Citation : 2021 Latest Caselaw 1031 Chatt
Judgement Date : 12 July, 2021
1
AFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR
Writ Petition (S) No. 3267 of 2010
M. Ram Prasad Rao, S/o Late Shri M. Surya
Narayan, Aged about 51 years, R/o 27 Kholi,
Vikash Nagar, Bilaspur, Presently posted Asstt.
Grade II, Cattle Breeding Farm Pakariya,
Veterinary Department, Pendra Road, Distt.
Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh.
Petitioner
Versus
1. State of Chhattisgarh, through the Secretary,
Department of Agriculture & Animal Husbandry
Department, Mantralaya, D.K.S. Bhawan, Raipur,
Chhattisgarh.
2. Director, Directorate of veterinary Services,
Raipur, Distt. Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
3. Joint Director, Veterinary Services, Composite
Building, Opposite Collectorate, Bilaspur,
Chhattisgarh.
Respondents
Writ Petition (S) No. 3286 of 2010 M.S. Sahgal, S/o Late B.S. Sahgal, Aged about 48 years, Working as Asstt. Grade III at office of Joint Director, Veterinary Services, Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh.
Petitioner
Versus
1. State of Chhattisgarh, through the Secretary, Veterinary Department, D.K.S. Bhawan, Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
2. Director, O/o Directorate veterinary Services, Raipur, Distt. Raipur, Chhattisgarh.
3. Joint Director, O/o Veterinary Services, Bilaspur, Distt. Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh.
Respondents
For Petitioner in WPS/3267/2010 : Mr. P. Acharya, Advocate For Petitioner in WPS/3268/2010 : Mr. Vinod Deshmukh, Advocate For Respondents/State : Mr. Animesh Tiwari, Dy. A.G.
Hon'ble Shri Justice Sanjay K. Agrawal Order on Board (Through Video Conferencing) 12/07/2021
1. Since common question of fact and law is
involved in both these writ petitions, they are
heard together and are being decided by this
common order.
2. In a regular departmental enquiry held against
the two petitioners herein and two other
employees, the Disciplinary Authority
(respondent No. 2 herein) vide order dated
15/01/2009 (Annexure P6) inflicted minor
penalty under Rule 10(iv) of the Chhattisgarh
Civil Services (Classification, Control and
Appeal) Rules, 1966 (in short 'Rules of 1966')
withholding three annual increments with
noncumulative effect. The petitioners did not
call in question the order dated 15/01/2009
(Annexure P6) and it had thus attained
finality, but thereafter, vide order dated
02/06/2010 (Annexure P1), the Disciplinary
Authority cancelled its earlier order (Annexure
P6) of withholding three annual increments of
the petitioners with noncumulative effect and
substituted it with the order of recovery of
₹ 7,50,000/ from each of the petitioners, which
has now been called in question by the
petitioners by way of both these writ petitions.
3. Mr. P. Acharya, learned counsel for petitioner
in WPS No. 3267/2010, as well as Mr. Vinod
Deshmukh, learned counsel for petitioner in WPS
No. 3268/2010, both would make a solitary
submission that the Disciplinary Authority
(respondent No. 2) has not been conferred with
the power of review under the Rules of 1966 as
it has only been conferred upon the Appellate
Authority under Rule 29(1) of the Rules of 1966,
therefore, the Disciplinary Authority
(respondent No. 2) could not have cancelled its
earlier order dated 15/01/2009 (Annexure P6)
inflicting minor penalty upon the petitioners
withholding three annual increments with
noncumulative effect and then it could not have
substituted it with the impugned order dated
02/06/2010 (Annexure P1) passed for recovery to
the tune of ₹ 7,50,000/ from each of the
petitioners under Rule 10(iii) of the Rules of
1966 and that too, without recording any finding
that such an amount is recoverable from the
petitioners because of the loss caused to the
State Government for negligence or breach of
order on the part of the petitioners as required
under Rule 10(iii) of the Rules of 1966, as
such, the impugned order deserves to be quashed.
4. Mr. Animesh Tiwari, learned Deputy Advocate
General appearing for respondents/State, would
support the impugned order and submit that since
huge loss was caused by the act of misconduct on
the part of the petitioners, therefore, pursuant
to the order of the Government, the Disciplinary
Authority directed for recovery of loss to the
tune of ₹ 7,50,000/ from each of the
petitioners, as such, the writ petitions deserve
to be dismissed.
