Citation : 2023 Latest Caselaw 7370 Cal
Judgement Date : 16 November, 2023
Form No.J(2)
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE
Present :
THE HON'BLE JUSTICE RAJA BASU CHOWDHURY
WPA 24486 of 2014
Sukumar Roy
Versus
Union of India & Ors.
For the petitioner : Mr. Gautam Kumar Das
Mr. Dipanjan Datta
Mr. Indranuj Dutta
Mr. Atanu Basu
For the respondent/bank : Mr. Bishwambhar Jha
Heard on : 16.11.2023 Judgment on : 16.11.2023 Raja Basu Chowdhury, J:
1. The present writ application has been filed, inter alia, challenging the
communication dated 17th May, 2014 issued by the Deputy Regional
Manager, Regional Office, Durgapur, Central Bank of India, convening a
purported decision of the Appellate Authority that the appeal filed by the
petitioner challenging the disciplinary proceeding and the imposition of
punishment vide order dated 28th June, 2011 stands time barred and the
same cannot be entertained.
2. The petitioner was employed with the Central Bank of India, Assansol
Branch, Durgapur Region. He was initially appointed as a clerk on 8th
June, 1973 and subsequently, he was promoted and posted as an officer
in Scale-I at Patna Zonal Office on 2nd November, 1981. Subsequently,
thereafter from time to time he was transferred to different places and
lately on 18th September, 2000 he was promoted as Scale-II officer and was
posted initially at Shaymbazar Branch and thereafter at different branches
of Central Bank of India.
3. In course of employment, the petitioner was served with a memorandum of
show-cause dated 2nd April, 2009 alleging violation of Bank's guidelines in
abetting withdrawal of fund in excess of sanctioned limits to the borrowers
of credit facilities in respect of two accounts, namely, M/s Rajco Steel
Enterprise and M/s Kali International Pvt. Ltd., by way of accommodation
against uncleared effect of high value cheques, lodged in normal clearing
which subsequently returned unpaid. Although, the petitioner had duly
responded to the said show cause, yet the management having found his
explanation to be unsatisfactory, decided to proceed with the disciplinary
proceeding against the petitioner. Such fact was communicated to the
petitioner vide a communication dated 3rd February, 2010 issued by the
Assistant General Manager of the respondent/bank. Subsequently, the
petitioner was served with a memorandum of charges dated 17th March,
2010, which contained as many as 8 charges of misconduct allegedly
committed by the writ petitioner between 4th July, 2007 to 18th March,
2009.
4. The petitioner had since, filed his written statement of defence to the
aforesaid memorandum of charges. According to the petitioner, he had not
resorted to any manipulation and such fact would corroborate from the
accounts as reflected and exhibited in various reports generated by the
system. After conclusion of the enquiry, the enquiry report dated 18th
March, 2011 was served on the petitioner. As per the aforesaid report out
of 8 charges, only charge no. 5 had not been proved, whereas the rest of
the charges had been proved. The petitioner had duly made a
representation to the aforesaid report against the purported findings, by
denying all allegations and findings arrived at by the enquiry officer.
5. The disciplinary authority of the petitioner, however, taking into
consideration the submission made by the petitioner and the enquiry
report, by a final order dated 28th June, 2011, while agreeing with the
findings of the enquiring authority had awarded the following punishment
on the petitioner:
"Reduction to lower post i.e., from MMGS-II to Clerk under Regulation 4(g) of Central Bank of India Officer Employees' (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976"
6. According to the petitioner consequent upon passing of the aforesaid
order, by a communication in writing dated 26th July 2011 the petitioner's
pay was refixed. Mr. Dutta, learned advocate appearing for the petitioner
submits that the petitioner is governed by the Central Bank of India Officer
Employees (Conduct) Regulations, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the said
Regulation). The aforesaid Regulation recognizes the right of the petitioner
to prefer a departmental appeal. Accordingly, in terms of the Regulation
17, the petitioner had preferred an appeal on 1st March, 2013. Admittedly,
the said appeal was filed beyond the period of limitation prescribed for
filing of appeal.
