Sunday, 17, May, 2026
 
 
 
Expand O P Jindal Global University
 
  
  
 
 
 

Abhijit Tie Up (P) Ltd. & Ors vs The State Of W Est Bengal & Ors
2023 Latest Caselaw 6166 Cal

Citation : 2023 Latest Caselaw 6166 Cal
Judgement Date : 14 September, 2023

Calcutta High Court (Appellete Side)
Abhijit Tie Up (P) Ltd. & Ors vs The State Of W Est Bengal & Ors on 14 September, 2023
                                                                     1


                     IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA

                CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION

                           APPELLATE SIDE



Present:

THE HON'BLE JUSTICE HARISH TANDON
            &
THE HON'BLE JUSTICE PRASENJIT BISW AS


                            WPLRT 64 OF 2022


                        Abhijit Tie Up (P) Ltd. & Ors.
                                   Vs.
                       The State of W est Bengal & Ors.

Appearance:

For the Petitioner          : M r. Shaktinath M ukherjee, Sr. Adv.

                              M r. Siddhartha Banerjee, Adv.

                              M r. Rahul Karmakar, Adv.

                              M r. Soumajit M ajumdar, Adv.

                              M s. Shayantee Dutta, Adv.




For the State                : M r. Chandi Charan Dey, Ld. AGP

                               M r. Anirban Sarkar, Adv.




Judgment On                : 14.09.2023
                                                                                 2


  Harish Tandon, J.:




      The instant writ petition raises an important and seminal point

relating to the status of the writ petitioner in relation to a factory land where

the mutation in the Record of Right was denied taking shelter under the

various provisions of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 and the

West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955.


      The facts are more or less undisputed. One Bissesswar Dutta was the

owner of a plot of land measuring 22 Bighas of garden land with a structure

and duly mutated his name in the Record of Right. Upon the death of the

said owner his widow and the son transferred and conveyed the said land in

favour of one Indian Malleable Castings Pvt. Ltd. Subsequently, the Record

of Right was corrected and the land comprised under the said deed of sale

was referred as Karkhana instead of Bagan. Thereafter, a winding-up

petition was filed against the said Indian Malleable Castings Pvt. Ltd. being

CP no. 72 of 1975 and an order was passed by the Company Court for sale

of the assets of the said company. The writ petitioner purchased the land

from the Court sale and subsequently applied for mutation of their names in

the Record of Rights. Since the authorities refused to record the name

taking shelter under the various provisions of the aforesaid Act, the Tribunal

was approached and the Tribunal Application was ultimately dismissed. The

instant writ petition is filed assailing the order of the Tribunal.
                                                                                3


      The respondent/State filed a written note of arguments supporting the

judgment of the Tribunal citing various provisions of the Act which shall be

dealt with hereinafter. However, Mr. Mukherjee, the learned Senior Advocate

appearing for the writ petitioner raises an important issue in relation to

Section 4, Section 5 and Section 6 of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act

and contends that the harmonious reading of the aforesaid provision leaves

no ambiguity that the non-agricultural tenant was kept outside the purview

of the vesting provisions. According to him, the definition of a intermediary

under Section 2 (f) of the Act of 1953 is explicit and categorical that it would

mean a proprietor, tenure holder or any other intermediary above a Rayat or

a non-agricultural tenant and, therefore, by virtue of Section 4 of the said

Act, the right of intermediary had vested with the State. It is further

submitted that the definition of a intermediary is exposite that non-

agricultural tenant were kept outside the purview of the vesting provision of

the said Act which would further be evident from Section 6 (1) (g) thereof.

According to Mr. Mukherjee, the provisions contained under Section 6 of the

Act confers right upon the intermediary to retain certain categories of the

land w.e.f. the date of the vesting and in relation to a land comprised only

mills, factories or workshop, such retention is subject to the provision of

sub-Section (3) thereof. Mr. Mukherjee further submits that sub-Section (3)

of Section 6 is again applicable in case of a land comprised in tea garden,

mill, factory and workshop in relation to an intermediary or where the land

is held under lease to be entitled to retain only so much of such land as in

the opinion of the State Government is required for such purposes and a

person holding under a lease for the purpose of assessment of compensation

is deemed to have intermediary. Mr. Mukherjee further takes us to sub-

Section (5) of Section 6 of the said Act wherein the right to retain the land

under sub-Section (1) of the said Section is provided and in the event no

choice is exercised, the Revenue Officer of its own after giving an

opportunity of being heard shall permit the retention of the land subject to

the limits specified in Clause (c), (d) and (j) of sub-Section (1) of Section 6 of

the Act. It is further contended that the right of a Raiyat or non-agricultural

tenant has not been disturbed under the said Act and the vesting provision

is applicable in case of an intermediary above the Raiyat or non-agricultural

tenant. Mr. Mukherjee further relied upon the provision of the Section 3A of

the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 in support of his contention that

the State Government was conscious that the Raiyat and/or non-

agricultural tenants are not subject to the vesting under the Act of 1953 and

introduced such amendment by way of Section 3A imbibing within itself the

non-agricultural tenant and the vesting of such land in the State free from

all encumbrances. The said amended Section came into effect on and from

the 9th Day of September, 1980 which would be evident from sub-Section (5)

of Section 3A of the Act of 1955 and, therefore, prior to the said effective

date the right of the non-agricultural tenant did not vest under the Act of

1953. Mr. Mukherjee further submits that explanation appended to sub-

Section 1 of Section 3A of the Act postulates that Section 5 and 5A of the Act

of 1953 shall not affect in any way the vesting of the rights and interest of

the non-agricultural tenant or under tenant under the West Bengal Non-

Agricultural Tenancy act, 1949 in the State under sub-Section (1) thereof.

