Smt. Ashoka Dubey & Ors vs Sri Arjun Dey & Ors
2022 Latest Caselaw 1584 Cal

                                    1


                    IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA
                     CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                            APPELLATE SIDE

BEFORE:
The Hon'ble Justice Soumen Sen
and
The Hon'ble Justice Ajoy Kumar Mukherjee

                            SAT 402 OF 2017
                                   With
                         I.A. No. CAN 1 of 2019
                      (Old No. CAN 10983 of 2019)
                                   With
                         I.A. No. CAN 2 of 2019
                      (Old No. CAN 10985 of 2019)

                        Smt. Ashoka Dubey & Ors.
                                   Vs.
                          Sri Arjun Dey & Ors.


For the Appellant                    : Mr. Saptangshu Basu, Sr. Adv.
                                       Mr. Pratip Kumar Chatterjee, Adv.

For the Respondent                   : Mr. Joy Chakraborty, Adv.

Mr. Sandipan Dinda, Adv.

Hearing Concluded On                 : 16th March, 2022

Judgment On                          :29th March, 2022

Soumen Sen, J.: This second appeal has come up for admission.

The appellant is aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 14th

August, 2019 passed by the Civil Judge (Sr. Div.) Kandi, Murshidabad in

Title Appeal No. 15 of 2016 (CIS registration no. 34 of 2016) by which the

judgment and decree dated 7th January, 2016 passed by the learned

Civil Judge (Jr. Div.) 1st Court, Kandi, Murshidabad in other Suit no. 125

of 2001 was affirmed.

Mr. Saptangshu Basu, the learned Senior Counsel submitted on

behalf of the appellants submits that in view of the decision of the co-

ordinate bench in Kanailal Manna & Ors. v. Bhabataran Santra &

Ors. reported in AIR 1970 Cal 99 the Trial Court decree is required to

be sent down to the trial court for necessary rectification and/or

correction of decree as the trial court decree was passed after the death

of the 6th and 7th defendants. It appears from record that the suit was

filed in the year 2001 and decreed on 7th January, 2016. The defendant

nos. 6 and 7 died on 5th August, 2013 and 24th December, 2005

respectively i.e. after the institution of the suit but before the decree was

passed. However, we propose to hear the admission of appeal in order to

find out whether any substantial question of law is involved in the

second appeal and if we find merit to pass consequential orders.

At the outset we should mention that Mr. Basu has relied upon

two decisions of co-ordinate benches in SAT 538 of 2015 (Nemai

Chandra Kundu v. Kalyan Das & Ors.) decided on 21st August, 2018

and W.P.L.R.T. 26 of 2019 (Gopal Shasmal v. The State of West

Bengal & Ors.) with W.P.L.R.T. 74 of 2019 (Tarapada Ghosh & Ors. v.

The State of West Bengal & Ors.) with W.P.L.R.T. 80 of 2018

(Tarakeswar Palit & Ors. v. The State of West Bengal & Ors.) decided

on 29th August, 2019 in support of his submission that the judgment

and decree passed by both the courts below are without jurisdiction as

the disputes between the parties are required to be decided by the West

Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal and in the event we take a

different view this appeal should await till the special Bench constituted

decides the controversy finally.

Before we advert to the said decisions it is necessary to briefly

indicate the facts.

The appellants are the defendants in a suit filed by the plaintiff for

eviction of the defendants on revocation of licence.

One Ram Nidhi Dey, Lakshman Chandra Dey, Bhuli Bala Dey,

Dasorothi Dey were the CS owners in respect of the suit plot. Ram Nidhi

Dey was a bachelor. After his death his share in the suit plot was

inherited by the plaintiff and proforma defendant nos. 5 to 7 who were

the legal heirs of Laksman Chandra Dey. After death of Bhuli Bala Dey

her share in the suit plot devolved upon Lakshman Chandra Dey and

accordingly he became the owner of share of Bhuli Bala Dey in the suit

plot. Accordingly, Lakshman Chandra Dey became the owner of 8 anna

share of the suit plot and was in possession of the suit plot.

Ram Nidhi Dey, Lakshman Ch. Dey and Ramkumar Dey (husband

of Bhuli Bala Dey) are brothers and Uddhop Dey were their father.

