Citation : 2022 Latest Caselaw 385 Chatt
Judgement Date : 24 January, 2022
1
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
WRIT PETITION NO. 6095 OF 2005
Shiv Narayan Jaiswal, aged about 54 years, S/o Late Shri
Sadasukh Jaiswal, Assistant District Excise Officer, Durg (CG)
... Petitioner
versus
1. State of Chhattisgarh, through Principal Secretary, Excise
Department, Govt. of Chhattisgarh, Mantralaya, D.K.S. Bhawan, G.E.
Road, Raipur (CG)
2. Excise Commissioner, Chhattisgarh and Secretary, Excise, Govt. of
Chhattisgarh, Raipur (CG)
3. Additional Secretary, Law and Justice, Government of Chhattisgarh,
Mantralaya, D.K.S. Bhawan, G.E. Road, Raipur (CG).
4. Bureau of Economic Offence, State of Chhattisgarh, through
Inspector General of Police, Shankar Nagar Chowk, Telibandha Road,
Raipur (CG)
5. Principal Secretary, Commercial Taxes Department, Government of
Chhattisgarh, Mantralaya, D.K.S. Bhawan, G.E. Road, Raipur (CG)
... Respondents
WRIT PETITION NO. 2517 OF 2006
Shiv Narayan Jaiswal, aged about 54 years, S/o Late Shri Sadasukh Jaiswal, Assistant District Excise Officer, Durg (CG) ... Petitioner versus
1. State of Chhattisgarh, through Principal Secretary, Excise Department, Govt. of Chhattisgarh, Mantralaya, D.K.S. Bhawan, G.E. Road, Raipur (CG)
2. Excise Commissioner, Chhattisgarh and Secretary, Excise, Govt. of Chhattisgarh, Raipur (CG)
3. Additional Secretary, Law and Justice, Government of Chhattisgarh, Mantralaya, D.K.S. Bhawan, Raipur (CG).
4. Bureau of Economic Offences, State of Chhattisgarh, through Inspector General of Police, Shankar Nagar Chowk, Telibandha Road, Raipur (CG)
5. Principal Secretary, Commercial Taxes Department, Government of Chhattisgarh, Mantralaya, D.K.S. Bhawan, G.E. Road, Raipur (CG)
6. Joint Secretary, Commercial (Excise) Department, Govt. of Chhattisgarh, Raipur (C.G.) ... Respondents
For Petitioner : Mr. V.G. Tamaskar, Advocate.
For Respondents : Mr. Jitendra Pali, Dy. A.G.
Hon'ble Shri Justice P. Sam Koshy
C A V Order
[Reserved on : 09.09.2021]
[Pronounced on : .01.2022]
1. These are two Writ Petitions of the same Petitioner aggrieved of the
same cause of action on the part of the Respondents and since the issue
involved is common, this Court proceeds to decide the present two
Petitions by this common Order.
2. Writ Petition No.6095/2005 is a Petition where the Petitioner has
challenged the Order dated 10.11.2005 whereby under the signature of
Respondent No.3, the Additional Secretary, Law and Legislative Affairs
Department, Government of Chhattisgarh, the Respondents have
accorded sanction for prosecution of the Petitioner for the offences
punishable under Section 13(1)(b), 13(1)(d)(iii), 13(1)(e) and 13(2) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (in short, "the P.C. Act").
3. The Writ Petition WPC No. 6095/2005 was filed as early as on
1.12.2005. However, in the meantime, since there was no interim prior to
6.9.2006, the Respondents proceeded with the sanction accorded and
finally a charge-sheet was filed in the Court of Special Judge designated
to hear the matters of Prevention of Corruption Act at Durg. This filing of
the charge-sheet was also challenged by the Petitioner by way of a
separate Writ Petition i.e. W.P. No.2517/2006. The said Writ Petition was
filed on 1.5.2006. Notices were issued to the Respondents.
4. Subsequently, vide Order dated 6.9.2006, an interim order was
passed by this Court in both the Writ Petitions in favour of the Petitioner to
the extent of staying the sanction accorded on 10.11.2005.
5. The case in brief is that the Petitioner was an Officer under the
Excise Department of the State, working on the post of Assistant District
Excise Officer. That, a raid was conducted on 16.5.1997 at the residential
houses owned by Petitioner and his wife. The raid was conducted by the
State Economic Offences Investigating Bureau and also by the Income
Tax Department.