5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties,
considered their rival submissions made herein
above and went through the records with utmost
circumspection.
6. It is not in dispute that in a regular
departmental proceeding held against the
petitioners as well as two other employees, the
Director, Veterinary Services i.e. respondent
No. 2 being the Disciplinary Authority had
inflicted minor penalty within the meaning of
Rule 10(iv) of the Rules of 1966 and directed
for withholding three annual increments of the
petitioners with noncumulative effect vide
order dated 15/01/2009 (Annexure P6) and the
said order was not questioned by the petitioners
and it had already come into force and had
become final. Thereafter, vide the order
impugned dated 02/06/2010 (Annexure P1), the
Disciplinary Authority (respondent No. 2),
pursuant to the order of the Government,
cancelled its earlier order (Annexure P6)
directing withholding of three annual increments
with noncumulative effect and substituted it
with the order of recovery of ₹ 7,50,000/ from
each of the petitioners.
7. The question for consideration is, whether the
Director, Veterinary Services i.e. respondent
No. 2 herein, being the Disciplinary Authority,
was justified in cancelling its earlier order
dated 15/01/2009 (Annexure P6) imposing minor
penalty of withholding three annual increments
of the petitioners with noncumulative effect
under Rule 10(iv) of the Rules of 1966 and
substituting that order with the order dated
02/06/2010 (Annexure P1) passed for recovery of
₹ 7,50,000/ from each of the petitioners under
Rule 10(iii) of the Rules of 1966 ?
8. It is wellsettled law that there is no inherent
power of review vested in a Court or a body
exercising judicial function. The power of
review is a creature of statute and unless the
statute expressly provides for it, there is no
power vested in judicial or quasijudicial
authority to review the decision already taken
by it.
9. It is wellsettled law that administrative
authority does not have inherent power of
review. The Supreme Court in the matter of Patel
Harshi Thakershi v. Shri Pradyumansinghji
Arjunsinghji1 has held as under :
"It is well settled that the power to review is not an inherent power. It must be conferred by law either specifically or by necessary implication. No provision in the Act was brought to our notice from which it could be gathered that the Government had power to review its own order. If the Government had no power to review its own order, it is obvious that its delegate could not have reviewed its order."
10. In the matter of Major Chandra Bhan Singh v.
Latafat Ullah Khan2, the Supreme Court has held
that review is creature of statute and cannot be
entertained in the absence of a provision
therefor relying upon its earlier judgments in
the matter of Harbhajan Singh v. Karam Singh3
and Patel Chunibhai Dajibhai v. Narayanrao
Khanderao Jambekar4. As such, the abovestated
principle will equally apply to the
administrative bodies also who sometimes take
decisions which are semijudicial in character.
Thus, the Disciplinary Authority has no power
and jurisdiction to exercise the power of review
as it has not been conferred by Rules of 1966
which is applicable to the Government servant.
1 AIR 1970 SCC 1273 2 (1979) 1 SCC 321 3 AIR 1966 SC 641 4 AIR 1965 SC 1457
11. Rule 29(1) of the Rules of 1966 provides for
review which states as under :
"29. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules except Rule 11
(i) the Governor; or
(ii) the head of a department directly under the State Government, in the case of a Government servant serving in a department or office (not being the secretariat), under the control of such head of a department, or
(iii) the appellate authority, within six months of the date of the order proposed to be reviewed, or
(iv) any other authority specified in this behalf by the Governor by a general or special order, and within such time as may be prescribed in such general or special order may at any time, either on his or its own motion or otherwise call for the records of any inquiry and review any order made under these rules or under the rules repealed by Rule 34 from which an appeal is allowed but from which no appeal has been preferred or from, which no appeal is allowed, after consultation with the Commission where such consultation is necessary, and may
(a) confirm, modify or set aside the order; or
(b) confirm, reduce, enhance or set aside the penalty imposed by the order, or impose any penalty where no penalty has been imposed; or
(c) remit the case to the authority which made the order or to any other authority directing such authority to make such further inquiry as it may consider proper in the circumstances of the case; or
(d) pass such other orders as it may deem fit:
Provided that no order imposing or enhancing any penalty shall be made by any
reviewing authority unless the Government servant concerned has been given a reasonable opportunity of making a representation against the penalty proposed and where it is proposed to impose; any of the penalties specified in clauses (v) to
(ix) of Rule 10 or to enhance the penalty imposed by the order sought to be reviewed to any of the penalties specified in those clauses, no such penalty shall be imposed except after an inquiry in the manner laid down in Rule 14 and except after consultation with the Commission where such consultation is necessary :
Provided further that no power to review shall be exercised by the head of department unless :
(I) the authority which made the order in appeal; or
(ii) the authority to which an appeal would lie, where no appeal has been preferred, is subordinate to him."