However, sub-Section (2) was further placed where the non-agricultural

tenant holding in his Khas possession any land to which the provision of

sub-Section (1) applied be entitled to retain as a Raiyat, the said land

subject to the ceiling limit given under Section 14M of the act of 1955, Mr.

Mukherjee is very much vocal in his submission that by introduction of

Section 3A of the Act of 1955 the non-agricultural tenant have been equated

with the Raiyat w.e.f the said date and entitled to retain the land subject to

the ceiling area defined in Clause (e) of sub-Section (1) of Section 14M is

beyond 24 Acres or 7 standard hectares. Mr. Mukherjee further submits

that Section 4B which was introduced by way of an amendment more

particularly, sub-Section (2) thereof inexplicitly indicate that where an

intermediary has been allowed to retain land irrespective of area and

classification with or without any order passed under Clause (g) of sub-

Section 1 and sub-section 3 of Section 6 of the Act of 1953 or general

transfer has taken place at the behest of such retainer. Such retainer or

transferee shall be deemed to hold a land or part thereafter as lessee directly

w.e.f the date of the vesting under the Act of 1953 or from the date of such

transfer as the case may be. According to Mr. Mukherjee, the aforesaid

provision is applicable in relation to an intermediary having an interest in

the land by virtue of Raiyat or a non-agricultural tenant and, therefore, the

stand of the Government in this regard is misplaced. Lastly, Mr. Mukherjee

submits that the original owner was holding the property as Raiyat which

would be evident from the entry in the Record of Rights to have been shown

as a STITHIBAN and having transferred the land to a company much before

coming into force of the Act of 1953 and the Record of Right was corrected

as Karkhana, the provision of the aforesaid Act contemplates the purpose

for which the land is used which is distinct from the other aspects. He

further submits that the moment the right of a Raiyat is transferred and

neither the Act of 1953 nor 1955 takes away the right of the Raiyat, the

Raiyat continues to remain in such capacity under the State upon vesting of

the right of the intermediary which in unequivocal term is by virtue of a

right of a Raiyat. Mr. Mukherjee thus submits that in whichever angle the

case is considered, there is no necessity of approaching the Government for

taking a lease and, therefore, the order of the Tribunal is infirm and/or

illegal.

On the other hand, the State in his written notes of argument relied

upon a definition of non-agricultural tenant under the West Bengal Non-

Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949 in support of his contention that any land

which is not used for agriculture or horticulture or held on any lease for

purposes not connected therewith irrespective of whether it is used for any

other purpose or not would be regarded as a non-agricultural tenant. It is

further contended that the aforesaid definition leaves no ambiguity that the

land held on any lease for the purpose connected with the agriculture or

horticulture irrespective of whether it is used for any other purpose cannot

be a non-agricultural tenant under the aforesaid definition section. It is

further contended that at one point of time the plots in question were

regarded as bagan and pond and, therefore, the original purpose was

agriculture and/or horticulture and, therefore, comes within the purview of

the Act of 1953. It is further contended that there was no express

permission sought for converting the subject plots of land from an

agriculture/horticulture to a non-agricultural land and, therefore, the Act of

1949 does not apply. Taking aid of the definition of Non -Agricultural

Tenancy Act of 1949 it is submitted that the land does not come under the

purview of the said Act as it remained an agricultural tenancy and, comes

under the purview of an Act of 1953. It is further contended that under

Clause (g) of sub-Section (3) of Section 6 thereof a recourse is required to

take a long term lease from the Government. It is thus contended that all

the plots being the subject matter of the instant writ petition were regarded

as Karkhana in the finally published RS Record of Rights and were retained

under Section 6 (1) (g) read with Section 6 (3) of the Act of 1953 and,

therefore, it is obligatory on the part of the writ petitioners to approach the

Government for a long term lease.

The facts adumbrated hereinabove are undisputed but the parties are

at variance on the applicability of the several provisions of the Act touching

upon the incidences and the consequences flowing therefrom. Admittedly,

the plot of land comprising of 22 Bighas of green land (Bagan) was sold,

transferred and conveyed to M/s. Indian Malleable Castings Pvt. Ltd.

much before coming in force of the Act of 1953, the said company

subsequently used and utilized the said green land (Bagan ) for the purpose

of factory (Karkhana) and indubitably the record of right also reflects so.