An FIR was lodged against Petitioner on 16.5.1997. According to
the Petitioner, though the Department of Commercial Tax i.e., the
Department under whom the Petitioner was working, had refused to grant
sanction for prosecution and the refusal also had the approval of the State
Finance Minister. However, in spite of this the Respondent No.3 vide
Order dated 10.11.2015 granted sanction under Section 19(1)(b) of the
P.C. Act for his prosecution under Sections 13(1)(b), 13(1)(d)(iii), 13(1)(e)
and 13(2) of the P.C. Act.
6. The primary contention of learned Counsel for Petitioner while
challenging the impugned Order is that the same has been issued by an
incompetent Authority. According to him, the Order ought to have been
issued by the Governor. That, since it has not been issued by the
Governor, the same cannot be said to be legally issued sanction order or
a valid sanction and therefore it is ab-initio void.
7. The challenge also is on the ground of delay in initiating the
proceedings.
8. Learned Counsel for Petitioner has relied upon the following
judgments in support of his contentions:
1. 2004 (Cr.L.J.) 2011.
2. 2006 (13) SCC 305.
3. 2007 Cr.L.J. 52.
4. 2008 Cr.L.J. 808.
5. 2010 Cr.L.J. 1436
9. Per contra, learned Deputy Advocate General, appearing for
Respondents, opposing the Petition submits that in-fact the sanction order
has been issued by the competent Authority. According to learned Deputy
Advocate General, the sanction order has been issued keeping in view the
"Rules of Business" framed for the State of Chhattisgarh. According to
him, Part-V of the aforesaid "Rules of Business" provides for
Supplementary Instructions for the convenient transaction of the business
of the Government. In the said Part-V of the Rules of Business, the
Additional Secretaries are also authorised to issue orders for and on
behalf of the Secretary or where orders have to be issued by the
Secretaries.
10. Having heard the contentions put forth on either side, some of the
additional factual matrix of the case are that the Petitioner was an
Assistant District Excise Officer. In the year 1996-97, a raid was
conducted at his residential premises and other locations and in the
process Crime No.8/1997 for the offences under Sections 13(1)(e) and
13(2) of the P.C. Act was registered against him. It was alleged that he
accumulated wealth disproportionate to his known source of income.
Though the Parent Department has initially refused to grant sanction,
however, the Law Department later on has vide the impugned Order
granted the sanction.
11. The main issue raised and contended by Petitioner is the
competency of the Authority who has granted the sanction. According to
learned Counsel for Petitioner, the Authority granting sanction is not the
Appointing Authority; it is not by the Governor nor by the Secretary of the
Department.
12. The other ground raised by the Petitioner in challenging the
sanction is the belated stage at which the sanction was accorded.
13. Now the first contention this Court ventures to decide is, whether
the Authority who has signed the impugned Order is competent or not.
14. Sanction is required under Section 19 of the P.C. Act. For ready
reference, the relevant portion of Section 19 is reproduced herein under:-
"19(1)(b). In the case of a person [who is employed, or as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed] in connection with the affairs of a State and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the State Government, of that Government;
*** *** *** (19)(3)(b). No court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on the ground of any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction granted by the authority, unless it is satisfied that such error, omission or irregularity has resulted in a failure of justice;"
15. In the instant case, the impugned Order has been issued by the
State Government. The Order has been issued in the name of and by an
order of his Excellency, the Governor of the State, though it may have
been signed by the Additional Secretary. If we look into the document, it
clearly reveals that the same has travelled to the Law Department with the
dissent of the parent Department. The Law Department thereafter again
scrutinised the entire document and gave its recommendation to the
Government and it was only thereafter that the impugned Order was
passed.
16. As regards the procedure for grant of sanction in the State of
Chhattisgarh is concerned, like any other State the State of Chhattisgarh
also has its own "Rules of Business" framed in exercise of the powers
conferred under Article 166 of the Constitution of India. Rule 13 of the said
Rules envisages that these Rules, to such extent as may be necessary,
be supplemented by instructions to be issued from time to time. Part-V of
the said Rules of Business is some of the Supplementary Instruction
issued under Rule 13 of the Rules of Business. That, under Part- V,
Instruction No.2 and its explanation, specifically provides that under this
Instruction, "Secretary" includes other Officers including the Additional
Secretary.
