[Cites 15, Cited by 0]
Calcutta High Court
Sanjib Saha And Anr vs Andrew Yule And Co. Ltd on 12 December, 2025
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
ORIGINAL SIDE
LAST HEARD ON: 22.09.2025
DELIVERED ON:12.12.2025
PRESENT:
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE BISWAROOP CHOWDHURY
I.A. No. GA 9 of 2025
IN
C.S. No. 574 OF 1985
SANJIB SAHA AND ANR. VS ANDREW YULE AND CO. LTD.
Appearance:
Mr. Jaydip Kar, Sr. Adv.
Mr. Sourav Mukherjee, Adv.
Ms. Sahana Pal, Adv.
Mr. R. C. Paul, Adv.
Mr. Anirban Pramanick, Adv.
Mr. Punarbasu Nath, Adv.
..... for the plaintiff s
Mr. Rohit Banerjee, Adv.
Mr. S. Kr. Agarwal, Adv.
... for the defendant.
Biswaroop Chowdhury, J.: This is an application filed by the plaintiffs praying as
follows:-
A . The defendant be directed to pay Rs. 3,47,63,348/- (being the arrears of
rent/occupational charges from December 2019 till February 2025) to the
plaintiffs within a period of 7 days or such other period as this Hon'ble
Court may deem fit and thereafter continue to pay Rs. 5,92,076/- per month
on or before 7th Day of each English calendar month;
B . In the alternative the defendant be directed to deposit and secure in this
Hon'ble Court Rs. 3,47,63,348/- ( being the arrears of rent, occupational
charges from December 2019, till February 2025) within a period of 7 days
or such other period as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and thereafter
continue to deposit Rs. 5,92,076/- per month on or before 7th Day of each
calendar month;
C . An order of injunction be passed restraining the defendant/lessee and
/or any person/entity claiming through it from encumbering and/or dealing
with and/or inducting any occupier in the suit premises;
D . Ad interim order in terms of prayer (C) above.
E . The respondent/lessee be directed to supply the completion certificate
relating to the newly constructed building as well as an authentic copy of
the sanction building plan within such time as to this Hon'ble Court may
deem fit and proper.
F . The respondent/lessee be directed to remedy the breaches committed of
the indenture of lease dated 4th February 1983 and supplemental deed of
lease dated 5th August 2010 by inter alia:
i) Paying and disbursing outstanding service tax on rent amounting
to Rs. 50, 77, 600/- towards reimbursement of the service tax.
ii) Paying and disbursing outstanding amount of Rs. 44,800/-
towards wrong deduction of TDS of GST.
iii) Paying entire arrear municipal tax along with interest and penalty
as may be due and payable thereon and producing Xerox Copy of
receipt thereof to the plaintiff and also continuing to pay current
municipal rates and taxes that may fall due.
iv) Disclosing the names and details of the sub - lessees/occupiers
who are there in the building.
G . In the alternative and on failure of the defendant to remedy the breaches
within the time stipulated :
i) Be it declared that the defence of the defendant stands struck off
and the lease has been validly terminated.
ii) The suit be directed to appear as an undefendant suit.
H . Such further or other order or orders be made and /or direction be
given including those relating to costs of and incidental to this application
as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper.
The contention of the plaintiffs/petitioners may be summed up thus:
1. The premises in question being 34 Jackson Lane since renamed as
Indra Kumar Karnani Street, Kolkata 700001( hereinafter referred to
as the said demised premises) contains by estimation 1 Bigha 2
Cottahs more or less with a structure thereon fully described in the
schedule to the deed of lease dated 4th February, 1983 is owned by the
estate of Shree Shree Jagat Janani Thakurani, a Hindu deity ( herein
after referred to as the said deity) by virtue of a deed of
dedication/arpannama dated 1st of November, 1871.
2. Upon considering various offers and after hearing the parties by and
order dated 07/04/1978 this Hon'ble Court was inter alia pleased to
give liberty to the then joint receivers to grant lease of the said
premises no. 34 Indra Kumar Karnani Street (Jackson Lane) Kolkata
in favour of the erstwhile lessee Chitpore Golabari Co. Ltd.
3. In terms of the order of this Hon'ble Court on 04/02/1983 lease was
granted in favour of Rajgarh Tea Co. Ltd. for an initial period of 49
years commencing from 1st April, 1980 with option for renewal for
another 19 years upon fulfillment of certain conditions as mentioned
therein.
4 . Clause 4 of the said lease deed, stipulates that the lessee shall
after demolition of the existing building, construct a new building on
the demised premises at their own cost up to the optimum height
permissible under the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act and/or
Urban Land (ceiling and regulation) Act within a period of 5 (five) years
from commencement of the lease (i.e. 1st April, 1980). In terms of
clause 5 of the said lease deed the lessee was obliged to pay monthly
rent thereby reserved both share of municipal taxes in respect of the
demised premises including all increments by reason of their new
constructions or otherwise and to pay all other taxes and impositions.
5 . That for non-completion of the said construction within 1st April
1985 by the lessee and for failure to pay monthly rent, the lessors,
through their Advocates determined the said lease dated 4th February
1983 , and filed the instant suit in this Hon'ble Court, inter alia,
claiming a Decree for possession of the premises no 35, Jackson Lane
(Indra Kumar Karnani Street, Kolkata 700001) by evicting the
defendant therefrom and for other reliefs.
6. Thereafter the Rajgarh Tea Co ltd pursuant to an order dated 26th
August 1987 of the Learned Company Law Board was amalgamated
with Andrew Yule and Co Ltd, and consequently Andrew Yule and Co
Ltd claimed to be the Lessee in respect of the said property at 34 Indra
Kumar Karnani Street(Jackson lane) Kolkata- 700001, in place of the
erstwhile Lessee Rajgarh Tea Co Ltd. Such fact was duly taken note of
by the then plaintiffs/ joint receivers and the cause title, suit register
and the body of the plaint were duly amended accordingly. Without
prejudice it is stated that in its written statement the
defendant/lessee, in effect admitted the defaults/breaches of the
conditions of the deed of lease committed by it.
7. The Defendant lessee in the instant suit affected mutation of its
name in the records of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation as a lessee
in respect of the said demised premises.
8. Subsequently in the said suit No-574 of 1985 various applications
were made from time to time by the lessee/defendant company inter-
alia for extension of time for demolition of existing building and
construction of a new building on the said demised premises and by
consent of the parties orders were passed by granting leaves from time
to time on such application.
