have also fully

supported the case of the prosecution but the learned court below

has failed to take note of the same as well. Similarly, the other

prosecution witnesses have also supported the prosecution case

but despite the same, the accused respondent has been acquitted

of the charges levelled against him. Thus, the finding and

conclusion drawn by the court below is illegal, perverse and contrary

to record, hence the judgment of acquittal is liable to be set aside.

7. None for the respondent, though notice is served.

8. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material

available on record.

9. It is not dispute before the Trial Court that at the relevant point of

time, the respondent was posted as Constable at SDO (Police)

Office, Kanker. The complainant (PW-4) stated that the respondent/

accused did not receive note in his hands and he kept the same in

file with pad. He stated in para 10 that "esjs ls iwNk x;k fd dkSu ls

QkbZy essa uksV j[ks rc eSa QkbZy crk;k rc ml QkbZy dks fudky dj MkW0

nso us ns[kk rks mlesa fj'orh jde fey x;kA" PW-6 Devnarayan, a

shadow witness, did not support the prosecution case and stated

that "ge yksx fQj fnukad 19 dks x;sA fQj ysus dh ckr gqbZ rks gfjjke us

dgk fd eSa [email protected]:i;s nwaxkA eq>s cpk yks vkjksih us C;ku ntZ fd;k vkSj

cksyk fd Qkyrw ckr er djks ;gka ls tkvksA".

10. Upon appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence available

on record, the learned Trial Court found the statement of the

complainant not reliable, as the statements of shadow witness and

complainant are not corroborated with each other. The other

witnesses have also stated different versions of trap and

procedures. Most significantly, the painted note was not recovered

from the possession of the respondent. As such, the respondent

was acquitted of the charges punishable under Sections 7, 13 (1)

(d) read with Section 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,

1988.

11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Muralidhar alias

Gidda and another vs State of Karnataka 1 has held in paras 11 &

12 as under:-

"11. As early as in 1952, this Court in Surajpal Singh[2] while dealing with the powers of the High Court in an appeal against acquittal under Section 417 of the Criminal Procedure Code observed:

"7..........the High Court has full power to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal was founded, but it is equally well settled that the presumption of innocence of the accused is further reinforced by his acquittal by the trial court, and the findings of the trial court which had the advantage of seeing the witnesses and hearing their evidence can be reversed only for very substantial and compelling reasons."

12. The approach of the appellate court in the appeal against acquittal has been dealt with by this Court in Tulsiram Kanu, Madan Mohan Singh, Atley, Aher Raja Khima, Balbir Singh, M.G. Agarwal, Noor Khan, Khedu Mohton, Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade, Lekha Yadav, Khem Karan, Bishan Singh, Umedbhai Jadavbhai, K. Gopal Reddy, Tota Singh, Ram Kumar, Madan Lal, Sambasivan, Bhagwan Singh, Harijana Thirupala, C. Antony, K. Gopalakrishna, Sanjay Thakran and Chandrappa. It is not necessary to deal with these cases individually.

Suffice it to say that this Court has consistently held that in dealing with appeals against acquittal, the appellate court must bear in mind the following:

(i) There is presumption of innocence in favour of an accused person and such presumption is strengthened by the order of acquittal passed in his favour by the trial court;

(ii) The accused person is entitled to the benefit of reasonable doubt when it deals with the merit of the

1 (2014) 5 SCC 730

appeal against acquittal;

(iii) Though, the power of the appellate court in considering the appeals against acquittal are as extensive as its powers in appeals against convictions but the appellate court is generally loath in disturbing the finding of fact recorded by the trial court. It is so because the trial court had an advantage of seeing the demeanor of the witnesses. If the trial court takes a reasonable view of the facts of the case, interference by the appellate court with the judgment of acquittal is not justified. Unless, the conclusions reached by the trial court are palpably wrong or based on erroneous view of the law or if such conclusions are allowed to stand, they are likely to result in grave injustice, the reluctance on the part of the appellate court in interfering with such conclusions is fully justified, and

(iv) Merely because the appellate court on re- appreciation and re-evaluation of the evidence is inclined to take a different view, interference with the judgment of acquittal is not justified if the view taken by the trial court is a possible view. The evenly balanced views of the evidence must not result in the interference by the appellate court in the judgment of the trial court."

12. Applying the aforesaid legal proposition in the present case as well,

it is quite vivid that the prosecution had to prove demand and

acceptance of bribe by the respondent beyond all reasonable doubt,

but the prosecution has failed to prove the same. The finding

recorded by the learned Special Judge acquitting the respondent of

the offence punishable under Section 13 (1) (d) read with Section 13

(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is based on the

material available on record, which is neither perverse nor contrary

to the record. As such, this Court finds no illegality in the impugned

judgment acquitting the respondent of the aforesaid charges

levelled against him, particularly when there is a settled legal

position that if on the basis of record, two conclusions can be