The West Bengal Non-agricultural Tenancy Act was promulgated in 1949

after independence and the object and the reasons for incorporation of the

said Act appears to be laudable in the sense that because of the radical

growth in the urban areas the tenants were facing the menace of mass

eviction in the hands of unscrupulous landlords as there was no protection

against the eviction provided under the Transfer of Property Act which was

in vogue at that relevant point of time. Though the Act came after

independence yet the object and the reasons would evince that during the

British Era a Committee of enquiry was constituted in 1938 with regard to

the rights and the obligations of the non-agricultural tenant in the then

province. A comprehensive Bill was introduced by the Bengal Legislative

Assembly before it was segregated from the province and thereafter the said

Act was introduced giving protection to a non-agricultural tenant against the

eviction and also the corresponding obligations of the landlord and such

non-agricultural tenant. The definition of the 'non-agricultural tenant'

under Section 2 (5) of the Act of 1949 postulates that a person holding non -

agricultural land under another person and is, or but for a special contract

would be liable to pay rent for such person for that land and does not

include a person who holds any premises or part of any premises, situated

on non-agricultural land or owned by another person, and who is, or but for

a special contract would be liable to pay a rent for such premise s or such

part of the premises to such person. The explanation appended thereto

defines the word 'Premises' to mean any building such as house,

manufactory, warehouse, stable, shop or hut whether constructed of

masonry, bricks, concrete, wood, mud and metal or any other material

whatsoever and includes any land appertaining to such building.

Subsequently, the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953 was

promulgated to provide for the acquisition of estate or rights of

intermediaries therein and of certain rights of raiyats and under raiyats and

of the rights of certain other persons in land comprised in estates. The

primary object of promulgation of the Act of 1953 was abolition of a

Zamindari system. By the Act of 1953, the right of intermediary

extinguished with the avowed object of bringing an egrarian reforms; the

intermediary is defined in Section 2 (i) of the Act of 1953 as follows:

―2(i). ‗intermediary' means a proprietor, tenure-holder, under-tenure-

holder or any other intermediary above a raiyat or a non-agricultural tenant

and includes a service tenure-holder and, in relation to mines and minerals,

includes a lessee and a sub-lessee.‖

The meaningful reading of the said definition conveyed a laudable

object of the said legislation that a proprietor, a tenure-holder, under-

tenure-holder or any other intermediary above a raiyat or non-agricultural

tenant shall stand vested with the State free from all encumbrances under

Section 4 of the Act of 1953. The non-agricultural tenant is again defined in

the said Act of 1953 to mean a tenant of non-agricultural land who holds

under a proprietor, a tenure-holder, a service tenure-holder or an under

tenure-holder. It is apposite to record that the said Act of 1953 having an

avowed object of extinguishing the Zamindari system and vest the land with

the State but protected the interest of a raiyat or a non-agricultural tenant

as such right did not vest into the State. In other words, the non -

agricultural tenant were kept outside the purview of the Act of 1953 as they

do not satisfy the definition of an intermediary given under Section 2 (i) of

the said Act. By virtue of Section 4 of the Act of 1953, the State Government

by notification shall declare the effective date of vesting of all estates and the

rights of the intermediaries and it is not in dispute that the property

situated in the area has also come within the purview of such notification.

Section 5 of the Act of 1953 is a repository of the effect of the

notification and have undergone several amendments subsequently, brought

by the legislatures; Section 5 (1) (c) deals with the non-agricultural tenancy

subject to the provision of Section 6(3) wherein every non-agricultural

tenant holding a land under intermediary and until the provision of Chapter

VI are given effect to, shall hold the same directly under the State treating

the State to be an intermediary on the same terms and conditions as

immediately before the date of vesting. Clause (d) of the aforesaid provision

makes obligatory on the every non-agricultural tenant holding under an

intermediary to pay to the State his rent and other dues in respect of his

land on and from the date of vesting.

The composite reading of the aforesaid provisions leaves no ambiguity

that the non-agricultural tenant is treated to have held the tenancy under

the intermediary and such tenancy has been kept outside the purview of the

Act of 1953. The said non-agricultural tenant shall continue to hold the

land directly under the State as the right of the intermediary vested with the

State and the State is regarded as an intermediary for the purpose of

collection of the rent and the other obligations attached to such non -

agricultural tenancy and shall continue to hold the land on the same terms

and conditions as he was before the date of vesting. Section 6 of the said

Act of 1953 though starting with the non-obstante Clause yet give a

protection on the right to the intermediary to retain the land with effect from

the vesting with certain conditions of the other provisions and imbibed

within itself the land comprised in mills, factories and workshops. Section

6(3) of the Act of 1953 provides that in case the land is comprised in mill,

tea-garden, factory and workshop the intermediary, or where the land is

held under a lease, the lessee, shall be entitled to retain so much of such

land as in the opinion of the State Government is required for such

purposes. The combined reading of the various sub -sections under Section

6 is exposit to the extent that the land comprised in non-agricultural

tenancy shall not be disturbed and a right of the intermediary to retain such

land is provided therein, which leads to unequivocal conclusion that the

non-agricultural tenancy was kept outside the purview of the Act of 1953

and does not get effected or extinguished by its operation. The aforesaid

conclusion will get further impetus from a subsequent amendment having

brought by inserting Section 3A of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955.