9. By order dated 22/05/2003, a Learned Co-ordinate Bench of this
Court by consent of parties was inter alia , pleased to extend such
time however the lessee was directed to make payment of monthly
occupational charges at the rate as depicted therein. The Lessee was
also directed to make payment of rents and taxes referred in the said
Lease Deed.
10. The Defendant/ Respondent committed breach of terms set out
dated 22/05/2003 and they failed to demolish the existing building
and discharge the other obligations as directed in the said order, for
which Defendant/Respondent took out an application being GA No-
1778 of 2008 seeking inter-alia extension of time to comply with the
order dated 22nd May 2003. The parties in the said application filed
terms of settlement and the Learned co-ordinate bench of this court
was pleased to dispose GA-1778 of 2008 in accordance with the terms
of settlement for the benefit of the Debutter Estate.
11. Subsequently the parties on the basis of the terms of settlement
approved vide order dated 21-05-2009, executed a supplemental lease
deed, incorporating therein the terms of settlement arrived at between
the parties. The same was made in furtherance of the aforesaid lease
deed.
12. In terms of clause 1(a) of the said Supplemental Lease Deed,
incorporating therein the terms of settlement arrived the lessee
remained obliged to pay monthly occupational charges at such rates
as depicted therein. The lessee/respondent willfully and deliberately
failed and neglected to comply with each obligation and in fact
stopped making payment of occupation charges since December 2019
till date. The said supplemental lease deed was executed between the
parties in furtherance of the said terms of settlement, approved vide
order dated 21/05/2009 passed by this Hon'ble Court, the lessee also
remained obliged to pay municipal tax in respect of the demised
premises including all increments by reason of the new construction
or otherwise and to pay all other taxes and impositions and any other
imposed that may be levied in respect of the said demised premises by
the KMC or any other authority from time to time and to furnish to
the lessors Xerox copies of the paid up rate bills within one month
from the date of such payment. It has been ascertained from the
Kolkata Municipal Corporation that a huge amount is due and
payable.
13 . Further the lessee /respondent in spite of repeated reminders
failed to pay the plaintiff Rs. 44,800/- which was wrongly deducted by
the respondent on account of TDS on GST in February and March
2019 on the ground TDS is not applicable on GST.
14 . Clause 10 of the lessee's convenant of the lease deed dated 4th
February, 1983 confers right on the lessees to sub-let or sub-lease,
the demised premises with intimation to the lessors.
15 . That in the demised portion there are 53 assesses. Majority are
sub-lessees. The lessee without intimating the lessor has inducted
sub-lessee and have thus violated the condition of lease.
Considering the persistent default on the part of the
lessee/respondent and considering that the occupation of the
lessee/respondent is governed by the provisions of the Transfer of
Property Act, 1882 the lessors/applicant terminated the special
tenancy with effect from 1st January, 2022 and called upon the
lessees to hand over peaceful, Khas and vacant position.
16 . By letter dated 24th February, 2022 the lessee replied that due to
some inadvertence and bona fide reasons of COVID-19 crisis, the
payment has not been received by the lessor from October, 2019. By
the said letter the lessee also stated that they would arrange to
provide the remaining dues as soon as they receive the differential
amount from one Akriti Developers Private Limited(in short Akriti) and
sought time to clear the dues.
17 . That there is clear admission of the lessee in the said letter that
they are in default on payment of occupation charges on and from
October 2019. It further appears from the said letter that for payment
of occupational charges the lessee is dependent upon the said Akriti
which is contrary to the obligation of the lessee under the order of this
Hon'ble Court.
18 . By a letter dated 07-03-2022 the lessee was called upon to
intimate within a period of 7 days from receipt of the said letter as to
the modalities of payment with exact time schedule for the same but
the said letter was not replied.
19 . The petitioners plaintiffs being aggrieved by the acts of the
defendant became compelled to file application being GA 6 of 2022
praying for deletion of the name of Samarendra Nath Shaw and to
substitute the name of Sanjib Saha, and for direction upon the
defendant to pay and disburse outstanding service tax amounting to
Rs. 50,77,600/-, arrear municipal tax outstanding lease occupation
charges from December 2019 to May 2022 amounting to Rs.
1,58,59,200/- ( Rupees one crore fifty eight lacs fifty nine thousand
two hundred) along with interest @ 18% p. a or at such other rate this
Hon'ble Court may deem fit and continue to pay current rent at the
agreed rate month by month without default.
20 . By an order dated 05/07/2022 a Learned Co-ordinate Bench of
this Court was pleased to allow prayer (a) to (e) of the Master's
summons.
21 . Thereafter the said application was taken up on 12/07/2022,
13/07/2022 and 18/07/2022. By order dated 18/07/2022 the
defendant was granted opportunity to file affidavit in opposition and
without prejudice to the rights was directed to pay Rs. 15 lakhs on
account of outstanding rental arrears receivable by the plaintiffs.
22 . In or about June 2023 the said Akriti filed an application being
GA 7 of 2023, with a prayer to be heard pro interesse suo. The said
application upon hearing was dismissed by the Learned Single Judge.
23 . Thereafter, another application being GA 8 of 2023 was filed by
the defendant for rejection of the plaint and the same was dismissed
by order dated 24/01/2024.
24 . The defendant being aggrieved by order dated 24/01/2024
passed by the Learned Single Judge preferred an appeal before the
Hon'ble Division Bench and the Hon'ble Division Bench was pleased to
hold that the Hon'ble Trial Court might decide the preliminary issue
within three months from date.
25 . By an order dated 24/04/2024 the Learned Single Judge was
inter alia pleased to hold that preliminary issue involving the
jurisdiction of the Court was to be decided first.
26 . Meanwhile the order dated 10/04/2024 passed by the Hon'ble
Division Bench was challenged before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and
the Hon'ble Supreme Court was pleased to dispose the special Leave
petition by order dated 17/12/2024. The Hon'ble Supreme Court was
pleased not to go into the merits of the application liberty was given to
the parties to file appropriate applications before this Hon'ble Court.
