Chamru Sai Yadav vs State Of Chhattisgarh
2021 Latest Caselaw 467 Chatt

                                         1

                                                                           AFR
             HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR

                       Writ Petition (S) No. 2726 of 2021

   1. Chamru Sai Yadav S/o Prem Sai Yadav Aged About 60 Years R/o Village And
      Post Machadoli, Lalpur, P.O. Bango, Tahsil Katghora, District Korba
      Chhattisgarh.                                       ---- Petitioner

                                       Versus

   1. State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Department Of Water
      Resources, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Nava Raipur, District Raipur
      Chhattisgarh.

   2. Chief Engineer Minimata (Hasdeo Project) Water Resources Department
      Bilaspur Chhattisgarh.

   3. Executive Engineer Minimata Bango Project Mandal Division No. 5, Kharsiya
      District Raigarh Chhattisgarh.

   4. Executive Engineer Kelo Project Sarvekshan Division, Raigarh, District
      Raigarh Chhattisgarh.

   5. Sub Divisional Officer Kelo Project Sarvekshan Division, Sub Division No. 1
      Lakha, District Raigarh Chhattisgarh.

   6. Collector Raigarh District Raigarh Chhattisgarh.      ----Respondents

For Petitioner : Shri K. P.S. Gandhi, Advocates.

For State                        :       Ms. Akanksha Jain, Dy.G.A.


                     Hon'ble Shri Justice P. Sam Koshy
                                Order On Board
22.06.2021

1. Aggrieved by the order passed by the respondents (Annexure P/1)

dated 20.04.2010, the present writ petition has been filed.

2. Vide the impugned order, the respondents had terminated the services

of the petitioner after giving him one month (30 days) notice.

3. The facts of the case are that the petitioner herein was appointed under

the respondents as a daily wage employee in the year 1984, thereafter

the petitioner stood regularized in service on 08.09.2008 (Annexure

P/2). When the regularization was done, it was specifically held that

services of the petitioner can be terminated after giving one month

notice or one month salary in lieu of notice. It was also the condition of

regularization that the credential of the petitioner and other workers

would be subject to the verification and the regularization would be

subject to the said verification including that of the character certificate

to be provided by the Police Authorities. Subsequently, the Department

received an intimation that the petitioner was involved in a criminal

case for the offence punishable under Section 148, 324, 323 R/w

section 149 and 249 of the IPC. It was also revealed that the petitioner

had been under judicial custody for a period from 19.05.2009 to

07.07.2009. When the said character report of the petitioner was

received from the Police Department by the employer, the impugned

order (Annexure P/1) has been passed and Annexure P/1 shows that

the order of termination has been passed after giving one month notice.

4. The said impugned order dated 20.04.2010 was never questioned or

challenged by the petitioner before any authority of law. Down the line

after eight years pending the trial before the Trial Court, the petitioner

compromised the matter with the complainant and got the case

compounded and the case got disposed of vide order dated 14.07.2018

before the Lok Adalat. Now the petitioner approaches the department

for treating the order of the Criminal Court dated 14.07.2018 as an

order of acquittal and thereby the petitioner be taken back in

employment.

5. This Court is of the opinion that firstly, the writ petition is highly belated

in as much as the challenge to the termination is after more than a

decade. Secondly, the order of termination is only on the basis of a

Police verification report received by the Department wherein it was

found that the petitioner was having a criminal background, he has also

remained under custody for about two months and the criminal case

was pending on the date when he was regularized. Thirdly, what can

also not be overlooked is the fact that the order passed in favour of the

petitioner on 14.08.2018 is not after completion of the entire trial, it's an

order where in the midst of a trial, the petitioner entered into a

compromise with the complainant and thereafter with the leave of the

Court, offences have been compounded. Though it may have an effect

of acquittal in-terms of the provision of CrPC but what has to be also

seem is whether on the date when the impugned order (Annexure P/1)

was passed, the authorities were justified in passing such an order or

not. Admittedly on the date when (Annexure P/1) was passed i.e. on

20.04.2010, the petitioner had a criminal antecedent and he was

involved in a criminal case for the aforesaid offences, he had been in

judicial custody for a period of around two months followed by a Police

verification report received by the department in respect of the criminal

antecedent and the petitioner having a criminal background.

