Md. Sarfaraz Alam vs Md. Mofazzular Rahman & Ors
2022 Latest Caselaw 2440 Cal/2

                     In the High Court At Calcutta
                          Special Jurisdiction
                              (Contempt)
                             Original Side

                             CC 27 of 2022

                     Md. Sarfaraz Alam
                            -Vs.-
                Md. Mofazzular Rahman & Ors.

Before: The Hon'ble Justice Arijit Banerjee

                         &

           The Hon'ble Justice Rai Chattopadhyay

For the petitioner        : Ms. Debapriya Mukherjee, Adv.
                            Ms. M. Palana, Adv.
                            Mr. Jishnu Chowdhury, Adv.
                            Mr. Aritra Basu, Adv.

For the Respondents/      : Mr. S.K. Kapur, Sr. Adv.

Contemnor Nos. 1 to Mr. Rudraman Bhattacharyya, Adv.

4 and 7                     Ms. Radhika Mishra, Adv.
                            Ms. Pooja Chakrabarti, Adv.
                            Ms. Roshmi Deepta Acharya, Adv.

For the Respondent        : Mr. Ranjan Bachawat, Sr. Adv.
Nos. 5 and 6                Mr. Ratnesh Kr. Rai, Adv.
                            Mr. Ankan Rai, Adv.
                            Mr. S.N. Pandey, Adv.
                            Ms. Ankita Singh, Adv.

Heard On                  : 24.06.2022, 15.07.2022, 20.07.2022,
                            28.07.2022, 08.08.2022, 12.08.2022 &
                           22.08.2022

CAV On                    : 29.08.2022

Judgment On               : 16.09.2022




Arijit Banerjee, J:-

1. This contempt application has been filed alleging wilful violation of the

order dated December 21, 2020, passed by a Coordinate Bench in A.P.O No.

29 of 2020, C.S No. 174 of 2019. G.A. No. 1 of 2020 (Md. Sarfaraz Alam v.

Md. Mofazzular Rahman & Ors.).

2. A brief factual background in which the order dated December 21,

2020, was passed may be helpful.

3. The petitioner and the alleged Contemnor Nos. 1 to 6 are all related to

each other and are members of a larger family. They carried on business in

co-partnership under the name and style of M/S. Serajuddin & Co. The

business is of mining related activities. The alleged Contemnor No. 7 is the

Chief Accountant of the partnership firm.

4. Disputes arose between the petitioners and the other partners of the

firm. The alleged Contemnor Nos. 1 to 6 filed a suit being C.S. No. 174 of

2019 against the petitioner herein, claiming inter alia, a declaration that the

petitioner herein stands removed as partner of the said firm. In the said suit

the petitioner herein has filed a counter claim praying for various reliefs

including a declaration that the partnership firm stands dissolved pursuant

to a notice of dissolution dated July 13, 2019, issued by him. In connection

with such counter claim, the petitioner herein moved an interlocutory

application in the suit praying for, inter alia, appointment of Receiver over

and in respect of the business and assets of the said firm. The prayer for

Receiver was not granted. Being aggrieved by such refusal, the petitioner

herein preferred an appeal being A.P.O No. 29 of 2020, wherein the order

dated December 21, 2020 came to be passed. The order reads as follows:

"The Court: An appeal is made on behalf of Md. Sarfaraz

Alam for some money to be released for his immediate treatment for

which Mr. Alam needs to travel to Singapore and incur considerable

expenses.

The respondent nos. 2 and 3 have agreed to immediately

release a sum of Rs. 50 lakh in favour of Mr. Alam to facilitate his

travel to Singapore for treatment. The respondent nos. 2 and 3 have

also agreed that in addition to the same being released immediately

which will meet the expenses for travel and the like, money will be

directly paid to the hospital upon the hospital raising bills and

without any delay. However, the respondent nos. 2 and 3 say that

the bills must be only pertaining to the treatment of Mr. Alam, his

stay in hospital and elsewhere in Singapore and the incidental

expenses pertaining to his wife who will accompany him. The

respondent nos. 2 and 3 have also agreed that Mr. Alam's travel by

air-ambulance to Singapore and expenses in such regard would be

borne from out of the common funds.