27 . On 18/02/2025 the present suit again appeared before the
Learned Single Judge as 'to be mentioned' when the matter was
directed to appear on 03.03.2025. During pendency of the present
suit from time to time plaintiffs through its Learned Advocate on
diverse occasions requested the defendant/lessee to make payment
towards the receivables of the plaintiffs. Despite the same no money
has yet been paid. As on 28/02/2025 an aggregated sum of Rs.
3,47,63,348/- is receivable by the plaintiffs from the defendant/lessee
on account of occupational charges and an amount of Rs. 50,77,600/-
on account of reimbursement of service tax. Besides a huge sum is
due and payable by the defendant to the KMC on account of
Municipal taxes.
28 . The defendant in the grab of an agreement for development had
received a sum of Rs. 2.07 crores from Akriti towards the right to sub-
let and sub-lease on its behalf.
The law is well settled that the plaintiffs being the owners of the
demised premises as are entitled to receive occupational charges from
the defendant and/or all other indivivuals and entitles who have
been enjoying actual possession of the demised premises or any
portion thereof. It is also well settled principle of Law that no
individual or entity is entitled, to enjoy the actual physical
possession/ occupation of the demised premise and /or any portion
thereof without payment of the occupational charges. Even in equity
the plaintiff is entitled to receive occupational charges from all the
occupants of the said demised premises proportionate to their
respective occupation at the present market rate. The plaintiffs cannot
be deprived of its legitimate lawful and genuine right to be adequately
Compensated. The plaintiff is suffering loss for not being paid its
genuine entitlement. On the other hand Deity is suffering month by
month and every month since December 2019, on the other hand the
defendant has been enjoying the demised premises being the most
vital asset of the Deity in its entirety without paying a single rupee.
30 . That this Debutter Estate of Shree Shree Jagat Janani
Thakuranit is a fairly large Estate. The Deity has her own abode and
there is substantial expenditure which is required to be incurred
month by month and every month for maintenance of the
establishment of the said Estate where number of employees are
permanently working. At present there are around 250 sebaits. The
Joint Receivers are disbursing necessary amount for performing Nitya
Seba Puja. Besides Nitya Seba Puja various periodical ceremonial
pujas are performed. The main puja of the said deity, being basanti
Puja is annually performed with great pomp and grandeur. Besides all
the outgoings including Income Tax Wealth Tax Municipal Tax, GST
operation and maintenance charges of other building and assets of the
Estate are paid by the Joint Receivers out of the rent issues and
profits in respect of inter alia of the demised premises.
31. That such expenditure is principally met from the rent of different
immoveable properties of the Estate the most important of which is
the said demised premises.
32. This Hon'ble Court being the guardian of the Deity, the interest of
the Deity is required to be protected in all possible manner. The
present state of affairs if allowed to continue the Deity and the Deity
only will continue to suffer.
Pursuant to filing of this application the Defendant/Respondent
filed Affidavit in opposition by denying the allegations made in the
petition.
The contention made in the affidavit in opposition may be
summed up thus;
1. The defendant is contesting suit No. 574 of 1985 wherein the
plaintiffs have sought for inter alia, eviction against the
defendant together with consequential reliefs. The present
suit is based out of a notice of forfeiture of lease dated 26-07-
1985 which were premised on two alleged defaults of the
defendant, first being non-completion of construction of
building on the leased out land and secondly for non-
payment of rent.
2. The defendant denied and disputed the contents made in the
plaint and has contended that Rs. 8,50,000/- was paid as
advance rent to the plaintiff. When the suit was instituted a
sum of Rs. 3,22,000/- was lying as excess rent already
deposited with the plaintiff.
3. The parties were in dispute with respect to construction of a
building on the demised premises. Pursuant to orders passed
by this Court parties entered into a terms of settlement dated
01.07.2009 and subsequently a supplemental deed of lease
dated 08.08.2010 was executed between the parties. the
parties agreed to timeline and rate of rent and defendant was
permitted to engage a third party to complete the
construction and to sub-let any portion of the constructed
building.
4. The defendant/respondent had engaged 'Akrity' Sales Private
Limited to demolish the existing structure and construct a
building thereon and also to pay rent with respect to the
demised premises. The plaintiffs have been receiving rent
from the defendant which was paid by Akriti which is
continuing from September 12, 2007, within the knowledge
of the plaintiffs.
5. The plaintiffs have admitted in the said petition to the fact
that the individuals/entities who are enjoying actual
possession of the demises premises must pay occupational
charges. The defendant is not in physical possession of the
demised premises at least from 12-09-2007 and cannot be
made liable to pay occupational charges.
6. That the plaintiffs always knew that the rent was actually
paid by Akriti to the plaintiff wherein the defendant is only
an intermediary. The plaintiffs further knew that the
defendant was not using any part or portion of the demised
premises to make monitory gains.
7. The existing structure on the demised premises was
demolished and a new building was constructed thereon,
which has been under the possession and use by Akriti and
its sub-lessees. The defendant has complied with its
obligation to cause construction of a building on the demised
premises which is usable.
8. The plaintiffs filed G.A. 6 of 2022 which are identical to the
prayers made in the said petition (excepting Prayers f(ii) and f
(iv) which are now added.)
9. The defendant took out an application GA. 8 of 2023 with a
prayer that the suit be dismissed alternatively the plaint filed
in suit No. 574 of 1985 be rejected.
10. The application being G.A. 8 of 2023 was dismissed by a
Learned Single Judge of this Court. Being aggrieved by the
order of the Learned Single Judge passed in GA. 8 of 2023,
defendant preferred an appeal being APOT-68 of 2024. The
said Appeal was disposed by the Hon'ble Division Bench with
the observation that the question raised in the application
before the Trial Court in GA-8/2023 should be tried as a
preliminary issue in the suit on the basis of the application
and the affidavits extended thereto before the suit proceeds
any further. As such the Division Bench opined that this
Hon'ble Court may direct documents disclosed relating to
that issue only invite evidence to be adduced in Court or by
Commission whichever the Trial Court deems fit and proper
and decide the question as soon as possible.
11. Upon considering the order passed by the Hon'ble
Division Bench Learned Single Judge by Order dated April
24, 2024 observed that the preliminary issue of jurisdiction
must be decided first because it relates to the authority of
this Court as was observed by the Hon'ble Division Bench.
