Citation : 2022 Latest Caselaw 2970 Cal
Judgement Date : 19 May, 2022
Item No. 14
IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
APPELLATE SIDE
Present:
The Hon'ble Justice Joymalya Bagchi
And
The Hon'ble Justice Ananya Bandyopadhyay
C.R.A. 451 of 2003
With
CRAN 3 of 2021
Sasti Bouri
-Vs-
The State of West Bengal
For the Appellant : Mr. Satadru Lahiri, Adv.
Mr. Sourav Paul, Adv.
For the State : Mr. Saibal Bapuli, ld. A.P.P.,
Mrs. Sreyashee Biswas, Adv.
Mr. Bibaswan Bhattacharya, Adv.
Heard on : 19.05.2022
Judgment on : 19.05.2022
Joymalya Bagchi, J. :-
Appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated
26.08.2003
passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast
Track 1st Court, Asansol in Sessions Trial No.18 of 2003 arising out of
Sessions Case No.8 of 1995 convicting the appellant for commission of
offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code and
sentencing him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life and to pay fine
of Rs. 5,000/-, in default, to suffer simple imprisonment for five months
more.
Archana Bauri was married to Kandan Bauri in 1989. In the
night of 16.03.1993 while her husband was away, appellant who is her
brother-in-law gave indecent proposal to her. She resisted him.
Appellant became enraged and poured kerosene oil and set her on fire.
She was admitted to Asansol S.D. Hospital. At the time of admission,
she was examined by one Dr. B. N. Banerjea. Dr. Banerjea noted burn
injuries on her body and recorded the history of assault as "cooking in
the evening". On and from 17.03.1993 she was treated by Dr. Utpal
Nandi (P.W.15). On 25.03.1993 Dr. Nandi informed police through
Superintendent of the hospital to record statement of the victim. On the
next day i.e. on 26.03.1993, one S. I. Mihir Kumar Banerjee recorded
statement of the victim, marked as Ext.6, in the presence of Dr. Nandi
and staff nurse. Dr. Nandi also endorsed the gist of the statement of the
victim in the treatment sheet marked as Ext. 2/1. Unfortunately, the
victim died on 29.03.1993. Two days later, her brother Durlav Bauri
(P.W.1) lodged FIR against the appellant, inter alia, alleging that his
sister had been subjected to mental and physical torture at the
matrimonial home. Appellant used to give indecent proposal to her. On
17.03.1993 he was informed that his sister had suffered burn injuries.
He met her in the hospital when her sister stated she committed
suicide unable to bear the torture inflicted by her husband and the
appellant who had given indecent proposal to her. On the written
complaint of P.W.1, Hirapur P. S. Case No. 31 of 1993 dated
31.03.1993 under Sections 498A/306 IPC was registered for
investigation against the appellant and Kandan Barui, husband of the
deceased. In course of investigation, the medical papers of the deceased
enclosing her dying declaration were collected and charge-sheet was
filed under Sections 498A/302/34 IPC against the appellant and
Kandan Bauri. Kandan absconded and charges were framed under the
aforesaid sections against the appellant. Appellant pleaded not guilty
and claimed to be tried. Prosecution examined 15 witnesses to prove its
case. Defence of the appellant was one of innocence and false
implication.
In conclusion of trial, the trial Judge by the impugned judgment
and order convicted and sentenced the appellant, as aforesaid.
Appellant was acquitted of the charge under Section 498A IPC.
Mr. Satadru Lahiri, learned Advocate for the appellant submits
the incriminating dying declaration recorded by SI, Mihir Kumar
Banerjee, marked as Ext.6, has not been proved. The police officer was
not examined. Neither the staff nurse nor Kalo Moni Bauri (P.W.11)
who was present at the time of recording statement of the deceased
supported the prosecution case. At the time of admission, it is noted in
the medical papers that the victim suffered accidental burn while
cooking. Dying declaration is not reflected in the first information
report lodged by P.W.1. P.W.1 and other witnesses did not support the
prosecution case and stated that the relationship between the couple
was good. P.W.3 stated that the appellant was present in his house
watching video show at the time of occurrence which wholly demolishes
the incriminating dying declaration. Appellant ought not to be convicted
on the basis of the so called dying declaration. He is entitled to an order
of acquittal.