It is hoped that in view of this gesture, the parties see

reason and upon Mr. Alam's treatment in Singapore being

successful, the parties would try to resolve the issues before the

matter appears next on the second Monday of February, 2021.

It is made clear that the payment to be released

immediately and for the medical expenses of Mr. Alam will be

completely without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the

parties and will create no equity in favour of Mr. Alam. It is also

agreed that upon final accounts being done, the expenses incurred

for Mr. Alam's treatment will be debited from the entitlement, if any,

of Mr. Alam.

The payment to be made to Mr. Alam for the purpose of his

medical treatment will be treated as an interest-free loan till the

accounts are finalised."

5. The acts of contempt alleged by the petitioner are as follows:-

"(i) In spite of the Contemnor Nos. 1 to 6 warding off an order by

agreeing to release a sum of Rs. 50 lakhs in favour of the petitioner

to facilitate his travel to Singapore for treatment, the contemnors

have thereafter resiled, whereupon, this sum had to be deposited

with the Registrar of this Hon'ble Court;

(ii) In spite of the Contemnor Nos. 1 to 6 agreeing that in addition

to Rs. 50 lakhs being released immediately, money will be paid

directly to the hospital upon the hospital raising bills and without

any delay, the Contemnor Nos. 1 to 6 have refused to pay money to

the hospital and have even delayed the insignificant payments

made by them:

(iii) In spite of the order dated December 21, 2020 directing the

Contemnor Nos. 1 to 6 to make payment pertaining to the treatment

of the petitioner, his stay in hospital and elsewhere in Singapore

and incidental expenditures pertaining to his wife, who is

accompanying him and inspite of the bills for the same being made

over, the Contemnor Nos. 1 to 6 have refused to make payment in

wilful, deliberate and contumacious violation of the said order;

(iv) Even though the petitioner has made over bills raised by the

hospital at Singapore for a sum of SGD 663005.10 relating to his

treatment and inspite of making over bills for a sum of SGD

74170.79 pertaining to the incidental expenditures for him and his

wife at Singapore for his treatment, the Contemnor Nos. 1 to 6 have

refused to make payment in excess of sum of SGD 127498.50 in

wilful, deliberate and contumacious violation of the said order;

(v) Even though the order dated December 21, 2020 requires the

Contemnor Nos. 1 to 6 to make payment without delay upon bills

being issued by the hospital and for other incidental expenditures,

the Contemnor Nos. 1 to 6 have delayed making payment;

(vi) Despite the petitioner, requesting the Contemnor Nos. 1 to 6 to

make payment to the hospital authorities for his treatment and

diagnosis, in terms of the order dated December 21, 2020, the

contemnors have refused to make payment to the hospital

authorities towards the expenses on account of treatment and/or

diagnosis incurred by the petitioner;

(vii) The contemnors have wilfully, deliberately and

contumaciously failed and/or neglected to meet the medical

expenses including hospital bills in connection with the petitioner's

treatment in Singapore;

(viii) The contemnors have wilfully and deliberately failed and/or

neglected to pay for the expenses incurred by the petitioner and his

wife in Singapore arising out of his treatment and his boarding and

lodging in Singapore as well as that of his wife, Sabana Alam who

have been in Singapore continuously since March 2, 2021;

(ix) The contemnors have wilfully and deliberately not met the

petitioner's expenses and that of his wife for travel to Singapore and

incidental expenses in connection with his travel;

(x) The contemnors have wilfully and deliberately not paid to the

hospital where the petitioner had been admitted, namely, Mount

Elizabeth Hospital, Singapore, where he is being treated from March

2, 2021.