Dasorothi Dey was the another brother of Uddhop Dey. Dasorothi Dey

was the absolute owner of 8 anna share in the suit plot. He died without

leaving any heir and accordingly his share in the suit plot devolved upon

Lakshman Ch. Dey. Lakshman Ch. Dey became the owner of 16 anna

share in the suit plot.

The principal defendants or their predecessor in interest according

to the plaintiffs are strangers to the suit plot having no right, title and

interest over the same. The plaintiffs and proforma defendant no. 5 to 7

are the absolute owners of 15 decimal land in the suit plot as described

in the schedule 'KA' to the plaint. Lakshman Ch. Dey on the basis of

the request of Bishnupada Dubey, Tarapada Dubey and Sottya Narayan

Dubey the predecessor of the principal defendants in or about December,

1953, orally permitted the said persons to occupy 6 decimal of land on

condition to leave the property as and when required. The plaintiff

alleged that on the strength of oral permission they continued till

Lakshman Ch. Dey died in the year 1969. On the demise of Lakshman

Ch. Dey the plaintiff requested the principal defendants to make over

possession of the portion of the said land under their occupation but the

defendants denied to handover possession and prevented the plaintiffs

from taking possession of the aforesaid 6 decimal of land. However, on

the basis of the request made by the principal defendants the plaintiffs

granted licence on oral permission to the defendants on 15th January,

1970 to occupy the said property till such permission is revoked.

In or about 2001 the plaintiffs were in need of 6 decimal of land

and accordingly the defendants were requested to vacate the suit

premises. The defendants however, refused to vacate and claim

ownership in the suit property on the basis of inclusion of their names

in RS and LRROR. The plaintiffs soon thereafter made enquiries when it

became revealed that out of 15 decimal of land 9 decimal land was

recorded in the name of the plaintiffs and the proforma defendants and

out of 6 decimal of land 5 ½ decimal was recorded in the name of the

principal defendants. It is alleged by the plaintiff that such recording

was erroneous as there was no such foundation for recording of the

name of the defendants in the record of right. Neither the plaintiffs nor

their predecessors in interest had ever transferred any portion of the suit

property in favour of the defendants. It was alleged that the defendants

in collusion with the officials of the Settlement office has recorded their

name in record of right in respect of 6 decimal of land which is described

as 'KHA' schedule land. The aforesaid recording is erroneous, baseless

and without any foundation.

On 17th August, 2001 the plaintiff revoked the licence in respect of

the aforesaid 6 decimal of land and called upon the defendants to quit

and vacate the suit premises. The defendants however, failed to vacate

the suit premises. The plaintiff left with no other alternative filed a suit

against the defendants for eviction of licencee.

The defendants entered appearance in the suit. In the written

statement filed by the contesting defendants it was alleged that the

predecessors of the plaintiffs were raiyat but they failed to pay the rent.

Originally a house was in existence in the suit plot but that was

demolished. However, presently the defendants are in absolute

possession of the entirety of 15 decimal land. Lakshman Ch. Dey, father

of plaintiff no.1 took 'Bondobosto' in respect of 9 decimal of land from the

defendants. The aforesaid 9 decimal of land is situated adjacent to the

Village Road. The house of the defendants is situated on the eastern

portion of the aforesaid 9 decimal of land which is adjacent to the Village

Main Road for their access to their house over 6 decimal of land covering

plot no. 1988 since long.

The defendants have their house and courtyard over the aforesaid

6 decimal of land and are enjoying the said property as absolute owners

for almost 51 years. The defendants alleged that they are paying

government rent and the LRROR has been duly published in the name of

the defendants. The defendants have also claimed acquisition of title by

way of adverse possession. The defendants alleged that they have

acquired adverse possession by way of non payment of rent accompanied

by delivery of possession in respect of entire 15 decimal of land over the

suit plot. On the request of the plaintiffs they have granted 'Bondobosto'

in respect of 9 decimal of land in favour of the plaintiffs. The record of

rights was thereafter published on the basis of the aforesaid

'Bondobosto'.

Defendant no.1 (ga), 1(gha) 4, 5, 6 and 7 did not contest the suit.

Both the parties adduced oral and documentary evidence.