12. A careful perusal of the aforesaid rule would
show that the power of review has been conferred
to the Governor, the head of a Department
directly under the State Government, the
appellate authority or any authority specified
in this behalf by the Governor by a general or
special order.
13. In the instant case, respondent No. 2 i.e. the
Director, Veterinary Services is neither the
head of a department directly under the State
Government in the case of a Government servant
serving in a department or office nor he is the
Appellate Authority being the Disciplinary
Authority and further he has not shown that he
has been conferred with the power of review by
general of special order of the Governor. As
such, respondent No. 2 being the Disciplinary
Authority reviewing its earlier order in
exercise of the power of review is without
jurisdiction and without authority of law in
absence of provision therefor in the Rules of
1966.
14. There is one more reason for not upholding the
impugned order dated 02/06/2010 (Annexure P1).
By the supersession of order dated 15/01/2009
(Annexure P6) inflicting minor penalty upon the
petitioners withholding three annual increments
with noncumulative effect under Rule 10(iv) of
the Rules of 1966, now minor penalty under Rule
10(iii) of the Rules of 1966 has been imposed
and order for recovery of ₹ 7,50,000/ from each
of the petitioners has been passed.
15. Rule 10(iii) of the Rules of 1966 states as
under :
"10. Penalties. The following penalties may, for good and sufficient reasons and as hereinafter provided, by imposed on a Government servant, namely :
Minor penalties : (I) XXXX
(ii) XXXX
(iii) recovery from his pay of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused by him to the Government by negligence or breach of order;"
16. It is clear from perusal of the aforesaid rule
that penalty of recovery of any pecuniary loss
from the pay of the Government servant can be
imposed only when it is found that the loss has
been caused by the Government servant to the
Government by negligence or breach of order. In
the instant case, no such notice has been issued
to the petitioners informing them that they are
liable for the loss caused to the Government
either by their negligence or by breach of order
on their part. Even the impugned order dated
02/06/2010 (Annexure P1) does not clearly show
that the alleged pecuniary loss to the extent of
₹ 7,50,000/ from each of the petitioners has
been caused to the Government because of
negligence or breach of order on the part of the
petitioners which is sine qua non for imposing
penalty under Rule 10(iii) of the Rules of 1966.
The impugned order (Annexure P1) directing
recovery of ₹ 7,50,000/ from each of the
petitioners does not contain any clear finding
that the said loss was caused to the Government
by petitioners' negligence or breach of order.
17. In view of the aforesaid legal analysis, the
impugned order dated 02/06/2010 (Annexure P1)
passed by respondent No. 2 substituting its
earlier order (Annexure P6) deserves to be and
is hereby set aside and the earlier order dated
15/01/2009 (Annexure P6) is restored.
18. With the aforesaid observations, both of these
writ petitions are allowed to the extent
indicated hereinabove. No cost(s).
Sd/ (Sanjay K. Agrawal) Judge
Harneet
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR WPS No. 3267 of 2010
Petitioner M. Ram Prasad Rao
Versus
Respondents State of Chhattisgarh & Ors.
WPS No. 3286 of 2010
Petitioner M.S. Sahgal
Versus
Respondents State of Chhattisgarh & Ors.
(English)
Disciplinary Authority has no power and jurisdiction to review its order imposing minor punishment.
(Hindi)
FR अननशशसननक पशनधकशरर अपनन ऐसन आदनश, नजसकन दशरश लघन शशनसस अनधररनपस ककयश गयश हह, कर पननरररलरकन करनन कक शनक एरव अनधकशररसश नहह हह |
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