12. The plaintiffs being aggrieved by the order of Hon'ble
Division Bench preferred a Special Leave Petition before the
Hon'ble Supreme Court. The Hon'ble Supreme Court by an
order dated 17-12-2024 neither set aside the order dated 10-
04-2024, nor granted the relief prayed in IA No. 21044/2024
inspite of the fact that extensive arguments were made on
behalf of the plaintiffs to obtain the relief for payment of
occupational charges.
13. Thereafter the matter appeared before the Learned Single
Judge and the Learned Judge after hearing the parties was
pleased to pass an order in 18/02/2025 observing that the
preliminary issue of jurisdiction should be decided first.
14. The plaintiffs are now trying to modify the order passed
on 18/02/2025 without preferring an appeal.
The defendant have also denied allegations made in paragraph 6
to 10 of the petition as false and have contended that Rs. 2,22,000/-
was lying with the plaintiff at the time of alleged termination of lease.
The defendant further denied that the defendant could not comply
with the directions passed in the order dated April 16, 1997. The
defendant also denied that the plaintiffs have paid service tax to the
concerned authority of Rs. 50,77,600/- The defendant has contended
that the termination notice dated 31-01-2022 was responded by the
defendant through its reply dated February 24, 2022 wherein the
defendant had specifically stated that Akriti Sales Private Limited had
not paid the defendant rent from October 2019, citing Covid-19 crises.
The defendant has denied that there is any sort of admission The
defendant has further contended that in terms of the order passed by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court this application for occupational charge is
not maintainable prior to the decision of preliminary issue.
It is also contended that prayers in GA-9 of 2025 are identical to
the prayers made in said petition GA-6 of 2022 which is kept pending
as directed by Order dated 18-02-2025 hence this application is not
maintainable.
The plaintiff has filed Affidavit in Reply repeating and reiterating
the allegations made in the petition.
It is contended by the plaintiff/petitioner that it is an admitted
position that respondent lessee could not complete the construction
within the agreed timeline despite specific assurances made by it
before this Hon'ble Court. The plaintiff contended that it is incorrect to
allege that the defendant/respondent lessee was allowed to engage
any third party to complete the construction or during the pendency
of the suit the plaintiffs agreed to receive rent or enhanced rent or the
tenure of tenancy is subsisting or is still due to expire on 31-03-2029.
The plaintiffs agreed to receive occupational charges and that too
under the orders passed by this Hon'ble Court only from the
defendant/respondent/lessee and from none else. It is contended that
the alleged induction of the said Akriti was never informed to the
plaintiffs, and plaintiff's consent had never been obtained in this
regard. The plaintiffs were never made a party to such alleged
transaction. It is further denied that the defendant is neither using
nor occupying the demised premises as the defendant has not made
any profit out of the rent paid for the demised premises. From the
alleged agreement of 2007 it would appear that the
defendant/respondent lessee had received payment of Rs. 2.07 crores
from the said Akriti besides regular monthly sub lease rentals. It is
contended that the orders of this Hon'ble Court and the Hon'ble Apex
Court are absolutely clear. Since the Hon'ble Supreme Court was not
inclined to go into the merits of the application liberty was given to the
parties to file appropriate applications before this Hon'ble Court. It
would further appear from the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court
that since the entire issue was left for the Hon'ble Single Bench to
decide, the Hon'ble Apex Court did not enter into the issue of payment
of occupational charges in the interregnum. IA no. 210441 of 2024
was simply disposed without any decision or observation thereon. It is
further contended that as on 18-02-2025 no fresh application was
filed by either of the parties despite the Hon'ble Supreme Court had
granted leave to both the parties in this regard. It is also contended
that it is the settled position of the law of our land that the issue of
payment of occupational charges in a pending suit for eviction cannot
be kept in abeyance.
Heard Learned Advocate for the plaintiff/petitioner, and Learned
Advocate for the Defendant/Respondent. Perused the petition filed
and materials on record.
Learned Advocate for the plaintiff/petitioner submits that it
would appear from the order dated 17-12-2024 passed by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court that while the Hon'ble Trial Judge was given liberty to
proceed with the entire suit simultaneously liberty was given to the
parties to file appropriate proceedings in the suit. It was also made
categorically clear that in the event such proceedings are filed the
same are to be adjudicated in accordance with law without being
influenced, by the observations of the Hon'ble Division Bench.
Learned Advocate further submits that on 18-02-2025 when the
subject suit was taken up for hearing no application was there by
either of the parties post 17-12-2024, availing, the liberty given by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court, that the Hon'ble Single Bench should proceed
with the suit itself in accordance with law having regard to the
developments which had taken place pending the suit. As such the
suit in its entirety should be adjudicated. The instant application
being GA. 9 of 2025 filed after 17-12-2024 is to be adjudicated
without being influenced by the observations of the Hon'ble Division
Bench.
Learned Advocate submits that the issue of payment of
occupational charges be decided during pendency of the suit and the
same is given primacy over the merits of the issues raised in the suit.
There cannot be any doubt that a lessee should not be permitted to
occupy the demised premises without making any payment of
occupational charges lesser than the market rate, even during
pendency of the suit. It is the bounden obligation of a person
occupying the demised premises to make payment of the occupational
charges while defending the action of eviction. Learned Advocate relies
upon the following Judicial decision.
Bijay Kumar Manish Kumar HUF Vs Ashwin Bhanulal Desai
Reported in 2024 (8) SCC-668.
Learned Advocate submits that in GA-6 of 2022 no issue which
are subject matter of this application has been decided. Moreover both
GA-6 of 2022 and GA. 9 of 2025 are interim applications, thus the
applications are not barred by the principles of Res-judicata. Learned
Advocate further submits that it is by now a settled principle of Law
that the Court is the Guardian of the Deity. The monthly lease rental
arising out of this demised premises of the Deity is the main source of
income of the Deity. Since December 2019 till February 2025 (in fact
till date) the Deity is being deprived of from its legitimate dues which
has now reached a staggering figure of around. Rs. 4 crores over and
above the Deity is further bleeding by making payment of GST element
on the rent to the concerned Authorities month by month and every
month as it is statutorily bound even without receipt of the same from
the Lessee/Defendant and though the onus of making payment of
GST element squarely rests on the Lessee/Defendant as per law.
Learned Advocate submits that GA 8 of 2022, has already been
dismissed, and not restored and on dismissal of the application, this
Hon'ble Court has become functus officio to the issues raised therein.