The evidence would reveal that the plaintiff is the raiyat and the

predecessors of the defendants were the Zamindars in respect of the suit

property. This is clear from the evidence of PW1. PW1 admitted during

cross examination that the Zaminders of plot no. 1997 were predecessor

in interest of the present defendants Krishnapada Dubey and Diju Pada

Dubey. The defendants also admitted that their predecessors were

Zaminders of the suit plot. They also admitted that the suit plots were

given to Lakshman Ch. Dey and the other family relation of Lakshman at

a Khajna (Land Revenue) of Rs.3.5. DW 1 during his cross examination

has admitted that the CSROR was prepared in the name of Lakshman as

raiyat and the predecessor in interest of the defendants as Zaminders in

respect of entire 15 decimal of land in plot no. 1997. The defendants

contended that the predecessors of the plaintiffs never paid any rent

during the CS period and accordingly the right of the predecessors of

plaintiffs as raiyat over the suit property was terminated. DW1 during

his cross examination has categorically stated that Lakshman Ch. Dey

never paid any Khajna to them.

Section 44 of Bengal Tenancy Act lays down the ground on which

non occupancy raiyat may be evicted. The said section reads:

"A non-occupancy raiyat shall, subject to the provisions of this Act, be liable to ejectment on one or more of the following grounds, and not otherwise (namely)-

(a) On the ground that he has failed to pay an arrear rent;

(b) On the ground that he has used the land in a manner which renders it unfit for the purpose of tenancy, or that he has broken a condition consistent with this Act, and, on breach of which, he is under the terms of a contract between himself and his landlord liable to be ejected;

(c) Where he has admitted to occupation of the land under a registered lease, on the ground that the term of the lease has expired;

(d) On the ground that he has refused to agree to pay a fair and equitable rent determined under Section 46 or that the terms for which he is entitled to hold at such a rent has expired."

The contention of the defendants before the trial court was that the

predecessors of the plaintiffs who were the non occupancy raiyats were

liable to be evicted under Section 44 of the Bengal Tenancy Act as they

had failed to pay arrear rent. However, the defendants before the trial

court had failed to produce any evidence to show that the predecessors

of the plaintiffs failed to pay any Khajna. On the contrary DW1 in his

cross examination has admitted that the predecessors of the defendants

did not file any case before any court for realisation of rent from

Lakshman. He has also admitted that no case was filed before the then

collector for cancellation of raiyati interest of Lakshman. The facts that

emerged from the evidence were that the predecessors of the plaintiffs

were the raiyat during the CS period in respect of the suit property and

the predecessors of the defendants were Zamindars.

The learned trial Judge on examination of the certified copy of

CSROR in respect of Khatian no. 249, 257, 251, 217 and 601 being

Exhibit. 1 series concluded that Bishnupada and others were the

Zamindars of the suit plot and the predecessors of the plaintiffs were

raiyat under them. The said exhibit also shows that CSROR in respect of

the suit property was duly published in the name of the predecessors of

the plaintiffs. Moreover, the defendants also failed to establish that on

the request of Lakshman Ch. Dey 'Bondobosto' was given by the

predecessors of the defendants in favour of Lakshman Ch. Dey in

respect of 9 decimal land.

The appellants/defendants on the one hand had claimed that the

possession of the plaintiffs in the suit property was on the basis of an

oral licence revoked subsequently and on the other hand claimed

ownership on the basis of adverse possession. If the later claim is

accepted then the appellants accept the ownership of the plaintiffs. The

pleas are mutually inconsistent and destructive.

The appellants claimed that Lakshman Ch. Dey had acquired 9

decimal of land by way of 'Bondobosto' given in his favour. This

'Bondobosto' could not be proved by the defendants/appellants.

It has now been settled that if there is any conflict between entry

in the record prepared under the Bengal Tenancy Act and in the

revisional record prepared under West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, the

later entry would prevail. (See. Bhawendra Nath Thakur v. Smt. Parul

Bala Das & Ors. reported at 1979(2) CLJ 44)

Admittedly the predecessors of the plaintiffs were raiyats at the

time of cadastral survey (CS) in respect of the suit property and the

predecessors of the defendants were the Zaminders.

On the basis of the materials on record, both the courts arrived at

a finding that there was no foundation on the basis of which the RSROR

was published in the name of the defendants. The evidence on record

would show that the plaintiffs were raiyats in respect of the suit property

and never evicted from the suit plot. It further transpired during trial

that the defendants were in possession of the suit property.