The said Section is quoted as under:

―3A. Rights of non-agricultural tenants and under-tenants in non-

agricultural land to vest in the State. - (1) The rights and interests of all non-

agricultural tenants and under-tenants under the West Bengal Non-

Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949 (West Ben. Act XX of 1949) shall vest in the

State fr ee from all encumbrances, and the provisions of Sections 5 and 5A of

the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 (West Ben. Act I of 1954) shall

apply, with such modifications as may be necessary, mutatis mutandis to all

such non-agricultural tenants and under-tenants as if such non-agricultural

tenants and under tenants were inter mediaries and the land held by them

were estates and a person holding under a non-agricultural tenant or under-

tenant were a raiyat.

Explanation.- Nothing in sections 5 and 5A of the West Bengal Estates

Acquisition Act, 1953 shall be construed to affect in any way the vesting of

the rights and interests of a non-agricultural tenant or under-tenant under

the West Bengal Non-Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949 in the State under sub-

section (1) of this section.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), a non-

agricultural tenant or under-tenant under the West Bengal Non- Agricultural

Tenancy Act, 1949 (West Ben. Act XX of 1949), holding in his khas possession

any land to which the provisions of sub-section (1) apply, shall, subject to the

other provisions of this Act, be entitled to retain as a raiyat the said land

which together with other lands, if any, held by him shall not exceed the

ceiling area under Section 14M.

(3) Every intermediary, -

(a) whose land held in his khas possession has vested in the

State under sub-section (1), or

(b) whose estates or interests, other than land held in his khas

possession, have vested in the State under sub-section (1),

Shall be entitled to receive an amount to be deter mined in accordance with

the provisions of section 14V.

(4) The provisions of th is section shall not apply to any land to which

the provisions of the West Bengal Thika Tenancy (Acquisition and Regulation)

Act, 2001 (West Ben. Act XXXII of 2001), apply.

(5) This section shall be deemed to have come into for ce on and from

the 9th day of September, 1980.‖

Upon incorporation of Section 3A of the Act of 1955, for the first time,

the rights and interests of the non-agricultural tenant stood vested in the

State free from all encumbrances as those non-agricultural tenants were the

intermediaries in the land held by them under estates and the person

holding the non-agricultural land were a raiyat. By virtue of the aforesaid

Section, the provisions contained under Section 5 and the 5A of the Act of

1953 was extended to those non-agricultural tenants meaning thereby that

they would be regarded as a tenant directly under the State and shall pay

the rent directly to the State. The Sub-Section 2 of Section 3A of the Act of

1955 has a overriding effect on Sub-Section 1 of Section 3A which is

primarily related to the vesting of non-agricultural tenancy into the State, be

entitled to retain as a raiyat of the said land but subject to the ceiling limit

of Section 14M of the Act of 1955. The cumulative effect of the aforesaid

provisions leaves no ambiguity that the non-agricultural tenancy was kept

outside the purview of the Act of 1953 but later on included in the Act of

1955 and upon introduction of Section 3A of the Act of 1955 stood vested

with the State and their status was considered as a raiyat holding a land

directly under the State on the same terms and conditions as it w as before

the date of vesting, however, subject to the ceiling limit under Section 14M

of the Act of 1955.

A point is raised by the State that the land was originally an

agricultural land (Bagan) and, therefore, even if it is subsequently recorded

as Karkhana it does not ipso facto change its character as such recording is

erroneous. As indicated above, the said land was all along used as

'Karkhana' which is undisputed (before the promulgation of Act of 1953 or

an Act of 1955) and continued thereafter. What is material in this regard is

the nature of the land as on the date of the vesting and it is undisputed that

it was recorded as Karkhana at such relevant point of time . The Division

Bench Judgment rendered in case Collector of 24- Parganas vs. Life

Insurance Corporation of India, reported in 74 CWN 166 throws light on

the aforesaid concept wherein it is held that mere record of right prepared

under the Act of 1953 refers to the date of vesting being a relevant date to

ascertain the rights of the parties under the said Act, what is important in

this regard is the nature of the land as on the date of the vesting and if the

land is under the non-agricultural tenancy it would be deemed to be so on

the advent of Act of 1953. The relevant excerpts from the aforementioned

judgment is quoted as under:

―2. That the disputed lands were Beels at the date of preparation of

the record of rights is not disputed. But the parties differ on the question

whether the same were Beels from before the date of vesting under the West

Bengal Estates Acquisition Act or converted into Beels after the said date.

The Assistant Settlement Officer, who dealt with the matter in the first

instance, was apparently of the view that the disputed lands were not Beels

at the date of vesting, but were converted into Beels after that date and as,

apparently, in his view, the date of vesting was the relevant point of time he

refused the opposite parties' application for correction or revision of the

record of rights by changing the description of the disputed lands into Beels.

