Chattisgarh High Court
State Of Chhattisgarh vs P.N. Singh And Anr on 14 October, 2022
1
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR
Order Reserved on : 27.07.2022
Order delivered on : 14.10.2022
ACQA No. 93 of 2009
The State of Chhattisgarh Through - Anti Corruption
Bureau, Jagdalpur, Bastar (C.G.).
---- Appellant
Versus
1. P.N. Singh, S/o Shankar Singh, Assistant Engineer, aged
about 44 years, R/o Chhattisgarh Electricity Board -
Kondagaon, District Bastar (C.G.)
2. Kailash Chandra Yadav, S/o Chhedi Lal Yadav, aged about
50 years, Occupation - Business, R/o Kailash Sound
Service, Thakur Road, Jagdalpur, District Bastar (C.G.)
---- Respondents
For Appellant : Mr. Ali Asgar, Dy. A.G.
Respondents : Mr. V.G. Tamaskar, Advocate.
Hon'ble Smt Justice Rajani Dubey
C.A.V. Order
1. The present acquittal appeal has been fled by the State
against the judgment dated 31.01.2007 passed in
Special Corruption Case No.02/2002 by the Special
Judge, Anti Corruption, Jagdalpur, Bastar (C.G.), whereby
the learned trial Court acquitted the
accused/respondents herein from the charge punishable
under Sections 7, 13(1)(d) read with 13 (2) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and Section 120-B of
IPC.
2. Brief facts of the case are that, accused/respondent No.1
and 2 were Assistant Engineer of M.P. (now C.G.)
Electricity Board and Licensee Contractor of the
Electricity Board respectively. On 07.08.2000,
accused/respondent No.1 visited the house of
complainant (PW/1) to check electricity meter and after
being found that the said meter is used for commercial
purpose, prepare a panchanama. On 09.08.2000, the
Complainant went to accused/respondent No.1 and
discussed about said panchanama of meter but the
accused/respondent No.1 asked the Complainant to pay
2 ½ times of the actual bill on the ground that the
electricity had been consumed for commercial purposes,
whereas the Complainant was authorized to consume
the electricity for domestic purpose only. The
Complainant requested the accused/respondent No.1 to
settle the matter, whereupon the respondent No.1
demanded Rs.12,000/-. Thereafter, the Complainant
lodged Dehati Nalishi (Ex.P/18) in the ofce of Special
Police Establishment Lokayukt, whereupon, after
priliminary enquiry, a trap team was constituted. On
13.08.2000, Complainant along with his friend Manoj
Tiwari (PW/3) went to the shop of respondent No.2 and,
in presence of respondent No.1, gave Rs.10,000/- to
accused/respondent No.2. The trap party reached the
spot, caught the accused/respondents red handed and
proceeded in accordance with the procedure and
practice. Thereafter, panchanama and other relevant
documents were prepared. After completion of
investigation, charge sheet was fled against the
accused/respondents herein. The accused/respondents
herein charged with the ofence punishable under
Sections 7, 13(1)(d) read with Section 13 (2) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act and respondent No.2
charged under Section 120-B of the IPC.
3. So as to hold the accused/respondents guilty, the
prosecution has examined 13 witnesses. Statements of
the accused/respondents were also recorded under
Section 313 of Cr.P.C. in which they denied the
circumstances appearing against them in the
prosecution case, pleaded innocence and false
implication. Accused/respondents were also examined
two defence witnesses and exhibited as many as 12
documents from Ex.D-1 to Ex.D-12.
4. The trial Court after hearing counsel for the respective
parties and considering the material available on record
has acquitted the accused/respondents as mentioned in
para-1 of this judgment. Hence, this acquittal appeal.