17. The General Administration Department, Government of
Chhattisgarh has vide its Order dated 26.5.2003 issued instructions as to
how and who shall consider granting of sanction for prosecution under the
P.C. Act. For ready reference, the contents of this document dated
26.5.2003 are reproduced herein under :-
NRrhlx<+ 'kklu lkekU; iz'kklu foHkkx ea=ky;] Mh-ds-,l- Hkou dzekad ,Q1&[email protected]@[email protected] jk;iqj] fnukad 26] ebZ] 2003 izfr] lfpo] NRrhlx<+ 'kklu] fof/k ,oa fo/kk;h dk;Z foHkkx] ea=ky;] jk;iqj fo'k;%& 'kkldh; lsodksa ds ekeys esa n.M izfdz;k lafgrk rFkk Hkz'Vkpkj fuokj.k vf/kfu;e ds varxZr vfHk;kstu dh Lohd`fr iznku fd, tkus ckor~A lanHkZ%& bl foHkkx ds vkns'k dzekad ,Q 1&[email protected]@[email protected],d fn0 26&5&2003-
bl foHkkx ds lanfHkZr vkns'k }kjk iwoZorhZ e/;izns'k 'kklu] lkekU; iz'kklu foHkkx ds vkns'k dzekad ,Q-,-3&[email protected]@,Q fnukad (1) 5-8-2000 dks la'kksf/kr djrs gq, bl vk'k; ds vkns'k izlkfjr fd, x, gSa fd fof/k ,oa fo/kk;h dk;Z foHkkx ds Hkkjlk/kd izeq[k [email protected] fuEufyf[kr Js.kh;ksa ds 'kkldh; lsodksa ds ekeyksa dks NksM+dj 'ks'k 'kkldh; lsodksa ds vfHk;ksstu Lohd`fr ds ekeyksa dk fuiVkjk djsaxsaA
(d) Hkkjrh; iz'kklfud lsok] Hkkjrh; iqfyl lsok rFkk Hkkjrh; ou lsok ds lnL;ksa ls lacaf/kr vfHk;kstu Lohd`fr ds ekeys( ([k) jkT; lsok ds ,sls vf/kdkjh tk jkT; 'kklu ds lfpo ds osrueku ;k blls mPprj osrueku esa dk;Zjr gks]a ls lacaf/kr vfHk;kstu Lohd`fr ds ekeys(
(x) vfHk;kstu Lohd`fr ds ,ssls ekeys ftuesa iz'kkldh; foHkkx }kjk vfHk;kstu Lohd`fr fn, tkus ij vlgefr O;Dr dh xbZ gSa ijarq fof/k foHkkx dk er vfHk;kstu Lohd`fr iznku fd, tkus ds i{k esa gSA
[email protected] dk;Z fu;eksa ds Hkkx pkj ds funZs'k (,d) (¥) rFkk (;;) ds ifjizs{; esa eq[;
ea=hth us ;g Hkh funZs'k fn, gSa fd mij fyf[kr rhuksa izdkj ds vfHk;kstu dh eatwjh ls lacaf/kr ekeys leUo; esa izLrqr fd, tk,axs rFkk bu ekeyksa esa vfHk;kstu dh Lohd`fr iznku djus dh izfdz;k fuEukuqlkj jgsaxh%&
(d) vf[ky Hkkjrh; lsokvksa ds lnL;ksa ds fo:) izdj.k % vf[ky Hkkjrh; lsokvksa ds lnL;ksa ds fo:) vfHk;kstu dh Lohd`fr ds izdj.k vuqla/kkudrkZ ,tsalh (investigating agency) }kjk leLr vfHkys[kksa lfgr fof/k foHkkx dks Hksts tk,axsaA fof/k foHkkx] izkIr izLrko ij loZizFke lacaf/kr vf/kdkjh ds iz'kkldh; foHkkx (;FkkfLFkfr lkekU; iz'kklu foHkkx] x`g foHkkx vFkok ou foHkkx ) dk er izkIr djsxkA iz'kkldh; foHkkx vf/kdre ,d ekg esa viuk vfHker fof/k foHkkx dks HkstsxkA rRi'pkr~ fof/k foHkkx] vuqla/kkudrkZ ,tsalh ls izkIr izLrko ,oa iz'kkldh; foHkkx }kjk fn, x, vfHker dk ijh{k.k dj leUo; esa vkns'k izkIr djsxk] vkSj(
(i) tgka dsoy /kkjk&197] n.M izfdz;k lafgrk] ds rgr vfHk;kstu Lohd`fr visf{kr gks] ogka rRlaca/kh vkSipkfjd vkns'k tkjh djsxk] ;k fQj] ;FkkfLFkfr] izLrko vLohd`fr djus dh lwpuk rQrh'kdrkZ ,tsalh dks Hkstsxk(
(ii) tgka /kkjk&197] n.M izfdz;k lafgrk] rFkk /kkjk&19] Hkz'Vkpkj fuokj.k vf/kfu;e] 1988] nksuksa ds rgr vfHk;kstu Lohd`fr visf{kr gks] ogka izFke izLrko ds ckjs esa mij in (i) vuqlkj dk;Zokgh djsxk vkSj f}rh; izLrko ds ckjs esa jkT; 'kklu dk er fu/kkZfjr dj izdj.k dsUnz ljdkj dk lanfHkZr djus gsrq lacaf/kr iz'kkldh; foHkkx dks Hkstsxk(