(xi) The contemnors have wilfully and deliberately refused to bear

the expenses for the petitioner's return travel from Singapore by air

ambulance;

(xii) The contemnors with the object of wilfully and deliberately

violating the said order December 21, 2021 issued an email on

January 26, 2022 refusing to bear the expenses on account of the

petitioner's medical treatment in Singapore;

(xiii) The Contemnor No. 7 has aided and abetted the Contemnor

Nos. 1 to 6 in committing contempt of Court which is borne out, inter

alia, from the email dated January 26, 2022 issued by Contemnor

No. 7;"

6. Mr. Jisnu Chowdhury, learned Advocate representing the petitioner

argued that the alleged contemnors assured the Court that they would bear

the medical expenses of the petitioner and acting on the basis of such

assurance, the Court refrained from passing any mandatory order. It was as

good as an undertaking given by the respondents to Court. The respondents

having wilfully acted in breach of such undertaking, they are liable to be

punished for contempt of Court.

7. Mr. Chowdhury relied on the observation of the Hon'ble Supreme

Court at paragraph 12 of its judgment in the case of Rita Markandey v.

Surjit Singh Arora, reported at (1996) 6 SCC 14, which reads as follows:-

"12. Law is well settled that if any party gives an undertaking to the

Court to vacate the premises from which he is liable to be evicted

under the orders of the Court and there is a clear and deliberate

breach thereof it amounts to civil contempt but since, in the present

case, the respondent did not file any undertaking as envisaged in

the order of this Court the question of his being punished for breach

thereof does not arise. However, in our considered view even in a

case where no such undertaking is given, a party to a litigation may

be held liable for such contempt if the Court is induced to sanction a

particular course of action or inaction on the basis of the

representation of such a party and the Court ultimately finds that

the party never intended to act on such representation or such

representation was false. In other words, if on the representation of

the respondent herein the Court was persuaded to pass the order

dated 5.10.1995 extending the time for vacation of the suit

premises, he may be held guilty of contempt of Court,

notwithstanding non-furnishing of the undertaking, if it is found that

the representation was false and the respondent never intended to

act upon it."

8. Mr. Chowdhury referred to various correspondence and hospital bills

and submitted that in spite of repeated requests, the respondents failed,

neglected and refused to honour their obligation under the order dated

December 21, 2020, which amounts to contumacious violation of the said

order. He submitted that due to the refusal of the respondents to clear the

hospital bills in Singapore, the hospital in question stopped medical

treatment of the petitioner thereby causing life threat to him.

9. Appearing for different respondents, Mr. S. K. Kapur, Senior Advocate

and Mr. Ranjan Bachawat, Senior Advocate, argued that for a person to be

held guilty of contempt of Court, first there has to be an order of Court

which contains a mandatory direction on that person. It is wilful violation of

such direction that will amount to contempt of Court. However, in the

present case, the order dated of December 21, 2020, is not such an order.

No direction or mandate to the respondents has emanated from that order.

At the highest, the said order records an agreement between the parties and

a good "gesture" on the part of the respondents.

10. It was further submitted that in any event, the respondents have not

violated the said order. The petitioner was unable to furnish proper

accounts of the amount of Rs. 50 lakhs that was admittedly released in his

favour, as he was called upon to do by a coordinate bench by an order dated

March 9, 2021 in A.P.O No. 29 of 2020. The petitioner therefore volunteered

to deposit Rs. 50 lakhs with the registrar (Original Side) of this Court.

11. It was further submitted that over the past few years, from time to

time, monies have been withdrawn from the till of the partnership firm by

the petitioner aggregating a sum which is in the region of Rupees two

Hundred Crore. The order in question recorded that the respondents will

directly pay the bills of the Singapore hospital upon that hospital raising

bills on the respondents. Such bills were not raised. The petitioner at all

material times, insisted that the bills will be provided after payment is

received by the hospital.

12. In reply, Ms. Debapriya Mukherjee, the new learned Advocate for the

petitioner submitted that the order dated December 21, 2020, was passed

upon consent being given by the respondents. Even a consent order, if

wilfully violated, amounts to contempt of Court within the meaning of

Section 2(b) of the contempt of Courts Act, 1971. In this connection she

relied on a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rama

Narang v. Ramesh Narang & Anr., reported at (2006) 11 SCC 114.