7. Mr. Dutta submits that during pendency of the aforesaid appeal the
petitioner had retired from service on 31st March, 2013. Consequent upon
his retirement, the authorities being otherwise obliged, had disbursed his
retiral benefits. It was only on 17th May, 2014 by a communication issued
by the Deputy Regional Manager that the petitioner was informed that the
appeal filed by him stood dismissed as being time barred. According to Mr.
Dutta the petitioner while preferring the appeal, had appropriately
explained the circumstances as to why the petitioner could not prefer the
appeal within the time specified.
8. It is submitted that Regulation 21 of the said Regulation authorizes the
competent authority in appropriate cases to condone the delay.
Unfortunately, while communicating the factum of dismissal of the appeal
to the petitioner, after more than one and a half year from the date of filing
of the appeal, no reasons had been given by the authority as to why, in
spite of the explanation provided by the petitioner for filing the appeal
belatedly, the explanation was found not to be sufficient. According to the
petitioner, the aforesaid communication is a cryptic communication and
the original order had never been served on the petitioner. The aforesaid
communication/order cannot be sustained and should be set aside and
the aforesaid case should be remanded back to the Appellate Authority for
it to take a fresh decision in this matter, on merit.
9. Mr. Jha, learned advocate appearing for the respondents/bank, on the
other hand, by filing a supplementary affidavit in Court today, which is
taken on record, submits that the present writ application is not
maintainable. According to him, the petitioner having accepted his retiral
dues, cannot be permitted to question the findings rendered by the
appellate authority. Admittedly, a disciplinary proceeding had been
initiated against the petitioner, which ultimately resulted in the final order
dated 28th June, 2011. The said final order had been given effect to. The
petitioner had accepted the final order. The petitioner had, however, filed
the appeal belatedly in the year 2013. According to Mr. Jha, the
explanation given by the petitioner is insufficient and it is for such reason,
the appellate authority had dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioner.
10. In support of his contention, Mr. Jha has placed reliance on an unreported
judgment delivered by a Coordinate Bench of this Court in W.P. No.
30108 (W) of 2017 in the case of Sri Pratap Ray -vs- Kolkata
Metropolitan Development Authority & Ors. According to him, the
present writ application deserves to be dismissed with costs.
11. Heard the learned advocates appearing for the respective parties and
considered the materials on record. Admittedly, in this case, I find that the
disciplinary proceeding had been initiated against the petitioner while he
was in service. The same ultimately culminated in the final order dated
28th June, 2011, by awarding the petitioner with the punishment as noted
hereinabove.
12. The aforesaid punishment, read with Regulation 4 of the said Regulation
would in no uncertain terms demonstrate that the said punishment
constitute a major penalty within the meaning of the said Regulation. It is
further noticed that the said Regulation confers a right on the officer
employees to prefer an appeal, from any order of punishment. Regulation
17(2), however, provides that the appeal shall be preferred within 45 days
from the date of receipt of the order. At the same time, as rightly pointed
out by Mr. Dutta, Regulation 21 of the said Regulation also authorizes the
competent authority for good and sufficient reasons or when sufficient
cause is shown, to extend the time specified in the aforesaid regulation for
anything required to be done under these regulations or to condone the
delay.
13. Admittedly, in this case, it is noticed that when the appeal was filed, the
petitioner was in service. Although, it has been contended by Mr. Jha that
the petitioner having accepted his retiral benefit, is estopped from
challenging the decision taken by the appellate authority, I am unable to
accept the same.
14. When the retiral benefits were disbursed in favour of the petitioner, the
petitioner had already preferred the appeal. Such appeal was, however,
kept pending and was not decided by the appellate authority for more than
a year, at least no intimation of dismissal of the appeal was given to the
petitioner at the time of his superannuation or prior to disbursal of his
retiral benefits. It is only on 17th May 2014, i.e., nearly after 1 year and 2
months that by a communication the Deputy Regional Manager had
communicated the petitioner, with the following:
"With reference to above we may inform you that Central Office observation in the matter of Appeal dated 01.03.2013 preferred by Sri Roy is as under.
