Citation : 2023 Latest Caselaw 6019 Cal
Judgement Date : 8 September, 2023
08.09.2023 FMAT 576 of 2019
S.L.-231 with
Ct. No.-654 IA No. CAN 1 of 2021
KB
Toton Ghosh
-Versus-
United India Insurance Co. Ltd. & Anr.
Mr. Muktakesh Das
... For the appellant-claimant.
Mrs. Sucharita Paul
... For the respondent no.1-ins. co.
In Re : CAN 1 of 2021
This is an application for condonation of delay in
preferring the appeal.
As per the report of the Additional Stamp Reporter
dated 1st July, 2019, there is delay of 2121 days in
preferring the appeal.
Mr. Muktakesh Das, learned advocate for
appellant-claimant submits that though the award was
passed on 24th of May, 2013, yet due to economic hardship,
the appellant could not file the appeal within the statutory
period of limitation thereby resulting in delay of 2121 days in
preferring the appeal. The award passed by the learned
Tribunal was also not satisfied by the respondent no.1-
insurance company. Due to his financial stringency and
non-receipt of the awarded sum, the petitioner was
prevented by sufficient cause in preferring the appeal within
the statutory period. The showing of 'sufficient cause' is the
only criterion for condoning the delay under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act. Referring to the decision of Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Sabarmati Gas Limited versus Shah Alloys
Limited reported in (2023) 3 SCC 229, he submits that
'sufficient cause' is the cause for which a party could not be
blamed. He further submits that the length of delay is not
material if sufficiency of satisfactory explanation is
established before the Court, which is a decisive factor for
condonation of delay. To buttress his contention he relies on
a decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Perumon
Bhagvathy Devaswom, Perinadu Village versus Bhargavi
Amma (Dead) By LRs & Ors. reported in (2008) 8 SCC
321. Further placing reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Dr. Yashwantrao Bhaskarrao
Deshmukh versus Raghunath Kisan Saindane reported
in 2021 SCC OnLine SC 914, he submits that the Hon'ble
Court condoned the delay after considering that a valuable
right has accrued in favour of the petitioner. Thus, the Motor
Vehicle Act being a beneficial legislation and entitlement of
enhanced compensation is a valuable right of the petitioner,
the delay in preferring the appeal requires to be condoned.
In light of his aforesaid submission, he prays that since the
petitioner was prevented from sufficient cause in preferring
the appeal within the statutory period, delay of more than
six years be condoned in the interest of justice.
In reply to the contention raised on behalf of the
petitioner Mrs. Sucharita Paul, learned advocate for
respondent no.1-insurance company submits from four
corners of the application no cogent reason has been cited
by the appellant for preferring the appeal after six years. She
further submits that the ground of financial hardship is a
cooked up story since the materials on record shows that the
victim opted to be treated in a private hospital instead of
government hospital. Since no sufficient cause has been
shown in the application for condonation of delay the prayer
needs to be dismissed in limini.
Having heard the learned advocates for respective
parties, I now proceed to decide the application in the
backdrop of the rival contention raised by the parties.
The petitioner in the application for condonation of
delay has precisely made out following grounds: (i) that since
the passing of the judgment the award has not been
satisfied; (ii) that the petitioner is suffering from financial
problem and mental agony; (iii) that the petitioner did not
have the capacity to move due to injuries.
So far as the first ground relating to award having
not satisfied is concerned, during the course of argument,
learned advocate for the petitioner has informed that no
execution proceeding has been initiated by the claimant for
recovery of the awarded sum granted in his favour by the
learned Tribunal. The award being not satisfied cannot be a
reasonable ground for not filing appeal within the statutory
period.
As far as the second ground is concerned relating
to the financial hardship of the claimant, nothing is placed
on record of his precarious financial status resulting in delay
of more than six years. From the impugned judgment, it is
found that at first the petitioner was treated in a government
hospital but thereafter his parents shifted him to Apollo
Gleneagles Hospital, Kolkata and spent a sum of
Rs.94,000/- towards medical treatment therein. This aspect
probabilises that the financial condition of the petitioner is
not so stringent to prevent him from filing the appeal after
six years. I find substance in the submission of Mrs. Paul,
learned advocate for the respondent no.1-insurance
company in this regard. Hence, such ground is not
acceptable.
Lastly, with regard to the delay occurring due to
difficulty in movement of the petitioner, it is found from the
paragraph no. 2 of the application for condonation of delay
that the petitioner himself met his learned advocate on 2nd
June, 2019. There are no materials to suggest that the
petitioner cannot move after the accident. Accordingly, this
ground also does not stand to reason.
The grounds taken by the petitioner is not tenable
and/or sustainable in the eye of law. There are no sufficient
cause shown to condone delay of 2121 days in preferring the
appeal.
It is a fact that length of delay is immaterial if such
delay is supported by sufficient cause. It is trite law that
once the Court accepts the explanation can exercise its
discretion in the matter of condonation of delay irrespective
of length of delay in preferring the appeal. Further law
relating to limitation does not show that such discretion can
be exercised only when the delay is within a certain limit.
The decisive factor is sufficient cause which lacking in the
present cause.
The decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court cited
on behalf of the petitioner are factually distinguishable from
the case at hand and do not apply.
Therefore, in the absence of reasonable explanation
of the delay, the application for condonation of delay is liable
to be dismissed.
Accordingly, the application being CAN 1 of 2021
stands dismissed.
In Re: FMAT 576 of 2019
Since the present appeal is time barred, the same is
also hereby dismissed.
All connected applications, if any, are also disposed
of.
Interim order, if any, stands vacated.
Urgent certified photocopy of this order, if applied
for, be supplied to the parties expeditiously upon compliance
of all necessary legal formalities.
(Bivas Pattanayak, J.)
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