13. Ms. Mukherjee then referred to a decision of the Allahabad High Court

in the case of Daya Shanker Dubey v. Subhas Kumar, D.M. Allahabad,

reported at 1992 Cri LJ 319 in support of her submission that once an

order has been passed by the Court, not only the plain meaning of the

language used is to be considered but also the spirit and the sense in which

the order had been passed has also to be kept in mind.

14. Learned Advocate also referred to the decision of the Hon'ble Apex

Court in the case of Om Prakash v. Suresh Kumar, reported at (2020) 13

SCC 188 in support of her submission that a party is bound by the

statement made by his counsel before the Court.

15. The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of

Vimaleshwar Nagappa Shet v. Noor Ahmed Shariff & Ors., reported at

(2011) 12 SCC 658 was relied upon by Ms. Mukherjee in support of the

proposition that a concession made by a counsel on a question of fact is

binding on the client, but if it is on a question of law, it is not binding.

16. Before dealing with the facts of the present case, it may be helpful to

briefly recount the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as regards

the nature of the Court's jurisdiction to punish for contempt of court and

how such jurisdiction should be exercised.

17. It is well settled that the Supreme Court (by reason of Art. 129 of the

Constitution) and the High Courts (by reason of Art. 215 of the Constitution)

have inherent power to punish for contempt independent of and apart from

the Contempt of Court's Act, 1971 or any other law relating to contempt. In

R. L. Kapur v. State of Madras, (1972) 1 SCC 651, the Apex Court

observed that such inherent power or jurisdiction is not derived from

statutory law relating to contempt. Such power partakes the character of

constitutional power and hence no law made by a legislature could take

away such jurisdiction conferred on the Supreme Court and the High

Courts. In American Jurisprudence, 17 Am, Jur, 2d 63, it is stated that if a

Court derives its powers from the Constitution, the Court's power to punish

for contempt cannot be taken away by the legislature. The consensus seems

to be that even in the absence of Arts. 129 and 215 of the Constitution of

India, the Supreme Court and the High Courts would necessarily possess

the power to punish for contempt.

18. In Murray & Co. v. Ashok Kr. Newatia, (2000) 2 SCC 367, the Apex

Court observed that the purpose of contempt jurisdiction is to uphold the

majesty and dignity of the Courts of Law since image of such majesty in the

minds of the people cannot be allowed to be distorted. The respect and

authority commanded by the Courts of Law are the greatest guarantee for

an ordinary citizen and the entire democratic fabric of the society will

crumble down if the respect for the judiciary is undermined.

19. In Arundhati Roy, In Re, AIR 2002 SC 1375, the Hon'ble Apex

Court opined that the Rule of Law is the basic scheme of the Constitution

and that maintenance of dignity of courts is one of the cardinal principles of

the Rule of Law. The object of the law of contempt is to uphold the majesty

of law and administration of justice, and not to vindicate the dignity and

honour of an individual Judge.

20. Before a person can be committed for contempt it must be shown

that he has wilfully disobeyed the orders of the Court. 'Wilful' means an act

or omission which is done voluntarily and intentionally. In Ashok Paper

Kamgar Union v. Dharam Godha, JT (2003) 7 SC 581, the Apex Court

opined that to establish that a person has wilfully disobeyed the orders of

the Court, it must be shown that that person has committed an act of

contempt with specific intent to do so i.e. with bad purpose either to disobey

or disregard the law. It signifies deliberate action done with full intent or

with a bad motive or purpose. Therefore in order to constitute contempt,

the order of the Court must be such which is capable of execution by the

person charged in normal circumstances.

21. Jurisdiction to punish for contempt exists to provide ultimate

sanction against the person who refuses to comply with orders of Court. In

T. N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Ashok Khot, (2006) 5 SCC 1, the

Hon'ble Apex Court observed that in our democratic polity under the

Constitution, the concept of 'Rule of Law' serves as an aorta in the anatomy

of our democratic system. The law is supreme. Everyone, whether

individually or collectively is unquestionably under the supremacy of law.

