Narendra Singh Bhatiya And Anr vs Shri Nilesh Patel And Anr
2021 Latest Caselaw 3531 Chatt

                                          1

                                                                         NAFR
               HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR

                                                 Reserved on : 22-09-2021

                                                Pronounced on : 07-12-2021

                               CRMP No. 624 of 2017

     1. NARENDRA SINGH BHATIYA, Aged about 47 years, S/o Late Shri
        Surjeet Singh,
     2. NIRMAL SINGH BHATIYA, Aged about 43 years, S/o Late Shri Surjeet
        Singh,

        Both-Petitioners :- Resident of Kailash Nagar Ward No. 27, Rajnandgaon,
        Police Station-      Rajnandgaon, Civil & Revenue District- Rajnandgaon
        (C.G.)
                                                                ---- Petitioners
                                       Versus
     1. SHRI NILESH PATEL, Aged about 52 years, S/o Late Shri Harihar Patel,
        Resident of Sagar Complex Durg -491001, Police Station- Durg, Civil and
        Revenue District- Durg, Chhattisgarh.
     2. STATE OF CHHATTISGARH, Through Office-In-Charge Police Station
        Kotwali Rajnandgaon, Civil & Revenue District Rajnandgaon (C.G.)
                                                              ---- Respondents

For Petitioners : Mr. V.G. Tamaskar, Advocate Respondent No.1 : Mr. Pushpendra Singh Baghel, Adv. For respondent No. 2/State. : Mr. Devendra Pratap Singh, Dy.A.G.

Hon'ble Shri Justice Narendra Kumar Vyas CAV Order

1. The petitioners have preferred this petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (henceforth "Cr.P.C.") assailing the order dated 29.04.2017 passed by Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Rajnandgaon (C.G.) in un-registered Complaint Case (Nilesh Patel v. Narendra Singh Bhatiya & another) whereby the application under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. filed by respondent No. 1 has been allowed and directed the respondent No. 2/State to register the FIR under Section 156 (3) of the Cr.P.C. against the petitioners and to investigate the matter in accordance with law.

2. The brief facts as projected by the petitioners are that the petitioners are real brothers. The family members of the petitioners are engaged in the business of coal transport since long. The petitioners have purchased a plot situated behind the plot bearing current Khasra No. 4/5 for the storage of coal. The only way to that plot was though Khasra No. 4/5 which belongs to the father of respondent No.1- late Harihar Bhai Patel. The plot bearing present Khasra No. 4/5 has been continued to be in possession and used by the petitioners. The truck and other articles were kept there and to keep a watch over the same a room was built for accommodating the Chowkidar. The land was surrounded with boundary wall with a gate in front to which Harihar Bhai Patel, who is father of respondent No.1, never objected nor he instituted any proceedings against the petitioners.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that the disputed land bearing Khasra No. 4/5 has been continued to be in possession and used by the petitioners and other articles were kept there and to keep a watch over the same a room was built for accommodating the Chowkidar. Neither Harihar Bhai Patel, who is father of respondent No.1 objected nor instituted any proceedings against the petitioners for possession of the said plot. He would further submit that the factum of possession of the petitioners over the said plot was admitted by the father of respondent No.1 on 12- 10-1984 and he died in September, 2012. The respondent No.1, who claims to have acquired American citizenship, came to India for a few days before death of his father, leaving behind his family in USA tried to usurp the possession of the plot forcibly but having failed to do so he submitted a false complaint on 16-10-2012 that the petitioners have trespassed over the land and, therefore, he wanted to restore his possession by ousting the petitioners. The police made inquiries and having found that the complaint is not true, they did not take any action, thereafter, respondent No.1 filed another complaint on 3-3-2013 before the In-charge of Police Station, Rajnandgaon and again using his political influence he made a false complaint to the Chief Minister of the State and got it

forwarded to the Superintendent of Police, Rajnandgaon to inquire into the matter vide letter dated 4-3-2013. Under the political pressure by respondent No.1, Incharge, Police Station Kotwali, Rajnandgaon, filed Istegasa under Section 145 of Cr.P.C., arraying the respondent No.1 as party No.1 and the petitioner No.1 as party No.2 on 7-1-2014 before the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Rajnandgaon. The preliminary order was passed and thereafter both parties have filed their respective claims and documents in support of their documents. It has been further contented that the Sub Divisional Magistrate found that no order of restoring of possession of lad of respondent No.1 can be passed and proceeding is untenable and, therefore, the proceedings were dropped by the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Rajnandgaon. Thereafter, respondent No.1 has filed a complaint on the basis of which FIR of Crime No. 691 of 2013 was registered on 31-8-2013. Charge sheet against the petitioner No.1 was filed on 28-12-2013 and the case is pending as criminal case No. 186 of 2014. Thereafter, the respondent No.1 filed Writ Petition (Cr) No. 98 of 2013 which is still pending.