5. Learned counsel for the appellant/State submits that the
impugned judgment is illegal, perverse and contrary to
the settled principles of law. He further submits that the
learned trial Court is not justifed by discarding the
evidence of Complainant, who has proved the case of
the prosecution and his version, which is duly
corroborated by the evidence of Manoj Tiwari (PW/3),
who at the time of trap proceeding, was present with
Complainant. He also submits that the learned trial
Court has failed to appreciate that for constituting the
ofence punishable under the Prevention of Corruption
Act, the fact of demand and acceptance of illegal
gratifcation must be proved and in the instant case, the
same has been categorically proved by the prosecution
witnesses PW/1 and PW/3. There is no reason to
disbelieve the evidence of these witnesses. The
evidence of PW/1 and PW/3 is trustworthy. It has been
submitted by learned counsel that the learned trial Court
has gone wrong in appreciating the evidence of these
witnesses in its true perspective, there is no reason to
disbelieve the evidence of trap ofcials, who are no
biased and are not inimical to the respondents. The
learned trial Court is not justifed by giving too much
weightage to the minor and immaterial omissions and
contradictions in the prosecution evidence.
6. On the other hand, learned counsel for
accused/respondents submits that the impugned
judgment of acquittal is in accordance with law and
there is no infrmity in the same warranting interference
by this Court.
7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused
the material available on record.
8. Before the learned trial Court, it is an admitted fact that
at the relevant time respondent No.1 was posed as
Assistant Engineer and he was a public servant and
respondent No.2 was a private person. It is also an
admitted fact before the learned trial Court that tented
note was recovered from the respondent No.2, thus, it is
the bounden duty of the prosecution to prove this fact
beyond reasonable doubt that respondent No.2 received
this amount under the instruction of respondent No.1. In
the instant case, according to the prosecution, the
accused persons demanded Rs.12,000/- but bare perusal
of document (Ex.P/5), which is transcription of cassette
recorder, goes to show that respondents only demanded
Rs.10,000/- as electricity bill only.
9. The learned trial Court recorded its fnding in para 30
that accused/respondent No.1 - P.N. Singh had told the
accused/respondent No.1 - Kailash Yadav that "Yadav Ji,
his (complainant's) bill will come, I will be out of station,
therefore, you (complainant) make payment to him, the
bill will come to you, keep the receipt.
Bare perusal of record goes to show that except
Complainant and his friend PW/1 and PW/3, no one has
stated about demand and bribe and the tented money
was also recovered from the respondent No.2.
10. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of C.M. Girish
Babu V. CBI, Chchin, High Court of Kerala), reported
in (2009) 3 SCC 779, held as under:-
"18. In Suraj Mal V. State (Delhi Admn.),
(1979) 4 SCC 725, this Court took the view that
(at SCC p. 727, para 2) mere recovery of tainted
money divorced from the circumstances under
which it is paid is not sufcient to convict the
accused when the substantive evidence in the
case is not reliable. The mere recovery by itself
cannot prove the charge of the prosecution
against the accused, in the absence of any
evidence to prove payment of bribe or to show
that the accused voluntarily accepted the money
knowing it to be bribe."
11. The learned trial Court while passing the impugned
judgment of acquittal examined defence witnesses
Rajendra Prasad (DW/1) and (DW/2). Rajendra Prasad
(DW/1) has stated in para 2 that the bill amount of
complainant was Rs.11,910/- prepared by audit team at
Raipur. Y. N. Rao (DW/2) has admitted his signature on
document Ex.D-1 to Ex.D/12 certifed by him, which were
related to examination of electricity meter of
complainant by respondent No.1. The learned trial Court
after going through the evidence of prosecution
witnesses as also defence witnesses, recorded its fnding
that the prosecution has failed in all front to prove this
fact that the respondent/accused person, in any manner,
conspired and accepted the illegal gratifcation. In this
case, tented note was recovered from respondent No.2,
thus, presumption of Section 20 of P.C. Act was not
against the respondent No.1.
12. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Muralidhar V.