Whoever he may be, however high he is, he is under the law, no matter how

powerful he is and how rich he may be. Disobedience to the Court's order

strikes at the very root of the rule of law on which our judicial system rests.

The rule of law is the foundation of a democratic society. Judiciary is the

guardian of the rule of law. It is the central pillar of the democratic State. If

the judiciary is to perform its duty and functions effectively and remains

true to the spirit with which the Courts are sacredly entrusted, the dignity

and authority of the Courts have to be respected and protected at all costs.

Otherwise, the very corner stone of our constitutional scheme will give way.

That is why it is imperative that Court's orders are to be followed and

complied with.

22. In holding the respondents to be guilty of contempt of Court and in

particular civil contempt, it has to be shown that there has been wilful

disobedience to the Court's order. Since the notice of contempt and

punishment for contempt has far reaching consequences, the power to

punish for contempt should be exercised sparingly and only when a clear

case of wilful disobedience to the Court's order has been made out. The

petitioner complaining of breach of Court's order must allege and establish

deliberate or contumacious violation of the order of the Court. In Re

Bramblevale (1969) 3 ALL ER 1062, Lord Denning observed that contempt

of Court is an offence of a criminal character. A man may be sent to prison

for it. It must be satisfactorily proved. To use the time honoured phrase it

must be proved beyond all reasonable doubt. In case of doubt the benefit

ought to go the person charged. In V. G. Nigam v. Kedar Nath Gupta,

(1992) 4 SCC 697, the Apex Court observed that it would be rather

hazardous to impose sentence for contempt on the authorities in exercise of

contempt jurisdiction on mere probabilities.

23. In the case of Patel Rajnikant Dhulabhai v. Patel Chandrakant

Dhulabhai, (2008) 14 SCC 561 the Hon'ble Apex Court held that

punishing a person for contempt of Court is indeed a drastic step and

normally such action should not be taken. At the same time, however, it is

not only the power but the duty of the Court to uphold and maintain the

dignity of Courts and Majesty of law which may call for such extreme step. If

for proper administration of justice and to ensure due compliance with the

orders passed by a Court, it is required to take a strict view under the

Contempt of Courts Act, it should not hesitate in wielding the potent weapon

of contempt.