Mr. Bibaswan Bhattacharya, learned Advocate for the State
submits the dying declaration of the victim recorded on 26.3.1993 is
most convincing. It was recorded in the presence of the treating doctor
(P.W.15). Though police officer who recorded the dying declaration was
not examined, he had recorded the statement in presence of the
treating doctor who proved the document. In addition thereto, gist of
the dying declaration was noted by the treating doctor in the treatment
sheet and has been proved and marked as Ext.2/1. Non-examination of
S.I. Mihir Banerjee or the Investigating officer does not affect the
truthfulness of the dying declaration which has been proved by the
treating doctor (P.W.15). Source of information with regard to the
earlier exonerative statement recorded by Dr. B. N. Banerjea at the time
of admission of the patient is unclear. Hence, such statement cannot be
treated as a dying declaration. The ambivalent stance of the
prosecution witnesses who remained mum with regard to the facts and
circumstances leading to the unfortunate demise of the victim
housewife may have been prompted through allurement but did not
erode the intrinsic truth of the dying declaration of the housewife
implicating the appellant recorded in the hospital. Evidence of P.W.3
with regard to presence of the appellant in his house is vague and non-
specific. He is a neighbour of the appellant and it is possible after the
incident, the appellant had come to his house. Be that as it may,
appellant did not raise any plea of alibi during his examination under
Section 313 Cr.P.C. Hence, the prosecution case is proved beyond
doubt and the appeal is liable to be dismissed.
The instant case depicts an extremely sad state of affairs.
Though Archana suffered a grisly death at her matrimonial home,
during trial her own relations through evasive responses have sought to
hide the truth regarding her unfortunate demise.
P.W.1, Durlav Barui remained silent with regard to the dying
declaration of the victim which was recorded on 26.03.1993 in the
hospital much prior to lodging of the first information report. In his
report he sought to dilute the case by claiming that the victim
housewife had committed suicide being vexed by ill-treatment of her
husband and indecent proposals held out by the appellant. In Court,
the witness went a step further. He disowned the FIR and came out
with an innocuous version that the victim had caught fire while
cooking. He claimed he had put LTI on a blank document. Similarly, his
wife Kalo Moni Bauri (P.W.11) though present while the dying
declaration of the victim lady was recorded in the hospital on
26.03.1993 remained silent with regard to such incriminating fact. Her
husband (P.W.1) claimed that his wife had been made to sign a blank
document by police. However, in cross-examination, Kalo Moni
admitted deceased had told something in the hospital but she could not
recollect the contents. It is unfortunate to note, though the witnesses
had not supported the prosecution case and even resiled away for the
FIR, they were not declared hostile and cross-examined.
Relying on the deposition of these witnesses Mr. Lahiri
strenuously argues the dying declaration recorded in the presence of
treating doctor (P.W.15) is bereft from material corroboration and ought
not to be believed. In my estimation, lack of corroboration from the
aforesaid witnesses does not affect the intrinsic truth of the aforesaid
statement of the deceased. None of these witnesses were present at the
place of occurrence, when the incident occurred. Hence, corroboration
with regard to the manner in which the victim lady suffered burn
injuries as narrated in her dying statement cannot be expected from
these witnesses.
Let me now examine the truthfulness of the dying declaration in
the instant case. It is contended by the appellant, there are three
conflicting dying declarations. First dying declaration is said to have
been recorded at the time of admission of the victim lady in the
hospital. She was admitted by one Dr. B. N. Banerjea. The doctor noted
she caught fire while cooking. Second statement of the victim was
recorded on 26.03.1993. On request of the treating doctor (P.W. 15),
Police Officer, SI Mihir Kumar Banerjee recorded her statement. She
stated appellant gave indecent proposal to her in the absence of her
husband. She resisted. Thereafter appellant got enraged and poured
kerosene oil and set her on fire. She cried for help and rushed out of
the house and fell in a pond. She was removed to the hospital by local
people. This is the second dying declaration. Third dying declaration
appears to have been recorded in the F.I.R. lodged by P.W. 1 wherein it
is claimed victim committed suicide on the instigation of the appellant
and her husband. This version, however, has not been supported by
P.W. 1 in Court.
When multiple dying declarations came to the fore, an onerous
duty is cast on the Court to examine in the facts and circumstances of
the case which of the dying statements is most reliable and consistent
with the broad probabilities of the case. Incompatibility between the
dying statements is not a ground to reject all of them. Each declaration
is to be judged on its own merits1. It is not the requirement of law nor a
matter of prudence that the declaration recorded at the earliest point of
time is to be given preference.