The petitioners' r eal grievance was that the learned Assistant Settlement

Officer did not allow them an opportunity to adduce full evidence, including

production of documents and cross-examination of the State's witnesses. The

appellate tribunal below, however, being of the view that the relevant point of

time would be the date of preparation of the record of rights, allowed the

petitioners' appeals and their applications for revision of the record of rights

by directing the description of the disputed lands as Beels, upon the view

that they having been admittedly Beels at the date of preparation of the said

records, no other question would be relevant and the point whether they were

Beels at the date of vesting might be left op en and undecided in our opinion,

the learned appellate tribunal was in error in its approach, as indicated

above. The record of rights which is prepared under the Act is for carr ying

out the purposes of the Act and the purposes of the Act, primarily, at least,

have refer ence to the date of vesting, which is the relevant date for judging

the rights of the parties under the Act. The records, therefor e, must have

reference to the state of things as it exists at the said date of vesting. ‖

In Ambika Prasad Thakur & Ors. vs. Ram Ekbal Rai (Dead) by

His Legal Representatives & Ors., reported in AIR 1966 SC 605, the

Apex Court have recognized the concept of existence of a thing in its

continuity in juxtaposition with the date of vesting and applied the rule of

presumption in favour of its continuance in the following:

―15. The survey records of 1892, 1895, 1904 and 1909 disclose that

the ancestors of the plaintiffs held some of the Fortier plots of Dubha Mal.

The High Court was, therefore, asked to draw the inference that then

ancestors held those plots during 1845 to 1863 when the Taufir land

accreted. The question is whether such an inference should be drawn. Now,

if a thing or a state of things is shown to exists, an inference of it continuity

within a reasonably proximate time both forwards and backward may

sometimes be drawn. The presumption of futur e continuance noticed in

Illustration (d) to Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. In

appropriate cases, an inference of the continuity of a thing or state of things

backwards may be drawn under this section, though on this point the section

does not give a separate illustration. The rule that the presumption of

continuance may operate retrospectively has been recognize both in India, see

Anangamanjari Chowdhrani v. Tripura Soondar Chowdhrani and England,

see Bristow v. Cormican, Doe v. Young. Th e board observation in Manmatha

Nath Haldary v. Girish Chandra Roy and Hemendra Nath Roy Chowdhury v.

Jnanendn Prasanna Bhaduri that there is no rule of evidence by which one

can presume the continuity of things backwards cannot be supported. The

presumption of continuity weakens with the passage of time. How far the

presumption may be drawn both backwards and for wards depends upon the

nature of the thing and the surrounding circumstances. In the present case

the High Court rightly refused to draw the in ference from the state of things

during 1892 to 1909 that the ancestors of the plaintiffs held frontier plots of

Dubha Mal in 1863. The High Court pointed out that even during 1894 to

1905 the ownership of some of the plots had changed and also that the

frontier Mal plots and the corresponding Taufir plot were not always held by

the same person. In 1845, part of the Mal lands was under water. The

frontier Mal lands re-for med between 1845 to 1863 where subject to annual

inundation. It is well- known that settlement of Char lands are seasonal and

temporary. There is a considerable gap of time between 1892 and 1845. It is

not safe to assume that the state of things during 1894 to 1905 existed

during 1845 to 1863.‖

The point that the non-agricultural tenancy was kept outside the

purview of the Act of 1953 gets further impetus from the judgment of the

Supreme Court in case of Shivsankar Nandi vs. Prabartak Sangha &

Ors., reported in AIR 1967 SC 940 in the following:

―9. Counsel however contended that the first respondent having merely

the right to receive rent, it was an ‗inter mediary' within the meaning of Act 1

of 1954, that under that Act the interests of such an intermediary vested in

the State on the extension of that Act to Chandernagore and therefore the

Association had no locus standi to apply for transfer. This contention also

cannot be accepted, for an ‗inter mediary' as defined in Section 2 (1) (i) of that

Act means ‗a proprietor, tenure-holder, under-tenure holder, or any other

intermediary above a raiyat or a non-agricultural tenant and in r elation to

mines and minerals, a lessee or a sub-lessee'. It is thus obvious that the 1 st

respondent being itself a non-agricultural tenant in respect of the entire land

including the land in dispute it does not fall within this definition. Not being

thus an intermediary it is impossible to say that its interests in the land in

dispute vested in the State or that therefore it was not entitled to apply

under Section 24.‖

The State has taken a point that by virtue of Section 6 (3) of the Act of

1953, the non-agricultural tenancy was impliedly taken within the engulf of

the aforesaid Act does not appear to be sound for the reasons that the State

with the conscious mind that the non-agricultural tenancies were kept

outside the purview of the Act of 1953, introduced Section 3A in the Act of

1955 imbibing the non-agricultural tenant and such tenancy to be vested in

the State. The stand of the State does not appear to be sound and logical

that even after the incorporation of Section 3A in the Act of 1955, Section 6

(3) of the Act of 1953 includes the non-agricultural tenancy as the power

was given to the intermediary to retain such land. The object and the

reasons behind the incorporation of Section 6 (3) of the Act 1953 can be

visualized that the non-agricultural tenancy was kept outside the purview of

the Act and, therefore, their right should not be affected on vesting of the

intermediary right as the intermediary was entitled to retain such land so as

to protect the interest of the non-agricultural tenant. Sub-Section 2 of

Section 3A of the Act of 1955 which was brought by an amendment in 1986

having a retroactive effect from 09.09.1980 creates an embargo in holding

the land above the ceiling limit which does not affect the right of a non-

agricultural tenant to continue with the occupation if the land comprised in

such non-agricultural tenancy falls within the ceiling limit provided under

Section 14M of the said Act. Section 14M in Act of 1955 are brought under

Chapter II B relatable to the ceiling of the land held by the raiyat and there

is no ambiguity to say that after the incorporation of Section 3A, the non-

agricultural tenant is entitled to hold the land subject, however, to the

ceiling limit provided therein. Section 14Z (2) of the Act is relatable to a

land comprised in mill, factory and others but we are concerned with the

factory, mill or workshop in the present purpose where the State

Government may permit such raiyat to retain the land in excess of the

prescribed ceiling which in the opinion of the State Government is required

for such purposes. The aforesaid Sub-Section 2 of Section 14Z has its

applicability in the event the land is in excess of the ceiling limit provided in

Section 14M of the Said Act and cannot be extended to a situation where the

land falls within such ceiling limit. In the instant case, the land is within

the ceiling limit and, therefore, the Sub-Section 2 of Section 14Z of the Act

of 1955 is not applicable.