Learned Advocate for the Defendant submits that the plaintiffs
have been accepting rent without any objection and in terms of the
supplemental deed of lease dated 05-08-2010. Therefore they have
waived their right to forfeit the Lease through the letter dated 26-07-
1985. Learned Advocate relies upon Section 112, and 113 of the
Transfer of property Act 1882 and the decision of Tayabali Jaffarbhai
Tankiwala VS M/S. Asha and Co. and Anr. Reported in (1970) 1 SCC.
P-46.
Learned Advocate further submits that suit No-574 of 1985 is
based out of the letter dated 26-07-1985. Other than the fact that the
building has been constructed, the plaintiff has kept on accepting rent
during pendency of this suit. Therefore Suit No.574 of 1985 has
become infructuous and the Court has no jurisdiction to pass any
interlocutory order in an infructuous suit. Learned Advocate relies
upon the decision of shipping Corporation of India Limited VS
Machads Brothers and ors. reported in (2004) 11 SCC P-168.
Learned Advocate also submits that the Division Bench had
directed the Trial Court to decide this lack of jurisdiction of the Court
in deciding the suit as infructious through a preliminary issue. The
Hon'ble Supreme Court has not interfered with the observation of the
Division Bench. A coordinate Bench of this Court has already decided
that the preliminary issue should be heard first.
It is submitted that issues relating to jurisdiction has to be
heard and decided first. The plaintiff has not been able to make out or
demonstrate any extraordinary situation. There is no pleading of such
extraordinary situation where it could take time to decide the point of
maintainability of the suit. Learned Advocate relies upon the decision
of Asma Lateef and Anr VS Shabbir Ahmad and ors. reported in (2024)
4 SCC P-696.
It is further submitted that by orders dated May 22, 2003 and
the order dated May 21, 2009 that this Hon'ble Court had revalidated
the continuation of the deed of lease dated February 4, 1983 to
continue for its entire term of 49 years expiring on March 31, 2029.
It is also submitted that the notice dated January 31, 2022
issued u/s-106 of the said Act of 1882 by the plaintiffs shows that
they are treating the defendant as a monthly tenant. According to the
plaintiffs there is now a new cause of action which has arisen in 2022.
The plaintiffs have not revoked or withdrawn this notice. In this
situation where the plaintiffs are pursuing an infructuous suit and
have shown a new cause of action in their letter dated 31-01-2022
they are not entitled to obtain any interlocutory orders in suit No. 574
of 1985, through GA-9 of 2025.
Before proceeding to decide the material in issue it would be
proper to consider the order dated 22-05-2003 and order dated 21-05-
2009, passed by this Hon'ble Court, in the instant suit.
Upon perusal of the order dated 22-05-2003 it will appear that
direction was issued upon the defendant to pay monthly occupation
charges of Rs. 100,000/- (Rupees one lakh) per English calendar
month, the arrear occupation charges from month of April 2002 to
31st March 2003. @ Rs. 100,000/- less the amount already paid
within eight weeks from date. It was further directed that with effect
from 1st April 2008 the defendant company will pay Rs. 3,00,000/-
and there will be increment of 10% of the said monthly rent every 6
years until the expiry of the lease. The extent of the increment in
occupation charge, rent as ordered, clause-I, sub-clause VI of the
Lease Deed dated 4th February 1983, was modified accordingly. There
was also direction to pay Municipal Taxes.
The consequence of breach of the condition was provided as
follows:
'It is further directed that if the defendant/applicant fails to
start the construction on the demised premises within two years from
date of this order then after 49 years ie. initial period of lease there
shall be no option by the lessee for renewal for a further period of 19
years as contemplated in the original lease Deed and in this respect
the operative part of the said lease deed and in this respect the
operative part of the said lease deed containing the option clause
stand modified.
It is further directed that if the defendant/applicant fails to
comply with any part of orders hereinbefore made the defence of the
defendant company shall be struck out and the suit which stands
adjourned for five years from the date hereof will be transferred to the
list of undefended suits for obtaining as ex-parte decree.
If the defendant applicant complies with the aforesaid orders it
will be deemed sufficient compliance with the relevant clauses of the
indenture Lease dated 4th February 1983 and in that event the
plaintiffs on the expiry of 5 years shall get the suit struck out subject
to payment of all costs incurred by the joint Receiver in connection
with the above suit.
It is further directed that a supplementary lease Deed
incorporating therein the modifications as made by this order shall be
executed and registered by the Lessor and the Lessee. The draft of
such supplementary Deed to be prepared by the lessee and shall be
approved by the lessor. All costs of and incidental to the preparation
of such Deed, the stamp duty and registration fees shall be paid and
borne by the defendant company.
Thus from the Order dated 22-05-2003 it is clear that the
parties by entering into terms by supplementary Deed did not intend
that the suit be treated as disposed and settled. Moreover the
consequence of non-compliance of the condition was mentioned. It
was further mentioned that in the event defendant complies the order
on the expiry of 5 years suit will get struck out.
As the defendant/respondent failed to comply the condition and
failed to demolish the building it took out an application being GA.
No,. 1778 of 2008 seeking inter alia extension of time to comply order
dated 22nd May 2003. In the said application parties filed a Terms of
settlement agreeing to re-schedule the time line to complete the
project and the defendant agreed to discharge its various obligations.
By order dated 21st May 2009, Learned Co-ordinate Bench was
pleased to dispose GA. 1778 of 2008 in accordance with the terms of
settlement by observing as follows:
'By the agreed terms filed in Court GA. No. 1778 of 2008 is
disposed of. The said order passed is for the benefit of the debuttar
estate.
All parties concerned are to act on a signed copy of the minutes
of this order on the usual undertakings.'
Thus upon perusal of the order dated 21st May 2009 it will
appear that the said order is passed for the benefit of the debuttar
estate, thus any violation of the terms and conditions of settlement
agreement without sufficient cause should be viewed seriously. As
court is the Guardian of the Deity it is the duty of the Court to look to
the benefit of the Deities in any proceedings before it relating to the
Estate of the Deities in accordance with law. When rents and
occupation charges due to the Debuttar Estate are not paid for years
it is prejudicial to the interest of the Deities for whom the Debuttar
Estate is created.
By Order dated 21st May 2009 the application GA-1778 filed by
the defendant was disposed of but the suit was kept pending.