4. Respondent No.1has filed a complaint under Sections 193, 197, 207, 218, 420, 464, 471 and 120-B of IPC against the petitioners mainly contending that respondent No. 1/accused with intention to take possession of the land bearing Khasra No. 60C 4/5 area 449 square-meter situated at Mathpara has committed criminal trespass. Complainant has made complaint with regard to criminal trespass committed by respondent No. 1, therefore, respondent No. 1/accused in order to show his possession & title over the said land, has submitted forged & fabricated documents before the Incharge of Police Station, wherein it has been stated that " ;g fd ifjoknh }kjk Lo;a okf.kT; dj vf/kdkjh jktukanxkao o`Rr ls tkudkjh fnukad 28 +04 +2014 dks izkIr fd;k] ftlesa fd Li"V rkSj ij vfHkfyf[kr gS] fd ^^olwyh izdj.k dzek [email protected] vof/k 01&04&1954&31&03&1956 Jh izdk'k panz vkRet jkenkl prqosZnh jktukanxkao ls lacaf/kr dksbZ izdj.k miyC/k ugh gS A vr,o izdj.k miyC/k&ugh gksus ds dkj.k tkudkjh ¼izekf.kr izfrfyfi½ iznk; fd;k tkuk laHko ugh gS** tks vuqlwph ^n* gS*A"

5. The Respondent No. 1 has also submitted an application to the Commercial Tax Department, Rajnandgaon and accordingly Police Station Kotwali has given information to Commercial Tax Officer, Rajnandgaon, Circle, who has given information on 28-4-2014, in which it has been mentioned that there is no record available with regard to Recovery Case No. 243/63 for the period from 01.04.1954 to 31.03.1956 relating to Shri Prakash Chandra S/o Ramdas Chaturvedi, Rajnandgaon, therefore, it is not possible to provide certified copy. It has further been contended by respondent No. 1 in his complaint that when there is no record available with Commercial Tax Department, Rajnandgaon with regard to Recovery Case No. 243/63, then commercial Tax Department cannot provide copy of information dated 14.03.2013. Complainant has submitted report to the Incharge Officer to take cognizance of the complaint, but he has not taken any action, thereafter, he has submitted complaint before the Superintendent of Police, Rajnandgoan, who has also not taken any action, thereafter, the present complaint has been filed.

6. Learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Rajnandgaon vide its order date 29.04.2017 has allowed the application under Section 156 (3) of the Cr.P.C. filed by respondent No. 1 and directed the respondent No. 2 to register the FIR under Section 156 (3) of the Cr.P.C. against the petitioners and to investigate the matter in accordance with law; which is extracted below :

" vkosnd }kjk ;g O;Dr fd;k x;k gS fd okf.kT;dj foHkkx esa ,slk dksbZ nLrkost ;k izdj.k ugha gS fd fdl vk/kkj ij uhykeh }kjk dz; dh xbZ ;k mUgs izekf.kr izfrfyfi ewy izdj.k ;k nLrkost ls iznku fd;k x;kA vkosnd }kjk ;g O;Dr fd;k x;k gS fd nLrkost dwVjfpr o dwVjfpr uhykeh izek.k i= vukosnd }kjk cuk;k x;k gS A vkosnd }kjk ;g Hkh mYys[k fd;k x;k gS fd vkjksihx.k }kjk 'kkldh; vfHkys[kksa dk dwVjfpr djds uhykeh izek.k i= cukdj /kks[kk/kM+h fd;k x;k gS mDr nLrkostksa dh lR;rk ds laca/k esa tkap fd;k tkuk vko';d gS rFkk xgu vUos'k.k dh vko';drk nf'kZr gksrh gS vr % [email protected] dh vksj ls is'k vkosnu i= varxZr /kkjk 156¼3½ na+-iz-la- Lohdkj fd;k tkrk gS A vkj{kh dsUnz flVh dksrokyh jktukanxkao dks funsZf'kr fd;k tkrk gS fd vukosndx.k ds fo#) vijk/k ntZ dj vUos"k.k i'pkr~ fof/k vuqlkj dk;Zokgh djsaA rRlaca/k esa izfrosnu vkj{kh dsUnz flVh dksrokyh dks izsf "kr fd;k tkosA"

7. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the order passed by Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Rajnandgaon

is illegal and bad-in-law. Learned counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of Krishna Lal Chawla and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh & another1, in which it has been held that subsequent complaint against same accused in respect of same incident/transaction is not tenable and it will amount to abuse of process of law, therefore, the subsequent complaint is liable to be dismissed. Learned counsel for the petitioner would further rely on the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Veer Prakash Sharma v. Anil Kumar Agrawal & Anr.2, in support of his submissions. He also placed reliance upon the judgment of Supreme Court in the matter of Samira Khanum v. Md. Afsar Towheed & Anr. 3, in which, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under :-

"6. We find substance in the plea of the learned counsel for the appellant that the High Court has not indicated any basis or reason for exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code. The application was disposed of in a casual manner."

8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the court below.

9. On the above factual matrix of the case, the point required to be determined by this is court whether an application under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C., directing the Police to investigate into the matter is tenable along with the complaint filed under Section 200 of Cr.P.C., before registration of the complaint. To determine the point raised in this petition, it is necessary for this court to extract the relevant provisions of Cr.P.C which read as under:-

"Section 156. Police officer' s power to investigate cognizable case.

(1) Any officer in charge of a police station may, without the order of a Magistrate, investigate any cognizable case which a Court having jurisdiction over the local area within the limits of such station would have power to inquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XIII.

(2) No proceeding of a police officer in any such case shall at any stage be called in question on the ground 1 (2021) 5 SCC 435 2 2007 Cri. L. L. 3735 3 2009 Cri.L.J. 2445

that the case was one which such officer was not empowered under this section to investigate. Any Magistrate empowered under section 190 may order such an investigation as above- mentioned. Section 190. Cognizance of offences by Magistrates. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, any Magistrate of the first class, and any Magistrate of the second class specially empowered in this behalf under sub- section (2), may take cognizance of any offence-

(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence;

(b) upon a police report of such facts;

(c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge, that such offence has been committed.

(2) The Chief Judicial Magistrate may empower any Magistrate of the second class to take cognizance under sub- section (1) of such offences as are within his competence to inquire into or try.

(3) The Chief Judicial Magistrate may empower any Magistrate of the second class to take cognizance under sub- section (1) of such offences as are within his competence to inquire into or try. Section 200 in The Code Of Criminal Procedure, 1973- Examination of complainant. A Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence on complaint shall examine upon oath the complainant and the witnesses present, if any, and the substance of such examination shall be reduced to writing and shall be signed by the complainant and the witnesses, and also by the Magistrate: Provided that, when the complaint is made in writing, the Magistrate need not examine the complainant and the witnesses-

(a) if a public servant acting or- purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties or a Court has made the complaint; or

(b) if the Magistrate makes over the case for inquiry or trial to another Magistrate under section 192: Provided further that if the Magistrate makes over the case to another Magistrate under section 192 after examining the complainant and the witnesses, the latter Magistrate need not re- examine them". (4)Chapter XII of the Code of Criminal Procedure deals with information to the Police and their powers to investigate and Section 156 of Cr.P.C. provides police power to investigate cognizable cases. Chapter XIII deals with jurisdiction of the criminal courts in inquiry and trial. Chapter XIV deals with condition

required for initiation of proceedings. Chapter XV deals with complaint to Magistrate and Section 200 of Cr.P.C., deals with examination of complaint and Section 202 of Cr.P.C., deals with postponement of issue of process, Section 203 of Cr.P.C.. deals with dismissal of the complaint. Chapter XVI deals with commencement of proceedings before Magistrate.