The identical situation arose in case of Juhi Finalease (p) Ltd. &

Anr. V. The State of West Bengal & Ors. reported in (2017) 3 CHN 97. In

the said case, the argument was advanced on behalf of the State that the

land in question vested in its entirety upon the State under the provision of

Section 4 of the Act of 1953 and the right of retention of land upto the

ceiling limit was dependent upon the exercise of option of the intermediary

and, therefore, in absence of any material such option was exercised, the

land stood vested with the State. A further argument was advanced on

behalf of the State that the retention of land in Clause (g) of sub-Section (1)

of Section 6 of the Act of 1953 is not controlled or guided by the provision of

the Act of 1949 and, therefore, the retention cannot be presumed to be

automatic. Admittedly, in the given case the land comprised of a mill or

factory having various shades and structures standing thereupon and the

applicability of Section 6 (3) of the Act of 1953 was questioned therein. The

Division Bench after considering the respective submissions advanced at the

Bar held:

32. Section 4 of the said Act, 1953, provides for issuance of notification from time to time declaring vesting of all estates and the rights of every inter mediary in each such estate situated in any district of the State of West Bengal in the State free from all encumbrances from the date mentioned in such notification.

33. The provisions of Section 5 of the said Act, 1953, deal with the effect of notification issued under Section 4 of the said Act, 1953. According to the provision of clause(a) of sub-section(1) of Section 5 of the said Act, 1953, upon the deemed publication of a notification under Section 4 of the said Act, 1953, and upon the date of vesting the estates and the right of the intermediary in the estates, to which the declaration applies, shall vest in the State free from all encumbrances.

34. In Section 6 of the said Act, 1953, right of intermediary to retain different categories of land are dealt with. It is provided in the above Section that notwithstanding anything contained in Sections 4 and 5, an intermediary shall, except in the cases mentioned in the proviso to subsection (2) but subject to the other provisions of that Section, be entitled to retain with effect from the date of vesting. Sub-section(1) of Section 6 of the said Act, 1953, deals with retention of different categories of land under different clauses.

35. Provisions of Clauses (a), (b) and (g) of sub-section(1) of Section 6 of the said Act, 1953, deal with only land comprised in and not appertaining to the categories of lands mentioned in the above clauses. The above interpretation of the aforesaid provisions of the said Act, 1953, lends support from a decision of a division bench of this Court in the matter of Saregama India Limited (Supra)

36. The term ―comprising‖ is defined in the Concise Oxford English Dictionary, Twelfth Edition, (at page 295 in South Asia Edition), as - consist of; be made,*(also be comprised of) make up ; constitute.

37. The above term is defined in the New International Webster's Comprehensive Dictionary of English Language, Deluxe En cyclop edic Edition, (at page 269), as - to include and contain; consist of; embrace.

38. So, under the scheme of the said Act, 1953, land appertaining to the lands mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (g) will not come under any of the aforesaid clauses.

39. The lands mentioned in clauses (a), (c) and (d) of sub-section(1) of Section 6 of the said Act, 1953, have their resp ective ceiling.

40. Therefore, the land of an industrial unit appertaining to the land comprised in a mill, factory and workshop should not come under clause(g) of sub-section(1) of Section 6 and the same will be governed by clause(c) of sub -section(1) of Section 6 of the said Act, 1953, provided factory related activity appears to be carried on such land on the date of vesting.

41. Under the provision of clause(b) of sub-section(1) of Section 6 of the said Act, 1953, land comprised in or appertaining to buildings and structures (owned by the intermediary or by any p erson, not being a tenant, holding under him by leave or license) can be retained without any ceiling. It will not be out of context to observe here that under the above provision, lands described in clause(b) of sub-section(1) of Section 6 of the said Act, 1953, whether or not in the possession of the intermediary or the person concerned, can be r etained without any ceiling.

42. N ecessary to point out that the said Act, 1953, does not provide for taking over any building and structure and as a result does not contain any provision for assessment and payment of compensation. However , retention of agricultural or non-agricultural land is subject to the further condition of being possessed in khas by the inter mediary seeking retention.

43. Under the provision of sub-section(2) of Section 6 of the said Act, 1953, the intermediary retaining the land loses his pre-vesting status and deemed to hold such land directly under the State from the date of vesting as a tenant, subject to payment of such rent as may be deter mined under the provision of the above Act and as entered in the record of rights finally published under Chapter V of the said Act, 1953, except that no rent shall be payable for the land referred to in clause(h) or (j) of sub-section(1) of Section 6 of the above Act. Proviso to sub- section(2) of Section 6 of the said Act, 1953 applies to leasehold land only.