On the basis of the evidence we are of the view that both the

courts have rightly held that the defendants are licencee under the

plaintiffs.

On such facts we need to consider the bar of jurisdiction under

Section 57B of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953 (in short

'WBEA Act') the jurisdiction of the West Bengal Land Reforms and

Tenancy Tribunal Act, 1997 and the relevancy of decisions relied upon

by Mr. Basu. In Nemai Chandra (supra) the issue before the trial court

was whether the suit property is liable to be vested in the State and

whether such issue can be decided by the Civil Court or by the West

Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal of 1997.

Section 57B of the WBEA Act reads:

"57B(2). No Civil Court shall entertain any suit or application concerning any land or any estate, or any right in such estate, if it relates to-

(a) alteration of any entry in the record of rights finally published, revised, made, corrected, or modified under any of the provisions of Chapter V.

(b) a dispute involving determination of the question, an intermediary, is or is not entitled to retain under the provisions of this Act such land or estate or right in such estate, as the case may be, or

(c) any matter which under nay of the provisions of this Act is to be, or has already been, enquired into, decided, dealt with or determined by the State Government or any authority specified

therein and any such suit or application which is pending before a Civil Court immediately before the commencement of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition (Second Amendment) Act, 1973, (West Ben. Act XXXIII of 1973), shall abate so far as it relates to all or any of the matters referred to in clause (a), clause (b) or clause (c)." (emphasis supplied)

Section 6 and 8 of the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy

Tribunal Act, 1997 Act are relevant for the present purpose. The said

sections are reproduced below:

"6. Jurisdiction, power and authority of Tribunal.- Subject to the other provisions of this Act the Tribunal shall, with effect from such date as may be appointed by the State Government by notification in this behalf, exercise jurisdiction, power and authority in relation to-

a) any order made by an Authority under a specified Act;

b) an application complaining inaction or culpable negligence of an Authority under a specified Act;

c) an appeal against an order of the Mines Tribunal appointed under Section 36 of the West Bengal Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 (West Bengal Act 1 of 1954);

d) application relating to matters under any provision of a specified Act or matters relating to any constitutional validity of any Act under the provisions of a specified Act;

e) adjudication of matters, proceedings, cases and appeals which stand transferred from the High Court and other Authorities to the Tribunal in accordance with the provisions of this Act.

8. Exclusion of jurisdiction of Courts- On and from the date from which jurisdiction, power and authority become exercisable under this Act by the Tribunal, the High Court, except where that Court exercises writ

jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution by a Division Bench, or ant Civil Court except the Supreme Court, shall not entertain any proceeding or application or exercise any jurisdiction, power or authority in relation to adjudication or trial of disputes or applications relating to land reforms or any matter connected therewith or incidental thereto or any other matter under any provision of a specified Act." (emphasis supplied)

It appears from the aforesaid judgment that Mr. Saptangshu Basu,

learned Senior Advocate before the coordinate bench relied upon two

decisions of this court namely Jharna Ghosal vs. Satyendra Prosad

Dhar reported at 82 CWN 335 and Bishnupada Khatua and Ors. Vs.

State of West Bengal reported at 89 CWN 168 in support of his

submission that suit was maintainable before Civil Court. The coordinate

bench distinguished Jharna Ghosal and Bishnupada on the ground that

at the relevant time there was no forum to establish title to land or

property and now that the tribunal has been constituted the issue raised

in the plaint is required to be decided by the West Bengal Land Reforms

and Tenancy Tribunal constituted under the West Bengal Land Reforms

and Tenancy Tribunal Act, 1997. It was further observed that the

tribunal is the forum which is even empowered to declare rights of

raiyats. In view of the fact that the suit was instituted by Nemai for

determination of question of title concerning 'Kathma Dighi' which Nemai

claimed to have not vested in the State, such a dispute relating to vesting

of immovable property which can only be decided by the Tribunal. The

Hon'ble Division Bench observed that the said issue can only be tried by

the tribunal constituted under Section 4 of the 1997 Act. The reasoning

is clear in paragraph 17 which reads:

