Citation : 2022 Latest Caselaw 3702 Chatt
Judgement Date : 14 June, 2022
Cr.A.No.1386/2016
Page 1 of 10
AFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR
Criminal Appeal No.1386 of 2016
{Arising out of judgment dated 10-9-2013 in Sessions Trial No.458/2011 of
the Sessions Judge, Ambikapur, District Surguja}
Premsai Nagesiya, S/o late Baiga Ram Nagesiya, aged about 52 years,
Occupation Cultivator, R/o Village Chitarpur (Pahadpara), Police Station
Dhourpur, District Surguja (C.G.)
(In Jail)
---- Appellant
Versus
The State of Chhattisgarh, through the Police Station Dhourpur, District
Surguja (C.G.)
---- Respondent
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For Appellant: Miss Sofia Khan, Advocate.
For Respondent/State: Mr. Sudeep Verma, Deputy Government Advocate.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hon'ble Shri Sanjay K. Agrawal and
Hon'ble Shri Sachin Singh Rajput, JJ.
Judgment On Board (14/06/2022)
Sanjay K. Agrawal, J.
1. This criminal appeal preferred under Section 374(2) of the CrPC is
directed against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of
sentence dated 10-9-2013 passed in Sessions Trial No.458/2011 by
the Sessions Judge, Ambikapur, District Surguja, by which the
appellant herein has been convicted for offence under Section 302 of
the IPC and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and further
sentenced to pay a fine of ₹ 1,000/- and to further undergo simple
imprisonment for six months for want of failure to pay the fine amount.
2. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that on 21-8-2011 at about 2.30
p.m. at Village Chitarpur, Bagichapara, Police Station Dhourpur, Cr.A.No.1386/2016
District Surguja, the appellant herein assaulted the deceased namely,
Jagdish and thereby caused his death by wooden plank ( kutela). It is
admitted position on record that Naresh (PW-5) and the deceased
were cousins. On 21-8-2011, deceased Jagdish had visited the house
of the appellant herein demanding his coin which he had lost and he
has reason to believe that it has been obtained by the daughter of the
appellant namely Pancho Bai which the appellant refused and then
some conversation took place and all of a sudden, the appellant
assaulted the deceased by wooden plank by which the deceased
suffered injuries on head and became unconscious. Thereafter, the
deceased was taken to hospital where he remained hospitalized for
two days and during treatment, he died. Further case of the
prosecution, in brief, is that morgue intimation was registered at the
instance of the District Hospital, Ambikapur on 27-8-2011 vide Ex.P-4
and deceased Jagdish was admitted to the District Hospital where he
succumbed to the injuries sustained by him and died. FIR was
registered vide Ex.P-6 and thereafter, inquest proceeding was
conducted and body was sent for postmortem and postmortem was
conducted by Dr. Sanjay Singh (PW-3) who submitted his report vide
Ex.P-5A. Upon the disclosure statement of the appellant Ex.P-12,
wooden plank (kutela) was seized vide Ex.P-13 and same was sent
for chemical examination and the chemical examination report is Ex.P-
19 according to which blood was found on the said wooden plank.
3. Statements of the witnesses were recorded under Section 161 of the
CrPC.. Thereafter, after completion of investigation, the appellant was
charge-sheeted before the jurisdictional criminal court which was
committed to the Court of Sessions for hearing and disposal in Cr.A.No.1386/2016
accordance with law.
4. The trial Court has framed charges under Sections 294, 506 Part-II
and 302 of the IPC against the appellant and proceeded on trial. The
accused / appellant abjured guilt and entered into trial.
5. The prosecution in order to bring home the offence examined as many
as 10 witnesses and brought on record 20 documents Exs.P-1 to P-20
to prove its case. However, the defence examined none, but proved
the documents Exs.D-1 & D-2 i.e. the statements of Smt. Sukanti Bai
and Naresh Ram recorded under Section 161 of the CrPC. Statement
of the accused / appellant was recorded under Section 313 of the
CrPC in which he abjured the guilt and pleaded innocence and false
implication.
6. The trial Court after completion of trial and after appreciating oral and
documentary evidence finding the death of deceased Jagdish to be
homicidal in nature proceeded to convict the appellant for offence
under Section 302 of the IPC and sentenced him in the manner as
mentioned in the opening paragraph of this judgment which has been
called in question in this appeal preferred under Section 374(2) of the
CrPC.