Nagabhushan Vs. State of Karnataka, (2021) 5 SCC 222; Kashmira Devi Vs. State of Uttrakhand And Others, (2020) 11 SCC 43
First declaration recorded in the medical papers by Dr. Banerjea
is an exonerative one. At the time of admission it was noted the victim
had caught fire while cooking in the evening. I have examined the
medical records wherein the said statement is recorded. There is no
noting in the statement that the declaration was of the victim herself. In
the absence of such noting the said statement cannot be treated as a
dying declaration of the victim at all. On the contrary, it transpires from
the document that the victim had been brought to the hospital by her
husband Kandan Bauri. It is possible that the history of the assault
noted at the time of admission was at the behest of Kandan Bauri,
brother of the appellant, who being eager to protect the latter from legal
punishment had given an exonerative version of the incident.
Thereafter the victim was treated in the hospital by doctor Nandi (P.W.
15). As her condition stabilized, on 25.03.1993 Dr. Nandi made a
request for her statement be recorded through the Superintendent of
the hospital. Upon such request a Police Officer viz., SI Mihir Kumar
Banerjee came to the hospital and recorded statement of the victim lady
in the presence of P.W. 15. Though SI Mihir Kumar Banerjee was not
examined, the statement of the victim was proved by the treating doctor
(P.W. 15). Dr. Nandi also recorded the gist of the dying declaration in
the treatment sheet by his own hand which was marked as "Exbt.-2/1".
In the dying declaration so recorded in presence of Dr. Nandi victim
categorically implicated the appellant as the person who set her on fire.
Mr. Lahiri has assailed the dying declaration on multiple
grounds. He contends the author who recorded the dying declaration
i.e. SI Mihir Kumar Banerjee was not examined. He also submits Kalo
Moni Bauri who was present at the time of recording of dying
declaration is silent with regard to the statement. Identity of the staff
nurse who was present at the time of recording dying declaration has
not come on record. Dying declaration is not reflected in the
subsequent F.I.R. registered by P.W. 1. Finally it is argued dying
declaration is improbable as P.W. 3, a neighbour, stated that the
appellant was at his house watching video show when the incident
occurred.
I have examined the aforesaid caveats in the backdrop of the
evidence on record. Before relying on a dying declaration it is important
to test whether the maker of the statement was conscious and in a fit
state to make the statement. In Laxman vs. State of Maharashtra2 a
Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court held certificate of a
doctor is not sine qua non for admissibility of a dying declaration. A
dying statement may be admissible if from the attending facts and
circumstances it appears that the victim was conscious and in a fit
state to make the statement. I have little doubt with regard to the
consciousness and the ability of the victim to make a cogent statement
before SI Mihir Kumar Banerjee on 26.03.1993 as such statement was
(2002) 6 SCC 710
made in the presence of her treating doctor. Dr. Nandi had been
treating the victim lady since 17.03.1993. Being satisfied that the
victim was in a fit state to make statement he requested to record the
dying declaration of the victim. On his request declaration was recorded
by a police officer in the presence of the doctor and staff nurse. In this
backdrop, failure to endorse in the treatment sheet that the victim was
in a fit state to make statement does not affect the admissibility of the
dying declaration in any way. It is true, examination of SI Mihir Kumar
Banerjee would have further bolstered the prosecution case. Non-
examination of the said police officer, however, does not create an
irreparable dent in the prosecution in view of the deposition of Dr.
Nandi who was present when the police recorded the statement.
Section 47 of the Evidence Act provides that a document may be proved
by a person in whose presence the same is executed. Dr. Nandi stated
the police officer SI Mihir Kumar Banerjee recorded dying declaration in
his presence. Hence, he was a competent witness to prove the dying
declaration marked as "Exbt.-6". Be that as it may, the doctor endorsed
the gist of the dying declaration in the treatment sheet in his own
writing which is duly proved and marked as "Exbt.-2/1".
In view of the aforesaid facts, I am of the opinion non-
examination of SI Mihir Kumar Banerjee or the investigating officer
does not affect the proof of the incriminating dying declaration or
unfolding of the prosecution case.