10. From the above provisions of Cr.P.C., it can be seen that on a complaint being filed before the Magistrate applies his mind for proceeding under the various provisions of Chapter XVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, he must be held to have taken cognizance of the offences mentioned in the complaint. Thus, the procedure which has been prescribed in Chapter XII of Cr.P:.C., is at pre-cognizance stage i.e., to say before taking cognizance under Sections 190, 200 and 204 of Cr.P.C., if a Magistrate decides to take cognizance under the provisions of Chapter XIV, he is not entitled to order any investigation under Section 156(3) but in the case in hand the complaint has not been registered and the Judicial Magistrate has not applied his mind before application of mind and before adopting the procedure prescribed under Chapter XVI in a pre-cognizance stage Magistrate can very well issue direction. When, the Magistrate applies his mind not for such purpose but for purposes of ordering investigation under Section 156(3) or issue a search warrant for the purpose of investigation, he cannot be said to have taken cognizance of any offence. Section 156(3) appears in Chapter XII which deals with information to the Police and the powers of the Police to investigate a crime. This Section is placed in a chapter different from Chapter XIV which deals with initiation of proceedings against an accused person. It is, therefore, clear that Sections 190 and 156(3) of Cr.P.C., are mutually exclusive and work in totally different spheres. In other words, the position is that even if a Magistrate receives a complaint under Section 190 of Cr.P.C., he can act under Section 156(3) and he does not take cognizance. Therefore, the Magistrate's power under Section 156(3) of the Code to order for investigation by the Police have not been touched or attached by Section 202 because these powers are exercised even before cognizance is taken. In other words, Section 202 of Cr.P.C., would apply only to cases where the

Magistrate has taken cognizance and chooses to inquire into the complaint either himself or through any other agency. But, in the present case, Magistrate has not taken any cognizance on the complaint, but along with complaint the respondent No.1 has submitted an application under Section 156(3) seeking direction to authorities to conduct investigation with regard to veracity of the document which is according to respondent No.1, alleged to have been forged one.

11. One of the issues raised in this petition has already been concluded and decided between the same parties on 1.11.2021 by this Court in Cr.M.P. No. 377 of 2015, by which, this Court while dismissing the said petition has held as under :-

"16. Thus, from the above legal position, it is quite clear that a Magistrate can order investigation under Section 156(3) of Cr.P,.C., only at the pre-cognizance stage, that is to say, before taking cognizance under Sections 190, 200 and 204 of Cr.P.C.

17. Now, reverting back to the present case in hand, respondent No.1 has filed an application under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C., for investigation with regard to the authenticity of the documents by sending it to the handwriting expert, therefore, he has filed the application for issuance of direction to investigate the authenticity of the documents by Police Station, Kotwali, which is mechanically rejected by the Magistrate without considering the provisions of law. Thereafter, respondent No.1 has referred the revision petition before the learned Revisional Court which by the impugned order dated 24-4-2015 has allowed the revision and quashed the order by directing the Judicial Magistrate First Class to decide the application filed under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C., in accordance with law. The order dated 24-4-2015 is inconformity with law by law laid down as above, therefore, the Revisional Court has not committed any material illegality or irregularity in passing the impugned order warranting any interference by this court. Therefore, the present Cr.M.P. is liable to be dismissed.

18. This court vide its order dated 15-5-2015 has stayed the impugned order passed in revision petition. The same stands vacated and it is directed that the Judicial Magistrate First Class shall proceed further in the matter, in accordance with law.

19. In the result, the petition fails and is hereby dismissed."

12. It is not in dispute that the learned court below has passed the impugned order dated 29.04.2017 allowing the application under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. filed by respondent No. 1 directing the respondent No. 2/State to register FIR against the petitioners and to

investigate the matter. It is pertinent to mention here that Cr.M.P. No. 377 of 2015 preferred by the petitioners has already been dismissed for want of prosecution and same was restored to its original number by this Court vide order dated 20.06.2017. Therefore, on second application the present order has been passed. Now the point is to be determined by this Court whether the subsequent FIR can be registered for the same allegation on the strength of order passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Rajnandgaon or not.