6. Under the circumstances, the action on the part of the respondents

when the impugned order was passed in the year 2010 can not be said

to be in any manner arbitrary or malafide. Only because in the year

2018 the matter i.e. the criminal case got compounded by itself would

not give rise to an occasion for challenging a termination order which

was otherwise passed only on the ground of criminal antecedent. The

said order can not be said to be an order of termination of service on

account of his getting involved in a criminal case or having remained in

judicial custody for a period of around two months. It is a case where

the order of regularization in service, which was otherwise subject to

verification, on verification of finding the criminal antecedent, the

services have been discontinued and the same is also purely in

accordance with the conditions stipulated in the order of regularization

itself.

7. The view of this Court gets fortified from a recent decision of the

Hon'ble Supreme Court in CIVIL APPEAL NO.3894 OF 2020 in the

case of State of Rajasthan vs Love Kush Meena decided on 24-03-

21wherein in paragraph 23 to 27 it has been held as under :-

"23.Examining the controversy in the present case in

theconspectus of the aforesaid legal position, what is

important to note is the fact that the view of this Court

has depended on the nature of offence charged and the

result of the same. The mere fact of an acquittal would

not suffice but rather it would depend on whether it is a

clean acquittal based on total absence of evidence or in

the criminal jurisprudence requiring the case to be

proved beyond reasonable doubt, that parameter having

not been met, benefit of doubt has been granted to the

accused. No doubt, in that facts of the present case, the

person who ran the tractor over the deceased lady was

one of the other co-accused but the role assigned to the

others including the respondent herein was not of a

mere bystander or being present at site. The attack with

knives was alleged against all the other co-accused

including the respondent.

24. We may also notice this is a clear case where the

endeavour was to settle the dispute, albeit not with the

job in mind. This is obvious from the recital in the

judgment of the Trial Court that the compoundable

offences were first compounded during trial but since the

offence under Section 302/34 IPC could not be

compounded, the Trial Court continued and qua those

offences the witnesses turned hostile. We are of the

view that this can hardly fall under the category of a

clean acquittal and the Judge was thus right in using the

terminology of benefit of doubt in respect of such

acquittal.

25. The judgment in Avtar Singh's case (supra) on the

relevant parameter extracted aforesaid clearly stipulates

that where in respect of a heinous or serious nature of

crime the acquittal is based on a benefit of reasonable

doubt, that cannot make the candidate eligible.

26. We may also note the submission of learned counsel

for the respondent that as per para 38.3 in Avtar Singh's

case (supra), the employer has to take into

consideration the Government orders/instructions/rules

applicable to the employee at the time of taking a

decision. It is her say that the issue whether the circular

dated 28.03.2017 would apply or not was res integra in

view of the earlier order of the learned Judge dated

14.05.2018. She has further contended that, in any

case, the circular had come into force and as per the

judgment in Avtar Singh's case (supra) para 38.4, it is

the date of decision which is material and as on the date

of decision dated 23.05.2017, the said circular was

applicable.

27. We may note here that the circular dated 28.03.2017

is undoubtedly very wide in its application. It seeks to

give the benefit to candidates including those acquitted

by the Court by giving benefit of doubt. However, such

circular has to be read in the context of the judicial

pronouncements and when this Court has repeatedly

opined that giving benefit of doubt would not entitle

candidate for appointment, despite the circular, the

impugned decision of the competent authority dated

23.05.2017 cannot be said to suffer from infirmity as

being in violation of the circular when it is in conformity

with the law laiddown by this Court.

8. For all the aforesaid reasons, this Court does not find any strong case

made out by the petitioner calling for an interference with the impugned

order Annexure P/1. The writ petition therefore sans merits and is

accordingly rejected.

Sd/--

1. P. Sam Koshy Judge Jyotijha