([k) jkT; lsokvksa ds ,sls vf/kdkfj;ksa] tks jkT; 'kklu ds lfpo ds osrueku ;k blls mPp osrueku esa dk;Zjr gksa] ds fo:) izdj.k % bl Js.kh ds vf/kdkfj;ksa ds fo:) vfHk;kstu dh Lohd`fr dh izfdz;k mi;qZDr in 2(d) vuqlkj jgsxh& dsoy bl varj ds lkFk fd Hkz'Vkpkj fuokj.k vf/kfu;e] 1988 dh /kkjk&19 ds varxZr vfHk;kstu Lohd`fr ds izdj.k Hkh jkT; 'kklu }kjk gh fujkd`r fd, tk;saxsaA
(x) vfHk;kstu Lohd`fr ds ,sls ekeys ftuesa iz'kkldh; foHkkx }kjk vfHk;kstu Lohd``fr fn, tkus ij vlgefr O;Dr dh xbZ gS ijarq fof/k foHkkx dk er vfHk;kstu Lohd`fr iznku fd, tkus ds i{k esa gS %
bl Js.kh ds 'kkldh; lsodksa ds ekeyksa esa vfHk;kstu dh Lohd`fr dh izfdz;k mi;ZqDr in 2([k) vuqlkj gh jgsxhA [email protected] ;fn yksd vk;ksx laxBu dk vfHk;kstu Lohd`fr dk izLrko vLohd`r djuk izLrkfor gks rks ,slk djus ds fy, ea=h ifj'kn dk jktuSfrd ekeyksa dh lfefr dk vuqeksnu izkIr fd;k tk,xkA [email protected] ;g vkns'k tkjh gksus ds fnukad ls bl laaca/k esa iwoZ esa tkjh vfHk;kstu Lohd`fr laca/kh vkns'[email protected]'k rn~uqlkj la'kksf/kr ekus tk,axsA
[email protected]& [email protected]@03 (iadt f}osnh)] izeq[k lfpo]
NRrhlx<+ 'kklu lkekU; iz'kklu foHkkx
18. Now, if we look into the documents enclosed along with the
pleadings, particularly the Order of the Law Department, it would clearly
reveal that in-fact all the procedures as laid down under the "Rules of
Business" have been followed before taking the decision to grant sanction
for prosecution.
19. The Rules of Business are framed by the State Government
exercising the powers conferred by Clauses 2 & 3 of Article 166 of the
Constitution of India. Rule 13 of the said "Rules of Business" of the State
of Chhattisgarh envisages the Rules by which the existing Rules can be
supplemented as may be necessary by way of instructions issued from
time to time.
20. According to the Rules of Business governing the field, in the event
of there is a difference of opinion between the Parent Department and
Law Department, the matter is placed for consideration before the State
Government as would be evident from the instructions that were issued by
the State Government so far as granting of sanction is concerned vide the
aforesaid Circular dated 26.5.2003. Clause 2([k) of the said Circular reads
as follows:-
"([k) jkT; lsokvksa ds ,sls vf/kdkfj;ksa] tks jkT; 'kklu ds lfpo ds osrueku ;k blls mPp osrueku esa dk;Zjr gksa] ds fo:) izdj.k % bl Js.kh ds vf/kdkfj;ksa ds fo:) vfHk;kstu dh Lohd`fr dh izfdz;k mi;qZDr in 2(d) vuqlkj jgsxh& dsoy bl varj ds lkFk fd Hkz'Vkpkj fuokj.k vf/kfu;e] 1988 dh /kkjk&19 ds varxZr vfHk;kstu Lohd`fr ds izdj.k Hkh jkT; 'kklu }kjk gh fujkd`r fd, tk;saxsaA "
21. If we look into the Note-sheets, it would clearly reflect that the State
Government has in the instant case followed the Rules which are
otherwise issued by the State Government from time to time. From the
pleadings and the contentions which have been brought on record, what is
evident is that it is not a case where there is no sanction, but it is a case
where there is a sanction available for prosecution. The only issue is,
whether the sanction accorded is valid or not.
