Chattisgarh High Court

Tilak Ram Verma And Ors vs State Of C.G on 24 September, 2021

                                     1

                                                                  NAFR

         HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR

                  Judgment reserved on : 25.08.2021
                  Judgment delivered on: 24.09.2021
                         CRA No. 604 of 2001


     1. Tilak Ram Verma, S/o. Tulai Ram Verma, Aged 22 years.
     2. Smt. Bhoj Bai W/o Tulai Ram Verma, Aged 50 years.
         Both Resident of Village Mohra, P.S. Suhela, District Raipur.


                                                        ---- Appellants
                                 Versus
        State of Chhattisgarh, through the Station House Officer,
         Police Station Suhela, District Raipur (Chhattisgarh)
                                                       ---- Respondent

For Appellants : Mr. Jameel Akhtar Lohani, Adv.

For State
[[
                                 :       Ms. Shubha Shrivastava, PL

                  Hon'ble Smt. Justice Rajani Dubey
                               CAV Order

24/09/2021

1. This appeal arises out of the impugned judgment of

conviction and order of sentence dated 05.07.2001 passed by

learned Second Additional Sessions Judge Baloda Bazar, District

Raipur in sessions Trial No. 314/2000 whereby and whereunder,

learned Second Additional Sessions Judge convicted the appellants

under Section 304-B of the IPC and sentenced them to undergo

R.I. for 10 years and pay fine of Rs. 1,000/-, plus default

stipulation.

2. Brief facts of the case are that on 06.05.2000 deceased

Geeta Bai @ Pramila Bail got married to one Tilak Ram Verma

(Appellant No.1). Appellant No. 2 is mother-in-law of the deceased.

The allegation against both the appellants is that they tortured the

deceased both physically and mentally due to which on

04.07.2000 she committed suicide by consuming poison.

Thereafter, Merg Intimation (Ex. P-11) was registered on the basis

of intimation of hospital. Intimation given to the punches through

Ex P-9 and inquest on the body of deceased was prepared vide

(Ex. P-10) and deady body was sent for postmortem to P.H.C.

Kharara where Dr. M. Samuel (PW-4) conducted autopsy vide (EXP-

3) The autopsy surgeon opined that the cause of death was

asphyxia due to suspected pressing. Dowry articles seized from

Tulai Ram and seizure memo (Ex. P-2) was prepared. FIR was

registered against the appellants under Sections 304(B), 34 of the

IPC. After completion of investigation charge-sheet was filed and

charge was framed under Section 304-B of the IPC against the

appellants.

3. So as to hold the accused/appellants guilty, the prosecution

has examined as many as 14 witnesses. Statements of the

accused/appellants were also recorded under Section 313 of the

Cr.P.C. in which they denied the charges leveled against them and

pleaded innocence and false implication in the case and also

examined 3 witnesses in their defence.

4. After examination of oral and documentary evidence,

learned trial Court convicted the appellants under Section 304-B

and sentenced them as mentioned above in para 1 of this order.

Hence, the present appeal filed by the appellants.

5. Assailing legality and validity of the impugned judgment of

conviction and order of sentence, learned counsel for the

appellants would argue that the impugned judgment is contrary to

law facts and circumstances of the case. The learned Court below

has erred in believing the statements of Sumitra Bai (PW-1),

Nirmala Bai (PW-11) and Ramadhar (PW-12). He further submitted

that there is inordinate delay in lodging the FIR which creates

serious doubt in the prosecution case. At the time of funeral of the

deceased all her relatives from parent side were present but they

did not say anything but, after some time, they concocted a false

story and implicated the appellants. As there are number of

omissions and contradictions in prosecution witnesses, the

impugned judgment is liable to be set-aside. In support of his

argument, learned counsel placed reliance on the decision of

Hon'ble Apex court in the matter of Major Singh & Another vs.

State of Punjab reported in (2015) 5 SCC 201, and decision of

this High Court in the matter of Ajay Koushik And Another vs.

State of Chhattisgarh reported in 2012 CJ (Chh) 92 &

Taramuni Prajapati Vs. State of Chhattisgarh reported in

2016 CJ (Chh) 669.

6. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing on behalf of

State has supported the impugned judgment of the Court below

convicting the appellants under Section 304-B of the IPC, being

based on the material available on record, are just and proper and

do not call for any interference in this appeal.

7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the

records including the impugned judgment.

8. Before the learned trial Court Sumita Bai (PW-1), co-villager

of the deceased, was examined and in her examination-in-chief

she states in paras 6 & 7 that deceased Pramila Bai/deceased had

told her that her mother-in-law and husband used to torture her.

They used to take her to the farm and make her do a lot of work.

Tilak Ram, husband of the deceased, also complained about the

golden ring gifted by father of deceased stating that the ring is too

tight and returned it to her to change the same. But in her cross-

examination, Sumita Bai stated in para 21 that she does not know

about the articles that Pramila's in-laws had demanded in dowry.

9. Kagin Bai (PW-3), mother of the deceased, was also

examined before the trial Court and in her statement she stated

that when her daughter came from in-laws' home, she was very

sad. Deceased told her mother that her in-laws were complaining

about the bed, ring & clothes, gifted by bride family stating that

the ring is too tight, bed is short and the quality of clothes is too

substandard. But in her cross-examination Kagin Bai again

submitted that there was no condition of dowry in the marriage.

Whatever they had given, it was at their own will. After marriage,

there was no demand of dowry on behalf of the in-laws.

10. Nirmala Bai (PW-11), sister of the deceased, deposed the

same as has been complained by Pramila Bai (deceased) but in

her cross examination she has not stated anything adverse

against the appellants about the demand of dowry soon before the

death.

11. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Major Singh

(Supra) in para 10, held as under:-

"10. To sustain the conviction under Section 304-B IPC, the

following essential ingredients are to be established: (i) the

death of a woman should be caused by burns or bodily injury or

otherwise than under a 'normal circumstance': (ii) such a death

should have occurred with seven years of her marriage; (iii) she

must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her

husband or any relative of her husband: (iv) such cruelty or

harassment should be for or in connection with demand of

dowry: and (v) such cruelty or harassment is shown to have

been meted out to the woman soon before her death.

11. If any death is caused in connection with dowry demand,

Section 113-B of the Evidence Act also comes into play. Both

these sections, Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-B of the

Evidence Act were inserted by Dowry Prohibition (Amendment)

Act 43 of 1986 with a view to combat the increasing menace of

dowry deaths. Section 113-B reads as follows:

"113.B. Presumption as to dowry death.- When the

question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of

a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such

woman has been subjected by such person to cruelty or

harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry,

the Court shall presume that such person had caused the

dowry death."

The language of Section 113 A of Evidence Act makes it clear that

if a woman has committed suicide within a period of 7 years from the

death of her marriage and that her husband subjected her to cruelty, the

Court may presume having regard to all other circumstances of the case

that such suicide has been abated by her husband.

12. In this case, father of the deceased Ramadhar (PW-12) has

admitted in his cross-examination that his son-in-law Tilak Ram

has not demanded dowry from him. He stated in para 9 of his

statement that:-

Þ'kknh ds ckn fonkbZ djds nwljs fnu yMdh dks vius ?kj ys vk;s FksA esjs

nkekn fryd us esjs lkeus esjs ls dksbZ ngst dh ekax ugha dhA igyh ckj

'kknh ds nwljs fnu fyok dj yk;s Fks rc yMdh us dksbZ f'kdk;r ugha dh

Fkh] ysfdu tc nqckjk ,d eghua ckn nkekn ds lkFkk vkbZ Fkh rc mlus

nkekn dh f'kdk;r dh FkhA nqckjk vkt csVh nkekn vk;s Fks] ml fnu

izfeyk usa dkbZ f'kdk;r ugha dh FkhA nkekn jkr esa #dk vkSj nwljs fnu

pyk x;kAß

He again stated in Para 12 of his cross examination that:-

Þiapukek esa iqfurjke] esjs vkSj ekfydjke ds gLrk{kj fy;s x;s Fks vkSj ogka

ij dkSu dkSu lkgc Fks] eq>s tkudkjh ugha gSA ml le; iqfyl okyksa us

esjs ls iwNrkN dh] rc eSaus mUgsa dksbZ f'kdk;r ugha dh FkhAß

13. Close scrutiny of evidence makes it clear that there is no

conclusive piece of evidence with regard to demand of dowry

soon before the death. In the light of evidence of the witnesses, it

is clear that deceased died on 04.07.2000 and at the time of

funerals, her father was present on the spot but he did not make

any allegation against anyone.

14. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Major(Supra) in para

16 held as under:-

"16.To attract conviction under Section 304-B IPC, the prosecution should adduce evidence to show that "soon before her death", the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment. There must always be proximate and live link between the effects of cruelty based on dowry demand and the concerned death. In Hira Lal v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) reported in (2003) 8 SCC 80, in paragraph (9) it was observed as under:-

"9. A conjoint reading of Section 113-B of the Evidence Act and Section 304-B IPC shows that there must be material to show that soon before her death the victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment. The prosecution has to rule out the possibility of a natural or accidental death so as to bring it within the purview of "death occurring otherwise than in

normal circumstances". The expression "soon before" is very relevant where Section 113-B of the Evidence Act and Section 304-B IPC are pressed into service. The prosecution is obliged to show that soon before the occurrence there was cruelty or harassment and only in that case presumption operates. Evidence in that regard has to be led by the prosecution. "Soon before" is a relative term and it would depend upon the circumstances of each case and no straitjacket formula can be laid down as to what would constitute a period of soon before the occurrence. It would be hazardous to indicate any fixed period, and that brings in the importance of a proximity test both for the proof of an offence of dowry death as well as for raising a presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. The expression "soon before her death" used in the substantive Section 304- B IPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act is present with the idea of proximity test. No definite period has been indicated and the expression "soon before" is not defined. A reference to the expression "soon before" used in Section 114 Illustration (a) of the Evidence Act is relevant. It lays down that a court may presume that a man who is in the possession of goods "soon after the theft, is either the thief or has received the goods knowing them to be stolen, unless he can account for their possession". The determination of the period which can come within the term "soon before" is left to be determined by the courts, depending upon facts and circumstances of each case. Suffice, however, to indicate that the expression "soon before" would normally imply that the interval should not be much between the cruelty or harassment concerned and the death in question. There must be existence of a proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the death concerned. If the alleged incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become stale enough not to disturb the mental equilibrium of the woman concerned, it would be of no consequence."

15. In the case in hand, in spite of these principles, this Court

finds no evidence with regard to demand of dowry or cruelty by

the appellants and that deceased Pramila Bai was subjected to

cruelty for demand of dowry soon before her death. Even father

(PW-2) of the deceased, admitted that appellants never demanded

any dowry from him. In absence of any evidence showing that the

deceased was treated with cruelty or harassment in connection

with demand of dowry soon before her death by the appellants,

the conviction of the appellants under Section 304-B IPC cannot be

sustained. The trial Court while convicting the appellants has not

appreciated the oral and documentary evidence in its true

perspective and has erred in law.