"17. The decision is clearly distinguishable on facts. Here substantive relief claimed by the appellant, inter alia, was for a declaration that 'Kathma Dighi' had not vested in the State. Such a declaration could not be had from the civil court in view of the specific bar created by the 1997 Act and it was the tribunal constituted under Section 4 thereof that the appellant should have approached." (emphasis supplied)

In Gopal Shasmal (supra) it appears that the West Bengal Land

Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal was approached by the petitioners

alleging inaction/refusal on the part of the concerned revenue

authorities to correct the relevant records of rights on the basis of

decrees passed by various Civil Courts. The tribunal dismissed the

application on the reasoning that the civil suits were not maintainable in

law having regard to the bar created by Section 57B of the West Bengal

Estates Acquisition Act, 1953 and therefore, the revenue authorities were

not bound by such decrees. The Hon'ble Division Bench after hearing

Mr. Saktinath Mukherjee, the learned Senior Advocate appointed as

amicus curie passed the following order:

"We had requested Mr. Sakti Nath Mukherjee, learned senior advocate, to assist us as an amicus curiae. According to him, the decision in Pramila Sanfui (supra) was rendered without examining the scheme of the said Act and it appeared to him to be rather confusing. He urged us to bear in mind that a civil suit in respect of the matters referred to in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of sub-section (2) of section 57B, which were quoted in paragraph 26, could be barred but not a suit for declaration of title which is within the exclusive domain of the civil court, ~ the revenue authorities not being competent to decide title.

Having heard Mr. Mukherjee as well as all other parties, we are of the considered opinion that these writ petitions raise substantial questions of law relating to maintainability of civil suits qua the bar created by section 57B of the said Act. In our opinion, the law needs to be settled once and for all and an authoritative decision by a Larger Bench would facilitate disposal of several litigation pending on the same point before the revenue authorities as well as the tribunal. Such decision would also provide useful guidance for future Division Benches, which could be called upon to decide similar points and, therefore, it would be appropriate to refer these writ petitions to the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for appropriate orders. It is ordered accordingly."

Mr. Basu has submitted that a special bench has been constituted

to decide the said issue.

During trial or at the appellate stage the appellant did not raise the

bar under Section 57B of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953.

The instant case is a suit for eviction of a licencee. The plaintiff has not

prayed for declaration of title or any of the reliefs which could attract a

bar under Section 57B of the West Bengal Estate Acquisition Act, 1953.

It is elementary that Revenue authorities cannot decide a question of

title. The WBEA Act, 1953 as the preamble of the Act suggest, provides

for acquisition of estates, rights of intermediaries therein, and of certain

rights of raiyats and under raiyats. Chapter-V of WBEA Act, 1953 deals

with preparation of Record-of-Rights. Section 46 under the said chapter

originally created a bar to jurisdiction of civil courts in respect of certain

matters. The said section was omitted by the WBEA (second Amendment)

Act, 1973. In the instant case, the civil Court is required to find out if

the plaintiffs on the basis of the materials on record could establish that

the appellants were licencees in respect of the suit plot. In establishing

such right reliance or reference to record of rights or any entry in the

land records does not necessarily make it a matter to be decided by the

tribunal exclusively. This is because entry in record of right does not

extinguish someone's right to grant licence, unless his ownership is

disproved. Merely because the court is required to look into the record of

rights or CSROR or any other land record to arrive at the nature of rights

of the respective parties in the suit by itself would not denude the Civil

Court in deciding the suit in one way or the other. The parties were well

aware that the nature of the suit and issues that are required to be

decided could not have been adjudicated upon and decided by the West

Bengal Tenancy Tribunal and consciously did not raise such an issue.

We have directed the parties to produce the plaint. We have gone

through the plaint. We do not find any averment in the plaint for

correction or alteration of the record of rights.

The jurisdiction of Civil Court is plenary. It has the jurisdiction to

determine its jurisdiction upon considering the averments made in the

plaint. The Civil Court is competent to decide all questions involving civil

disputes.

Section 9 of the Code is in enforcement of the fundamental

principles of law laid down in the maxim ubi jus ibi remedium. A litigant,

thus having a grievance of a civil nature has a right to institute a civil

suit in a competent civil court unless its cognizance is either expressly or

impliedly barred by any statute.

Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure confers jurisdiction upon

the civil courts to determine all disputes of civil nature unless the same

is barred under a statute either expressly or by necessary implication.

Bar of jurisdiction of a civil court is not to be readily inferred. A provision

seeking to bar jurisdiction of a civil court requires strict interpretation.

The court, it is well settled, would normally lean in favour of

construction, which would uphold retention of jurisdiction of the civil

court. The burden of proof in this behalf shall be on the party who

asserts that the civil court's jurisdiction is ousted (Dwarka Prasad

Agarwal v Ramesh Chandra Agarwas (2003) 6 SCC 220)

The question as regards ouster of a jurisdiction of a civil court must

be construed having regard to the scheme of the Act ousting the

jurisdiction as also the object and purpose it seeks to achieve.

A plea of bar to jurisdiction of a civil court must be considered

having regard to the contentions raised in the plaint. For the said

purpose, the averments disclosing cause of action and the reliefs sought

for therein must be considered in their entirety. The court may not be

justified in determining the question, one way or the other, only having

regard to the reliefs claimed de hors the factual averments made in the

plaint. The court has to consider what, in substance, and not merely in

form, is the nature of the claim made in the suit and the underlying

object in seeking the real relief therein. [See. Dhulabhai v State of M.P.

AIR 1969 SC 78 and Church of North India v Lavajibhai

Ratanjibhai & Ors. reported in AIR 2005 SC 2544: 2005(10) SCC

760]

When a jurisdictional issue is raised the court is required to

ascertain whether the averments made in the plaint could be decided

exclusively by the forum established under such specified or special

statute. Unless from a reading of the plaint it appears that the issues

raised and reliefs claimed can only be decided by the forum constituted

under the special Act, the civil court shall retain its jurisdiction to decide

such disputes between the parties. In the instant case although there is

a reference of a wrong recording in the record of rights by the respondent

no. 4 but no relief was claimed for alteration or revision of the record of

rights. The learned trial court has recorded such fact. In fact the

plaintiffs did not make any prayer to that effect. The relevant

observations are:

"It is the contention of the plaintiffs that the RS ROR has been

erroneously published in the name of the defendants and on the strength

of the aforesaid erroneous LRROR, the defendants are disturbing the

peaceful possession of the plaintiffs though the plaintiffs have revoked

their permission given in the favour of the plaintiffs to stay thereon.

On a close scrutiny of the record it is evident that there is no such

foundation on the basis of which the RS ROR has been published in the

name of the defendants. But this is not the appropriate forum to question

about the correctness of the Record of Right". (emphasis supplied)

The claim in the plaint is for eviction of a licencee on the ground

that the appellants have continued to remain in possession of the suit

property after the oral permission was revoked. In fact, it is interesting

to note that the appellants have claimed acquisition of interest over the

land by way of adverse possession which cannot be adjudicated by the

West Bengal Tenancy Tribunal. The incidental reference to the record of

rights or CSROR or other land records for the purpose of tracing title or

possession cannot in our view oust the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to

decide the issue involved in the suit. The substantive claim in the suit is

for eviction of a licencee. Moreover, the appellants have never raised the

incompetence of the Civil Court to try and determine all or any of the

issues involved in the suit. We agree with Mr. Basu that no amount of

acquiescence or waiver can confer jurisdiction on the civil court if it is

found that there is an inherent lack of jurisdiction in respect of the

subject matter of the suit. However, since we are of the opinion that the

disputes raised can only be decided by the Civil Court and not by the

tenancy tribunal we are unable to accept the submission of Mr. Basu

that the Civil Court does not have the jurisdiction to decide the suit.

In view thereof we are not inclined to accept the submission made

by Mr. Basu, learned Senior Counsel representing the appellants for

referring the matter to the larger Bench or to await the decision of the

larger Bench.

No other issues on merits have been argued.

Under such circumstances, we dismiss the second appeal along

with I.A. No. CAN 1 of 2019 (Old No. CAN 10983 of 2019) with I.A. No.

CAN 2 of 2019 (Old No. CAN 10985 of 2019) at the admission stage. We

also record that we do not find any substantial question of law for

admission of the second appeal.

There shall be no order as to costs.

I agree                                            (Soumen Sen, J.)




(Ajoy Kumar Mukherjee, J.)