22. On the issue as to whether the sanction granted is valid or not and
whether it would be appropriate for the High Court in a Writ Petition to
consider this aspect, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Dinesh
Kumar Vs. Chairman, Airport Authority of India and others [2012 (1)
SCC 532] in Paragraphs 10 & 13 has held as under:-
"10. In our view, invalidity of sanction where sanction order exists, can be raised on diverse grounds like non-availability of material before the sanctioning authority or bias of the sanctioning authority or the order of sanction having been passed by an authority not authorised or competent to grant such sanction. The above grounds are only illustrative and not exhaustive. All such grounds of invalidity or illegality of sanction would fall in the same category like the ground of invalidity of sanction on account of non-application of mind - a category carved out by this Court in Parkash Singh Badal (supra), the challenge to which can always be raised in the course of trial.
*** *** ***
13. In our view, having regard to the facts of the present case, now since cognizance has already been taken against the appellant by the Trial Judge, the High Court cannot be said to have erred in leaving the question of validity of sanction open for consideration by the Trial Court and giving liberty to the appellant to raise the issue concerning validity of sanction order in the course of trial. Such course is in accord with the decision of this Court in Parkash Singh Badal (supra) and not unjustified."
23. Similarly, in the recent past also the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
case of Central Bureau of Investigation and others Vs. Pramila
Virendra Kumar Agarwal and others [2019 (14) Scale 246] again had
the occasion of considering the issue so far as the validity of a sanction for
prosecution is concerned. In Paragraph 13 of the said judgment, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows:-
"13. Further the issue relating to validity of the sanction for prosecution could have been considered only during trial since essentially the conclusion reached by the High Court is with regard to the defective sanction since according to the High Court, the procedure of providing opportunity for explanation was not followed
which will result in the sanction being defective. In that regard, the decision in the case of Dinesh Kumar v. Chairman, Airport Authority of India, MANU/SC/1407/2011 : (2012) 1 SCC 532 relied upon by the learned Additional Solicitor General would be relevant since it is held therein that there is a distinction between the absence of sanction and the alleged invalidity on account of non-application of mind. The absence of sanction no doubt can be agitated at the threshold but the invalidity of the sanction is to be raised during the trial. In the instant facts, admittedly there is a sanction though the Accused seek to pick holes in the manner the sanction has been granted and to claim that the same is defective which is a matter to be considered in the trial."
24. From the aforesaid two judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court,
what is evident is that the business of sanction is one which can be
considered for the purpose of vitiating the prosecution case. However, the
validity or perversity of an order of sanction for prosecution is an issue
which can only be questioned before the Trial Court during the course of
trial.
25. Recently, the Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench, also had the
occasion of dealing with one such issue in the case of Ram Naresh
Singh Tomar Vs. State of U.P., through S.P., & Others, decided on
17.8.2021 in Case No.2633/2021. Relevant portion of the said judgment is
reproduced herein below:-
"The validity of the sanction would, therefore, depend upon the material placed before the sanctioning authority and the fact that all the relevant facts, material and evidence have been considered by the sanctioning authority. Consideration implies application of mind. The order of sanction must ex facie disclose that the sanctioning authority had considered the evidence and other material placed before it. This fact can also be established by extrinsic evidence by placing the relevant files before the Court to show that all relevant facts were considered by the sanctioning authority."
26. In the event of the challenge being made to the validity of the
sanction, it becomes incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that a valid
sanction for prosecution was granted by the Sanctioning Authority and the
sanction for prosecution was granted after being satisfied that a strong
case for prosecution has been made out.
27. Given the aforesaid legal position as it stands, since in the instant
case there is a sanction for prosecution granted by the Sanctioning
Authority and the only issue raised is the aspect of validity of the sanction,
in the light of the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Dinesh Kumar (supra) as also in the case of Pramila Virendra Kumar
Agarwal (supra), these are the grounds which have to be raised by the
defence during the course of trial or before the Trial Court. While
challenging the aspect of validity before the Trial Court, the Petitioner can
also question the aspect of the competency of the Authority who has
granted the sanction for prosecution.
28. For the aforesaid reasons, this Court is of the opinion that no strong
case for quashing of the sanction for prosecution has been made out,
neither has the Petitioner made out any case for quashment of the entire
criminal proceeding against the Petitioner under the provisions of the P.C.
Act.
29. Both the Writ Petitions, therefore, deserve to be and are accordingly
dismissed. The interim relief granted in both the Writ Petitions vide Order
dated 6.9.2006 also stand vacated. Petitioner would be at liberty to raise
the ground of validity of the sanction for prosecution before the Trial Court
during the course of trial.
30. Both the Writ Petitions accordingly stands dismissed.
Sd/-
(P. Sam Koshy) /sharad/ Judge
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