44. Under the provision of sub-Rule (2) of Rule 4 of the said Rules, 1954, if the land held by the intermediary be non-agricultural land, then he shall hold it as a tenant under the said Act, 1949, holding non-agricultural land for not less than twelve years without any lease in writing. If the land held by the intermediary is agricultural land, he shall hold it, mutate mutandis on the terms and conditions mentioned in the specific Section of the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1885. So, the status of post vesting intermediary retaining any land under Section 6 of the Said Act, 1953, is not that of a licensee, but that of a statutory tenant.

45. Noteworthy, under the provisions of Section 7 of the West Bengal Non - Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1949, the right of retainer over the land is transferable.

46. Subsequently, the non-agricultural tenancy and under tenancies were made to vest under Section 3A of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955, (hereinafter referred to as the said Act, 1955) with effect from September 9, 1980, and only the provisions of Section 5 and 5A of the said Act, 1953, have been made applicable but sub-section(3) of Section 6 of the said Act, 1953, has no application in respect of vesting under Section 3A of the said Act, 1 955.

47. Sub-section(3) of Section 6 of the said Act, 1953, is in the nature of proviso to sub-section(2) of Section 6 of the above Act. It carves out an exception from sub - section(2) of Section 6 of the above Act. It deals with the retention of land comprised in a tea-garden, mill, factory or workshop by the intermediary. According to the above provision the intermediary, or where a land is held under a lease, the lessee, shall be entitled to retain only so much of such land as in the opinion of the State Government, is required for the tea-garden, mill, factory or workshop, as the case may be, and a person holding under a lease shall, for the purpose of assessment of compensation, deemed to be an intermediary. A Division Bench of this Court, while analyzing the provisions of clause(g) of sub- section(1) of Section 6 with that of sub-section(3) of Section 6 of the said Act, 1953, in the matter of BRC Construction Company Private Limited v. State of West Bengal, reported in 2015 (3) CHN (CAL) 658, observed as follows:--

―57. Upon a car eful analysis of the provisions of section 6(1) (g) read with section 6 (3), it can even be applied to one cattah plot with a small manufacturing unit. It may well be that post-vesting tenant of one cattah plot

has no other plot and in the event of his stopping the operation of such unit after date of vesting there may be a claim of the State Government to revise the order of retention and resume even to such one cattah plot such an application of said two provisions will be contrary to the scheme of the Act seeking to bring about agrarian reform.

58. But, such an interpretation of the two provisions, namely, section 6(1) (g) and 6 (3) read with recently introduced explanation are not of any assistance to the State Government. As revision of section 6(3) and any vesting of a portion of the whole of the retained plot of lant with structures thereon will be an unjust deprivation and deprivation offending the provisions of Articles 14 and 300A of the Constitution of India. An intermediary holding a bare plot of land will be entitled to compensation according to the scheme of sections 16 and 17. But, a post-vesting tenant holding mill, factory structures will be having no comp ensation at all for structur es and buildings as the Act does n ot provide for it. The provision of sections 16 and 17 are illusory in their content and in their application to lands comprised in mills and factories when they are sought to be vested upon revision. The provisions of section 16(1) (g) lead to absurdity.

59. The Estates Acquisition Act does not contemplate vesting of land with structures and, therefore, do not provide for any comp ensation not even of their vesting.

60.We are informed that the decisions of this Court on similar lines in Saregama India Limit ed v. State of West Bengal reported in 2014 (2) Calcutta Law Times 311 and the State of West Bengal v. Star Iron Works Limited reported in 2012 (2) Calcutta Law Times 639 were challenged before the Supreme Court of India and the challenges proved to be futile.‖

48. It was held by another division bench of this Court in the matter of The State of West Bengal v. Star Iron Works, reported in AIR 2012 Cal 148, in respect of a in respect of a mill which was closed before the date of vesting there could not be any question of assessing the requirement of factory and the relevant portion of the above decision is quoted below:--

―32. Having regard to the scheme of the said West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act and the language of sub-section(3) including the proviso thereto, there can be no doubt that Section 6(3) applies only to mill or factory which was in operation or was functioning on the date of vesting. In respect of a mill which was closed

long befor e the date of vesting there could not be any question of ass essing the requirement of factory. Section 6 (3) does not directly deal with the right of retention. It really deals with the extent of retention and such extent is required to be deter mined having regard to the requirement of a mill, factory.

(Emphasis supplied).

33 .........

34 .........

35 .........

36 .........

37 .........

38. From the records, it does not appear that the lands in question was ever allowed to be retained by the State Government under Section 6(3) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act after assessing the requir ement for the purpose of said running factory. The learned senior counsel of the respondent Company specifically submitted before us that there was no question of applicability of Section 6(3) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act in the facts of the present case as the respondent No. 1 Company acquired the lands from the learned Receiver appointed by the High Court and the said lands are recorded as the retained lands of the predecessors-in-title. It is the sp ecific case of the said Company that the respondent Company cannot be deprived of the said land by unjust and illegal invocation of Section 6(3) of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act.‖

49. Under the provision of sub-section (5) of Section 6 of the said Act, 1953, If no choice is exercised by an intermediary for retention of land under sub-section(1) of Section 6 of the above Act, the Revenue Officer shall, after giving him an opportunity of being heard, allow him to retain so much of land as do not exceed the limits specified in clauses (c), (d) and (j) of that sub-section.