Moreover the terms agreed by the parties was that suit No-574 of
1985 filed by the Lessors against the lessee shall stand adjourned for
5 (five) years from 21st May 2009 ie. the date of the Order and if the
Lessee makes default in compliance with the order dated 21st May
2009 then the defence taken by the Lessee in the said suit No. 574 of
1985 shall be struck off and the suit shall be transferred to the List of
undefended suit for an exparte decree. It was also provided that if the
Lessee completes the construction of a new building on the demised
premises within 5(five) years from the date of the Order of the Hon'ble
Court dated 21st May 2009 made in GA. No. 1778 of 2009 CS. No. 574
of 1985 and complies with the directions given by the Hon'ble Court in
the said Order then Lessors shall get the said suit No-574 of 1985
struck out on expiry of 5 years from the said Order subject to
payment of all costs incurred by the Joint Receivers in connection
with the said suit.
The act of the defendant in not-paying the occupational charges
of the Debuttar Estate for a long period and cause prejudice to the
Deities goes to show lack of bona-fide, of the defendant being a
Government Undertaking and State within Article 12 of the
Constitution of India.
However as the issue of the suit becoming infructious and non-
maintainable being raised by the defendant the same has to be
decided in accordance with law. But the point of consideration is
whether the defendant can be directed to pay occupational charges
before the issue of maintainability of the suit is decided.
In this regard it is necessary to consider some judicial decisions
relied upon by the parties.
In the case of Bijay Kumar Manish Kumar HUF VS Ashwin
Bhanulal Desai Reported in (2024)8 SCC P-668 the Hon'ble Supreme
Court observed as follows:
"15. On account of non-payment of rent, the lease was
forfeited/determined. However, the respondent has neither delivered
the possession of the property nor paid the rent. The petitioner has
submitted a report of an independent valuer dated 12th March 2020.
The assessment of the rentals, made by the valuer, it is submitted, is
fair and reasonable @ INR 41/- per Sq.ft.
15. It is submitted on behalf of the respondent that since no
court has declared the end of the landlord-tenant relationship,
the petitioner-applicant asking the respondent to pay
occupational charges as opposed to contractual rent would
amount to the re-writing of the tenancy Agreement. Further, it
is argued that occupation charges are only payable after the
lease is validly determined or after the decree of eviction.Since
both these eventualities are yet to occur, no question of such
payment arises. It is also urged that the petitioner-applicant
accepted rent from the respondent till August 2002 but
thereafter refused to do so. According to the respondent-
tenant, a total amount of Rs,2,06,400/- is payable on their
part to the petitioner-applicant in the following terms:-
Particulars
Arrears of rent from Interest Total
September 2002 to Calculated @
February 2024 10% till
February 2024
Tenancy 1 Rs. 50x258 Rs. 14,625 Rs. 27,525
months=Rs. 12,900
(Car
Parking)
Tenancy 2 Rs. 150x258 Rs. 43,875 Rs. 82,575
months=Rs. 38,700
(Godown
1)
Tenancy 3 Rs. 250x258 Rs. 73,125 Rs. 1,37,625
months=Rs. 64,500
(Godown
2)
Tenancy 4 Rs. 350x258 Rs. 1,02,375 Rs. 1,92,675
months=Rs. 90,300
(Office
Space)
Total Rs. 4,40,400
2,06,400 +
2,34,400=
18. Landlord-tenant disputes often make their way to this Court,
and obviously, the payment of rent/mesne profit/occupation
charges/damages becomes, more often than not a matter of high
contest. Determination, as alleged to have taken place by the petitioner,
can take place at the instance of both the landlord and the tenant.
Halsbury's Laws of England 3rd Edn. Vol.23 defines 'determination by
landlord' as follows:
"The tenancy is impliedly determined by the landlord when he
does any act on the premises which is inconsistent with the
continuance of tenancy; for example, when he re-enters to take
possession (b), or puts in a new tenant (c), or cuts down trees or carries
away stone (d), the trees and stone not being excepted from the demise
(e), and also when he does an act off the premises which is
inconsistence with the tenancy, as when he conveys the reversion (f), or
grants a lease of the premises to commence forthwith (g). An act done
off the premises, however, does not determine the tenancy until the
tenant has notice of it (h)."
19. According to the petitioner, as already taken note of above,
the lease was 'forfeited' due to non-payment of rent. Forfeiture, as
defined by Corpus Juris Secundum is "the right of the lessor to
terminate a lease because of lessee's breach of covenant or other
wrongful act". Further, it mentions as under:
"The word as used in a lease does not, strictly speaking, refer to
any right given to the lessee to terminate the lease. Accordingly, it has
been held that provisions for forfeiture, cancelation or termination of a
lease are usually inserted for the benefit of the lessor and because of
some default on the part of the lessee. A forfeiture is in the nature of a
penalty of doing of failing to do a particular thing, and results from
failure to keep an obligation."
28. A perusal of the judgments extracted above as also other
cases where Atma Ram Properties one common factor can be observed
i.e. the decree of eviction stands passed and the same having been
stayed, gives rise to the question of payment of mesne profits. As
observed above, the respondent contends that since, in the present case
no decree of eviction is passed, and there is no stay awarded, the
question of such payment does not arise.
31. Having considered the submissions made across the Bar, we
note that the disputed nature of the lease deed, in other words, its
continuation or forfeiture on account of non-payment is heavily
contested and stemming there from, so is the nature of payment to be
made. We also note that the location of demised premises is in the heart
of Kolkata and if the submissions of the petitioner are to be believed,
they have been deprived of rent for a considerable period of time.
Taking a lock stock and barrel view of the present dispute, the
averments and the documents placed before us, we may record a prima
facie view, that the respondent tenant has for the reasons yet
undemonstrated, been delaying the payment of rent and/or other dues,
payable to the petitioner applicant landlord. This denial of monetary
benefits accruing from the property, when viewed in terms of the
unchallenged market report forming part of the record is undoubtedly
substantial and as such, subject to just exceptions, we pass this order
for deposit of the amount claimed by the petitioner applicant, to ensure
complete justice inter se the parties."