State of Karnataka1 held in para 11 and 12 as under:-
"11. As early as in 1952, this Court in
1 (2014) 5 SCC 730
Surajpal Singh (AIR1952 SC 52) while dealing
with the powers of the High Court in an appeal
against acquittal under Section 417 of the Criminal
Procedure Code observed : (AIR p.54, para7)
"7. ... the High Court hs full power to
review the evidence upon which the order of
acquittal was founded, but it is equally well
settled that the presumption of innocence of
the accused is further reinforced by his
acquittal by the trial court, and the fndings of
the trial court which had the advantage of
seeing the witnesses and hearing their
evidence can be reversed only for very
substantial and compelling reasons."
12. The approach of the appellate court
in the appeal against acquittal has been dealt
with by this Court in Tulsiram Kanu[3], Madan
Mohan Singh[4], Atley[5] , Aher Raja Khima[6],
Balbir Singh[7], M.G. Agarwal[8], Noor Khan[9],
Khedu Mohton[10], Shivaji Sahabrao
Bobade[11], Lekha Yadav[12], Khem
Karan[13], Bishan Singh[14], Umedbhai
Jadavbhai[15], K. Gopal Reddy[16], Tota
Singh[17], Ram Kumar[18], Madan Lal[19],
Sambasivan[20], Bhagwan Singh[21], Harijana
Thirupala[22], C. Antony[23], K.
Gopalakrishna[24], Sanjay Thakran[25] and
Chandrappa[26]. It is not necessary to deal
with these cases individually. Sufce it to say
that this Court has consistently held that in
dealing with appeals against acquittal, the
appellate court must bear in mind the
following:
(i) There is presumption of innocence in favour of
an accused person and such presumption is
strengthened by the order of acquittal passed
in his favour by the trial court,
(ii) The accused person is entitled to the beneft of
reasonable doubt when it deals with the merit
of the appeal against acquittal,
(iii) Though, the power of the appellate court in
considering the appeals against acquittal are
as extensive as its powers in appeals against
convictions but the appellate court is generally
loath in disturbing the fnding of fact recorded
by the trial court. It is so because the trial
court had an advantage of seeing the
demeanor of the witnesses. If the trial court
takes a reasonable view of the facts of the
case, interference by the appellate court with
the judgment of acquittal is not justifed.
Unless, the conclusions reached by the trial
court are palpably wrong or based on
erroneous view of the law or if such
conclusions are allowed to stand, they are
likely to result in grave injustice, the reluctance
on the part of the appellate court in interfering
with such conclusions is fully justifed, and
(iv) Merely because the appellate court on re-
appreciation and re-evaluation of the evidence
is inclined to take a diferent view, interference
with the judgment of acquittal is not justifed if
the view taken by the trial court is a possible
view. The evenly balanced views of the
evidence must not result in the interference by
the appellate court in the judgment of the trial
court."
13. Thus, in view of judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the
matter of C.M. Girish (Supra) and Muralidhar (supra),
the fnding recorded by the learned Special Judge in
acquitting the accused/respondents from the ofence
punishable under Sections Sections 7, 13(1)(d) read with
13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and
Section 120-B of IPC is based on proper appreciation of
material available on record and this Court do not fnd
any illegality or infrmity in the judgment impugned
acquitting the accused/respondents particularly when
there is a settled legal position that if on the basis of
record two conclusions can be arrived at, the one
favouring the accused has to be preferred. Even
otherwise, the prosecution thus has utterly failed in
proving its case beyond reasonable doubt and the trial
Court has been fully justifed in recording the fnding of
acquittal which is based on proper appreciation of
evidence available on record. Furthermore, in case of
appeal against the acquittal the scope is very limited
and interference can only be made if fnding recorded by
the trial Court is highly perverse or arrived at by ignoring
the relevant material and considering the irrelevant
ones. In the present case, no such circumstance is there
warranting interference by this Court.
14. Accordingly, the acquittal appeal preferred by the State
is bereft of any substance and, therefore, the same is
liable to be and is hereby dismissed.
Sd/-
(Rajani Dubey)
JUDGE
PKD
