[Cites 7, Cited by 0]
Calcutta High Court
Samsung Electronics Co Ltd vs The Registrar Of Trade Marks And Anr on 9 December, 2025
Author: Ravi Krishan Kapur
Bench: Ravi Krishan Kapur
OIP-50
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
Intellectual Property Rights Division
(COMMERCIAL DIVISION)
ORIGINAL SIDE
IPDTMA/1/2025
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO LTD
VS
THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS AND ANR.
BEFORE:
The Hon'ble JUSTICE RAVI KRISHAN KAPUR
Date : 9th December, 2025
Appearance:
Mr. Sayanta Basu, Sr.Adv.
Mr. Tanmoy Roy, Adv.
...for the petitioner.
Mr. Swatarup Banerjee, Adv.
...for the respondents.
The Court: By the impugned order dated 15 February, 2024 the Senior
Examiner of Trademarks has rejected the application for review on the ground
that the same was not maintainable and did not contain any special reason or
any error apparent on the face of the record.
The application for registration was filed in respect of word "Quantum Dot
TV" in respect of applied goods in Class-9.
The impugned order dated 15 February, 2024 and this appeal has been
filed on 17 January, 2025. There is also no application seeking condonation of
delay.
This appeal has been filed way beyond the prescribed statutory limitation
period of three months. In addition, there are no reasons nor grounds nor
explanation whatsoever provided warranting any condonation of delay.
Section 91 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 provides as follows:
91. Appeals to Appellate Board.--(1) Any person aggrieved by an order or decision of the
Registrar under this Act, or the rules made thereunder may prefer an appeal to the
Appellate Board within three months from the date on which the order or decision sought to
be appealed against is communicated to such person preferring the appeal.
(2) No appeal shall be admitted if it is preferred after the expiry of the period specified
under sub-section (1):
Provided that an appeal may be admitted after the expiry of the period specified therefor, if
the appellant satisfies the Appellate Board that he had sufficient cause for not preferring
the appeal within the specified period.
(3) An appeal to the Appellate Board shall be in the prescribed form and shall be verified in
the prescribed manner and shall be accompanied by a copy of the order or decision
appealed against and by such fees as may be prescribed.
In Shivamma Vs Karnataka Housing Board, 2025 SCC Online SC 1969 it
has been held as followed:
"10. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, reads as under:--
"5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases.--
Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of
Order XXI of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the
prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had
sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such
period.
Explanation.-- The fact that the appellant or the applicant was misled by any order,
practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed
period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section."
11. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, which corresponds to the erstwhile Section 5 of the now-
repealed Limitation Act, 1908, confers upon the courts the discretionary power to admit any
appeal or application (except that under Order XXI of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908) if filed
after the expiry of the prescribed period of limitation, provided the erring party is able to
show to the court a sufficient cause for not filing the same within the stipulated period of
limitation, and the court is satisfied with sufficiency of such cause. It is only in cases,
where such "sufficient cause" for the resultant delay in filing/presenting of the appeal or
application is shown by the defaulting party, and the courts are satisfied with the
explanation and sufficiency of such cause that the recourse to Section 5 of the Limitation
Act may be taken by the courts, and in exercise of its discretion the delay be condoned and
thereby admit the appeal or application.
13. It was submitted that, there is a cleavage of opinion expressed as regards the meaning
of the expression "within such period" occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, wherein
the expression has been understood to mean the period commencing from the last date on
which the appeal or application, as the case may could have been filed i.e., the last day on
which the period of limitation would have expired, up to the actual date on which such
appeal or application is ultimately filed. In other words, the delay that has to be explained
is only for the interregnum period between the expiry of limitation and the actual date of
filing, and the court concerned should be satisfied about the existence of a sufficient cause
resulting in such delay for this period alone. In this regard, reliance was placed on the
decisions of this Court in Ramlal, Motilal & Chhotelal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 SC
361 and State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani, (1996) 3 SCC 132, respectively.
14. Whereas on the other hand, the same expression has been construed to mean that
"sufficient cause" must be shown to have existed not merely during the period of delay post
the expiry of limitation, but rather throughout the entire statutory period of limitation itself
till the date of actual filing. According to this line of authority, "within such period" for the
purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, means the entire duration from the date when the
cause of action accrued or the clock of limitation began to tick, until the date of actual filing.
To put it simply, if the party seeking condonation of delay has no good explanation to offer
for demonstrating the existence of a "sufficient cause" during the period of limitation, which
inhibited the timely filing of the appeal or application, then even if there existed a "sufficient
cause" after the expiry of the limitation that contributed to the delay, the same would be
inconsequential insofar as Section 5 of the Limitation Act is concerned. In this regard,
reliance was placed on the decisions of Ajit Singh Thakur v. State of Gujrat, (1981) 1 SCC
495 and State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3612,
respectively."
Even on merits, the petitioner is unprepared and is unable to assist this
Court even in third call.
In view of the above, IPDTMA/1/2025 stands dismissed on the ground of
maintainability.
(RAVI KRISHAN KAPUR, J.)
spal