7. Miss Sofia Khan, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, would
submit that the trial Court is absolutely unjustified in convicting the
appellant for offence under Section 302 of the IPC as there is no
sufficient evidence available on record to convict him for offence under
Section 302 of the IPC and looking to only two injuries sustained by
the deceased on vital part of the body which were said to have been
caused by the appellant, the deceased died after two days of the
incident for want of treatment and for want of expert neurosurgeon in Cr.A.No.1386/2016
the Ambikapur Hospital. As such, it is evident that the appellant had
no intention to cause the death of the deceased, at the best, the
appellant can be convicted for offence under Section 304 Part-II of the
IPC and he is in jail since 28-8-2011, thereby he has served more
than ten years of jail sentence. Therefore, the appellant be sentenced
to the period already undergone by him and he be released from jail.
8. Per contra, Mr. Sudeep Verma, learned Deputy Government Advocate
appearing for the State / respondent, would submit that the
prosecution has brought sufficient legal evidence in shape of oral,
medical and documentary evidence to convict the appellant under
Section 302 of the IPC, as such, the trial Court has rightly convicted
him for offence under Section 302 of the IPC. It is not the case where
the appellant's conviction under Section 302 of the IPC can be
converted to one under Section 304 Part-II of the IPC, as the appellant
with intention to cause death of the deceased has caused injuries on
the vital part of the body of the deceased as a result of which occipital
bone and temporal bone of head were fractured, as such, the instant
appeal deserves to be dismissed in toto.
9. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their
rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the
record with utmost circumspection.
10. The first question for consideration would be, whether the death of
deceased Jagdish was homicidal in nature?
11. The trial Court after appreciating oral and documentary evidence and
considering the nature of injuries which the deceased has received
particularly injury on head on which fracture was found in occipital and
temporal regions and further considering the statement of Dr. Sanjay Cr.A.No.1386/2016
Singh (PW-3), came to the conclusion that the death of deceased
Jagdish was homicidal in nature. After due consideration, we are
inclined to hold that the finding recorded by the learned trial Court
holding the death of deceased Jagdish to be homicidal in nature is a
finding of fact based on the evidence available on record and we
hereby affirm the said finding recorded by the trial Court.
12. Now, the question is, whether the trial Court is justified in holding that
it is the appellant who is the author of the crime and he has caused
the murder of deceased Jagdish?
13. The genesis of the crime is one old coin which was owned by
deceased Jagdish and which he is said to have lost in the marriage
ceremony of neighbour Solaram's sister in the courtyard of Solaram.
The deceased suspected the said coin to have been received by the
appellant's daughter Pancho Bai. On being demanded by the
deceased, Pancho Bai did not give the coin to the deceased and for
taking back that coin, the deceased had gone to the house of
appellant Premsai on that very day and during conversation, dispute
arose on that day which resulted in marpit and then the incident came
to be happened in the shape of murder of Jagdish.
14. Sakunti (PW-4), who is wife of Naresh (PW-5), being eyewitness has
clearly stated before the Court that on that day she was working in her
courtyard grazing the grass and she has seen the incident by which
the appellant caused injury to the deceased by wooden plank as a
result of which the deceased suffered grievous injury and Naresh Ram
(PW-5) lodged report to the police and thereafter, the deceased was
taken to the District Hospital where he died after two days of his
admission in the hospital. Sakunti (PW-4) has been subjected to Cr.A.No.1386/2016
lengthy cross-examination on behalf of the defence, but nothing has
been elicited to discard her statement, however, it has been stated by
Sakunti (PW-4) that relation of the appellant and the deceased was
cordial.
15. As such, it has been established by the prosecution based on the
testimony of Sakunti (PW-4) that it is the appellant who has caused
injuries to the deceased by wooden plank by which the deceased
suffered grievous injuries on head and thereafter succumbed to death
after being admitted in the hospital for two days. Upon the
memorandum statement of the appellant Ex.P-12, wooden plank
stained with blood has been recovered vide Ex.P-13 and it has been
sent for chemical analysis and chemical analysis report has been filed
as Ex.P-19 in which blood has been found on the said wooden plank.
As such, there is sufficient evidence on record to hold that it is the
appellant who has caused injuries to the deceased by wooden plank
and by which the deceased suffered injuries and succumbed to death.
16. Now, the question is, whether the offence would fall under Exception 4
to Section 300 of the IPC and whether the appellant is liable to be
convicted under Section 304 Part-I or Part-II of the IPC or whether the
offence under Section 302 of the IPC is made out as it has been found
proved against the appellant by the trial Court?
17. As noticed herein-above, it is quite vivid that the dispute is only with
regard to an old coin owned by the deceased - Jagdish, which he lost
in the marriage ceremony of his neighbour Solaram's sister and which
is said to have been received by the appellant's daughter Pancho Bai
which she refused to give back to deceased Jagdish and which was
regularly being demanded unsuccessfully by the deceased. It is also Cr.A.No.1386/2016
established from the statement of Sakunti (PW-4), paragraphs 9 & 10,
that accused / appellant Premsai and deceased Jagdish both were
having good relations and they are in talking terms, but the fact
remains that coin was not being returned by the appellant to the
deceased - Jagdish and on that pretext, the deceased had gone to
the house of the appellant on that particular day and during the course
of conversation, dispute arose which resulted in assault by each other
and the appellant has caused injury to the deceased. As such, there
is no premeditation for commission of offence, particularly when the
incident occurred in the house of the appellant and it took place in a
sudden fight, and the appellant has not taken any undue advantage.
