Chattisgarh High Court
Uma Shankar Gupta vs State Of Chhattisgarh on 2 December, 2021
1
NAFR
HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH, BILASPUR
W.P.(C) No. 4863 of 2021
Uma Shankar Gupta S/o Shri Mishrilal Gupta Aged About 60 Years Cast Teli
R/o Village Bhanora Balrampur District Balrampur Ramanujganj
Chhattisgarh.
---- Petitioner
Versus
1. State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Department Of
Revenue Mahanadi Bhawan New Raipur District Raipur Chhattisgarh.
2. The Collector Balrampur District Balrampur Ramanujganj
Chhattisgarh.
3. The Tahsildar Balrampur District Balrampur Ramanujganj
Chhattisgarh.
4. Patiya S/o Late Tumala Aged About 55 Years Cast Uraon,
5. Maina Devi W/o Patiya Aged About 53 Years Caste Uraon
No.4 and 5 both are R/o Village Bhanoura (Khutahanpara) Police
Station And Tahsil Balrampur District Balrampur Ramanujganj
Chhattisgarh.
6. Kameshwar Giri S/o Shiprasad Giri Aged About 60 Years Cast Gosai,
R/o Village Bhanoura Police Station And Tahsil Balrampur District
Balrampur Ramanujganj Chhattisgarh.
---- Respondents
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For Petitioner : Mr. A.N. Pandey, Advocate
For Respondents/State : Ms. Sameeksha Gupta, P.L.
Hon'ble Shri Rajendra Chandra Singh Samant
Order on Board
02.12.2021
Heard
1. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the
petitioner is the owner of the land bearing Kh.No. 329 area 0.03
hectares, situated in village - Bhanoura, District - Balrampur which
has been purchased by the petitioner on 20.07.2019 by registered
sale deed, which was executed by the vendor respondent No.6. The
name of the petitioner was mutated in the revenue records and he is
in possession of the same, which is continued till date. The
respondents No.4 and 5 filed a complaint, before the respondent
No.2 praying for cancellation of the sale deed in favour of the
petitioner on which the proceeding has been initiated and delegated to
Tahsildar i.e. respondent No.3. The respondent No.3 has passed the
impugned order in Revenue Case No.4/A-19(1)/2 dated 14.09.2018
granting temporary injunction regarding the disputed land.
2. It is submitted that respondent No.3 has exercised the jurisdiction,
which was not available to it under the provisions of C.G. Land
Revenue Code, 1959, therefore, the order passed is totally illegal and
arbitrary, therefore, unsustainable. Reliance has been placed on the
order of this Court dated 16.09.2021, passed in W.P.(C) No. 235 of
2020 between the parties Smt. Vandana Gupta Vs. State of C.G.
and others. Hence, it is prayed that impugned order be quashed.
3. Learned State counsel opposes the petition and the submissions
made in this respect. It is submitted that the order passed by the
Tahsildar is appealable under Section 44 of the C.G. Land Revenue
Code, 1959. Therefore, the petitioner is not entitled for any relief in
this petition.
4. Considered on the submissions and perused the documents placed
on record.
5. The operative part of the order dated 16.09.2021, passed in W.P.(C)
No. 235 of 2020 is reproduced as under :-
"8. This Court in Seraj Ahmad Vs. State of
Chhattisgarh & others 2017 (4) C.G.L.J. 559 has held
that the order to grant injunction is surely vested in the
jurisdictional Civil Court and the Revenue Courts cannot
grant the order of injunction and it was held that the
revenue order granting temporary injunction restraining the
transfer would be without jurisdiction and without authority
of law. The said judgment was based on a decision of the
Madhya Pradesh High Court rendered in Maya
Lalchandani (Mrs.) Vs. Board of Revenue 2009 (3)
MPLJ 660. I am also in respectful agreement with the
judgment passed by this Court in Seraj Ahmad Vs. State of
C.G. (Supra) on earlier occasion and the relevant part of
the decision is reproduced herein below:
2. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits
that the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue) has passed
order on 10.03.2016 granting temporary injunction for
which he has no jurisdiction, therefore, the order
passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer (Revenue) is
without jurisdiction and without authority of law. He
relies upon a decision of the High Court of Madhya
Pradesh in the matter of Maya Lalchandani (Mrs.)
and others Vs. Board of Revenue and others in which
the M.P. High Court has held as under:
"4. After going through the order passed
by the learned President, Board of Revenue
and taking into consideration the legal
provisions, we are of the opinion that the
directions sisued in paragraph 7 of the order
passed by the Board of Revenue cannot be
allowed to stand. Section 32 of the Land
Revenue Code talks of the inherent powers of
the Revenue Authorities while Section 43 talks
of applicability of the Code of Civil Procedure. It
is to be seen from Section 32 that nothing in the
Land Revenue Code shall be deemed to limit or
otherwise affect the inherent power of the
Revenue Court to make such orders as may be
necessary to meet the ends of justice or as may
be necessary to prevent the abuse of the
process of Court. Section 43 simply provides
that unless otherwise expressly provided in the
Code, the procedure laid down in the Code of
Civil Procedure shall, so far as may be, followed
in all proceedings under the Code. Section 43
in no case would authorise a Revenue Authority
to grant an injunction. Section 43 simply
provides that the procedure laid down in the
Code of Civil Procedure so far as may be
followed in all proceedings under the Code. It is
also to be seen from the provision of the Code
of Civil Procedure that an injunction can be
granted only by civil Court and by none else.
Section 32 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code
only talks of the inherent powers of the
Revenue Courts where they are required to
make such order as may be necessary for the
ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the
process of the Court. The powers under
Section 32 can be exercised within the Code
itself and not beyond the Code. If the Revenue
Authority does not have the power to grant
injunction then the Board of Revenue also could
not grant injunction."
6. In view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court and on
perusal of the impugned order, it is clear that it is in the form of
temporary injunction as provided under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of
C.P.C., the respondent No.3 does not have any jurisdiction to pass
order invoking the provision under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 of C.P.C. it
being a revenue Court, which exercises under the powers available to
it under the Code, 1959. Therefore, without any doubt the respondent
No.3 has exercised the jurisdiction, which was not available to it.
Hence, the impugned order dated 14.09.2018 is not sustainable. The
petition is disposed off at motion stage. The impugned order passed
by the respondent No.3 is hereby quashed.
7. With these observations, this petition stands disposed off.
Sd/-
(Rajendra Chandra Singh Samant)
Judge
Balram