13. The learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Rajnandgan vide its impugned order has directed for registration of FIR. Though the FIR has already been registered on the complaint made by respondent No. 1 therefore, the registration of subsequent FIR not only causes intervention into the petitioner's rights as citizens as well as Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. The issue whether the subsequent FIR can be registered is not more res-integra as the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Arrnab Ranjan Goswami Vs. Union of India and Others reported in 2020 (14) SCC12 has held as under:

"31 The Court held that " there can be no second FIR" where the information concerns the same cognizable offence alleged in the first FIR or the same occurrence or icident which gives rise to one or more cognizable offences. This is due to the fact that the investigation covers within its ambit not just the alleged cognizable offence, but alos any other connected offences that may be found to have been committed. This Court held that once an FIR postulated by the provisions of Section 154 has been recorded, any information received after the commencement of investigation cannot form the basis of a second FIR as doing so would fail to comport with the scheme of the CrPC. The court observed: (2001) 6 SCC 181 "18...All other information made orally or in writing after the commencement of the investigation into the cognizable offence disclosed from the facts mentioned in the first information report and entered in the station house diary by the police officer or such other cognizable offences as may come to his notice during the investigation, will be statements falling under Section 162 CrPC.

No such information/statement can properly be treated as an FIR and entered in the station house diary again, as it would in effect be a second FIR and the same cannot be in conformity with the scheme of CrPC."

32. This Court adverted to the need to strike a just balance between the fundamental rights of citizens under Articles 19 and 21 and the expansive power of the police to investigate a cognisable offence. Adverting to precedent, this Court held:

"27...the sweeping power of investigation does not warrant subjecting a citizen each time to fresh investigation by the police in respect of the same incident, giving rise to one or more cognizable offences, consequent upon filing of successive FIRs whether before or after filing the final report under Section 173(2) CrPC. It would clearly be beyond the purview of Sections 154 and 156 CrPC, nay, a case of abuse of the statutory power of investigation in a given case. In our view a case of fresh investigation based on the second or successive FIRs, not being a counter-case, filed in connection with the same or connected cognizable offence alleged to have been committed in the course of the same transaction and in respect of which pursuant to the first FIR either investigation is under way or final report under Section 173(2) has been forwarded to the Magistrate, may be a fit case for exercise of power under Section 482 CrPC or under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution." (Emphasis supplied) The Court held that barring situations in which a counter- case is filed, a fresh investigation or a second FIR on the basis of the same or connected cognisable offence would constitute an "abuse of the statutory power of investigation" and may be a fit case for the exercise of power either under Section 482 of the CrPC or Articles 226/227 of the Constitution.

33. The Court held that barring situations in which a counter-case is filed, a fesh investigaiton or a second FIR on the basis of the same or connected cognizable offence would constitute an "abuse of the statutory power of inbrdyihsyion" and may be a fit case for the exercise of power either under Section 482 Cr.PC or Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India.

34. The decision in TT Antony came up for consideration before a three judge Bench in Upkar

Singh v Ved Prakash20 ("Upkar Singh"). Justice N Santosh Hegde, speaking for this Court adverted to the earlier decisions of this Court in Ram Lal Narang v State (Delhi Administration)21 ("Ram Lal Narang"), Kari Choudhary v Mst. Sita Devi22 ("Kari Choudhary") and State of Bihar v JAC Saldanha23 ("Saldanha"). The Court noted that in Kari Choudhary, this Court held that:

"11...Of course the legal position is that there cannot be two FIRs against the same accused in respect of the same case. But when there are rival versions in respect of the same episode, they would normally take the shape of two different FIRs and investigation can be carried on under both of them by the same investigating agency."

35. In Saldanha, this Court had held that the power conferred upon the Magistrate under Section 156(3) does not affect the power of the investigating officer to further investigate the case even after submission of the report under Section 173(8). In Upkar Singh, this Court noted that the decision in Ram Lal Narang is "in the same line" as the judgments in Kari Choudhary and Saldanha and held that the decision in TT Antony does not preclude the filing of a second complaint in regard (2004) 13 SCC 292 (1979) 2 SCC 322 (2002) 1 SCC 714 (1980) 1 SCC 554 to the same incident as a counter complaint nor is this course of action prohibited by the CrPC. In that context, this Court held:

"23. Be that as it may, if the law laid down by this Court in T.T. Antony case [(2001) 6 SCC 181 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1048] is to be accepted as holding that a second complaint in regard to the same incident filed as a counter-complaint is prohibited under the Code then, in our opinion, such conclusion would lead to serious consequences. This will be clear from the hypothetical example given hereinbelow i.e. if in regard to a crime committed by the real accused he takes the first opportunity to lodge a false complaint and the same is registered by the jurisdictional police then the aggrieved victim of such crime will be precluded from lodging a complaint giving his version of the incident in question, consequently he will be deprived of his legitimate right to bring the real accused to book. This cannot be the purport of the Code."