18. The Supreme Court in the matter of Arjun and another v. State of
Chhattisgarh1 has elaborately dealt with the issue and observed in
paragraphs 20 and 21 as under :-
"20. To invoke this Exception 4, the requirements that are to be fulfilled have been laid down by this Court in Surinder Kumar v. UT, Chandigarh2, it has been explained as under: (SCC p. 220, para 7)
"7. To invoke this exception four requirements must be satisfied, namely, (i) it was a sudden fight; (ii) there was no premeditation; (iii) the act was done in a heat of passion; and (iv) the assailant had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. The cause of the quarrel is not relevant nor is it relevant who offered the provocation or started the assault. The number of wounds caused during the occurrence is not a decisive factor but what is important is that the occurrence must have been sudden and unpremeditated and the offender must have acted in a fit of anger. Of course, the offender must not have taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner.
Where, on a sudden quarrel, a person in the heat of the moment picks up a weapon which is handy and causes
1 (2017) 3 SCC 247 2 (1989) 2 SCC 217 Cr.A.No.1386/2016
injuries, one of which proves fatal, he would be entitled to the benefit of this exception provided he has not acted cruelly."
21. Further in Arumugam v. State3, in support of the proposition of law that under what circumstances Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC can be invoked if death is caused, it has been explained as under: (SCC p. 596, para 9)
"9. .... '18. The help of Exception 4 can be invoked if death is caused (a) without premeditation; (b) in a sudden fight; (c) without the offender's having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner; and (d) the fight must have been with the person killed. To bring a case within Exception 4 all the ingredients mentioned in it must be found. It is to be noted that the "fight" occurring in Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC is not defined in the Penal Code, 1860. It takes two to make a fight. Heat of passion requires that there must be no time for the passions to cool down and in this case, the parties had worked themselves into a fury on account of the verbal altercation in the beginning. A fight is a combat between two and more persons whether with or without weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any general rule as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden or not must necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each case. For the application of Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that there was a sudden quarrel and there was no premeditation. It must further be shown that the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in cruel or unusual manner. The expression "undue advantage" as used in the provision means "unfair advantage".'"
19. In Arjun (supra), the Supreme Court has held that when and if there is
intent and knowledge, the same would be a case of Section 304 Part-I
of the IPC and if it is only a case of knowledge and not the intention to
cause murder and bodily injury, then same would be a case of Section
304 Part-II of the IPC.
20. Reverting to the facts of the present case in the light of the principles
3 (2008) 15 SCC 590 Cr.A.No.1386/2016
of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Arjun
(supra), it is quite vivid that except for the missing coin of deceased
Jagdish, there was no dispute existing between the appellant and the
deceased and on a sudden fight, without any premeditation and in a
heat of passion, the offence is said to have been committed by the
appellant. Furthermore, Dr. Sanjay Singh (PW-3) has clearly stated in
paragraphs 8 & 14 of his evidence that there was clotting of blood on
the head of the deceased and same could have been removed in
presence of surgical expert or neurosurgeon through treatment, but in
the Ambikapur hospital there was no surgical specialist / expert or
neurosurgeon, therefore, clot could not be removed and the patient
went into coma and thereafter died. Thus, the possibility of surviving
of the appellant was also there as per the statement of Dr. Sanjay
Singh (PW-3). As such, there was no intention on the part of the
appellant to cause the death of Jagdish, but from the injuries that have
been caused by the appellant on the head of the deceased by which
there was clotting of blood inside the brain and fracture of occipital
and temporal bones on the head of the deceased, the appellant must
have had the knowledge that his act is likely to cause death of the
deceased, as he had assaulted the deceased on his head. Therefore,
we are of the considered opinion that conviction of the appellant
herein under Section 302 of the IPC can be converted to Section 304
Part-II of the IPC.
21. Accordingly, conviction of the appellant for offence under Section 302
of the IPC is modified to Section 304 Part-II of the IPC. The appellant
is in jail since 28-8-2011, thereby he has completed more than ten
years of imprisonment. Jail sentence imposed upon the appellant is Cr.A.No.1386/2016
modified to that of the period already undergone by him. The
appellant be released forthwith, unless required in any other case.
22. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated herein-above.
Sd/- Sd/-
(Sanjay K. Agrawal) (Sachin Singh Rajput)
Judge Judge
Soma
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