24. In the case of Jhareswar Prasad Paul v. Tarak Nath Ganguly,

(2002) 5 SCC 352, at paragraph 11 of the reported judgment, the Hon'ble

Apex Court observed as follows:-

"11. The purpose of contempt jurisdiction is to uphold the majesty

and dignity of the Courts of law, since the respect and authority

commanded by the Courts of law are the greatest guarantee to an

ordinary citizen and the democratic fabric of society will suffer if

respect for the judiciary is undermined. The Contempt of Courts Act,

1971 has been introduced for the purpose of securing the feeling of

confidence of the people in general for true and proper

administration of justice in the country. The power to punish for

contempt of Courts is a special power vested under the Constitution

in the Courts of record and also under the statute. The power is

special and needs to be exercised with care and caution. It should

be used sparingly by the Courts on being satisfied regarding the

true effect of contemptuous conduct. It is to be kept in mind that the

Court exercising the jurisdiction to punish for contempt does not

function as an original or appellate Court for determination of the

disputes between the parties. The contempt jurisdiction should be

confined to the question whether there has been any deliberate

disobedience of the order of the Court and if the conduct of the party

who is alleged to have committed such disobedience is

contumacious. The Court exercising contempt jurisdiction is not

entitled to enter into questions which have not been dealt with and

decided in the judgment or order, violation of which is alleged by the

applicant. The Court has to consider the direction issued in the

judgment or order and not to consider the question as to what the

judgment or order should have contained. At the cost of repetition be

it stated here that the Court exercising contempt jurisdiction is

primarily concerned with the question of contumacious conduct of

the party, who is alleged to have committed deliberate default in

complying with the directions in the judgment or order. If the

judgment or order does not contain any specific direction

regarding a matter or if there is any ambiguity in the

directions issued therein then it will be better to direct the

parties to approach the Court which disposed of the matter

for clarification of the order instead of the Court exercising

contempt jurisdiction taking upon itself the power to decide

the original proceeding in a manner not dealt with by the

Court passing the judgment or order. If this limitation is borne in

mind then criticisms which are sometimes levelled against the

Courts exercising contempt of Court jurisdiction "that it has

exceeded its powers in granting substantive relief and issuing a

direction regarding the same without proper adjudication of the

dispute" in its entirety can be avoided. This will also avoid

multiplicity of proceedings because the party which is prejudicially

affected by the judgment or order passed in the contempt

proceeding and granting relief and issuing fresh directions is likely

to challenge that order and that may give rise to another round of

litigation arising from a proceeding which is intended to maintain

the majesty and image of Courts." [Emphasis is mine]

25. In the more recent case of Sudhir Vasudeva, Chairman and

Managing Director, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. M. George

Ravishekaran, (2014) 3 SCC 373, at paragraph 19 of the reported

judgment it was observed as follows:-

"19. The power vested in the High Courts as well as this Court to

punish for contempt is a special and rare power available both

under the Constitution as well as the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

It is a drastic power which, if misdirected, could even curb

the liberty of the individual charged with commission of

contempt. The very nature of the power casts a sacred duty

on the Courts to exercise the same with the greatest of care

and caution. This is also necessary as, more often than not,

adjudication of a contempt plea involves a process of self-

determination of the sweep, meaning and effect of the order in

respect of which disobedience is alleged. The courts must not,

therefore, travel beyond the four corners of the order which is

alleged to have been flouted or enter into questions that have not

been dealt with or decided in the judgment or the order violation of

which is alleged. Only such directions which are explicit in a

judgment or order or are plainly self-evident ought to be taken into

account for the purpose of consideration as to whether there has

been any disobedience or wilful violation of the same. Decided

issues cannot be reopened; nor can the plea of equities be

considered. The Courts must also ensure that while considering a

contempt plea the power available to the Court in other corrective

jurisdictions like review or appeal is not trenched upon. No order or

direction supplemental to what has been already expressed should

be issued by the Court while exercising jurisdiction in the domain of

the contempt law; such an exercise is more appropriate in other

jurisdictions vested in the Court, as noticed above. The above

principles would appear to be the cumulative outcome of the

precedents cited at the Bar, namely, Jhareswar Prasad Paul-vs.-

Tarak Nath Ganguly, (2002) 5 SCC 352, v. M. Manohar Prasad-vs.-

N. Ratnam Raju, (2004) 13 SCC 610, Bihar Finance Service House

Construction Coop. Society Ltd. v. Gautam Goswami, (2008) 5 SCC

339, and Union of India v. Subedar Devassy PV, (2006) 1 SCC 613."

[Emphasis is mine]

26. What is clear from the above discussion is that the jurisdiction of the

Court to punish a person for committing contempt of Court is a special

jurisdiction and quasi-criminal in nature. It has to be sparingly exercised.

Only in cases where it is absolutely clear that with full knowledge of an

order of the Court, a person has acted in wilful violation thereof, will the

Court exercise its jurisdiction to punish that person for contempt of Court.

It is a jurisdiction to be exercised with caution and circumspection, to

uphold the majesty of the Court and also to bring to books a person who

wilfully defies an order of Court.

27. Section 2(a) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 defines Contempt of

Court as meaning civil contempt or criminal contempt. In the present case,

we are concerned with Civil Contempt. Section 2(b) of the Act defines civil

contempt as wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order,

writ or other process of a Court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a

Court. From the definition section, the following ingredients of a civil

contempt can be deciphered:-

(a) There must be a judgment or decree or direction or order of a

Court restraining a party from doing a particular act or directing that

party to do a particular act or an undertaking given by that party to

a Court.

(b) That party must have knowledge of the judgment or decree or

direction or order of the Court.