It is held in the aforesaid decision that if the non-agricultural land is

held by the intermediary it would continue to hold the same as a tenant

under the Act of 1949 provided it is beyond the 12 years under sub-Rule (2)

of Rule 4 of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Rules, 1954 and, therefore,

the status of a post vesting intermediary retaining any land is not that of a

licensee but that of a statutory tenant. It is further held that after the

introduction of Section 3A in the Act of 1955, the provisions of Section 5

and 5A of the Act of 1953 is made applicable but the provisions contained

under Section 6 (3) of the Act of 1953 has no manner of applications in

relation to a vesting contemplated under Section 3A of the Act of 1955. It is

further held that the aforesaid last Section as mentioned above is in effect,

Proviso to the sub-Section (2) of Section 6 of the Act of 1953 and the

cumulative effect of the above would bring no ambiguity that the non-

agricultural tenant can retain the land provided it falls within the ceiling

limit of Section 14M in the instant case. Indubitably the land in question is

well within the ceiling limit indicated under Section 14M and, therefore, we

do not find any ambiguity in this regard.

We may also not lose the sight of the another judgment of the Division

Bench rendered in case of BRC Construction Company Pvt. Ltd & Anr.

Vs. The State of West Bengal & Ors. reported in (2015) 3 CHN 658

wherein somewhat identical points arose in relation to the applicability of

Section 6(3) of the Estate Acquisition Act vis-à-vis a Section 3A of the West

Bengal Land Reforms Act. Taking an inspiration from the judgment of the

Apex Court in case of Shivsankar Nandi (Supra), the Division Bench held

that there is no provision under the Estate Acquisition Act to treat the non -

agricultural tenant as deemed intermediary and, therefore, such non-

agricultural tenancy shall not vest under the Estate Acquisition Act and,

therefore, was kept outside the purview thereof. The reason for holding the

same was on bringing Section 3A in the West Bengal Land Reforms Act w.e.f

September 9, 1980 wherein the said non-agricultural tenancy came to be

vested with the State with such retroactive effect. We have been given to

understand that the Special Leave Petition against the 'judgment' of the

Division Bench (above-noted) has been admitted but till date the judgment

has not been set aside nor the operation of the said judgment has been

stayed by the Supreme Court so long the judgment is set aside by the higher

forum, the binding effect of the said judgment cannot be ruled out. The

contention of the State that Section 6(3) of the Estate Acquisition Act

interplay with Section 4 of the said Act is not acceptable. The Division

Bench ultimately held:

―61. Our Conclusions, therefore, are that:

(a) the state cannot resume any land, which is within ceiling limit,

according to Section 6 (3) of the Estates Acquisition Act, 1953.

(b) the State cannot resume any land with structures under Section

6(3) of the Estates Acquisition Act, as it does not contain any

provision for vesting of structures,

(c) as the land of the petitioner is well within the ceiling limit with

existing structures, even assuming that Section 6 (3) ap plies to the

land, still the State cannot resume the land in question.‖

In view of the discussion made hereinabove the non-agricultural

tenancy was kept outside the purview of the Estate Acquisition Act as the

non-agricultural tenant was never regarded as deemed intermediary and,

therefore, does not come under the mischief of the said Act. Furthermore,

the status of the land has to be construed on the date of the vesting, i.e. the

promulgation of the Estate Acquisition Act and the Record of Right

signifying the status of the land would be relevant factor for the purpose of

such vesting. However, upon introduction of Section 3A of the West Bengal

Land Reforms Act, 1955 the right, title and interest of the non-agricultural

tenant or under tenant governed by the West Bengal land Agricultural

Tenancy Act, 1959 became vested with the State free from all encumbrances

subject however, that they were in Khas possession and the land held by

them shall not exceed the ceiling area fixed under Section 14M of the said

Act. Admittedly, the land in question is well within the ceiling limits

provided under Section 14M of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955

and, therefore, there is no occasion for seeking any permission for fresh

lease as contemplated by the State in this regard.

In view of the discussion made hereinabove the order of the Tribunal

is hereby set aside. The application filed before the Tribunal stands allowed.

However, there shall be no order as to costs.

I agree.

 (PRASENJIT BISWAS, J.)                               (HARISH TANDON, J.)
 

 
Download the LatestLaws.com Mobile App
 
 
Latestlaws Newsletter
 

Publish Your Article

 

Campus Ambassador

 

Media Partner

 

Campus Buzz

 

LatestLaws Guest Court Correspondent

LatestLaws Guest Court Correspondent Apply Now!
 

LatestLaws.com presents: Lexidem Offline Internship Program, 2026

 

LatestLaws.com presents 'Lexidem Online Internship, 2026', Apply Now!

 
 

LatestLaws Partner Event : Smt. Nirmala Devi Bam Memorial International Moot Court Competition

 

LatestLaws Partner Event : IJJ

 
 
Latestlaws Newsletter