It has been argued neither Kalo Moni Bauri nor her husband
(P.W. 1) stated about the dying declaration in the F.I.R. in Court. On
the first blush such omission would have created doubt with regard to
the dying declaration. However, factual matrix of the case prompts me
to rely on the declaration recorded by an independent medical officer in
the hospital than the prevaricative and evasive relations of the deceased
who appear to have been won over by the appellant and made every
effort during trial to hide the truth. It may not be out of place to note,
the dying declaration in the present case came into being much prior to
the registration of the F.I.R. and had been recorded in the presence of
the treating doctor who, in my estimation, was prompted to do so in his
zeal to unravel the truth and not to falsely implicate any person. On the
other hand, subsequent watering down of the dying declaration from
one of homicide to suicide in F.I.R. and thereafter evasive depositions of
the relations and other witnesses in Court show their scant respect for
truth or any genuine concern to punish the real offender. Had it not
been for the conscientious and timely intervention of the treating
doctor, truth would have been an unfortunate casualty in the hands of
conniving relations.
Failure to identify the staff nurse who was present during
recording of the dying declaration is also of little consequence. Evidence
of the treating doctor is truthful and reliable in nature. It discloses his
earnest endeavour to preserve evidence with regard to circumstances
leading to the death of the hapless lady. Quality and quantity of the
evidence is the guiding factor to prove a fact and arrive at the truth.
Examination of the staff nurse would have merely increased the
number of witnesses and not the quality of evidence. Thus, I am of the
opinion dying declaration marked as "Exbt.-6" and "Exbt.-2/1" has
been clearly proved through the evidence of P.W. 15 and is wholly
reliable in nature.
A faint plea of alibi has been raised with reference to P.W. 3.
P.W. 3, a neighbour, contended the appellant was attending video show
in his residence when a boy informed that the victim had suffered burn
injuries. P.W. 3 has not spoken when the appellant had joined the video
show. He is a neighbour and his house was close to that of the
appellant. Even if the said witness is believed, it is possible that the
appellant after committing the crime in order to cover his tracks went
to the residence of P.W. 3 and pretended ignorance when the matter
was reported. That is the most charitable interpretation of the evidence
of P.W. 3. However, in the factual matrix of the case when relations of
the victim housewife appear to have won over and had tried to hide the
truth by giving out vague and innocuous statements, it is too much to
expect that a neighbour of the appellant would speak the truth. It
appears P.W. 3 is a zeal of clannish solidarity came out with this
untrue version to save his neighbour. In the face of the clear and
unequivocal evidence of the independent medical personnel (P.W. 15)
who proved the incriminating dying declaration, I do not wish to give
credence to P.W. 3 with regard to the alibi of the appellant. It may not
be out of place to note even the appellant during his examination under
Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure did not raise such alibi
in his defence.
The so-called dying declaration pertaining to suicide recorded in
the F.I.R. does not deserve any serious consideration. It was not even
supported by its maker P.W. 1 during trial. P.W. 1, being influenced by
some unseen malevolent force, had at various stages of the case sought
to obfuscate the unravelling of truth by coming out with a diluted
version of culpability in the F.I.R. and thereafter a complete clean chit
during trial.
In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, I
am of the opinion the incriminating dying declaration of the victim
recorded in Exbts. 4 and 2/1 respectively in the presence of treating
doctor (P.W. 15) is wholly reliable, truthful and inspires confidence. It
can form the sole basis of conviction of the appellant.
In the light of the aforesaid discussion, I uphold the conviction
and sentence of the appellant.
The appeal is, accordingly, dismissed.
In view of dismissal of the appeal, connected application being
CRAN 3 of 2021 is also dismissed.
Period of detention suffered by the appellant during
investigation, enquiry and trial shall be set off against the substantive
sentence imposed upon him in terms of Section 428 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure.
Appellant has no criminal antecedents. He appears to have roots
in society. Though he has committed a grave crime, his criminal act
does not portray any potentiality to recidivism. In the event, upon
completion of 14 years of actual imprisonment he makes an application
for remission of sentence under section 432 read with section 433A of
Cr.P.C. before the appropriate Government, the said Government shall
consider his application in the light of the aforesaid circumstances and
other relevant factors including his conduct in the correctional home.
Let a copy of this judgment along with the lower court records be
forthwith sent down to the trial court at once.
Photostat certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, shall be
made available to the appellant upon completion of all formalities.
I agree.
(Ananya Bandyopadhyay J.) (Joymalya Bagchi, J.) as/cm/sdas/PA
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