In the case of Tayabali Jaffarbhai Tankiwala VS M/S. Asha
and co and Anr. (1970) 1 SCC P. 46 the Hon'ble Court observed as
follows:
4. "It seems to us that on the facts which have been established the
landlord was bound to fail. It is abundantly clear that he had, in the
second notice dated October 18, 1957, treated the tenancy as
subsisting and not only the respondent was described as a monthly
tenant but also in the plaint, even after the amendment had been
allowed, rent was claimed upto November 1957; thereafter the amount
due was described as compensation for use and Occupation. The
plaintiff was thus fully alive to the distinction between rent and
damages for use and occupation and it cannot be said that he had
abandoned the second notice and asked for the same to be treated as
non-est or that he had relied solely on the first;notice dated June 1'3,
19'56. Under s. 113 of the Transfer of Property Acts notice given under
s. 111, clause (h) is waived with the express or implied consent of the
person to whom it is given by any act on the part of the person giving it
showing an intention to treat the lease as Subsisting. Illustration (b) is
in the following terms.
"(b) A, the lessor, gives B, the lessee, notice to quit the property
leased. The notice expires, and B remains in possession. A gives to B as
lessee a second notice to quit. The first notice is waived".
If only the language of the illustration were to be considered, as
soon as the second notice was given the first, notice- would stand
waived. Counsel for the appellant has relied on the observation of
Denning, J., (as he then was) in Lowenthal v. Vanhoute(1) that where a
tenancy is determined by a notice to quit it is not revived by anything
short of a new tenancy and in order to create a new tenancy there must
be an express or implied agreement to that effect and further that a
subsequent notice to quit is of no effect unless, with other
circumstances, it is the basis for inferring an intention to create a new
tenancy after the expiration of the first. The Privy Council in Harihar
Banerji & Ors. v. Ramsashi Roy & Ors had said that the principles
governing a notice to quit under s. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act
were the same in England as well as in India. For the purpose of the
present case it is wholly unnecessary to decide whether for bringing
about a waiver under s. 113 of the Transfer of Property Act a new
tenancy by an express or implied agreement must come into existence.
All that need be observed is that section 113 in terms does not appear
to indicate any such requirement and all that has to be seen is whether
any act has been proved on the part of the present appellant which
shows an intention to treat the lease as subsisting provided there is an
express or implied consent of the person to whom the notice is given.
5. In the present case there can 'be no doubt that the serving of the second
notice and what was stated therein together with the claim as laid and
amplified in the plaint showed that the landlord waived the first notice
by showing an intention to treat the tenancy as subsisting and ,that
this was with the express or implied consent of the tenant to whom the
first notice had been given because he had even made payment of the
rent which had been demanded though it was after the expiration of the
period of one month given in the notice."
In the case of Asma Lateef and Anr VS Shabbir Ahmad and
Ors. reported in (2024) 4 SCC P-696, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
observed as follows:
"26. We have no hesitation to hold that Rule 10 is permissive in
nature, enabling the trial court to exercise, in a given case, either of the
two alternatives open to it. Notwithstanding the alternative of
proceeding to pronounce judgement the court still has an option not to
pronounce judgment and to make such order in relation to the suit it
considers fit. The verb "shall" in Rule 10 (although substituted for the
verb "may" by the Amendment Act, 1976) does not elevate the first
alternative to the status of a mandatory provision, so much so that in
every case where a party from whom a written statement is invited fails
to file it, the court must pronounce the judgment against him. If that
were the purport, the second alternative to which "shall" equally applies
would be rendered otiose."
Upon perusing the decision relied upon by the Learned Advocate
for the plaintiff it is clear that while a lease has expired and suit for
eviction is pending the lessee after expiry of lease becomes liable to
pay mesne profits.
With regard to the decisions relied upon by Learned Advocate
for the defendants it is clear when by subsequent event suit becomes
infructuous the said suit shall be disposed.
It is also to be remembered that Courts have inherent power to
do justice and to prevent abuse of the process of court under Section
151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Thus prior to passing order for
disposal of suit and before relegating the parties to another suit
Courts have power to grant necessary protection and relief to the
parties in the interest of justice. In this regard it is necessary to refer
to some judicial decisions although not relied upon by the parties.
In the case of Guilherme D'Souza VS Jose Radrigues reported
in AIR 1976 GOA, DAMAN DEU P-22. The Hon'ble Court while issuing
injunction to the respondents from continuing in any manner the
construction till such time as the appeal was filed in the Supreme
Court, to enable the petitioner to obtain an order of injunction from
the Supreme Court against the respondents observed as follows:
"4. As against 'this decision Shri Shinkre has relied on 'S.P. Jain
v. M/s. Kalinga Tubes Ltd., AIR 1964 Ori 72. That was a decision given
by a Division Bench. The application for stay order was in that case
resisted on the ground that there was no application for leave to file an
appeal to the Supreme Court pending before the Orissa High Court and
reliance was placed on a Bench decision given in 'Purna Chand v.
Chamra Bariha', AIR 1954 Ori 114. The learned; Judges however,
relying on the decision in 'Ramendra Narayan v. Bibhabati Debi', AIR
1942 Cal 488, rejected the objection and held that even after the
dismissal of an appeal the High Court has inherent powers under
Section 151, C.P.C, to make an interim order, in aid of the order which
may eventually be passed by the Court dealing with the application for
leave to appeal apart from the provisions of 0.45, Rule 13, C.P.C. In the
opinion of the learned Judges who delivered that judgment the decision
given in the case of 'Manohar Lal v. Seth Hiralal', AIR 1962 SC 527,
concludes the matter. They drew support from the following passage of
the decision in Manohar Lal's case:-
"Section 151 itself says that nothing in the Code shall be deemed
to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Court to make
orders necessary for the ends of justice. In the face of such a clear
statement, it is not possible to hold that the provisions of the Code
control the inherent power by limiting it or otherwise affecting it. The
inherent power has not been conferred upon the Court; it is a power
inherent in the Court by virtue of its duty to do justice between the
parties, before it. Further, when the Code itself recognizes the existence
of the inherent power of the Court, there is no question of implying any
powers outside the limits of the Code."
and held that the High Court had jurisdiction to pass necessary
interim orders even though no application for leave to appeal to the
Supreme Court was pending."
In the case of Mir Bazlay Ali VS Jagirdar Nirkhy Miz
Mahammad Ali reported in AIR 2006 A.P. 131 the Hon'ble Court
while upholding the decision of Trial Court under Section 151 of Code
of Civil Procedure in restoring possession which is taken in violation of
the order injunction was pleased to observe as follows:
"15. From the above, it is clear that the lower appellate Court
found that the 1st respondent-original plaintiff is in possession of the
suit schedule property as on the date of filing of the suit. Therefore, the
lower appellate Court directed the appellant to hand over the suit
schedule site to the respondents and also directed to restore the status
quo ante and granted permanent injunction. There is no creditworthy
evidence adduced by the appellant-defendant and the evidence of D.