1) Final order in the Disciplinary Action case against Shri Roy was passed by the Disciplinary Authority on 28.06.2011
2) Sri Roy has submitted his Appeal in the matter only on 01.03.2013 I.e. very long after expiry of the stipulated period of 45 days.
3) Thus the Appeal stands time barred and the same can not be entertained."
15. The original order of the appellate authority was never been served on the
petitioner. Mr. Jha also could not produce any other documents. He
submits that the aforesaid communication happens to be the only
available document in connection with the dismissal of the appeal.
16. Although, the appellate authority had been conferred with the power to
condone the delay and despite the petitioner having explained the reasons
for delay, no reasons had been disclosed in the aforesaid communication
as to why the appeal was kept pending for over a year. The discretion in
refusing to condone the delay does not appear to have been exercised
judiciously. There is no finding of the appellate authority as regards
insufficiency of the explanation given by the petitioner, in fact there
appears to be complete non-consideration of the explanation given by the
petitioner and complete failure to exercise the jurisdiction to condone the
delay, since, the communication proceeds on the premise that a time
barred appeal cannot be entertained.
17. It is well settled that a discretion also requires to be exercised judiciously.
In absence of judicious exercise of discretion by the appellate authority, it
is very difficult for the aforesaid order to be sustained. The aforesaid order
also suffers from failure to exercise jurisdiction provided under Regulation
21 of the said Regulation. Although, Mr. Jha by relying on the decision in
the case of Sri Pratap Ray (Surpa) has tried to impress upon this Court
that the writ application is not maintainable, I, however, notice that the
facts of the said case are different from the facts of this case. In the
aforesaid case, after the final order was passed by the disciplinary
authority, the employee concerned had accepted his retiral dues and only,
thereafter without filing any statutory appeal had invoked the extra-
ordinary jurisdiction of this Court.
18. It is in the factual backdrop as aforesaid that the Coordinate Bench while
applying the principles of estoppels, held that the employee concerned was
estopped from challenging the said order. Such is not the case here.
Admittedly, the petitioner had preferred a departmental appeal which was
admittedly, pending when the petitioner retired from service. The right to
receive retiral dues consequent upon attaining the age of superannuation
is a legal right and the respondents were otherwise obliged to disburse the
retiral dues, subject to pendency of the appeal, which had been done in
this case. The aforesaid judgment does not assist the respondent/bank.
19. Having regard to the aforesaid, the objection raised by Mr. Jha fails as the
same is not sustainable in law. For reasons discussed hereinabove, the
communication dated 17th May, 2014 being the only communication on
record with regard to dismissal of the petitioner's appeal also cannot be
sustained and the same is set aside and quashed. Further taking note of
the long pendency of the writ application, I am of the view that no fruitful
purpose will be served at this stage by directing the appellate authority to
re-hear the question of condoning the delay in preferring the appeal.
20. Having regard to the aforesaid and taking note of the explanation provided
by the petitioner in filing the appeal beyond the time prescribed, I find that
delay in filing the appeal has been sufficiently explained. As such, I direct
the appellate authority to hear out the petitioner's appeal on merit and
dispose of the same within a period of 8 weeks from the date of
communication of this order.
21. It is made clear that this Court has not gone into the merits of the appeal
and the appellate authority shall decide the appeal on its own merit
without being influenced by any of the observation made hereinabove.
21. Accordingly, the writ application being WPA 24486 of 2014 is accordingly
disposed of.
22. There shall be no order as to costs.
23. All parties shall act on the basis of the server copies of the order duly
downloaded from this Court's official website.
(Raja Basu Chowdhury, J.)
Saswata Assistant Registrar (Court)
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