(c) That party must have acted in disobedience to the judgment or

decree or direction or order or in breach of the undertaking given to

the Court.

(d) Such disobedience to the judgment or decree or direction or

order or breach of undertaking must be wilful.

28. As a starting point therefore, there must be an order whereby the

Court has directed a person to do something or has restrained him from

doing something or has recorded an undertaking of that person to do or

refrain from doing something. If with knowledge of such an order that

person wilfully refuses to do the thing that the Court has mandated or

wilfully does the thing that the Court has retrained him from doing or acts

in breach of his undertaking which the Court has recorded, he would

generally be guilty of contempt of Court.

29. In the present case, the order dated December 21, 2020, of which

wilfully violation is alleged, does not contain any such injunction, whether

mandatory or prohibitory, on the respondents. The Court did not direct or

order the respondents to release the sum of Rs. 50 lakhs for funding the

petitioner's treatment in Singapore nor did the Court direct the respondents

to foot the bills of the Singapore hospital. The Court merely recorded that

the respondents, by way of good gesture had agreed to release the sum of

Rs. 50 lakhs immediately and to pay the bills of the hospital in Singapore

where the petitioner was to undergo treatment if such bills were raised on

them by the hospital. It was further recorded that the respondents had

agreed that the expenses pertaining to the petitioner's travel by air-

ambulance to Singapore would be paid from the common funds.

30. Indeed, the Court could not have mandated the respondents to pay

any money to the petitioner for footing his medical bills and incidental

expenses since the Court did not have any application before it with such

prayer. There was no occasion for the Court to apply its mind and

adjudicate the issue as to whether or not the respondents should bear the

expenses relating to the petitioner's medical treatment for the time being.

Without coming to a finding that the respondents are under a legal liability

or obligation to release funds in favour of the petitioner for his medical

treatment, albeit by way of interest free loan, to be adjusted at the time of

final settlement of accounts of the concerned partnership firm, the Court

could not have directed the respondents to pay any money to the petitioner.

A desperate appeal was made by the petitioner in Court but addressed to

the respondents. The respondents responded to such appeal in a positive

manner and the Court merely recorded the same. There was no mandate

from the Court to the respondents to make any payment to the petitioner.

Hence, the question of the respondents' disobedience to or violation of any

mandate of Court does not arise.

31. We also cannot accept the petitioner's contention that the respondents

by their conduct induced the Court not to pass an order in favour of the

petitioner. On December 21, 20220, the Court was not in a position to pass

any mandatory order directing the respondents to make payment to any

extent to the petitioner.

32. Further, no undertaking of the respondents is recorded in the order in

question nor can the order be construed as an undertaking by the

respondents to Court. Hence, the question of breach of undertaking does

not arise. Submission was made on behalf of the petitioner in reply that

violation of a consent order may also amount to contempt of Court. In this

connection reliance was placed on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme

Court in the case of Ramanarang v. Ramesh Narang & Anr. (Supra). In

that case the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that it would neither be in

consonance with the statute, judicial authority, principle or logic to draw

any distinction between the wilful violation of the terms of a consent decree

and wilful violation of a decree which is passed on adjudication. With great

respect to learned Counsel for the petitioner, that case has no manner of

application to the facts of the present case. The order dated December 21,

2020, is no kind of consent order.

33. When the Court passes an order or decree in accordance with the

terms of settlement arrived at by and between the litigating parties, it puts

its imprimatur on such terms of settlement which is elevated to the status of

an order of Court. Therefore, wilful violation of such an order with

knowledge thereof would amount to contempt of Court. However, that is not

the case here. There is no consent order.

34. The other three decisions cited by learned Advocate for the petitioner

as part of her submission in reply, are not germane to the facts of the

present case.

35. In view of the aforesaid this contempt application fails and is

dismissed, without, however, any order as to costs.

36. Urgent certified photocopy of this judgment and order, if applied, be

given to the parties upon compliance of necessary formalities.

I agree.

(Rai Chattopadhyay, J.)                                (Arijit Banerjee, J.)