Ws 2 to 4 cannot be believed. D. W. 2 is a neighbour of the defendant,
D. W. 3 is defendant's son's father-in-law and D. W. 4 is the tenant of
the defendant. Even the trial Court recorded a finding that the
defendant is in possession and enjoyment of the property in some
extent only. The lower appellate Court after reappreciation of the entire
evidence on record held that Exs. A1 to A63 prove that the plaintiff is
the owner and is in possession of the plaint schedule property as on the
date of filing of the suit and the thatched hut and electricity supply from
the defendant's house to the said hut are new one and that the plaintiff
was dispossessed during the pendency of the suit. The said finding of
fact is based on the evidence on record and there are no grounds to
interfere with the said finding of fact in the Second Appeal under
Section 100 of C. P. C.
15A. I am in complete agreement with the submissions made by
the learned counsel for the respondents that the judgements relied upon
by the learned counsel for the appellant have no relevance to the facts
of this case and they are the cases wherein it was found that the
plaintiff was not in possession of the property as on the date of filing of
the suit and as such, in those cases, it was held that the plaintiff is not
entitled for injunction and the proper remedy available to him was to file
a suit for recovery of possession or amend the plaint accordingly.
Whereas, in this case, there is a categorical finding that the original
plaintiff is in possession of the suit schedule property as on the date of
filing of the suit and a thatched hut was constructed and electricity
supply was given to it from the defendant's house and they are all new
one i. e. after filing of the suit. On reappraisal of the entire evidence on
record, this Court is of the view that the lower appellate Court has not
committed any error in coming to the conclusion that the appellant-
defendant violated the interim injunction and forcibly entered into the
possession of the suit schedule property during the subsistence of the
ad interim injunction. Therefore, as held by the Apex Court, which was
followed by various High Courts in the judgements relied upon by the
learned counsel for the respondents, which are referred to above, that
since the plaintiff was dispossessed from the suit schedule property
during the subsistence of the interim injunction granted by the trial
Court, the Court can order for restoration of possession though not
under S. 144, but under S. 151 of C. P. C. Therefore, the lower appellate
Court rightly held that the respondent-plaintiffs are entitled for
restoration of the status quo ante and also for permanent injunction.
16. In view of the above, there was no necessity for the
respondent-plaintiffs to amend the plaint seeking restitution or
restoration or recovery of possession of the suit schedule property.
Thus, the substantial question of law raised by the learned counsel for
the appellant pales into insignificance. The Second Appeal is, therefore,
devoid of merit and liable to be dismissed."
As this case relates to Debuttar property and Court being
Guardian of the Deity is empowered to see that any steps taken by the
sebaits of the Deities or the trustees is for benefit of the Deities and
the said Debuttar property in the suit. Thus while granting any
permission to any Sebait or trustees in any application in the suit the
Court is to consider the benefit of the Deities.
Thus when Order dated 21st of May, 2009 passed by this
Hon'ble Court is still subsisting and it was observed in the said order
that it is passed for the benefit of the Debuttar Estate and the suit is
not disposed Court is empowered to enforce the order dated 31st of
May,2009 for the benefit of the Deities. Any letter or notice issued by
any Sebait or Trustees in connection with the Debuttar property
without leave of the Court during pendency of suit may not be binding
upon the Court, being Guardian of Deities or upon the Deities.
However as the issue of maintainability of the suit is raised and
there is direction by the Hon'ble Division Bench to decide the issue of
maintainability of the suit first which is not varied by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court but only liberty granted to the plaintiff to take out
necessary application the issue of maintainability has to be decided.
Now as the plaintiff in terms of the liberty granted by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court has filed this instant application and the issue of
maintainability may require certain time to be decided and which may
also be taken before the higher forum on the decision the defendant
although cannot be directed at this stage to pay the entire occupation
charge due but considering the fact that the day today administration
of the Debuttar Estate is suffering due to dearth of fund and huge
taxes are due and payble and it is alleged that about Rs. 4 Crore is
due and payable by Defendant, it would be just and reasonable that
for the benefit of the Debuttar Estate Rs. 1,50,00,000/- (Rupees One
Crore fifty lac) be directed to be paid by the Defendant to the plaintiff.
This payment however will be without prejudice to the rights of the
parties. As similar application being GA-6/2022 is pending for
occupational charges it would be proper to dispose this application
with liberty to the parties to incorporate subsequent facts if any by
supplementary affidavit in the application GA-6/2022 pursuant to the
decision in the issue of maintainability of the suit.
However considering the issues raised in this application
regarding occupants of the suit property it would be just and proper to
appoint special officer to conduct an enquiry at the suit property.
Thus Ms Dipanwita Ghosh Learned Advocate, Ph- 9831548854,
9432597571, and Mr Rajaram Banerjee Advocate Ph 9830189403,
9903300703 are appointed as Joint Special Officers. Learned Special
officers shall upon notice to the parties and their Learned Advocates
visit the suit property take photographs of the building which is
constructed or under construction as the case may be and ascertain
the number of persons occupying the property, under what capacity
they are occupying and the occupation charge paid by them, and to
whom. The Learned Special Officers thereafter shall submit report on
or before 15/01/2026.
Thus this application GA. 9 of 2025 stands allowed in part. The
defendant is directed to pay ad-hoc amount of Rs. 1,50,00,000/-
(Rupees one crore fifty lakh) to the plaintiff on account of occupation
charges which is without prejudice to the rights of the parties. Such
payments shall be made within 5 weeks from date.
As this application stands disposed parties are granted liberty to
bring subsequent events regarding occupation charges in GA. 6/2022
by supplementary affidavit pursuant to the decision with regard to
maintainability.
The Learned Special Officers as observed above shall file report
on or before 15/01/2026 before Learned Regular Bench having
determination as per. Learned Special Officers are entitled to a
remuneration of 1000 G.M. each to be paid by the plaintiff.
Let the matter be placed before the Learned Regular Bench on
15/01/2026, for report of the Special Officers and payment
compliance by Defendant.
(BISWAROOP CHOWDHURY, J.)