36. These principles were reiterated by a two judge Bench of this Court in Babubhai v State of Gujarat24. Dr Justice B S Chauhan observed:

"21. In such a case the court has to examine the facts and circumstances giving rise to both the FIRs and the test of sameness is to be applied to find out whether both the FIRs relate to the same incident in respect of the same occurrence or are in regard to the incidents which are two or more parts of the same transaction. If the answer is in the affirmative, the second FIR is liable to be quashed. However, in case the contrary is proved, where the version in the second FIR is different and they are in respect of the two different incidents/crimes, the second FIR is permissible. In case in respect of the same incident the accused in the first FIR comes forward with a different version or counterclaim, investigation on both the FIRs has to be conducted." (2010) 12 SCC 254 This Court held that the relevant enquiry is whether two or more FIRs relate to the same incident or relate to incidents which form part of the same transactions. If the Court were to conclude in the affirmative, the subsequent FIRs are liable to be quashed. However, where the subsequent FIR relates to different incidents or crimes or is in the form of a counter-claim, investigation may proceed.

[See also in this context Chirra Shivraj v State of Andhra Pradesh25 and Chirag M Pathak v Dollyben Kantilal Patel26].

37. In the present case, all the FIRs or complaints which have been lodged in diverse jurisdictions arise out of one and the same incident - the broadcast by the petitioner on 21 April 2020 on R Bharat. The broadcast is the foundation of the allegation that offences have been committed under the provisions of Sections 153, 153A, 153B, 295A, 298, 500, 504 and 506 of the IPC. During the course of the hearing, this Court has had the occasion, with the assistance of the learned Senior Counsel, to peruse the several complaints that were filed in relation to the incident dated 21 April 2020. They are worded in identical terms and leave no manner of doubt that an identity of cause of action underlies the allegations leveled against the petitioner on the basis of the programme which was broadcast on 21 April 2020. Moreover, the language, content and sequencing of paragraphs

and their numbering is identical. It was in this backdrop that Mr Kapil Sibal, learned Senior Counsel fairly submitted (in our view correctly) that this Court may proceed to quash all the other (2010) 14 SCC 444 (2018) 1 SCC 330 FIRs and complaints lodged in diverse jurisdictions in the States, leaving open, however, the investigation in respect of the FIR 238 of 2020 dated 22 April 2020 transferred from the Police Station Sadar, District Nagpur City to NM Joshi Marg Police Station in Mumbai.

14. In view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the above-cited cases, it is crystal clear that the subsequent order dated 24.4.2015, directing for registration of FIR is illegal and liable to be and is hereby quashed. The Investigating Authorities are directed to proceed further in view of First FIR registered against the petitioner as this Court has already dismissed the CRMP No. 377/2015 on 01.11.2021 by which the registration of FIR while allowing the application under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. has been dismissed, therefore, the Police authority is directed to investigate the matter in terms of first FIR, whose legality and validity has already been upheld vide order dated 01.11.2021. Therefore, The order of learned Session Judge while dismissing the revision on merit is quashed for the reason mentioned in foregoing paragraphs as the revision was not maintainable and the subsequent FIR is also quashed in light of the above stated legal position settle in case of Arnab Ranjan (Supra). The Police Authority is directed to investigate the matter as earlier directed by this Court in CRMP No. 377/2015.

15. It is made clear that this Court has not expressed anything on merits and contents of the FIR, it is for the investigating Authority to collect the material and submit before the concerning Court for further course of action as permissible under the law. This Court vide it's order dated 17.05.2017 has directed to call for the record of unregistered case"Nilesh Patel Vs. Narendra Singh Bhatia & Anr. The same may be sent back to learned Judicial Magistrate First Class Rajnandgaon, forthwith.

16. With these observations and directions, the present Cr.M.P. is allowed directing the Investigating Authority to proceed further, pursuant to the First FIR.

Sd/-

(Narendra Kumar Vyas) Judge

Amita